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1introduction
Bushfalling, trafficking  
and the governance of migration
The cover page of this book shows a woman working at ‘Snack bar le visa’. The bar 
owner told me that the name was good advertisement because it drew attention 
and attracted new clientele. Many bars and restaurants in both Francophone and 
Anglophone Cameroon speak of the dream of international mobility: Ambassa-
dor, Ambassade, Embassy Wisdom Annexe, and Restaurant Schengen Place. Event 
sachets of whiskey are sold under the name of visa. For only 250 cfa, everyone can 
have a taste of a whiskey sachet of visa. 
These choices for names for bars and whiskey sachets reveal the attractive-
ness of migration in Cameroon, but also evoke how unattainable this mobility has 
become for many Cameroonians. I noticed, for example, how a small store in the 
capital of Cameroon advertised passport photos with a signboard that read: ‘photo 
visa – permis minute’ (see photo 2). The storeowner was playing to the desire of 
young Cameroonians to obtain a travel permit within a minute. These advertise-
ment strategies conjure up questions about the ways in which Cameroonians en-
visage emigration trajectories. 
1. Advertisement material of a photography shop in Buea
2Throughout fieldwork, I no-
ticed a series of playful jokes about 
access paths to the outside world. 
An assembly of signboards outside 
a photo shop in Buea, for example, 
read the following: ‘Married pass-
port, lottery passport, American 
passport, Holland passport, urgent 
passport, 4x4 Visa passport.’ The 
imaginary of emigration is intrin-
sically tied up with conceptions 
of papers. The advertisement of a 
‘married passport’ and an ‘urgent 
passport’ points towards the im-
portance of marriage and money in relation to travel documents. Throughout the 
country, I also noticed small posters that advertised the sale of travel documents and 
different types of other migration brokerage services: from limited advice to all-en-
compassing trips and bushfalling tours.
Bushfalling is the act of going out to the wilderness (i.e. the bush) to hunt 
down meat (i.e. money) and bring back home the trophies. It is under the term 
of bushfalling that emigration is currently imagined and envisaged in Anglophone 
Cameroon. To fall bush implies trying against all odds to leave the country to go (i.e. 
fall) and earn money to send back to the family in Cameroon. A person who has 
successfully travelled or migrated is called a bushfaller. Successful bushfallers are 
expected to generate and send back money for the survival of the family.
The town I lived in during 
fieldwork had two bars respec-
tively called Bushfaller Spot and 
Bushfaller Bar (see photo 3). 
While the topic of out-migration 
is eminently present in Cameroon 
today, the current obsession with 
transcontinental migration and 
travelling is a new phenomenon.1 
In the late 1990s the term bush 
emerged to refer to the ‘white 
world’ – largely understood as ‘the 
‘West’.2  In its broader meaning, 
any place where there is money 
can be called bush.3 
1 Bushfalling has become the topic of numerous songs and films. Some popular films on bushfalling are: ‘Mama G in 
America’; ‘Osuofia in London’; ‘Back from America’; ‘The Master’ and ‘Paris a tout prix’. Some popular songs on bushfall-
ing are: ‘I wanna be a bushfaller’ by Awillo; ‘Njumboss’ by Eriko and ‘Si tu vois ma go’ by Koppo.
2 For a more extended discussion of the meaning of whiteness in the contemporary Cameroonian context, see (Nyam-
njoh & Page 2002).
3 Migration destinations in other African states are mostly not considered as bush. See also  (Pelican 2009:  232).
3. Bar in Buea: Bush Faller’s Spot 
2. Advertisement for passport photos in Yaoundé 
3Most bushfalling in Cameroon takes place via the airport and not overland. 
The most attractive places of destination are Europe and the U.S. My research also 
shows that many bushfallers actually end up in China or Dubai.4 Inspired by a ra-
dio show, I conducted a survey with 100 respondents in different neighbourhoods 
asking what they would do if they were given 2.5 million cfa. The greatest part of 
all respondents - 38 percent - said that they would use the money to conduct busi-
ness and 26 percent of all respondents wanted to use the money to fall bush. If I 
regroup these respondents with those that wanted to do business to be able to fall 
bush - five percent - and those who wanted to use the money to study in bush - six 
percent -, then a total of 37 percent of all respondents wanted to use the money 
directly or indirectly for bushfalling (see graph 1).5
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the political anthropology of migra-
tion. Through the methods of ethnography, I trace how young Cameroonians dare 
to emigrate. I first became interested in the topic of migration through (practical 
and academic) work on human trafficking. The paradigm of human trafficking 
often limits migrant women to the role of victims. While films and Internet may 
portray unrealistic images of life in Europe, I argue in this book that the paradigm 
of trafficking has equally given birth to unfounded expectations of why and how 
young women in West Africa seek emigration. The focus on the illegality of mi-
grants and the victimhood of migrant women overshadows the choices, motiva-
tions and difficulties of aspiring migrants before they set upon their journey. The 
purpose of this research project is to develop an alternative view on migration that 
focuses on the quests and struggles of aspiring migrants when still in their country 
of departure. The phenomenon of bushfalling serves as a key entry point to study 
the degree of control of migrants over the outcome of migration trajectories in a 
framework that is informed by people’s perspectives in a place of departure. 
I qualify unwanted or uncertain outcomes of migration trajectories as migra-
tory risks. Given the limits of the administrative and legal category of trafficking, 
the concept of migratory risks is a broader and more open notion that enables me 
to better understand the hurdles and possibilities within the governance of migra-
tion as they occur to aspiring migrants. Following Desmond, I weigh risks using 
the lens of values and belief systems of aspiring migrants and their family members 
within their social environment (2007: 267). I shall begin by drawing on the case 
of my research assistant Delphine. She has helped me to explore what does or does 
not constitute an acceptable investment and sacrifice in the quest of social and 
geographical mobility in Cameroon.
4 Within a quantitative survey among 100 respondents that I conducted in May 2008, the most popular destinations 
for bushfalling was the U.S., followed by Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., Scandinavian countries, South Africa, 
Belgium, France, other African countries, Canada, Spain and China. The survey covered 50 percent men and women, 
as well as three different neighbourhoods of varying income groups. For further details about the methodology of the 
survey, see Annexe 1 and 2.
5 As pointed out above, I conducted the survey in three neighbourhoods with different socio-demongraphic charac-
teristics. In graph 1, I have marked separately the results from respondents in Mile Sixteen, which is a poorer and less-
privileged neighbourhood in Buea. It is striking to note how the rate of people in Mile Sixteen who want to use the money 
to build a house or buy a plot of land is much higher than the rate of people who want to fall bush.
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During an entire year, my 25 year old research assistant Delphine refused to take 
her salary because she wanted to save up her salary to be able to travel to bush.6 
She was determined to add to her salary money she received from boyfriends, ex-
boyfriends and family members to go to bush. She wanted to study in either South 
Africa or Europe. Based on what she had heard from others abroad, she planned 
to study and hustle. As I explained above, hustling in Cameroon means to try and 
be ready to do any kind of work. Both men and women can hustle. In Pidgin, the 
word to hustle often refers to work done in bush.7 
To obtain the goal of studying and hustling 
in bush, Delphine was willing to give money 
to a migration broker. In the midst of the tran-
scription of yet another interview on the hard-
ships, struggles and sufferings of undocument-
ed migrant woman whom I had interviewed in 
Europe, Delphine jumped up, laughed and pro-
claimed: ‘Je veux go a tout prix!’8 In her excla-
mation, she made reference to a Cameroonian 
film of the title ‘Paris à tout prix’ that came out 
in 2008. The film portrays risks and potential 
downfalls of migration, such as unwanted sex 
work, money swindlers, failure and deportation 
(see photo 4). After watching the film, Delphine 
just shrugged her head, viewing these issues as 
the ‘bad luck’ of the protagonists. Delphine was 
ambitious and determined: ‘Bush a tout prix!’ 
She was going to go at any cost and in any way. 
If others had been unlucky, she would work 
hard on getting bush right. She was going to 
have success and bush was the only means and place to get there. 
In our research, we repeatedly came across migration brokers that failed 
to send out their clients and families who had invested money in vain into the 
bushfalling projects of their children.9 Yet, Delphine would not change her mind 
about wanting to go to bush. Half way through fieldwork, one of the informants 
6  In order to save money,, Delphine first kept it a secret that she was working for me and later pretended that her 
salary was about a third of what it actually was. This way she was under less pressure from her siblings and her wider 
family to make financial contributions.
7  For the usage of the word hustling in Nigeria, see (Chernoff 2003). 
8  As Delphine was referring herself to this Francophone film, she mixed the title of the film ‘a tout prix’ with both 
Pidgin and French.
9 In the quantitative survey, 14 percent of all respondents indicated to have already paid money to a place or a person 
without having been able to fall bush in the end. Initially, this question was designed to gain an estimation of the expo-
sure of informants to duping amongst migration brokers. However, this number also includes respondents who have 
spent money on application fees for foreign universities, embassies or for getting the passport.
4. Paris a tout prix Film Poster 
5whose bushfalling trajectory Delphine had been transcribing was deported back 
to Cameroon. Delphine saw first hand how impossible Manuella’s life had become 
in Cameroon.10 Although they became friends, Delphine did not trust, believe or 
take seriously Manuella’s advice. Why should the bad luck of others discourage 
her? Whatever the odds, she wanted to see bush with her own eyes.
Why did Delphine want to go to bush at all cost? Why in the face of deporta-
tion, duping, stories of hardship in bush and the advice of people that had been in 
bush, did she remain so very resilient? In this thesis, I set out to provide a response 
to this puzzle. In doing so, I seek answers to the following research questions:
What makes young Cameroonians migrate at all cost?•	
How do young Cameroonians try to achieve their ambitions of mobility? •	
How do state institutions, migration brokers, migrant women and family •	
members interact to shape the risks and gains of migration trajectories?
Delphine is not an isolated case of extreme fixation on bush. The level of en-
thusiasm about the possibilities of bushfalling is high in Cameroon in general and 
in Anglophone Cameroon in particular. Eighty percent of all respondents in my 
survey said that they would like to fall bush11 and twenty-nine percent had actually 
tried in concrete ways to go abroad (see graph 2).12 Above all, young Camerooni-
ans - not yet married and of both genders - are eager to try and make their life out-
side of the country.13 Families are willing to mobilize considerable sums of money 
for both their daughters and sons to go to bush.14 
Nevertheless, the gap between desire and capacity to travel abroad is vast. In 
my survey, only five percent of all respondents had actually been able to travel to 
bush.15 In relation to bushfalling, the experience of having tried, but failing to trav-
el out is extremely common. To understand the eagerness of Delphine and others 
wanting to fall bush at all cost, the gap between aspiration and capability needs to 
be taken into account.16 Many young Africans today experience their place in the 
world as having been abjected (Ferguson 1999: 236; Piot 2010: 77 & 94).17 Central 
10 I will be discussing this dynamic in greater detail in chapter five.
11 This number also includes people that want to go to bush for holidays or studies. Not all of these respondents 
wanted to go to bush to work or stay. 
12 These emigration attempts spanned from applying for admission with foreign universities abroad to engaging con-
versations with family members abroad whether they could ‘bring them over’. For further details, see Table 1.
13  Fleischer has pointed to a gendered difference between the pre-migrational marital behaviour of men and women. 
According to her research, Cameroonian men are able to migrate alone even after they are married while married 
women face more difficulties in leaving the country without their husbands (2009: 238). Yet, just as women, men nev-
ertheless prefer to fall bush when they do not have a family in Cameroon.
14  In a survey conducted in the 1990s, Seraphin established that more than half of the questioned population in Douala 
would like to migrate or at least travel out of the country. Most that would like to emigrate are young, of a higher level of 
education and not yet heading a household (2000: 200- 201).
15  None of these five respondents came from Mile Sixteen (see also footnote 5). 
16  Carling has equally argued for the importance of an understanding of involuntary immobility for the study of migra-
tion (2002: 5).
17  Ferguson has defined the state of abjection as the act of ‘being thrown aside, expelled, or discarded’ (1999: 236). In 
this sense, abjection is different from mere exclusion.
6for this particular sense of exclusion is not the cost of migration, but the absence of 
visas (Rosny 2002). Cameroonians perceive the world as closed off. Possibilities for 
air travel out are referred to as lines, openings and programmes. 
In an age of supposed globalisation, the movement of large parts of the world 
population remains remarkably restricted. While the free flow of capital and com-
modities is often celebrated, the free circulation of people - and by extension thus 
workers - is often seen as a problem (Comaroff 2000: 300). My PhD research takes 
these paradoxes between mobility and closure as its starting point. As a conse-
quence, my dissertation brings the experience of immobility and failed emigration 
attempts into the study of migration. I examine the challenges aspiring migrants 
and their families face, as well as the ways in which different actors try to achieve 
their ambitions of mobility. In view of young Cameroonians like Delphine, I study 
attitudes towards the costs of migration, flows of information and understandings 
of success and failure. 
I begin the introduction of this dissertation by tracing, through the example of 
Delphine, how migration manifests in contemporary Cameroon. After exposing 
how secrecy and success relate to the topic of migration in Cameroon, I situate the 
emergence of bushfalling in Cameroon historically. My research has been driven 
by the desire to provide an alternative narrative to that of human trafficking. In 
the second part of this introduction, I unravel how the paradigm of trafficking 
has motivated me to study ethnographically the governance of migration from 
the geographical and temporal standpoint of departure. In the third major part of 
this introduction, I explicate the theoretical framework through which I analyzed 
the regulation of emigration. I conclude with an outline of my adopted research 
methodology and a preview of the following chapters.
M i g r a t o r y  r i s k s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n
Delphine was the first in her family (and one of the very few in her compound) to 
graduate from university. She is from a modest family. Both her parents are illiter-
ate and complement the pension of the father through working the soil.18 In the 
fifties, they moved from the North West Province to ‘work money’ on the planta-
tions at the coast.19 In the South West Province today, families from the North West 
Province are looked at as ‘strangers’. Due to tensions between North and South 
Westerners, Delphine’s mother was forced to give some of the land she was farm-
ing to feed and educate her children to South Westerners who claimed that it was 
18  Having Ngie, Ngwo and Pidgin as their main three languages, neither parent speaks English.
19  To ‘work money’ is an expression in Pidgin that I have chosen to keep, as it reflects well the idea that prior to migra-
tion, her parents have worked the soil. Delphine’s parents were not the only case in which was mobility closely related 
to a further integration into the money economy.
7theirs. Delphine’s father also lost a plot of land to a group of South Westerners that 
claimed it had not been rightfully purchased.  
Bush is today’s version of what was then migration towards plantations at the 
coast. While migration as a means of integration into the money economy is part 
of the family history of all North Westerners in Buea, actual exposure rates to what 
it takes to get and be in are low. I will demonstrate how information on migration 
pathways does or does not flow, as well how it is received and interpreted. While 
enthusiasm for migration is predominantly discussed in terms of lack of informa-
tion about realities in Europe, at stake is whether and how information is trusted as 
credible.20 I will demonstrate how decisions to migrate are not based on knowledge, 
but on interpretations of knowledge.21 
The imminence of departure: secrecy, jealousy and bad luck
Every time my landlady was absent for more than one day, my neighbour would 
jokingly ask whether my landlady had fallen bush. Despite endless repetition 
of the joke, her question never failed to entertain the people in our compound. 
‘Where have you been all this time? I haven’t seen you in ages. As if you had left 
for bush!?’22 I often overheard such conversations and was once in shock myself 
when I could no longer contact an informant of mine. None of her telephone 
numbers worked and her house was deserted. Now that Mamie Comfort had left, 
I remembered the times she had confidently shared that she might try to rejoin 
her brother in the U.S. A few weeks later, I discovered that her visa for the U.S. had 
been denied, yet, I had learned a lesson. Preparations for international journeys 
are largely well-guarded secrets.
As pointed out earlier, few actually make it to bush. Many travel attempts falter. 
Thus secrecy is paramount to avoid embarrassment and gossip in cases when travel 
projects come to an unexpected halt. Secrecy in the preparation to leave for bush is 
furthermore crucial as it increases the chances of actually being able to make it out. 
In Cameroon, witchcraft is often said to cause the failure of migration. Because 
migration is related to success, jealous people can seek to prevent the success of 
others through witchcraft attacks.23 Secrecy can prevent the jealousy of others and 
thus render migration safe.
I was often told stories about mysterious disasters happening to people on 
their way to the airport. Delphine told me, for example, the story of a girl from her 
quarter who, after many failed migration attempts, sought out the spiritual protec-
tion and prayer of her pastor and finally received her visa. On the day that she was 
meant to leave, something strange happened in Cameroon so that no airplanes 
20  While Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar, for example, mention that people process information differently, they have 
very little so say about how and why different interpretations occur (1997: 65).
21  For other discussions of migration choices, see (Carling 2002 & Barak 2005).
22  Original: ‘How you loss so? A don stay for see you like se you go na bush!’
23  The ‘notion of effortless gain at the expense or even consumption of others is echoed in various witchcraft beliefs 
and feeds into cultural imaginings of migration’ (Apter 1999). Urban migrants can, for example, be suspected by mem-
bers of rural communities of origin to have used occult forces to enrich themselves (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 1998).
8could come in or out. The girl’s flight got delayed and she was only able to leave a 
few days later. People afterwards said that if the girl had left on that particular day, 
she would have died. A witch had been waiting for her at the airport on that day. 
Fears of jealousy and witchcraft mean that only secret emigration trajectories 
are safe emigration trajectories. Given that also the extended family is seen as a 
possible source of jealous and occult dangers (Geschiere 1997), even close friends 
and family members will often only be informed a few days before the departure 
date. As a consequence, the departure of people for bush always seems imminent. 
Anybody can be suspected at any time to secretly prepare to travel out. A standard 
greeting is: ‘what are you so busy with? Are you chasing down your papers?’24
Yet, even when negative news about bushfalling does circulate, information 
can be interpreted in ways that do not change dominant views and contemporary 
understandings of migration. Those that have succeeded in getting to bush and 
proceed to talk negatively about bush are said to speak to prevent the success of 
others. Their warnings about bush are considered to be the fruits of jealousy. As 
another informant called Florence put it: ‘White man kontri is paradise on earth. 
[…] If anybody says white man kontri is not good, that person is a witch.’ 
Delphine: scholarships, cyber massas and doki men
Delphine’s choices after graduation were either bushfalling or marriage. So she 
started applying for MA programmes abroad. Even were she granted admission 
with a university in Europe, she was going to need a doki man. Doki men are mi-
gration brokers specialized in the production of the papers needed for emigration. 
‘After all’, Delphine explained to me, ‘not everyone can get a visa.’25 She meant that 
it took special powers to be granted this privilege. I encouraged Delphine to apply 
for scholarships. For her, scholarships were a highly unlikely route towards bush. 
Instead of researching the scholarship institutions I wrote down for her, Delphine 
often came back with stories of men from international dating websites. 
Delphine knew people who had succeeded in getting to bush with the help of 
a doki man. She also knew people who had succeeded in getting to bush with the 
help of a cyber mass, that is, a husband found on the Internet. Yet, scholarships 
were a relatively unknown access route to bush to her. Hence, it did not seem a reli-
able or trustworthy means of making it to bush. Scholarships were for others and 
something only I could believe in. Being a foreigner and newcomer to Cameroon, 
I don’t think she trusted me to know what it really takes to fall bush. To browse 
dating sites, instead, was a more ordinary procedure to her. 
A year of arguing over bushfalling at all cost finally came to an end when Del-
phine actually - against all odds - did win a scholarship for a Master programme 
in Europe. A former teacher of hers had forwarded her the information for the 
24  Original: ‘Ha you over busy so? You de follow na doki?’ To go to bush above all means following up on one’s papers. 
These papers can be attained in any manner, both through official procedures, as well as through financial motivations. 
For further explanations of the term doki, see the two chapters on migration brokers.
25  Embassy requirements for visas are restrictive and in 1995 consulate officers considered they had to reduce the 
quota of granted visa demands by 50 percent (Rosy 2002). 
9application. When Delphine found out about having won the scholarship, she ex-
claimed that she was now on a different level: ‘My level now na different level.’ She 
declared that she now no longer had time for those Internet dating websites – or 
even men in general. She now no longer needed either to get what she wanted. She 
was eligible for a visa. 
When the visa had not come available on the first promised date, Delphine got 
nervous. Whether for externally funded studies or otherwise, Delphine’s path to 
bush was marked by fear and anxiety. Secrecy remained of the essence even for the 
scholarship route of falling bush. Delphine only confided with her immediate fam-
ily and others who had been to bush before. Beyond that, Delphine kept her bush 
preparations a secret, and by extension I had to do so as well. Delphine traveled 
back and forth to the Embassy. Yet, when close informants of ours asked how Del-
phine was, I had to say that she was around and that things were as ever.26 
It was awkward to have to keep a secret from close informants that had shared 
many intimate stories with us.27 Not until Delphine arrived in Sweden could I fi-
nally speak openly again. I explained to neighbours and informants that Delphine 
had won a scholarship. Yet, despite my explanations, a doubt always remained in 
people’s minds. What I was saying did not have the same weight as what every-
body had been seeing. For the past year, Delphine and I had side by side every 
day. Now Delphine had disappeared and people knew that I was about to leave 
soon after.28 It was clear that I must have been instrumental in aiding Delphine’s 
departure. The rumour in Delphine’s neighbourhood was that the ‘white lady’ had 
brought her over. 
Delphine had disappeared and because her departure had been a secret, few 
people beyond her immediate family actually knew how and why she had been 
able to go: ‘Delphine has left for the white world.’29 That is the part of her migration 
trajectory that has become visible in her quarter. While Delphine’s brothers and 
sisters knew she had received a scholarship, her mother simply knew that a njangi 
group had decided to give money to her daughter. In Cameroon, njangi groups are 
weekly savings groups. The word scholarship does not exist in Pidgin. 
Delphine: luck and trust in information
Eleven months after Delphine’s arrival in bush, she sent me an e-mail telling me 
about a phone conversation with an old friend in Cameroon. This friend had just 
come back from Nigeria to Cameroon. He had wanted to go to Spain overland via 
Libya with four male friends. In answer to Delphine’s question on whether they had 
not heard how people were dying on that route to Europe, he replied: ‘Some have 
died, some have succeeded. No risk, no money. We wanted to try our own luck.’
26  Original: ‘I dey.’ 
27  Among our closest informants, Delphine decided to only tell Manuealla about her scholarship. She would have 
confided with Pamella, too, but an occasion did not present itself before her departure.
28  Foreigners do not need to keep their departure a secret. Instead, I was advised by my assistant and host mother to 
keep further arrivals a secret. For them, this secrecy was an extra guarantee for my safety.
29  Original: ‘Delphine don go white man kontri.’
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Delphine never considered reaching Europe through the overland route. Even 
my informants who were the most eager to go and fall bush tended to recognise 
the physical dangers associated with this route. The only people I came across 
during fieldwork who had attempted this route were men. In principle Delphine’s 
shocked reaction was not connected to her new geographical position in Sweden. 
She shouted at her friend and told him never to try again to fall bush in this way. 
Delphine now began to talk to her friend about the dangers of bushfalling in terms 
of papers (residence and work permits) and issues of legality. 
During our period of doing fieldwork, Delphine had persistently waved away 
the relevance of any negative aspect she was told about bush, as well as anything 
she would hear about legal frameworks of migration control. As I shall be discuss-
ing further in the coming chapters, Delphine and many other young Camerooni-
ans consider that it takes luck and/or a connection to be able to overcome closure 
and travel to bush. In this mental worldview, legality cannot explain the respective 
success or failure of migrants. As a consequence, Delphine’s new narrative of how 
difficult it is to get papers in Europe did not fall on fertile grounds with her friend. 
Delphine told me that her friend responded to her warnings about illegality in 
bush in these terms:
How about those who have documents? How did they manage to get theirs? The ways 
that those who have succeeded – we would have also used the same ways to succeed. 
Because we were very prepared for anything. We are men and men are smart.
In e-mail to me, Delphine complained that her friend was unlikely to change 
his opinion about bushfalling at all cost. None of her explanations about the dif-
ficulties of Cameroonians in bush, she complained to me, ‘mean [t] anything’ to 
him. For the first time in over two years of ongoing discussions between the two 
of us on bushfalling, I found her to express fear, as well as a sense of concern that 
bushfalling could also have negative consequences: 
I am so afraid because I know that they will not give up and they will only try again. 
My fear is what may happen to them if they even succeed to cross Morocco. How will 
they manage? Oh my God!
The passionate advocate of bush at all cost had turned - largely due to her 
stay in bush - into a person warning people not to go. She had ardently defended 
bushfalling as a precious dream and important ambition. Yet, in this e-mail from 
Sweden, she talked about bushfalling as an ‘illness’ that needed a ‘cure’. This is a 
radical shift in Delphine’s attitudes towards bushfalling at all cost. 
Yet, her new attitude was in line with a discourse I had already encountered 
with a small group of elite students in Yaoundé organising in an NGO that was 
largely sponsored by the Swiss Embassy to fight ‘illegal migration’.30 As young 
30  For public treatments of the theme of bushfalling in Cameroon that also include negative aspects of the phe-
nomenon, see (Ngwa & Ngwa 2006; Ngang’hi 2006). From Dust to Snow is an edited volume that gathers mainly the 
voices of Cameroonian students abroad. As such, the edited volume is not at all a reflection of views and attitudes of 
Cameroonians still in Cameroon. Billet Retour was written by a Francophone student migrant in Russia who overstayed 
his visa after his studies and was after a period of emprisonment repatriated back to Cameroon. Another example that 
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students of a much more privileged class background than Delphine, the NGO 
staff had themselves a better chance of being granted a visa at the embassy. What 
distinguished the members of this NGO from Delphine was not their level of edu-
cation, but the degree to which they were already connected with people and 
institutions in bush. It is connections rather than education that makes bush at 
all cost less desirable and travel and migration projects through other channels 
more attainable.
By fully appreciating the shift in ‘level’ and status that comes with having had 
and having access to the international level we can grasp why Delphine’s new 
views on bush at all cost would not speak to and be relevant to her friends in 
Cameroon. After her arrival in Sweden, Delphine simply no longer needed to go 
for bush at all cost. Upon receiving an MA degree, Delphine was in a position to 
sign up for a second MA degree in order to prolong her residence permit. With 
only a university admission letter, her friends in Cameroon by contrast would 
have only had a small chance of being granted a visa. If Delphine was changing 
her views on bushfalling, it was also because she now had other means to achieve 
social and geographical mobility.
After a two page e-mail describing her horror and despair at the Cameroo-
nian madness of wanting to fall bush at all cost, Delphine added in a short note 
that she was preparing to send money home for Christmas, but also to buy phone 
credit so that she could call and greet friends and family in Cameroon. She sent 
home 175,000 cfa (almost 300 Euros), equal to a good monthly salary of a well-
positioned person in Cameroon. The money was able to take care of the school fees 
for her younger brothers and sisters, which must have been a considerable relief 
to her aging parents who receive 10,000 cfa - roughly fifteen Euros - every three 
months from their pension. They work as farmers to be able to pay for the rest of 
their expenses.31 
Both the financial gifts and the phone calls demonstrated to everyone in Cam-
eroon the power of bush. Before falling bush, Delphine would not have had the 
capacity to pay the school fees of her family members. Now that she was in bush 
she had the power. Through being in bush, Delphine was on a different ‘level’. All 
those connected to her through kinship ties or friendship benefited from the oc-
casional money streams or even just the added prestige of receiving phone calls 
from a bushfaller.
Through performing the ritual of calling from bush during Christmas, Del-
phine elevated the social status of those that she called. Any connection to bush 
includes a more critical stance on migration is the academic volume edited by the Cameroonian scholar Pondi. After a 
conversation with Professor Pondi, my research assistant disqualified his arguments as representing a typical ajebotar 
perspective. With ajebotar, Delphine referred to Professor Pondi’s privileged socio-economic position in Cameroon (see 
also glossary). Whereas Delphine and other informants were reasoning on an individual or family level, Pondi was con-
cerned in his argument on bushfalling with development on the African continent as whole. His main reference was the 
nation state or the African continent.
31  At the national level, the average monthly salary that stems from the exercise of the principal working activity is 26, 
800 cfa. In the public sector, the average monthly salary in public administration is 124,300 cfa. In the formal private 
sector, the average monthly salary is 103,600 cfa. These data stem from a report on employment and the informal sector 
(‘Enquete sure l’emploi et le secteur informel (eesi)) by the Institut national de la statistique (ins) (Evina 2009: 37).
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has its worth – particularly when migration is possible because of connections 
and not because of information and knowledge on procedures. As a bushfaller, 
Delphine can now elevate the status of her family both financially and through 
the additional prestige of rendering international connection visible and apparent 
through phone calls. 
T h e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  a n d  h i s t o r i c a l  e m e r g e n c e  o f  b u s h f a l l i n g
Bushfalling is a local term with fundamentally local dynamics, yet also an impor-
tant product and expression of powerful national and global forces. Below, I will 
look more closely at the role of both local and global dynamics within the emer-
gence of bushfalling in Cameroon in the late 1990s.
The black bush and the worldly bush
Before the 1990s, bush only referred to backward hinterlands or forest areas. These 
days, the ‘Western’ world outside of Cameroon is a wild bush in which one hunts 
down money that is then sent back to families in one’s area of origin. A radical 
reversal in the meaning of this term has come about. How does one explain how 
the term bush has become the term used today for the big dream of migration in 
Cameroon?
In everyday conversation today, bush can refer to both the worldly and the 
rural bush. Far away from human settlement, the wilderness of the rural bush is 
also referred to as the ‘black bush’ (Fokwang 2006: 84). While bushfallers are highly 
admired, to call somebody a bush girl or a bush boy is an insult. It designates the 
person as ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’. The same term of bush hence designates both 
a highly desired and a deeply devaluated space. Yet, bush is not to be simply under-
stood as only a geographical space.
Roitman has elaborated on how bush is ‘a space – albeit a discontinuous one 
– of certain forms of connection and integration’ (2005: 101). Because of this con-
necting and integrating function, bush is not just a ‘signifier of a return to the 
past, a regression, or a step backward in the teleology of developmentalist history’, 
but has by now become an ‘elusive and yet promising domain of a possible future’ 
(2005: 102- 102). In this sense, bush is both a space for new forms of wealth crea-
tion, but also a projected future. In this future, people that work the economy of 
the bush attain the means to ‘counter what they feel is the state’s monopoly over 
surpluses’ (2005: 32).
Literally speaking, ‘to go bush’ means to go hunting or to go to the farm, to 
work there, to sweat and then to bring back food to eat. The bush in the Chad basin 
area, for example, has become an important site of economic accumulation and 
socio-economic mobility. It is the essence of food and money that joins the two 
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seemingly contradictory meanings of ‘bush’ as in farm and ‘bush’ as in white man 
kontri or the ‘West’. Both are a source of living. Both are places of productivity. 
A person who has travelled to bush has to hustle, which means that he or she 
will accept any kind of work to be able to work money.32 After having hustled, 
bushfallers are expected to return home and share their hunting trophies. Mobil-
ity here is a means to become responsible. Remaining within borders by contrast 
would be an act of escaping social obligations (De Bruijn, Van Rijk & Foeke 2001). 
Migration policy is based on the assumption that migrants want to immigrate only 
to integrate, settle and remain. Yet, the notion of bushfalling reveals a very different 
understanding of mobility. Bushfalling is a form of mobility that explicitly requires 
the migrant to return to his place of departure to share the money or goods that 
have been hunted down in the wilderness. 33
Precedents of labour migration
While bushfalling is a very new term, mobility itself is deeply ingrained in the 
history of the region. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the slave trade 
flourished in the region that is today divided into Nigeria and Cameroon. Calabar, 
one of the main ports for the slave trade in West Africa, is situated not far from 
today’s South West Cameroon. Centuries prior to colonial conquest, people in the 
Grassfields of what is today North West Cameroon were furthermore active in 
long-distance trade (Ngoh 1996; Nkwi & Warnier 1982). 
With the formation of colonial border regimes, the transportation of goods 
and the movement of people in certain areas became subject to state regulation. 
With the creation of plantations and the introduction of money, new forms of mo-
bility came into being in the region. Mobility became connected to wage labour. 
Hence, an understanding of the history of colonial labour systems provides an 
entry point to precedents of labour migration in the region.
Attempts by the German colonisers to integrate larger sections of society in 
Cameroon into a money economy were based in large parts on forced labour. In 
order for men in rural areas to be more productive for the colonial and monetary 
part of the economy, colonial authorities engaged in the forced levying of labour 
for the cultivation of cash crops (Cooper 1996). The recruitment of workers often 
resulted in the forced movement of people.
The history of mobility in Anglophone Cameroon points towards the crucial role of 
the colonial state in instigating these movements. Colonies were expensive, particu-
larly after the First World War. And hence they needed to be self-financing. A method 
of self-financing was to make the best possible use of plantations. For this, workers 
were needed. They were partly recruited from the North West province. Taxation was 
32  An iom report lists as the principal sectors of employment of Cameroonians working in the informal sector: res-
toration, textile industry, construction work, domestic work, childcare, cleaning, care work, intensive agriculture (Evina 
2009).
33  During fieldwork, the notion of bushfalling was furthermore very rarely translated by my informants as wanting to 
migrate. Instead, they talked about wanting to travel.
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one instrument to bring people from the village into the money economy (and thus to 
make the colony financially more sustainable).
Although a plantation economy already had been introduced in South West 
Cameroon during German colonial rule at the turn of the twentieth century (1884-
1916), the British administration further promoted the creation of tea estates in 
its Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroonian the 1950s. As a consequence, la-
bourers came to South West Cameroon from the North West province and other 
neighbouring regions. In the British Cameroons, no use of direct coercion (as in 
German or French Cameroon) was exerted. The British succeeded in letting chiefs 
recruit labourers. The Tole Tea Estate (just ten minutes from Buea) almost exclu-
sively employed women for work on its plantations. Some of those female labour 
migrants came together with their husbands; others migrated on their own to work 
in the South West.34
Due to these plantations, South West Cameroon has had and still has a rela-
tively high rate of regional in-migration. In local terminology, ‘immigrants’ from 
the North West Province are referred to by South Westerners as cam no gos - that 
is people that came, but did not go away. This is the word for immigrants in Pidgin 
English. Most of my informants lived in the South West Province, but their village 
of origin was in the North West Province. The context from which they were seek-
ing to travel for work in bush was one in which they were already considered as 
‘strangers’ in their places of residence.35 
In this sense, the bushfalling trajectories under scrutiny in this dissertation are 
in many ways but the continuation of a much older practice rooted within family 
histories, as well as within colonial and economic developments within the coun-
try. Not only were the protagonists of this book already considered as immigrants, 
their Anglophone identity furthermore placed them at odds with the predomi-
nantly Francophone state to which – according to their national identity cards and 
passports – they were said to (legally) belong.36
From migrants as been to ,  to migrants as bushfallers
Prior to the phenomenon of bushfalling, people that had managed to travel out of 
the country were referred to as been to. People who had been to the Western world 
were highly respected. Yet, the emergence of bushfalling as a term indicates an im-
portant transformation in the meaning and role of migration. To become a been to 
was associated with educational achievements, while bushfalling is associated with 
34  For a history of the South-West plantation economy and labour mobility in the region, see e.g. Konings (1993, 1995, 
2001), Ngoh (1996) and Nkwi and Warnier (1982).
35  Given contemporary economic circumstances, I would argue that South Westerners have developed almost as 
strong a taste for bushfalling as the North Westerners.
36  Given that the public perception in Anglophone Cameroon, the regime disadvantages and devaluates Anglophone 
Cameroonians. Jua even puts forward that Anglophone Cameroonians also seek out migration so as to gain national 
recognition or visibility by excelling in the international arena (2003: 22). For more on tensions between Anglophone and 
Francophone Cameroonians, see (Konings 2001 & 2005).
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adventure and self-enrichment (Pelican 2009: 232). The emergence of bushfalling 
also represents a shift in understanding of cultures of success.
Ever since the late 1990s when the terminology of bushfalling first emerged, 
bush itself has come to define more and more the very notion of success. When 
a person with no education goes to bush and then comes back, for example, his 
‘level’ and status will be higher than that of a person who has spent the last ten 
years studying and learning in Cameroon. In a context of massive unemployment 
and recruitment techniques that often rely on connections rather than qualifica-
tions, the perceived worth of education has been deteriorating and the promise 
of bush has been attaining high credibility. As the mother of a current bushfaller 
complained to me: 
And when Agatha was already doing her A level, you know as a young girl, some of 
them will want to follow life fast, fast, fast. I said no, just go gradually, if you reach 
your university. She said, ‘ah university. You go to university, come back, there are 
no jobs. University or no university, it makes no difference. So the father had to raise 
money, look for people, look for a visa and that is how you find Agatha in Holland.37 
Migration patterns currently take this specific form of bushfalling mainly due 
to two dynamics. First, bushfalling needs to be explained with reference to the 
structural adjustment programmes and the demise of work for the civil service as 
an access route to success and status in Cameroon. In a radio interview, for exam-
ple, a listener called in to explain why he wanted to go to bush at all cost. The very 
popular local journalist challenged the views of the listener in the following man-
ner: ‘You know that it is difficult to get papers in bush. They go there and become 
like slaves that can’t even come back here. Why do people still want to go?’ The 
radio listener who had called in replied by pointing towards the dire situation of 
some civil servants who can go for eight months without receiving their salaries. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, policies related to the IMF structural adjust-
ment programme drastically changed the economic situation in Cameroon (Kon-
ings 1996b: 252, Monga 1995). The economic crisis in Cameroon since 1992 has 
greatly decreased possibilities for the creation of wealth in Cameroon itself.38 Due 
to the devaluation of the cfa in 1994, the real value of salaries  - when they were 
indeed paid out - was reduced by two thirds. Education became still less of a guar-
antee for social status. Hence people in Cameroon today widely believe and uphold 
that the best place to work one’s money these days is in bush.39  
37  Agatha is the only one in her family who has not gone to university. Cases in which young people delay or even stop 
their education in the hope of falling bush are abundant. Rather than education being seen as preparation or means to 
go to bush, bushfalling often becomes a substitute for education. A person who has persevered all the way to the level 
of graduate education, however, will not look at bushfalling in the same way as a person with fewer qualifications. A 
graduate teaching assistant at the University of Buea, for example, said about his own potential to fall bush: ‘Will I throw 
away all those years of education and start from zero in bush?’
38  In 2001, the Cameroon Tribute estimated the unemployment rate at seven million people. This represents about half 
of the working-age population. Officially, however, unemployment rates are estimated by the ministry of employment, 
labour and social insurance to only be at around seven percent (July 19).
39  According to a report by the World Bank, remittances of Cameroonians towards their country of origin have con-
siderably increased since 2001. Remittances were estimated to be eleven million dollars in 2000, 103 million in 2004 and 
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Secondly, emigration patterns that currently take the specific form of bushfall-
ing do so because the offer of visas is not in harmony with the demand for labour 
in receiving states (Levoy & Verbruggen 2005; Baldwin-Edwards 2008: 1456-1457). 
Since the 1990s, immigration policies have changed and de facto resulted in a 
shortage of visas. Visas were not always as scarce and difficult to attain as they are 
currently.40 Today, it has become very difficult for most Cameroonians to leave the 
country. The status of a bushfaller is precisely so very high because bushfallers have 
been able to overcome geographic exclusion.
The gap between people’s ambitions for migration and available avenues for 
migration also means that family members outside of Cameroon have a special 
responsibility for family members still in Cameroon. A Cameroonian ma student 
in his mid twenties - who was lucky to receive a scholarship to pursue an ma course 
in Denmark - shared with me his experience of having been alleviated to the status 
of a bushfaller: 
Communication between Cameroon and bush only ever turns around three issues. 
[…] When people call you from Cameroon, they call to tell you that somebody has 
died, that somebody is ill or that they need money. When you call them, it’s either to 
give them directions on how to retrieve the money or you shout at them to leave you 
alone with their problems. 
With only 30 or 50 Euros, a bushfaller can at times solve life-threatening prob-
lems. In the absence of health insurance and other social securities provided by 
the state, the presence of a bushfaller abroad can be crucial for the survival and 
well-being of a family. 
So high are the pressures from family members in Cameroon that Camerooni-
ans abroad refer to an image of themselves as victims of nyongo (Nyamnjoh 2005). 
In this popular form of witchcraft, its victims have to work as zombies to make 
money. Bushfallers in bush also have negative evaluations of the self-sacrifice that 
is necessary to live up to the often very high expectations of families back in Cam-
eroon. They can feel threatened by their relatives through witchcraft attacks and at 
times joke about their self-enslavement to work for the latter’s’ enrichment without 
consideration for their own personal well-being. 
I repeatedly confronted aspiring migrants in Cameroon with the metaphor 
of bushfallers as victims of nyongo. Nobody ever wanted to really take seriously 
or respond to this idea. From the perspective of departure in Cameroon, working 
money in bush is a dream that elevates one’s social status. The metaphor of slave 
work is a much more of a relevant frame of reference for Cameroonians outside 
of Cameroon. Anglophone Cameroonians that are not privileged in terms of their 
social origins or levels of connections to bush, will ironically accept neither the 
narrative of migrants as victims of nyongo, nor as victims of trafficking.
167 million in 2008. These data stem from a 2009 report on ‘World Development Indicators’ by the World Bank, quoted 
in (Evina 2009: 58- 59).
40  For example, until the 1980s, Germany did not require Cameroonians to apply for visas.
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H u m a n  t r a f f i c k i n g  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n a n c e  o f  m i g r a t i o n
My interest in migration began when I was working as an intern on a human traf-
ficking project at unesco and later with the iom.41 Through this work, but also 
other encounters, I grew increasingly skeptical of the discourse and politics of traf-
ficking. There seemed to be little space to acknowledge the choices and desires 
of people in other places of the world to want to migrate. In policies and anti-
trafficking programmes, state interests to control migration seemed to prime over 
concerns for genuinely safe labour migration. 
My MA thesis was based on interviews with migrant women from Nigeria and 
Cameroon considered by an ngo in Paris to be ‘trafficking victims.’ The dissertation 
contrasted the paradigm of ‘human trafficking’ with the migration experiences of 
West African migrant women working in prostitution in Paris. With this project, I 
began to think more broadly about human rights violations of trafficking victims 
prior to their migration, the living and working conditions of undocumented mi-
grant women in countries of arrival and the ways in which their vulnerabilities 
came about by a multitude of economic, social and legal dynamics. Amongst mul-
tiple causes of vulnerability, there were state actors as much as migration brokers 
and employers.
I suggested it fruitful to consider ‘trafficking’ within a wider framework of 
voluntary labour migration, as well as within a continuum of vulnerabilities and 
respective human insecurities (Alpes 2010). In this study, I build on this approach. 
I look at migration trajectories from the standpoint of a society of departure. I con-
sider the actors and factors that render a trajectory potentially safe or dangerous. 
I furthermore do not take for granted what is constituted as a migratory risk, but 
follow the experiences and views of aspiring migrants and their family members 
in Cameroon. 
From human trafficking to conditions of departure
In its legal definition, human trafficking refers to the recruitment, transportation 
and exploitation of a human being. Essential in this legal definition are the ex-
istence of deception and manipulation, coercion and abuse of authority, as well 
as debt bondage and forced labour. Theoretically, the deceitful nature of the re-
cruitment process and the exploitative conditions of work, rather than the type 
of work as such, qualify a migration trajectory as ‘human trafficking’ (Kempadoo 
and Doezema 1998). In practice however, many policies are still predominantly 
focused on trafficking within the sex industry.
41  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (unesco); International Organisation for Migration 
(iom).
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Since its adoption in 2000, the Palermo Protocol has become the central document 
used for purposes of defining and dealing with ‘human trafficking’.42 While smug-
gling takes its main concern with the security of national borders, trafficking is the 
concept that is supposed to take the security of individuals as its main and core 
concern.43 Yet, in migration policies and programmes, the security of states often 
takes precedents over the security of migrants and/or individuals (Kapur 2005a: 
31). The discourse of trafficking is furthermore often fashioned to act as justifica-
tions for paternalistic actions that in the end serve purposes of anti-immigration 
and abolitionism more than the human rights and human security of migrants 
(Andrijasevic 2010; Dottridge 2007; Mathieu 2007).
Ratna Kapur teases out the tensions between the paradigm of ‘human traffick-
ing’, the movement of people for work and contemporary state-managed migration 
regimes in the following way:
The construction of women who move - or are moved - as victims of a web of criminal 
networks lies in tension with the counter-narrative that regards the movement of la-
bour as part of the globalization process in which the emergence of human trafficking 
and smuggling networks are parallel responses to the migration phenomenon that 
nation states, especially in the global North, refuse to address other than as an issue 
of immigration or criminality (Kapur 2005b: 118).
42  The full and exact name of the Palermo Protocol is ‘United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children’. The Protocol supplements the ‘United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime’. It splits up human trafficking into three distinct, but interconnected elements: a) the 
recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person; b) by use of threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud 
or deception, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or giving or receiving payments of benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person; c) for the purpose of the exploitation in prostitution or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery, practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal or 
organs.
43  As a contribution to the project of international human rights of migrants and a corrective to the project of global 
capitalism, Des Gasper and Thanh-Dam Truong propose that human security constitutes a particularly relevant frame-
work for the theme of migration. As an analytical lens that grew in part out of the field of development studies, human 
security goes beyond visions of security of either state or individual by also allowing for emphasis on the security of 
communities (2010: 14). Because of these benefits, I shall in the chapter on marriage migration draw on the framework 
of human security.
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Two key propositions follow from this:
The exploitation of migrants cannot be blamed exclusively on criminals. Cur-•	
rent migration regimes have created a high demand for migration brokers. By 
putting the blame of exploitation on supposedly criminal migration brokers, 
the paradigm of trafficking renders invisible more structural causes of exploi-
tation and vulnerability.
What is portrayed and treated as human trafficking is more adequately under-•	
stood as labour migration. Even with elements of deception or force at play, 
migration is always related to the need or desire for work, including work in 
prostitution.44 
In some of the academic literature on migration, ‘human trafficking’ has now 
come to be understood more broadly as a form of exploitative labour migration or 
forced labour (Van den Anker 2009, Andrijasevic 2010, Vernier 2010). While this 
understanding of trafficking is productive in many ways, both legally and socio-
logically speaking, the nature and exact meaning of exploitation remains elusive. 
For me this implies a further need for empirical research with migrants, aspiring 
migrants and family members to find out their respective visions of what consti-
tutes a failed or an acceptable migration trajectory.
Legal rubrics - like ‘trafficking’ - do not capture people’s experiences and hence 
the unreflective usage of legal definitions in sociological analysis is extremely 
problematic. With respect to refugee studies, Malkki remarks how much the ‘bu-
reaucratic and discursive domain’ has influenced the assumptions and questions of 
social scientists (Malkki 1995b: 505). Very much the same holds true for much of 
the literature on ‘human trafficking’. Some academic literature on ‘human traffick-
ing’ uncritically uses the legal and administrative definitions of trafficking – with-
out sociologically questioning the origins and implications of these definitions (for 
the distinction between administrative and sociological definition, see Anderson 
2007: 12; Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron 1968). 
Legal rubrics are boundaries around a group of personal histories. For an an-
thropological study, ‘informal’ migrants, refugees and ‘trafficking victims’ do not 
comprise a self-delimiting domain (Malkki 1995b; de Haas 2010a: 16). To con-
duct research on the basis of legal definitions and protocols results in a further 
naturalization of statist assumptions. In Cameroon, terms such as trafficking and 
smuggling are hardly of relevance for people’s understanding of migration. If one 
changes one’s geographical standpoint and looks at migration from the viewpoint 
of those departing a country, the success and failure of migration is understood 
through the language of bushfalling. 
Rather than taking at face value legal distinctions between ‘human trafficking’ 
and ‘human smuggling’ or the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migration, 
44  This is not to deny that some migrants do work in prostitution and that others do fall victim to criminals. Skrobanek 
makes the point that in most cases women freely chose migration and are only subsequently directed into exploitative 
channels (Skrobanek, Boonpakdee & Jantateero 1997: 98). 
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I follow Wong’s call to analyse migration trajectories on the basis of the condi-
tions under which migration projects are undertaken, as well as the agency of the 
migrant (Wong 2005: 87). In this way, the results of my PhD project will speak to 
concerns within trafficking debates without being driven by the parameters of its 
legal and administrative definition.
From vulnerable migrant women to attempts at controlling migration 
trajectories
It was my interest in sex trafficking that initially led me to focus primarily on the 
emigration trajectories of women.  Upon arrival in Buea, I initially set out to work 
with narratives of women who were trying to leave the country, as well as of fami-
lies who have undocumented migrant women in Europe. I thus matched undocu-
mented migrant women in Europe with their families in Cameroon and gained 
insights into the ways in which illegality are seen and experienced in Cameroon. 
Upon arrival in my fieldwork site, I quickly learned how common narratives 
of duping and of failed departure were and how little influence these narratives 
had on people’s enthusiasm about emigration. Delphine’s strong desire to emigrate 
and her conscious willingness to take risks to achieve her ambition of mobility 
was in stark contrast to the trafficking paradigm that assumes that brokers are the 
ones who instigate the migration projects.45 In contrast to the trafficking narra-
tive, Cameroonian women make their own choices about wanting to migrate. The 
pursuit of these ambitions of mobility are not so much - as the paradigm of traf-
ficking suggests -  marked by ignorance or naïveté, but by an interpretation of the 
reality of migration that calls into question ideas on credible information, success 
and failure. 
In the context of high aspirations for migration and few access routes to achieve 
these aspirations, my interests is with the aspiring migrants’ scope for choices at 
different stages of migration, their relation to the migration broker, as well as the 
level of insight and understanding of the process in which they engaged in. Con-
straints on agency can come to play the desires and beliefs of aspiring migrants, 
with respect to the competences necessary for autonomy, as well as with respect to 
the available choices or avenues of actions (Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000: 22). All three 
seem relevant for my purposes. In her analysis of female migration in Malaysia, 
Wong refers to the ‘level of self control over the migration project’ (Wong 2005: 
87). The way she classifies instances and factors that limit this level of control over 
the outcome and process of migration is close to the concerns that I have in analyz-
ing migration trajectories. 
In the course of fieldwork, my focus of attention regarding migrant vulner-
abilities shifted from gender-based more to legal and economic factors. In my 
predominantly Christian research location, I found that gender was not the main 
explanatory factor that would help me understand vulnerabilities having to do 
with emigration. Many comparisons between men and women can, of course, be 
45  For an empirical analysis of recruitment processes, see e.g. (Andrijasevic 2010: 31- 35).
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made. Aspects that are specific to women are the framing of their trajectories as 
trafficking, as well as the recourse to marriage as a means to achieve ambitions of 
mobility. The demand for labour also operates according to different dynamics for 
men and women. Yet, this dissertation does not aim at comparing men and women 
per se because the law – even if in different ways - excludes both from ambitions 
of mobility.46 
Regulation can differ by gender, but be nonetheless exclusionary or enabling 
in its overall effects for both men and women. Female and male bushfallers are, for 
example, constructed to spend their gain from bush in very different ways. Male 
bushfallers are said to be more likely to strive to construct new houses for their 
families. Female bushfallers are said to invest into the school fees of their family 
members, as well as other smaller family matters. It is furthermore often said that 
a daughter will always ‘think back to the family at home’, while a man may feel the 
need to spend and impress his friends and girlfriends. Female bushfaller have a 
better reputation for having a ‘good heart.’ 
Yet, despite these gendered perceptions of how bushfallers spend their money, 
family members were equally willing to raise money for the travelling projects 
of their daughters and their sons. When my research assistant and I conducted a 
qualitative survey in which we asked families whether they preferred to send their 
daughters or sons to bush, gender did not emerge as a deciding factor. From the 
perspective of members of family it was important to ensure that only members 
of family who could be trusted to work hard and be loyal to their people back in 
Cameroon would be sponsored to go out to bush. Prostitution rarely emerged as 
a fear for families in Cameroon. Instead, they spoke of the fear of disloyal or lazy 
bushfallers that would not support their family members in Cameroon. 
A large part of the Cameroonian population is excluded from the possibility of 
being granted a visa at embassies and thus needs to attempt their emigration plans 
through the help of brokers. All the brokers with whom I worked offered lines indis-
criminately for men and women. At times special programs for specific professional 
groups were drawn up. Thus women were recruited to work as nurses in Dubai or 
men were recruited to work as welders on construction sites in Dubai. While power 
dynamics between brokers and aspiring migrants obviously always are gendered, 
both aspiring migrant men and women needed to consider that they had better 
chances of being able to travel by seeking out the help of migration brokers. 
In this dissertation, I argue that a concern with human trafficking calls us to 
look at people’s lives in source countries and the way in which these regions are 
globally connected with destination countries. The phenomenon of bushfalling is 
an important case in point that allows us to place the vulnerability of migrants 
into a framework that is informed by the perspectives of people in a place of de-
parture.
46  Dalby has suggested ways in which mobility has become a luxury of the rich and developed populations, while fixity 
has become an encumbrance of the poor (1999). 
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From illegal migration to the regulatory dynamics of emigration
In this dissertation, I follow Torpey who argues that the state has long remained 
under problematised in migration studies.47 Passports, identity cards and visas are 
means that seek to fix modes of belongings and simultaneously control mobility. 
Very often these state-defined forms of belonging are implicit in assumptions about 
the ‘proper’ or ‘natural’ place of belonging for people (Malkki 2002: 353).48 As a 
consequence, mobility is often viewed as border crossing (Abraham & Van Schen-
del 2005: 11). Yet, migration can also be conceptualised as autonomous because it 
has already been occurring before state regulation (Papadopoulos, Stephenson & 
Tsianos 2008). From this perspective, borders and border control – rather than just 
mobility itself - require attention.49
Two inter-related conceptual considerations, in particular, have marked the 
way in which I seek to contribute to the academic literature within migration stud-
ies. First, at the core of this research was the intention to go beyond ‘seeing like 
the state’ (Scott 1998). ‘Due to their symbiotic history with the modern state and 
its interests […] contemporary social sciences are ill-equipped to make sense of 
transnational flows’ (Abraham & van Schendel 2005: 5). Hence, much research on 
transcontinental migration is conducted from the perspective of ‘the migrant-re-
ceiving nation state’ that looks at immigrants as ‘outsiders coming in, presumably 
to stay’ (De Genova 2002: 421). 
My PhD research instead privileges the study of migration from the perspec-
tive of individual migrants, migrant families and the region/country from which 
they come. This is a much-needed move as many studies of transcontinental mi-
gration are often studies of immigration and integration. Kyle and Siracusa stress 
the need within debates on smuggling and trafficking to shed light on the ‘em-
pirical reality of how migrants themselves view their actions’ (2005: 155). Through 
engaging in an ethnographic manner in a study of emigration, my study strives to 
address this gap.
Secondly, it is not sufficient to look at migrants and their experiences. If con-
cerned with the illegality of migration, we need to study the processes that create 
the conditions of illegality. De Genova argues that the construction of migrants in 
terms of their ‘legality’ or ‘illegality’ effaces other aspects of their migration trajec-
tories, namely the importance of labour markets for the flow of people and the ex-
pectations and demands of families. Yet, states frame migrant workers without pa-
47  ‘Analyses of migration and migration policies have tended to take the existence of states largely for granted, typi-
cally attributing migration to a variety of socioeconomic factors (push-pull processes, chain migration, transnational 
communities, etc.) without paying adequate attention to territorial states’ need to distinguish ‘on the ground’ among 
different populations or to the ways in which the activities of states – especially war-making and state-building – result 
in population movements.’ (Torpey 1998: 240).
48  Malkki has greatly contributed to unravelling the underlying assumptions on the ‘national order of things (Malkki 
1995). Anthropological studies have explored in great depth the complexities implied in questions of belonging, as 
well as the struggles that these complexities lead to (see e.g. Nyamnjoh & Rowland 1998; Pelican 2009; Ndjio 2006b; 
Geschiere 2009).
49  Karakayali and Rigo (2009), for example, suggest that circulation itself constitutes an act of citizenship. This line of 
argumentation legitimises mobility and gives importance to forms of subjectivity that are not state-defined.
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pers as ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘smuggled aliens’ or ‘trafficked victims’. Through their 
legal categories, states thus legally produce the illegality of migration trajectories 
(De Genova 2002). 
Legality and illegality need to be considered separate processes of historical 
and political constructions prior to an analysis of how these terms are used to 
label people, activities or trajectories. Scholars need to also study the logics and 
norms inherent in processes of regulation that demarcate people and activities as 
in violation with legal frameworks. By studying how people experience emigration 
trajectories, I question the place of the law at points of departure. In the course of 
the following chapters, I will consequently only bring up illegality as an issue when 
and where and how it becomes relevant for actors.
Finally, we also need to relate illegality to other normative frameworks that 
regulate migration trajectories and their outcomes. While I argue for a theoretical 
shift from ‘seeing like the state’ to ‘seeing the state’, state authorities are not the only 
authorities important for the trajectory of a migrant. While laws try to regulate 
migration, migrants do not only have subjective experiences of these instances of 
state regulation, but are also exposed to other regulatory frameworks such as the 
market or the family. Besides legality, the profitability of a migration trajectory is 
important, as well as the honour it brings to the family members of a migrant.
This is why I have chosen to study the regulation of emigration within a frame-
work that captures the multitude of ongoing dynamics within which aspiring mi-
grants seek to move out of Cameroon. I look at the ways in which migration is 
regulated and I do so in a way that goes both beyond the perspective of the state 
and the mere and exclusive focus on the state. Beyond the regulatory instruments 
and norms of the state, I broaden the perspective to take into account the plurality 
of regulatory authorities that shape the context in which aspiring migrants move. 
With this work, I hope to contribute not only to a literature on ‘illegal’ migration, 
but also more widely to a theoretical body of political anthropology and its relation 
to migration studies. 
P l u r a l  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s :  s t a t e ,  m a r k e t  a n d  f a m i l y
It is striking that the flow of people is often analyzed through entirely different 
theoretical frameworks from the flow of goods (Malkki 2002: 352; Kearney 1986; 
Carling 2002: 5). Academic work on flows of goods notably adopts less often an 
explicitly statist perspective (McKeown 2008). This difference can most probably 
be explained by the high degree of legitimacy that the flow of goods has attained 
in the contemporary era. 
Through historical analysis, Torpey has illustrated how states have monopo-
lized the authority to restrict movement. He does not argue that states have ef-
fectively monopolized control over movement, but that states have achieved a mo-
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nopoly over the legitimacy of movement control. In his work, he traces how the 
monopolization of this authority by states has emerged gradually in Europe after 
the medieval period and was paralleled by the states’ monopolization of the legiti-
mate means of violence. Torpey places his argument within the context of Meyer’s 
work on the delegitimation of organizational forms other than the nation-state. 
While the state can prevent a person from crossing national boundaries, Meyer 
points out how the attempts of non-state associations to control people are stigma-
tized as slavery (Meyer 1987: 53).
It follows from the state’s monopolization of legitimate means of control, the 
question of what occurs with other potential claimants of authority. The state with 
its laws and regulations is not the only authority that regulates the conditions un-
der which people seek to realize their ambitions of mobility. Torpey argues that 
private economic, religious or other social entities claim authority at the ‘behest’ of 
states. This is a claim that I wish to investigate further within my dissertation. 
In the context of the Chad basin, Roitman has conceptualized connections and 
overlaps between actors engaged in cross-border trade in innovative ways. She ar-
gues firstly that regulatory authorities have pluralized and secondly that the plural-
isation of regulatory authorities has led to an increase in state powers (2004a). For 
an analysis of dynamics of emigration, Roitman’s study of cross border trade can 
be instructive. In the case of cross-border trade, smuggling and gang-based road 
banditry in the Chad basin, Roitman argues that authorities regulating access to 
possibilities of wealth accumulation have multiplied. Roitman defines an authority 
as an instance that exercises power (2005: 18). Hence, not all regulatory authori-
ties of trade or migration have to be official or authorities sanctioned by the state. 
Indeed, activities that are not regulated by the state can also be highly organised, 
recognised as legitimate and, as such, become institutionalised in their own way.
In line with Hibou (1999), as well as Chabal and Daloz (1999), Roitman stresses 
the productivity of these activities for the (urban) economy and for the financing 
of local administrations. The wealth that is created in smuggling and banditry is 
also used to pay state taxes, as well as to directly complement the salaries of state 
officials. Rather than seeing unregulated trade as trade that occurs in opposition 
to or to the deficit of the power of the state, Roitman proposes to look at interde-
pendencies between various regulatory authorities in a way that fundamentally 
challenges conceptions of wealth, legitimacy and, by extension, also the notion 
of legality and illegality. Both on a financial and moral level, smuggling and road 
banditry are not constructed as or enacted against the state. 
If the state is relativised as one form of modern political authority among oth-
ers, it becomes possible to go beyond statist visions of migration. The usage of its 
own dominant (and mostly legal) categories can be avoided (Abraham & Schendel 
2005: 6). That is why I study state officials, migration brokers and family members 
as important figures that regulate migration trajectories. These multiple players 
can be said to cover the sphere of the state, market and family. Within the sphere of 
the state, the role of paper seemed at first sight to be important both as a regulatory 
instrument and a means of self-representation. Within the sphere of the market, 
I focused on the role of migration brokers and the impact of money. Within the 
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course of the dissertations, however, I will demonstrate how the important role of 
money cannot be limited to the work and activities of migration brokers and vice 
versa.50 The crucial point here is the novel ways in which spheres of the state, mar-
ket and family interact and overlap with one another. 
I look at state, market and family as three constructed spheres that allow me to 
analyse the multitude of at times contradictory expectations and demands that set 
out the context within which aspiring migrants go about their ambitions of mobil-
ity. By encompassing market, state and family actors, the theoretical approach of 
this dissertation seeks to go beyond the analysis of structuralist scholars that place 
migration in world systems and focus on market and economic disparities (Sas-
sen 1988; Massey et al 1993: 444). I also seek to go beyond network approaches 
that look at migration through the lens of family connections, ethnic networks 
and social capital (Levitt 2007; Glick Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1992; Nyberg 
Sorensen & Fog Olwig 2001). 
The sphere of the state, family and market do not in any way constitute self-
contained units. Ideal types of stateness collapse once one starts to work ethno-
graphically. I am thus interested in connections and intersections between the reg-
ulatory ambitions of all three spheres. In the chapters of my dissertation, I explore 
how money and marriage play a role within the embassies, how family networks 
deal with money and deportation, and finally how migration brokers are perceived 
and conceive of themselves as public authorities and figure heads. I also study how 
boundaries between realms of market, state and family are constructed. 
In the conceptualisation of my research material, I seek to treat state and non-
state governance within a common frame of regulatory dynamics (Ferguson 2006: 
112). I use the term regulation to refer to processes of control and governance 
in its broadest sense. Under this term, I will consider all authorities that seek to 
rule, direct, adjust, influence and determine processes of mobility so that they are 
channeled as desired. I consider, not just intentional acts of regulation, but also 
constraints and difficulties that follow from regulatory logics of different spheres. 
Circulating normative expectations about the legality, respectability and profit-
ability of a migration trajectory, for example, also shape the choices and moves of 
aspiring migrants.
I consider different regulatory authorities within a common framework even 
though regulatory instruments and ambitions are by far not all equal. State institu-
tions, for example, will regulate migration with different normative expectations 
and tools than family members and networks of migrants will. Yet, while not all 
regulation is equal, I do not take for granted these variations. Instead, I study how 
differences in degrees of legitimacy and capacity between regulatory authorities 
are constructed. As we shall see in the course of the various chapters, the very 
construction of supposed boundaries between plural spheres of regulation can 
constitute acts of regulation that establish one regulatory authority as morally su-
50  For a critique of the separation between culture and economics, as well as between kinship and market as a char-
acteristic of modern Western thought, see (Geschiere 2000: 54; Appadurai 1986: 11).
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perior over another. Different normative assumptions about legitimate monetary 
exchanges, marital unions and forms of paper production play an important role.
To theorize from the vantage point of a plurality of regulatory authorities al-
lows me to analyse emigration trajectories in a way that is not state-centric, but 
instead grounded in empirical data on the relationships and interactions between 
brokers, state officials and family members. The supposed monopoly position of 
the state is always continuously under construction and this construction process 
deserves scholarly analysis.
F i e l d w o r k  i n  C a m e r o o n :  m a r r i a g e ,  m o n e y  a n d  p a p e r s
To ground my theoretical framework within the empirical realities in Cameroon, 
I chose to construct the methodology of my fieldwork around focal points central 
to the three spheres: state, market and family. I chose to focus on the role and 
meaning of papers, money and marriage within different locations and moments 
of emigration. Paper served as a regulatory instrument that specified the sphere of 
the state. Marriage is an important regulatory instrument within the sphere of the 
family. Money served as a focal point that highlighted market dynamics within the 
regulation of emigration. 
Papers, money and marriage leave migrants with smaller or larger degrees of 
control over the outcome of their migration project.51 Papers give access to state-
sanctioned migration. Money can buy papers. Family connections or marriage can 
facilitate access to papers. Money is important for flight tickets, visa fees and the 
price charged by migration brokers for whatever services they offer. Family net-
works are important in raising the necessary money for migration. These three 
focal points help in the exploration of how aspiring migrants dare to attempt mi-
gration and also directly relates to my overall explanatory framework.
Fieldwork site
The data for this work was generated during thirteen months of fieldwork in Buea, 
one of the two provincial capitals of Anglophone Cameroon. I chose Anglophone 
Cameroon as my fieldwork location for several reasons. Having prior to this PhD 
worked with Nigerian and Cameroonian sex workers in Paris, I wanted to continue 
with research on conditions of departure in a Western African country. At the start 
of my research project, a Dutch NGO was also closely working with Cameroonian 
51 As pointed out above, I borrow this particular operationalisation of the concept of agency from Diana Wong 
(2005: 87).
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trafficking victims and I had met three of them prior to going for research.52 As a 
research site, South West Cameroon promised to be a safe environment, as well 
as particularly interesting because of its history of mobility control and changing 
colonial state regimes. 
Buea used to be the capital of the German colony of Kamerun. It currently 
owes its size and dynamic character to the university constructed there in the early 
1990s. As a university town, Buea is densely populated with young people. Al-
though all informants with whom I worked remain tied to their villages of origin 
either in the South or North West Province, this study is largely one of people’s 
attitudes and levels of knowledge within an urban setting.
As pointed out earlier, Buea and the South West Province, in general, have seen 
massive flows of immigration during the last 100 years. The names of bars like 
‘Fungom Embassy’ or ‘Chemba Embassy’ remind one how relative the very notions 
of home and abroad are. Such bars serve to welcome any new arrivals in Buea from 
the villages of Fungom and Chemba (North West Province). Most of my inform-
ants and their families consider themselves as strangers in the place they live. How-
ever, most Anglophone inhabitants of Buea (whether considered to be immigrants 
or not) have an ambiguous relationship to the predominantly Francophone state 
of Cameroon that came into existence in 1960.53 The fieldwork site of Buea is thus 
a rich place from which to study perceptions and practices of mobility. The very 
history of the place disturbs artificial dichotomies of settlement and motion. 
With one short interruption, I conducted fieldwork from September 2007 to 
the end of January 2009. Before my departure to Cameroon, people in Europe 
warned me that it would be very difficult to research potentially ‘illegal’ migration 
trajectories and was hence given all sorts of advice on how to present my research 
topic so that it would not seem too offensive. Yet, thanks to the warm welcome and 
unfailing support of two staff members at the University of Buea, I was quickly 
able to integrate into the social fabric of life in Buea. Once I had brushed up on my 
Pidgin, I was literally met with laughter when seeking to explain my research topic 
to Cameroonians. What had been a scholarly ordeal to formulate in my research 
proposal could in my research proposal could be summed up in one simple word 
that was immediately accessible and comprehensible to anyone in Anglophone 
Cameroon: bushfalling. I was working on bushfalling and to hear a white woman 
speak Pidgin and be seriously interested in bushfalling always and with no failure 
evoked laughter and amusement. 
52  Initially, I had intended to focus my research more closely around the narratives of these three women, as well as 
their families back in Cameroon. Yet, one of the three women was no longer in touch with her family. An international 
ngo was in the process of trying to help her locate her family. The other woman was still in the process of her B9 legali-
sation procedure and thus did not want to participate closely in the research. The third woman shared her migration 
narrative with me and also put me in contact with her family in Cameroon. Yet, it turned out that she had not been in 
contact for her family for many years and that her family did not even know that she was in Europe. While this certainly 
was an interesting finding, it did not generate further routes for research and I thus extended my scope to conditions of 
departure and conceptions of bushfalling in general.
53  As Fokwang points out, many Cameroonians feel betrayed by the Biya government, but young Anglophone Cam-
eroonians, in particular, considered that there was no prospect for them to ever become proper citizens in Cameroon 
(2006: 84).
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In certain pages of this dissertation, I may write in a tone that could be criti-
cized for verging on the ridiculous. Yet, this tone of mockery and amusement is not 
dissimilar to the ways in which Anglophone Cameroonians talk about bushfalling 
themselves. To stay true to this tone is not to disregard the serious effects for fami-
lies that lose their entire savings in failed bushfalling attempts or the impossibility 
of life of those individuals deported back to Cameroon. Instead, the humour with 
which bushfalling is associated in Cameroon might reveal another element of the 
phenomenon of bushfalling.
While information and communication technologies mirror the hope of par-
ticipation on a global level, political and legal frameworks impose exclusion. Ap-
padurai has described this situation that has come to characterise social life in the 
global South as an ‘ironic compromise between what can be imagined and what 
social life will permit’ (1991: 198). If the compromise between imaginary and re-
ality is ‘ironic’, then jokes about bushfallers can relieve the tension. I was at first 
surprised to see my research matter discussed in such a humorous tones in Cam-
eroon. However, the joking tone with which bushfalling and bushfallers are dis-
cussed in Cameroon may also be a way of dealing with the tensions between global 
ambitions and the meagre possibilities for realisation. As Roitman and Mbembe 
put it, ‘to laugh means not only to hypostasize domination, but also to mark the 
non-correspondence between objectified violence and the fear that one endeav-
ours to admit and avert (1995: 351-2).’54 
Case studies
Although in my prior research I had heard much about brokers and facilitators, I 
had not thought when l left for Cameroon that access and contact to broker would 
be possible. The trafficking and smuggling discourse was so strong that I simply 
assumed that brokers in Cameroon would be conducting their work in greater 
secrecy and under higher protection. Yet, during fieldwork, I rather unexpectedly 
managed to gain the trust of a migration broker in Buea through the personal in-
troduction of a lecturer at the university. Because migration brokers are big men, 
he was proud to open up his office for research. The presence of a white person at 
his office was a welcome increase in his status and appearance in society and he 
was most probably also hoping that I would generate useful contacts for him in 
Europe. Yet, he willingly opened his doors to my Cameroonian research assistant 
Delphine. Whether to white or Cameroonian, male or female, he liked showing off 
his powers. 
Only ten years prior to my research, migration brokers would not have been 
present to this extent in Cameroon. At the time that I was in Buea, two of these 
migration brokers even had offices in town. They were firmly established. Yet, a 
54  The desire for migration in Cameroon has often been ascribed as being rooted in new cultures of material suc-
cess and Western models of consumerism (Fleischer 2009, Jua 2003, Rosny 2002). However, these aspirations are not 
always exclusively material (Fischer, Martin & Straubhaar 1997). The emergence of migration in the form of bushfalling 
also stems from the above-described tension between aspirations for global belonging (Ferguson 2006: 192- 193) and 
the meagre potential for fulfilment.
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year after my departure from Buea, news reached me that both offices had had to 
close. As one of the brokers had told me during research, bushfalling is a volatile 
and ever-changing business.
Thus having established a first entry point with one major migration broker in 
town, I worked on indirect introduction routes to the two other migration brokers 
that I had heard about in Buea.55 Particularly two of them were very open to let me 
into their offices and allowed me to follow them in their daily working routines. I 
was able to ethnographically observe how they go about their work. Yet, because a 
lot of their work occurred outside of their office, Delphine and I were of course not 
able to follow the entire chain and networks through which the brokers conducted 
their work. 
However, both broker offices provided convenient spaces for the research in 
which Delphine and I could come into contact with men and women who were 
aspiring and concretely working towards travelling out of the country. Delphine 
and I always made sure to clearly indicate that we were researchers and thus not 
co-workers of the brokers. And after an initial meeting in one of the migration 
broker offices, we always met with informants either at my home, their home, or 
occasionally, in bars or restaurants. For the research, I chose those case studies 
that promised to yield the most in-depth insights about the ways in which money, 
paper and marriage interconnect within emigration attempts.
Despite the secrecy that surrounds specific emigration trajectories, Anglo-
phone Cameroonians greatly enjoyed talking about bushfalling. Throughout field-
work, my white presence constantly evoked my research topic. As an Anglophone 
and Francophone German national who after a few months fluently spoke Pidgin, 
I embodied travelling and thus also a variant of bushfalling. The fact that I was a 
white researcher also made it easier for aspiring migrants to share the secrets of 
their travel preparations with me. Although I was not always given the exact de-
parture date, I was generally considered more as a potential source of help than as 
a threat. I could thus be led into the inner circle of those who were trusted with the 
details of travel preparations and was barred from the imperative of secrecy.
It was very rare for me to be confronted with direct requests of people to make 
them travel. Due to my student status, I was not necessarily considered to be pow-
erful enough. Yet, my close association with Delphine and two lecturers from the 
University of Buea (U.B.) also meant that informants, acquaintances and neigh-
bours would not have dared to ask for help or services in manners that would have 
been considered as inappropriate or disrespectful by either. In the few exceptions, 
my response very much depended on the situation of the individual. In the case of 
students, I tried to provide links of websites with study information and scholar-
ship openings abroad. 
During fieldwork, I was also able to gain access to the French and American 
Embassy. A chain of personal contacts led me from a theatre group in Amsterdam 
55  In the absence of a personal connection that could introduce us, I first sent Delphine alone to make enquiries with 
some migration brokers in town. Once she had spoken to them and found out a few basic elements of their brokerage 
work, she then proceeded to introduce me to the brokers on subsequent meetings in their work places or in public.
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to the doors of the U.S. consulate in Yaoundé. In a similar fashion, an accidental 
encounter in a train from Amsterdam to Paris generated a contact with the French 
Embassy in Yaoundé. Besides these personal entrance routes, I was also a likely 
candidate to be allowed entrance to both embassies due to my academic training 
at Sciences Po Paris, which most French consulate staff attended themselves. I was 
thus easily integrated as an ‘intern’ for a few weeks to observe the functioning of 
the consulate office. 
Besides many smaller cases, interviews and observations, my research has over 
the course of one and a half years (and in some cases longer) followed the emigra-
tion projects of above all ten women. Six of these women were North Western-
ers; four of them were South Westerners. During the course of research, I worked 
within their family networks and thus also followed the migration projects and 
aspirations of their brothers and male members of family. I equally matched up 
five undocumented migrant women with their respective families of origin in 
Cameroon. One of these informants was deported during the course of fieldwork. 
Along with my various key informants, I conducted nineteen recorded and fully 
transcribed interviews. Yet, the second pillar of my research material was founded 
on observations of three migration broker offices (with its various employees and 
their respective family members), as well on observations from two consulate of-
fices in the capital of Cameroon. 
To be able to ground these narratives, as well as the ethnographic insights from 
the broker and Embassy offices within a firmer framework of size and scale, Del-
phine and I also conducted a quantitative survey in Buea. With the survey, I sought 
to measure the density of out-migration, the popularity of bushfalling, exposure 
rates to deportation, as well as attitudes towards money and bushfalling (see graph 
1 & 2, as well as table 1). Finally, the ethnographic material on the mobility/immo-
bility nexus is also supported by additional archival and visual material.  
Methodology
All interviews and conversations were conducted in Pidgin, the lingua franca 
of Anglophone Cameroon. As many specificities of the culture of emigration in 
Cameroon today become visible through Pidgin terminology, I always include the 
original Pidgin (either within the core of the text or within the footnotes). Most 
conversations were relatively casual and I thus made notes only to the extent that it 
seemed appropriate so as not to disturb the flow of conversation. I then used these 
notes as much as possible immediately after most encounters to support and com-
plete the recording of my field-notes. For key informants, I would at later stages 
of the research conduct fully recorded semi-structured biographical interviews. 
During the write up of the thesis, I sent draft chapters to three key informants and 
integrated their comments and reactions. For the sake of anonymity, the names of 
all informants have been changed in the manuscript. 
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I came to employ Delphine as my research assistant right from the beginning 
of my pilot study in September 2007.56 Because of Delphine’s own strong dreams 
of bushfalling, she became both an informant and a research assistant to me. On 
the first day that we met, Delphine greeted me with Madame, a term that speaks of 
respect and is used for lecturers at university. As we set out with our research day 
after day, we went from Madame to kojokojo, a slang term in Pidgin, abbreviated 
as kojo. It translates as very good and dear friend and because of its slang origins 
implies a rather playful and intimate mode of interaction. When it came to the 
formulation of objectives and directions, I was (as she would at times call me) the 
‘boss’ making the ultimate decisions. Yet, Delphine also invented a different role 
for herself. She would regularly look in her pocket mirror, check her makeup and 
declare to me proudly that I had a beautiful ‘mother’. As my mother, she would 
teach me Pidgin, advise me on what gifts to bring to our informants and make 
sure that her ‘child’ (in Pidgin pikin) would not be embarrassed by having a house 
with no food to offer to informants, neighbours or friends that would come by to 
greet and visit. Depending on the circumstances, she would thus jokingly call me 
madame, kojo, boss or pikin.
Although on rare occasions Delphine was challenged by friends or neighbours 
whether she was working for or with a spy who would further complicate people’s 
chances to travel out of the country, Delphine herself was proud of the research that 
we conducted. For a long time, she even insisted that she did not want her name 
to be replaced by a pseudonym. She strongly identified with the project and highly 
regretted my choice not to put a photo of her on the cover pages of the book. She 
believed in the importance of our research and wanted the world to know about 
bushfalling to correct the somewhat distorted ‘white man’ way of looking at immi-
gration. Delphine and I continued to discuss bushfalling and various draft chapters 
when she was already in Sweden and I was back in the Netherlands. Delphine also 
came to live with me in the Netherlands for six weeks over the summer months 
in 2009 and we were able to continue our discussions and interactions when she – 
against all odds and expectations – had indeed become a bushfaller.
D e p a r t u r e
Seeking to explain why people take high risks in their quest for mobility, I illumi-
nate in the next five empirical chapters different spaces (i.e. migration broker offic-
es, embassies, airports) and moments (i.e. monetary transfers, departures, returns) 
of migration as they manifest themselves in Cameroon. I will discuss relations 
between brokers and clients; the emergence of migration brokers and their rela-
56  I followed the precious recommendations of two lecturers at the University of Buea here, Robert Akoko and Evelyne 
Tegomoh. I remain very indebted to their invaluable support all the way through fieldwork and much beyond.
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tions to instances of state authority; dynamics during visa interviews at embassies; 
diverging quests for security in the case of marriage-related migration attempts; as 
well as perceptions and experiences of deportation. Through explaining dynamics 
of security, connections, luck, security and visibility, each chapter will contribute 
elements of response to the overall puzzle of bush a tout prix.
Within the economy of emigration, brokers are the main authority for people 
that are seriously trying to achieve their ambitions of mobility. The first chapter 
zooms into the relations between brokers and clients and the way in which both 
deal with the loss of money.  It also addresses the involuntary return of aspiring 
migrants. In discussing the relations between brokers and clients, in the first chap-
ter I shed light onto attitudes towards financial investments, notions of success, 
as well as conceptions of what it takes to leave the country. Fundraising dynamics 
within families and monetary transactions between brokers and aspiring migrants 
are instances that illuminate what I will call the market and family nexus. Through 
the key case study of Pamella, in the chapter I argue that relations between brokers 
and aspiring migrants cannot be discussed exclusively in terms of mere market or 
patronage relations.
From the perspective of an aspiring bushfaller, it is the migration brokers that 
offer visas. Interested in dynamics between state and market, in chapter two I study 
the sources that make migration brokers credible. In the discussion of the emer-
gence of migration brokers, I address in the second chapter how brokers base much 
of their success and status on connections and knowledge, as well as on forms of 
papers production. Brokers are situated in relation to state authorities, without 
which the rise of brokers would not be possible. 
In the third chapter, I focus on visa application processes and financial flows 
within and beyond the consulate offices in Yaoundé. In the perceptions of aspiring 
migrants, embassies are spaces of great danger and incertitude. Through a critical 
analysis of mediating technologies that govern visa application processes, I seek to 
unravel the seeming opposition between the narrative of legality and the narrative 
of luck. Narratives of legality and luck are sites of struggle over legitimate modes of 
mediation. And it is in this context, I will argue, that the frequent referral to migra-
tion brokers needs to best be understood.
Building on this insight in the fourth chapter, I use instances of marriage-re-
lated migration to analyse how state and family authorities seek security in di-
verging and conflicting ways. I will do so on the basis of a series of life stories and 
observations of marriage visa interviews at the French (and to a lesser extent the 
American) consulate service. Security threats for aspiring migrant women occur 
precisely because state and family locate security threats in conflicting ways.
As young Cameroonians dream of bushfalling and families keep raising the 
money for migration brokers, deportation is simultaneously becoming an ever 
more real possibility. Sventy-five percent of all respondents had a member of fam-
ily who is in bush and nine percent declared to have a member of family who has 
been repatriated back to Cameroon. Nevertheless, bushfalling remains popular. In 
the final chapter, I study how deported migrant women and their members of fam-
ily understand, experience and deal with deportation. Through and in-depth case 
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study of Manuella and a few contrasting cases, I explore the narratives of bad luck, 
bad behaviour and laziness that characterise the moral economy of deportation in 
Cameroon. I will offer an explanation of why it is not surprising that deportation 
rates have no effect on migratory choices of others.
In these five chapters, I strive to explain how and why young Cameroonians 
dare to emigrate. Based on observations and narratives of aspiring migrants in 
Cameroon, these five empirical dissertation chapters provide a picture of what 
people know, do and aspire towards before they set upon a journey to the Western 
world. In analysing step by step the various actions that aspiring migrants take in 
Cameroon, I seek, in this dissertation, to provide an alternative view of trafficking 
that opposes the dominant trend within the discourse of trafficking that negates 
people’s migratory choices. Through the lens of this ethnographic study, the very 
meanings of security, credibility and failure might radically change.
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chapter 1 
A line for 1.5  million cfa:  
Overcoming closure through migration brokers
‘It takes 1.5 million CFA to get to bush.’ This was the very first thing I heard about 
bushfalling at the beginning of my fieldwork research. Upon arrival in Cameroon, 
I discussed bushfalling with students and staff at the University of Buea, I learned 
about ‘lines’, ‘programmes’ and ‘openings’, but also about ‘closures’ and ‘feymen’ 
that dupe people who want to leave the country. I was surprised at this vocabulary 
and began to explore how migration-related risks and opportunities are captured 
in Pidgin terminology.
In Anglophone Cameroon, possibilities for travelling are referred to as ‘lines’, 
‘openings’ or ‘programmes’. All three are emic terms through which the possibilities 
and impossibilities of migration are understood. The language, through which these 
possibilities for travel are referred, implies that access to mobility is difficult. To 
travel is understood as overcoming closure and hence travelling requires the search 
for openings. Thus the impossibility of travelling is a given at the point of departure. 
Even if one has found an ‘opening’ or a ‘line,’ these can close at any time. The threat 
of failure is thus deeply ingrained in language referring to migration and travel. The 
5. Bar in Buea: ‘Restaurant Schengen Place’
35
threat of failure is a pre-given and not located with the broker. Migration brokers, to 
the contrary, provide hope and the chance of being able to travel.
Given the risky nature of bushfalling and the ever-looming possibility of failure 
and closure, aspiring migrants need to ‘rush’ whenever they find out or hear about 
an opening. If one delays too much, the ‘opening’ can close again. Consequently, 
the success of a broker is evaluated by the speed with which he can deliver. If one 
has heard of a particularly good and safe ‘programme’, one talks about a ‘direct 
line’. A ‘direct line’ is one that goes straight from a migration broker to the outside 
world. In particular, a direct line does not go via an embassy that could otherwise 
stop the emigration trajectory. 
Lines, programmes and openings all refer to opportunities for travel. A mi-
gration broker can offer a line and a programme, but this language can also refer 
to other possibilities for travel. A scholarship announcement, a volunteer pro-
gramme, a conference or a job offer can all be referred to as lines, programmes or 
openings. Only a line or a programme can overcome the hurdles that have come 
to be associated with wanting to travel out of the country. Besides its most literal 
signification, a line can also refer to a line of action or to a line of communication. 
These openings to bush de facto also imply job openings in the country of arrival, 
as well as the opening of a new chapter in the life of the aspiring migrant. 
I was furthermore surprised to find that everybody around me talked about 
the price of these openings, lines and programmes in extremely frank and candid 
terms. When bushfalling initially emerged as a phenomenon in the 1990s, a line 
cost 1.5 million CFA. Since the 1990s, prices have increased. Nowadays it takes 1.8 
million CFA to go to China or Dubai and roughly 2.5 million CFA for Europe or 
Canada. The precision and openness with which the ‘fees’ for migration brokers 
are referred are striking. Mobility is clearly understood in terms of needing to have 
money. The very terminology of informality and illegality (as much as the one of 
smuggling and trafficking), however, assumes the supposed under-cover, shadowy 
and invisible nature of the market of migration brokerage. Contrary to these pro-
jections, there is nothing hidden, opaque or illicit about the money that is neces-
sary for the ‘help’ of a migration broker with bushfalling. 
Warnings against dokimen
Embassies in Yaoundé do their best to warn Cameroonians against migration bro-
kers. Notes of warnings are spread in public relations activities at schools, open 
days, radio and TV broadcasts, as well as on notice boards outside the embassy 
compound itself: ‘Beware of dokimen! They are hurting your future.’ ‘These people 
are just making money out of your fears and ignorance. They are not the friend of 
the applicant.’ The chief consulate officer made these statements, which I heard on 
an open day organized for journalists at the U.S. embassy in Yaoundé, pleading to 
journalists present to warn their countrymen not to go to the Embassy with the 
mediation of doki men. They are ‘giving and selling bad advice on how to present 
visa applications.’ The main message that is conveyed is that doki men are bad 
for visa applicants, as well as for the country as a whole. ‘Protect yourself. Protect 
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Cameroon. Stop the doki men.’ According to the consulate officer, commercial me-
diation is a scam at the best of times. Most importantly, the quotes from the U.S. 
embassy show that relations between aspiring migrants and brokers are under-
stood in terms of criminality and merely profit-driven commerce. 
In the above statements (but also often in debates on trafficking and smuggling), 
migration brokers are supposed to be either criminals who break laws (Finkenauer 
2001, Aronowitz 2009) or businessmen (Salt & Stein 1997) that instigate trajecto-
ries of migration. Yet, while embassies seek to denigrate migration brokerage to the 
realms of crime and commerce, the first point of departure for aspiring migrants 
is not the embassy, but a migration broker or a member of family who has already 
succeeded in getting out. I was very surprised at how invisible embassies are in 
people’s perception of what it takes to emigrate. In the social imaginary, it takes 
extraordinary powers or money to be able to overcome closure and make it to 
bush. Migration brokers are the ones who have the ‘power’ to make the impossible 
possible. For 1.5 million CFA (so the saying goes) anybody can go to bush. 
Large amounts of money are given to migration brokers in the hope of a po-
tential emigration project. At times families even take out debt to finance emigra-
tion attempts and many times the money invested comes from important financial 
reserves for retirement or the education of younger ones. Although failure is com-
mon, migration brokers continue to be able to gain new clients who entrust them 
with large sums of money. While often accused of being criminal businessmen, 
the migration brokers with whom I worked in the field were greatly admired. This 
puzzle is at the heart of this chapter. Why in the face of uncertainty do aspiring 
migrants trust and hand over large sums of money to migration brokers? In ad-
dition, in what terms can power relations between brokers and aspiring migrants 
best be understood?
Relations between migration brokers and aspiring migrants
This chapter approaches the theme of migration brokerage through the vocabulary 
of openings, lines and programmes. Using this approach, the purpose of this chap-
ter is to elaborate on migrant-based understandings of migration-related risks. 
The chapter investigates brokerage relationships by focusing, amongst others, on 
monetary exchanges between aspiring migrants and migration brokers, as well as 
on social interaction in the case of problems and failures of emigration attempts. 
Through the lens of social interactions and financial transfers, this chapter seeks to 
empirically establish the place and role of migration brokers as actors within the 
economy of emigration. 
In this chapter, I argue that both the languages of crime and commerce are 
inadequate to understand relations and financial flows between actors. Whilst Salt 
and Stein have already established the point that crime is not a useful framework 
of analysis for brokerage activities, they uphold the distinction between ‘legitimate’ 
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and ‘illegitimate’ migration (1997: 489).1 According to this distinction, recruit-
ment consultants, travel agencies, transport operators, legal and advisory firms are 
clearly distinguishable from trafficking organisations. From the point of departure, 
these distinctions seem highly questionable. 
I try to go further by pointing out that migration brokers do not function ex-
clusively according to the laws of the market. I argue that the money entrusted to 
migration brokers needs to be considered in relation to both the risk of immobility 
and the authority that a migration broker represents in Cameroon. The authority 
of brokers depends also upon their reputation and status within society. This is 
why I will also introduce patronage (Bayart 2009; Bayart, Ellis & Hibou 1999; Cha-
bal & Daloz 1999; Smith 2007: 11-16) as an important relation explaining relations 
between aspiring migrants and migration brokers. 
I will demonstrate that from the perspective of aspiring migrants, the failure of 
migration brokers is not substantially different from the failure to get a visa from 
the embassy. When embassies deny visas, aspiring migrants also experience a loss 
of money. In addition, while migration brokers can fail with their programmes, 
the outcomes of travel projects that pass through embassies are highly uncertain 
as well. Hence, the failure of both migration brokers and embassies are considered 
in relation to each other.
This chapter includes a conceptual discussion of migration brokerage and three 
empirical case studies. In the conceptual section, I position the two key migration 
brokers of the case studies in a context of wider forms of mediation in Cameroon, 
highlight my approach to the question of smuggling and sketch out how I seek to 
contribute to a better theorization of migration brokerage. Through the three case 
studies, this chapter demonstrates how migration brokers are centwral actors of the 
regulation of emigration. Through the help of an ethnographic description of a trip 
of a migration broker to the airport with an aspiring migrant, the first case study 
illustrates the high status of migration brokers within the economy of emigration, 
as well as the set of expectations that are present with aspiring migrants. The sec-
ond section of this chapter examines the financial politics of monetary choices 
within the family network of Pamella. Finally, in the third case study of Victoria 
and her brother, I argue for the importance of the symbolic value of the monetary 
transfers between aspiring migrants and migration brokers. The transformative 
potential that migration brokers offer helps to explain why many aspiring migrants 
and their members of family do not consider giving money to a migration broker 
as a substantial risk.
1  More specifically in relation to human trafficking, Andrijasevic, too, challenges crime as a factor within cross-border 
migration trajectories for purposes of sex work. In one of her chapters, she questions notions such as deception, coer-
cion and force as distinctive elements of trafficking at points of departure in Eastern Europe  (2010: 26- 56).
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C o n c e p t u a l i s i n g  m i g r a t i o n  b r o k e r s
Migration brokers are feared, yet also greatly admired and respected. Despite low 
levels of expertise and at times high levels of failure, mediators are in a position to 
uphold their status. The knowledge and connections of migration brokers are im-
portant assets – even if not at all times strong enough to deliver on all promises. 
This section of the chapter argues for an understanding of migration broker-
age through the lens of the relations between aspiring migrants and brokers. Rela-
tions of aspiring migrants with migration brokers cannot be understood without 
recognizing both the normality and necessity of mediating practices. I will first 
sketch the context in which the two key migration brokers of this chapter operate 
and offer their services. I will then further explain my approach to the study of 
migration brokerage and seek to trace its potential contributions to other bodies 
of literature.
Migration brokers in Anglophone Cameroon
‘There is much business in migration’, one migration broker told me over dinner. 
Both the migrant and the migratVVion broker hope to make money with migra-
tion. Anyone with a comparative advantage will seek to share the gains of migra-
tion. When the period of the year in which the U.S. diversity lottery applications 
arrived, an informant and friend asked me to lend her my digital camera. For a 
small fee of a few hundred CFA, she took photos of neighbours and friends in her 
village and completed their application forms. Florence was less interested in the 
fee than the potential of somebody from her village of origin to leave the country. If 
somebody for whom she completed an application form had won, she would have 
gained incredible status and would have had the opportunity to marry this person 
or, if the winner was a woman, marry one of her brothers. 
The range of facilitators and mediators of migration in Cameroon is vast. A 
poster on a public litter bin advertises ‘payment solutions’ for Toefl tests, paypal, 
hotel reservations and the purchase of flight tickets. The people who made the 
poster sell the possibility to pay online fees for language tests, to make online hotel 
reservations, reserve or buy flight or train tickets, or simply to use their paypal 
account for whatever online activity the client desires. In Cameroon, few people 
hold formalized bank accounts and even fewer have credit cards. Even seemingly, 
simple transactions need mediation. Without a credit card, making a hotel reserva-
tion abroad becomes a lot more complicated, and without a hotel reservation, one 
cannot (in most or many cases) be granted a visa. 
Services change incredibly fast and the degrees to which mediated services are 
commercialized also vary. Cyber café staff charge 1,000 CFA (roughly 1.50 Euro) for 
filling out application forms for the American visa lottery, creating Internet pro-
files on dating websites and a bit more for filling in visa application forms online. 
People who are engaged in international trade can ‘carry along’ others or simply 
give out information on visa processes. Posters on the street of Yaoundé suggest 
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support with visa applications that require bank statements from countries of des-
tination.2  I ended up functioning as a broker many times, too – certainly not tak-
ing money, but often giving out information or advice. 
Even NGOs whose raison d’être is the fight against illegal migration find that 
they cannot do so without also at times advocating for legal pathways of emigra-
tion. One group of well-educated university graduates had organized themselves 
as an NGO to ‘fight’ what they call ‘illegal migration that kills’. Yet, on extremely rare 
occasions they would also write support letters for visa applicants – validating the 
travel objectives of certain of their contact people. 
Lines between aspiring migrants and migration brokers are not clear-cut. Of-
ten people acquire skills due to an experience of failing to travel out with which 
they can later capitalize by selling migration services. On the other hand, pretend-
ing to be able to facilitate the emigration project of others can also be a means 
of making money for one’s own emigration project. The friend of a neighbour of 
mine was desperate to go to bush. One day he was no longer to be found and it 
was rumoured that he had successfully ‘knocked stick’ (duped) somebody who 
also wanted to travel out of the country. Apparently, the money that he got out 
of the deal was not sufficient for him to fall bush himself. After a few weeks, he 
reappeared in our compound. Rumours continued to circulate about his supposed 
bushfalling attempt through duping.  
Just as there are no clear dividing lines between aspiring migrant and brokers, 
it is important to realize that the field of commercial migration services is in and 
of itself multilayered.3 A former employee of one of the migration agencies where I 
worked was kicked out of the office for reasons of fraud. He is now secretly offering 
his own emigration services, using his experience of having worked for a migration 
agency, but also of having once been duped himself to make money with bushfall-
ing. It is an important additional source of income for him. To set himself up and 
be able to raise a family he needs more than what his teaching jobs can provide. 
In the last ten years, a whole array of migration agents, brokers and facilitators 
has mushroomed (for some advertisement posters, see annexe 5). The Embassy is a 
distant institution considered to be hostile. Even if at times they seem more power-
ful than they are in fact, mediators are welcome ‘helpers’. Despite potential failure, 
migration brokers keep being seen as experts in their field. They are powerful men 
who have connections and are considered to be ‘known’ internationally. They have 
powers to obtain visas that others do not – even if at times they fail, these percep-
tions largely remain intact. 
2  The German consulate service in Yaounde, for example, requires applicants for student visas to prove that they have 
at least a monthly sum of 659 Euro at their disposal for the first twelve months of their degree course. If the sponsoring 
person does not reside in a EU country, sufficient means of subsistence can only be proven through a blocked savings 
account in Germany with 7.908 Euro in credit for the first year of studies.
3  Daloz documents the multitude of layers and networks within which big men move, associate and ally themselves 
(Daloz, 2005: p. 158).
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Migration brokers and the vulnerabilities of migrants
Much of the academic writing on ‘smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ locates the sources 
of the vulnerabilities of migrants and the causes of the failure of migration trajecto-
ries with ‘traffickers’ and ‘smugglers’ (Spener 2009: 201-229). The potential illegal-
ity is high on the agenda of most discussions about migration brokers. Categorised 
as either smugglers or traffickers, brokers are described in terms of the respective 
laws that they are breaking (nation state borders or human rights of migrants). 
This chapter seeks to contribute towards discussions of migration brokers by pro-
posing a different perspective. Instead of understanding migrant vulnerability as 
caused by the actions of migration brokers, this chapter seeks to explain why aspir-
ing migrants trust migration brokers.
I am interested in the policing of movement. The brokers referred to in this 
chapter partly prescribe and enable the mobility of Cameroonians. Mobility is 
made possible and is organised through migration brokers. Following Roitman’s 
work on cross-border trade in the Chad basin (2005), I conceptualise migration 
brokers as one out of a multiplicity of figures within the economy of emigration.4 
Whilst states might claim a monopoly over the legitimate means of movement 
(Torpey 2000), this does not reflect the ways in which migrants engage upon their 
emigration trajectories. First of all, many migration trajectories occur without offi-
cial state-authorisation. Secondly, the legitimacy of the state’s attempt to monopo-
lise means of movement can itself also be challenged. The means of movement mi-
gration brokers provide have gained currency and legitimacy – because of the fears 
that many aspiring migrants have of embassies. The case studies of this chapter 
demonstrate that migration brokers are recognised as exercising legitimate author-
ity over access to possibilities for mobility and thence the right to mobility. 
Spener points out how ‘although the transactions between migrants and ‘coyo-
tes’ [i.e. the Mexican terminology for migration brokers] take place outside the 
legal frameworks created and enforced by governments, they are nonetheless reg-
ulated by other important social relationships and cultural norms for behaviour 
(2009: 163).’  Frameworks outside and beyond the law regulate brokerage relations. 
Granovetter (1985) has referred to this extralegal nongovernmental regulation of 
economic action as ‘embeddedness’, and it is an essential concept for understand-
ing how migration brokerage takes place. Embeddedness, he argues, takes two 
forms. Relational embeddedness refers to the personal relations between parties to 
an economic transaction. Structural embeddedness refers to the broader network 
of social relations in which the parties to a transaction are inserted (Granovetter 
1990: 98-99). This first chapter looks at the relational embeddedness of migration 
brokerage. The following chapter will dedicate attention to more structural forms 
of embeddedness.
Beyond working on the multitude of vulnerabilities and risks in a different 
geographical setting, my approach is different from Spener in that I do not attempt 
4  The plurality of regulatory authority does not necessarily imply the demise of state sovereignty or the rise of an 
alternate sovereign power (Roitman 2004).
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to come up with an alternative social science classificatory system for an analysis 
of relations between aspiring migrants and migration brokers. So as to understand 
why and how aspiring migrants take risks and relate amongst others to migration 
brokers, I argue for the importance of local terminology such as lines, programmes, 
openings and closure, but also the ones of dokimen, big men and feymen.
The paradigms of trafficking and smuggling have a tendency to criminalise 
and stigmatise a broad array of migration intermediaries (for a critical analysis of 
such tendencies, see Spener 2009: 201-229 or Gisti 2010). Yet, the more legal migra-
tion becomes difficult and state actors discursively criminalise migration, the more 
migration intermediaries become necessary. The increased presence of migration 
intermediaries then further contributes to criminalise the act of migration. Thus 
given the scarcity of visas and the current economic situation of Anglophone Cam-
eroon, the vulnerability of aspiring migrants is a given. 
Risks and vulnerabilities between aspiring migrants and migration brokers thus 
need to be embedded into an overall analysis of conditions of departure. Through 
ethnography of relations between aspiring migrants and migration brokers, this 
chapter seeks to contribute towards a more empirically grounded understanding 
of the nature of migration brokerage (Kyle & Siracusa 2005), as well as to a more 
migrant-based understanding of migratory risks. I follow here Desmond’s call that 
risk cannot be analyzed within a vacuum (2007: 9).
Kyle and Siracusa argue that migration services are commodities in high de-
mand (2005: 158). Together with Liang, Kyle furthermore talk of ‘migrant export-
ing schemes’ when looking at out-migration possibilities for migrants (2001). In 
an attempt to move away from a predominantly criminal way of framing migra-
tion brokerage, Kyle and Liang define ‘migration merchants’ as ‘anyone who profits 
from the migration of others regardless of legality’ (2001: 4). With their concept 
of ‘migrant-exporting schemes’, they propose a model that considers the selling of 
migration services in terms of business. For them, a ‘migrant-exporting scheme’ 
turns into a ‘slave-importing scheme’ if most of the profits are generated by the 
unpaid labour of migrants in countries of destination. Whilst Kyle and Liang give 
recognition to the fact that migrant exporting schemes are limited by the need for 
trust (2001: 22), this chapter argues that profit generation is not a main factor in the 
structure power dynamics between brokers and aspiring migrants. The potential 
vulnerability of aspiring migrants towards their migration brokers is not grounded 
alone in the fact that migration brokers generate income with their work.
From traffickers and smugglers to dokimen, feymen and big men
As bushfalling is the pursuit against all odds of an opening in a context of closure, 
success is considered a question of luck and for success the connections of mi-
gration brokers are crucial. Prior failure (including through a broker) renders the 
need for a broker all the more necessary. Brokers have special knowledge on these 
matters, as well as connections. People prefer to go to bush with a broker because 
this protects them from people with bad intentions in bush.
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Drawing distinctions between various kinds of brokerage, aspiring migrants 
talk about feymen, dokimen and big men. Feymen are con artist and trick busi-
nessmen (Ndjio 2006a; Malaquais 2001). They generate money through swindling 
and financial deception. Some feymen generate so much money that they can be-
come local and national benefactors. Despite the often-unlawful nature of their 
economic activities, feymen are respected as wealthy and powerful men. In its cur-
rent economic climate, all new forms of wealth have come to be closely associated 
with feymenia. 
In my friend’s perception, migration brokers that are feymen do not deliver 
and have no intention of delivering. They merely dupe their clients. Aspiring mi-
grants always have to fear that their migration broker might only pretend to be 
big and powerful, but will actually dupe them. Dokimen are much less respected 
than big men. They do not have connections, but merely imitate and manufacture 
travel documents. The real migration broker that everybody hopes for is a big man. 
When an informant that had just handed over money to a migration broker was 
confronted by stories of duping, she responded that her broker was ‘big’ and that 
she could thus really trust him. Big men are powerful people with good connec-
tions. These connections give them the power to make others travel. The term ‘big 
man’ can refer to businessmen and politicians (Daloz 2002). 
Dokimen, feymen and big men are all three emic terms referring to migration 
brokers. These linguistic terms give us access to how the reality of migration bro-
kerage is conceived in Cameroon. Any given migration broker is evaluated against 
these three ideal types. 
To understand migration brokers as either ‘dokimen’, ‘feymen’ or ‘big men’ 
opens up an understanding of the horizon of expectations that aspiring migrants 
have. Aspiring migrants hope and think that migration brokers are big men, but if 
the level of respect goes down, then they might have to admit or understand that 
their broker was a mere dokiman. Whilst I have heard stories of duping, I have 
never witnessed a direct accusation of somebody as a feyman. As long as the rela-
tionship between an aspiring migrant and migration broker continue in one way 
or the other, aspiring migrants will not talk of duping. To be a feyman is to let the 
programme or line fail intentionally. Migration brokers are then measured not so 
much in terms of success and failure, but in terms of the genuine chance and pos-
sibility of trying to overcome closure in quest of an opening.
The typology of dokimen, feymen and big men is useful in that these terms 
indicate three different types of relationships. Aspiring migrants will trust and give 
over money to a dokiman with a different set of expectations and motivations than 
to a big man. The risk of giving money to a dokiman rests with the efficiency of 
the documents the dokiman will supply. The risk of giving money to a big man is 
located with the question of whether or not he is actually a big man. Feymen can 
pose as big men, but then proceed to merely dupe their clients. In this case, the 
intention of the migration broker would have been fake. 
Whether or not the papers of any broker, however, would be classified as real 
or fake by state officials is not of concern and does not figure within the parameters 
of how migration-related risks are assessed. The typology of dokimen, feymen and 
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big men is unrelated to question of legality. Once I heard a migrant ask about the 
nature of the visa and the broker replied that a visa is a visa. Yet, this was the only 
time that legal considerations were brought into the discussion between broker 
and aspiring migrant. In line with the theoretical commitment of my dissertation 
project to trace perceptions of migration-related risks from the vantage point of 
aspiring migrants in a country of departure, I will only discuss questions of legality 
when these issues are of relevance to my informants.
A  t r i p  t o  t h e  a i r p o r t  w i t h  M r.  Wa l t e r :  
b r o k e r a g e  r e l a t i o n s  a n d  h o r i z o n s  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s
On his way to Douala, the migration broker Mr. Walter picked me up to give me a 
lift. As we drove out of my compound, we passed by a young man in the pouring 
rain whom Mr. Walter had just dropped off beforehand. The young man’s shirt was 
completely soaked. As Mr. Walter stopped his car, the rain kept pouring down on 
the young man. He begged Mr. Walter to offer him the six-month visa for Greece 
for two million CFA. That’s all he had! 
Yet, Mr. Walter claimed that the ‘line’ costs a lot more. Mr. Walter is in his mid 
30s. As a former mathematics teacher, he now runs an NGO office in Buea that sells 
migration services. He talked about the quality of the programme and the many 
costs that he has in making this programme work. Mr. Walter did not want to re-
duce the price and enter into an agreement for only 2 million CFA.  He would help 
only if the young man gave him 2.5 million CFA. 
‘You’ve seen how I am.’ He touches his wet shirt. He has neither bag, nor um-
brella. ‘I am desperate.’ Mr. Walter insisted on his price and told him that he has 
until next week to decide. Mr. Walter drove off in his four-wheel drive jeep and 
explained to me (his female company of the day) that ‘the boy has surely been ‘sent 
back’.’ ‘To be sent back’ is the Cameroonian expression referring to deportation. 
Desperately in need to go out again, he begged for another chance at becoming a 
true bushfaller.
The boy addressed one of the three major migration brokers of the town. It 
is mostly through connections and hearsay that aspiring migrants find out about 
possible ‘lines’ or ‘programmes’ of migration brokers. Aspiring migrants and their 
families travel from villages in Bamenda all the way to Buea to meet one of the 
two migration brokers with whom I conducted fieldwork. While some might have 
a destination country in mind, in general the country chosen for the travelling 
project de facto depends on the ‘openings’ in which a given broker can actually 
deliver. While it was safe and easy for the two main brokers with whom I worked 
to have people leave for Dubai or China, aspiring migrants preferred to travel to 
Europe or North America. In response to such demands and expectations, both 
brokers tried their best to expand the range of available programmes, but did not 
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always succeed to do so. If a line or opening to Europe failed, the brokers often of-
fered compensation in terms of a trip to either China or Dubai.
I now explore how expectations shape relations between aspiring migrants and 
migration brokers. As a researcher, I was at times concerned with the safety of the 
migration trajectories that my informants were to embark upon.5 However, in the 
analysis of my chapter, I seek to remain loyal to the issues and points that were of 
concern to my informants. The boy in the rain only had two million CFA and thus 
had to plead with Mr. Walter for help. The enforced immobility of his life was cre-
ating a degree of despair that turned Mr. Walter not just into a migration broker, 
but also a ‘big man’ who could save him from his situation.
As we continued our route to Douala, Mr. Walter – otherwise referred to as 
‘the boss’ — explained the purpose of his trip. He had the case of a young Fran-
cophone man from Yaoundé who wanted to pursue his studies in accountancy in 
Malaysia. The boy had received his own admission letter, but did not know how to 
transfer the tuition fees to the university without a bank account or a credit card. 
There is no Malaysian Embassy in Cameroon. How to get the visa? How to pay 
the fees? How to get the ticket? How to make sure that the young man can really 
go out? In the face of so many unknown challenges, the family of the young man 
had turned to Mr. Walter for help. They agreed, but the fee was high and the family 
struggled to raise the money for the broker. 
All the money had finally been gathered on the day that the boy was supposed 
to travel. Mr. Walter received confirmation that the money was complete, but the 
boy’s passport was still in the capital. He had no visa and no flight ticket. There 
was no hotel reservation and no university inscription. In spite of this, Mr. Walter 
calmly assured me that the boy would travel that very day. Connections would 
make it possible. As we drove, he called a contact person. The boy would first travel 
to Laos – which is visa free – and then on from there to his final destination. The 
contact person was to prepare a hotel reservation for the boy in Vientiane.  In ad-
dition, Mr. Walter gave me to understand that he would also ‘pay the route’ at the 
airport in Douala. Police people are ‘hungry’. One never knows. Even with a hotel 
reservation for a visa free country, they could decide to pose problems. His con-
nections, as well as his knowledge made the boss confident in his powers.
While we were stuck for hours in a traffic jam, Mr. Walter received many re-
peated phone calls from the now anxiously waiting accountant in Douala. When 
we finally arrived in Douala at about four p.m., we picked up the aspiring migrant 
and his mother at the roadside. He greeted us anxiously and said, ‘Am I still leav-
ing tonight?’ The flight was to leave at eleven p.m. Mr. Walter was confident. ‘The 
boy will go out.’ He was set on the young accountant leaving the country that same 
evening. 
Any line that takes a while and where preparations stretch over a period of 
time is a line that is potentially fraudulent. Any delay can speak for failure. Any 
5  If this was the case, I would discuss my doubts and concerns with my informants and if they desired would then 
proceed to explore whether I could find out about pieces of information that would enable them to make more informed 
choices about the emigration projects that they were about to embark upon.
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kind of long-term preparation might be a side manoeuvre to divert the money. To 
avoid such suspicions and to prove one’s power, brokers operate their lines fast. 
Speed is of the essence. Speed, in part, proves the true power of a broker. Hence, 
in this situation, there was no cause for concern. Walter answered to the aspiring 
bushfaller in French that everything was ready. After this statement, the real jour-
ney began.
The young accountant and his mother got into the four-wheel drive jeep. We 
drove through muddy roads with big holes. The mother wore lace. The boy wore 
a buttoned shirt and a formal looking pair of trousers. As we drove off, the boss 
broke the silence, ‘You want your son to be a great accountant?’ The mother nod-
ded proudly. The plan was that the powers of Mr. Walter would help her boy reach 
his new university in Malaysia. Mr. Walter would turn her son into a bushfaller and 
thus a potential big man. 
As we drove off, the boss asked the boy to type his name into his mobile phone. 
I took the initiative to ask the boy to type the name into the phone exactly as it 
was written in his passport. The boss then sent the name of the aspiring bushfaller 
as a text message to his collaborator who was supposed to be preparing the hotel 
reservation in Vientiane. None of the proceedings was explained to either mother 
or son. Part the obscurity of procedures keeps the mythical power of brokers in the 
face of imposed immobility alive. To fall bush is to be transformed into a different 
category of people. It is the dramatic nature of this transformation that makes the 
brokers appear so powerful and not the details of how their businesses operate.
The first stop was at a travel agency in Douala. As we entered, the travel agen-
cy felt like an entirely different world. The space was air conditioned, clean and 
full of colourful posters that spoke of the promises of another world. All employ-
ers wore suits and had an air of professionalism. The staff knew Mr. Walter. He 
quietly whispered to a clerk. I sat down in a corner with the mother and the ac-
countant. As a big man, Mr. Walter was connected, known and clearly part of this 
air-conditioned world. 
It was also the ease with which Mr. Walter moved through spaces connected to 
bush or prestige that gave him an air of power and authority. Delphine and I had 
sometimes jokingly referred to very expensive restaurants in Yaoundé as bush. The 
travel agency was a place of a similar standing. Not anybody would feel comfort-
able and assume that he or she could be a client there. Lost in the face of unknown 
institutions like embassies and travel agencies, the mediation of Mr. Walter was 
clearly indispensable. He was an Ambassador to this unknown place called bush.
The boss disappeared up the stairs and pointed out the toilet to the mother of 
the boy. She followed and after a while came out with an envelope of money which 
she had hidden by tying it into her lace dress. Most of the money was compiled of 
notes of 10,000, but some of the piles were notes of 2,000 CFA. The money had been 
taken from a communal savings group. In small weekly sums, members of savings 
group make regular payments - which are then during the meetings shared out to 
one member at a time. 
Busy and with big steps, the boss flew down the stairs. The accountant’s mother 
handed him the equivalent of a year’s salary. As he sat down at the desk with one of 
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the clerks of the travel agency, an ‘embarrassing’ situation occurred. There ought to 
have been 1.3 million CFA, but the accountant’s mother had only brought 1.2 mil-
lion – roughly 1,800 Euros.6 Graciously Mr. Walter waived the missing 100,000 CFA. 
He explained to me that he often came into situations in which his clients were not 
fully able to meet up financially in which he ‘helped’ them by using his own money 
to complete the transaction. Mr. Walter repeatedly mentioned to me that quite a 
few of his ‘applicants’ still owed him money.
Narratives of duping are extremely common. To overcome initial doubt and 
suspicion, Mr. Walter maintained a very flexible discourse on modes of financing. 
Aspiring migrants have to make an initial non-refundable deposit. Afterwards, 
they are free to make payments at their own pace and convenience. At times, when 
the visa is obtained, recipients do not manage to mobilise the necessary money 
to pay him. In Delphine’s and my presence, he often boasted how he has already 
helped so many people who never had been able to complete all their payments. 
Any successful departure is good advertisement for him. Moreover, most times, 
with the high profit margin, he still makes a profit even if only two thirds of the 
entire fee have been paid. 
This was the recurrent story line during the course of the one-year that I fol-
lowed him. He was proud to point out how much money he was making, but re-
mained very serious about his role as a helper and a benefactor. His gracious stand 
in the face of the needy and helpless was, of course, also aimed at impressing me as 
his white guest of honour, but ultimately his actions of ‘charity’ were instrumental 
in maintaining his personal reputation in town. I always got the impression that he 
enjoyed the act of generously waving off money, of being the one whom everybody 
owes and the one who has the power to save and help.7
It was four-thirty p.m. when we left the travel agency. The flight was to leave 
at eleven p.m. We got back into the jeep and the race continued. As often, traffic 
was rather chaotic in Douala and Mr. Walter shouted at another driver, ‘You are 
in Douala! Do we follow rules in Douala?’ Mr. Walter was beyond rules. It was 
but the strength of his jeep that mattered. The charm with which he acclaimed his 
own powers made us all laugh. There was something very light and playful in this 
rush to get to the airport. The whole afternoon seemed unreal and as if it was but 
a game. 
As we circumvented holes in the road and other cars, the boss called back his 
collaborator, who had not yet made the hotel reservation. ‘L - A - O – S’, the boss 
shouted down the phone. ‘It’s close to China.’ I was shocked about the level of geo-
graphic skills of his collaborator. I later confronted him with this. The boss told me 
6  Based on a monthly salary of a state employed primary school teacher of roughly 100,000 cfa, this sum of money is 
equivalent to almost 12 monthly salaries.
7  Mr. Walter said in front of me that he was making a monthly profit of roughly 4,000 Euros. Most of Mr. Walter’s cli-
ents travelled to China. What he did, for example, was to officially buy return tickets for his clients (as visa requirements 
foresee), but arrange with the travel agency that it would only print the return tickets, but actually only issue and charge 
him for a single fare. The return ticket is required for the visa and for emigration controls at the airport in Cameroon. 
Yet, in the agreement that Mr. Walter makes with his ‘applicants’, he only promises to take them to China or any other 
respective country of destination. My research assistant was not at all shocked by this procedure. Bushfallers want to 
travel out, but will only return to Cameroon after a while.
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that people’s knowledge of bush in Cameroon is low. Apparently, this partly held 
true for dokimen and facilitators as well. Neither the accountant, nor the mother 
seemed to notice or to mind. Mr. Walter’s air of authority radiated calm and confi-
dence in the process. I was probably the only one in the car who was worried.
Our final stop was with a bus company called Guarantee Express. The account-
ant’s passport had been sent from Yaoundé to Douala through the postal service of 
this bus company.8 We had to pick up the passport. The mother did not want to get 
out of the car due to the mud and rain all around us. I somehow got out without 
getting too dirty. I followed Mr. Walter race around some cars and more puddles. 
Eventually, we reached the office of Guarantee Express and collected the passport 
that had been deposited earlier in the day under Boss’s name. At this point, Mr. 
Walter tried to impress me with his powers and his smartness. He handed me a 
pen and triumphantly said that it had a hidden USB stick inside. With this CIA-like 
device, he could secretly steal information from people’s computers. I do not know 
whether he has ever used his secret pen. He was visibly pleased with himself to 
possess one.
To finally have the passport at hand was another important step in the pur-
suit of air travel. In the whole haste and chaos of the matter, I asked the aspiring 
bushfaller about his luggage and it appears that he had a great deal. Apparently 
not being aware of weight and size restrictions and most likely assuming that all 
travel was the same, the accountant was a little startled at my interference. We had 
only met on the day of the trip itself.9 When I talked to him about freight regula-
tions and weight restrictions, he did not give the impression that he considered the 
information to be of great value or importance.10 Buses in Cameroon are always 
filled to the brim with vegetables, fruits and at times animals. I do not know what 
the aspiring accountant decided to do about his luggage.
Boarding began at seven p.m. It was quarter to five p.m. when we dropped off 
the aspiring bushfaller and his mother somewhere in the middle of Douala and Mr. 
Walter drove me to the hotel where he was staying. He wanted to have a drink and 
eat. It was five p.m. By six p.m., we had discussed my research issues and his sexual 
desires for me. I then departed and he only now was going to prepare the university 
admission letter that the accountant needed to be admitted into the country at the 
airport in L – A – O - S.  Mr. Walker was to meet the accountant one hour later for 
boarding at the airport. 
The young accountant left the country that night. I do not know much about his 
onward journey from Laos to Malaysia. Such details would have been visible only 
to his immediate family. For others, the young man had left the country. He was in 
bush and he now was a bushfaller. That is why Mr. Walter was an extremely power-
ful man in his field - and even more so because he did it all in but a few hours.
8  Mr. Walter had left the passport in Yaounde because he had first intended to make the accountant travel through 
another route.
9  He does not know me as he was living in Yaoundé.
10 Neither were weight restrictions a concern to my own friends who sought to give me kilos of food (pineapples, 
sweet potatoes, cooked ndole) as I was leaving the country.
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With respect to the above narrative, one can see that procedures that grant 
access to bush are largely unknown. Hence, it is possible for family members to 
hand over the money to the broker on the departure day itself. Migration broker-
age is necessary and considered to be normal. In a situation of closure, migration 
brokers, like Mr. Walter, are the ones with the powers to make visas come out. The 
largest part of Cameroonian society does not qualify for a visa, and hence some-
body who can bring out a visa is admired and considered a powerful man. The 
above case study illustrates how power relations between migration brokers and 
aspiring migrants are structured. 
The above case study has also illustrated that Mr. Walter is one of many regula-
tory authorities. These days both emigration and immigration controls at airports 
are conducted by a multitude of authorities. State agencies have partly outsourced 
some of their responsibilities for the upkeep of legality in international travel to 
the flight companies themselves who now operate their own security checks (Salter 
2007: 54). Airport authorities employ private companies to conduct additional se-
curity checks on the papers of travellers. Thus, authorities have multiplied and Mr. 
Walter is one of these regulatory authorities. He always gets to the airport by car to 
ensure his people get out of the country. 
Mr. Walter was able to arrange the young man’s departure within this short 
time delay due to a combination of knowledge, connections and the skill of paper 
production. He knew about visa applications, visa free countries and indirect trav-
el routes. Even when airport officials have doubts, Mr. Walters can guarantee safe 
passage at the airport in Douala.  He also has contacts with people (both within 
and beyond the realm of the state) who can issue, produce, imitate and manufac-
ture supporting documents that his clients need to pass immigration controls at 
the airport of arrival. Overall, his knowledge and his connections grant Mr. Walter 
an extraordinary position of status and power. He is a ‘big man’. Not an ordinary 
line of business, his brokerage help brings upon a family such a promise of change 
and hope that he fulfils the role and function of a generous benefactor. 
Having illustrated the social status of migration brokers as big men, the follow-
ing case study and section of this chapter will continue to analyse moments when 
the capacity of migration brokers to deliver is at its limits.
Pa m e l l a :  r i s k i n g  m o n e y  a t  t i m e s  o f  c r i s i s
Pamella estimated that her parents lost about six million CFA in trying to make her 
fall bush. When looking at the money that her parents had spent over the years 
on bushfalling, Pamella knew that they could have paid for her tuition fees at a 
foreign university. Yet, they repeatedly entrusted money into the hands of different 
migration brokers. Mr. James was one of the migration broker in question. Just 
like Mr. Walter, Mr. James ran NGO office in Buea that sold migration services. Mr. 
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Jameshad a lower level of education than Mr. Walter and specialized in sending 
people to Dubai. 
Mr. James and Pamella’s parents: surviving the younger ones
Pamellla’s parents placed a surprising degree of trust in Mr. James. Pamella had 
tried three times on her own and twice with a migration broker to leave the coun-
try. Her visa was denied four times. She left a fifth time without a visa using an 
indirect route through Kenya and Egypt to Cyprus, but was turned around at Cairo 
airport. It is after five prior failures that Pamella’s parents took up contact with Mr. 
James and gave him an initial amount of 500,000 CFA. 
The money came from prior savings, small-scale trade with Nigeria and from 
a compensation payment for their early forced redundancy from the CDC plan-
tations.11 Pamella’s mother added her own money through farming and through 
running a small pharmacy in the village. ‘They are so desperate for me to go!’ Pa-
mella explained. After a year of repeated disappointments, they proceeded to hand 
over a further two million CFA to Mr. James, even though their daughter had been 
repeatedly warned not to do so. In the end, Pamella’s parents were more motivated 
for the bushfalling project than Pamella herself. How does one explain Pamella’s 
parents trust in Mr. James?
First, the risks that are part of trying to send one of the children out need to 
also be placed in relation to the routinised state of crises, i.e. the everyday nature 
of risk in Cameroon today (Mbembe & Roitman 1995; Van de Walle 2001). Cam-
eroon’s everyday life is characterised by much uncertainty (Johnson-Hanks 2005). 
Pamella’s father hence wanted to secure a future for his wife and daughters and 
tried to do so by putting his money into bushfalling. 
There was a very real risk that the inhabitants of his village of origin in the 
North West Province and more so the uncles of Pamella’s father12 would not have 
accepted that fact that Pamella’s father had registered his two stores under the name 
of his wife and his eldest daughter.13 Pamella explained to me that village custom 
has it that ‘property [i.e. women] cannot buy property!’  ‘He has put down his will, 
but the uncles will be there nevertheless.’ ‘Legally one can succeed in trying to stop 
it, but it’s risky. As an African, things can happen.’ Even while he was still alive, 
Pamella’s father’s uncles had seized some of his cattle, sold it and squandered the 
money. They had insulted him because he had been ‘wasting’ his money on his 
female children. Pamella’s father feared that his property would be seized when he 
11  Pamella’s father and mother were both born in the North West Province (Banso & Nkambe). They left their vil-
lages of origin to go and work in the Ndu Tea Estate in the North West Province. Both worked for a plantation company 
called Cameroonian Development Company (cdc) until transferred to work for the cdc in the South West Province. The 
plantation company was privatised in 2002 and Pamella’s parents were both made redundant in 2006. They have since 
moved back to the North West Province.
12  These uncles are the brothers to the mother of Pamella’s father.
13  Upon their death, their belongings would normally go to the eldest male child in the family. Pamella’s parents, how-
ever, considered their eldest son to be too irresponsible. For further details on financial dynamics within family networks 
in the North West Province, see Endeley (2001: 38).
50
died and that his wife and daughters would have to suffer the consequences. In this 
context, the financial risk of investing into Pamella’s migration project takes another 
dimension. Pamella could take care of the younger ones when she was in bush.
Due to the death of two of Pamella’s maternal aunts, her mother and Pamella’s 
two sisters were in charge of the education of six more children. At the village 
level, Mamie Pamella was an educated woman14 and it was her strong desire that 
the level of education for her children should not drop.15 Yet, if not for bushfalling, 
there was no hope for the younger children to be able to go to university. ‘Look at 
the children’, Mamie Pamella told me, ‘Nobody is really in a position to ‘survive’ 
the others.’ She needed her most educated daughter to begin to take charge of the 
remaining dependents. 
Pamella needed to be sent out, not despite, but because of the financial bur-
den for the education of the younger ones. Families were willing to sponsor even 
repeated bushfalling attempts because emigration is perceived as one of the few 
strategies that could truly make a difference to the family. Expected high gains 
legitimatised high risks. Their parents could raise money for bushfalling, but not 
for business. ‘In Cameroon you work, but you don’t see your money. In bush you 
see the money that you work.’ 
Secondly, Pamella’s parents decided to give their money to Mr. James because 
they trusted him to be able to deliver. Pamella’s mother told me that she considered 
Mr. James to be a man with ‘connections’ and hence to be a man of ‘power’. She 
considered him an agent that worked with an NGO. She knew that Mr. James had 
sent out members of family of a family friend. ‘A lot of people have already gone.’16 
Yet, she did not know where to or what these people were now doing in ‘bush’. Pa-
mella imitated to me how her parents were talking about her broker: ‘Mr. James is 
big… he’s big… he’s big!’ She complained that her parents were getting old and that 
Mr. James could easily tell them that this or that country would be good for her.
Pamella’s parents had met Mr. James through a close friend of Pamella’s moth-
er who worked at the office of Mr. James. Pamella’s ‘uncle’ served as a guarantee 
for the deal. In a conversation, Mr. James told Pamella that he could not afford to 
disappoint that man. ‘I’m with him every day.’ As a man from their village of origin 
and as a man of status in society, Mr. James was well placed to advise Pamella’s 
parents as to what was good for their daughter. 
The connection Mr. James had to Pamella’s parents’ village of origin also played 
a great role in the trust they had for Mr. James. However, such connections also 
come with other problems. The closer his own family was to the family of his cli-
ents, the more he would be under pressure and accountable to his clients if he did 
not live up to their expectations. When on a visit to one of Mr. James’ s offices in 
Bamenda, I came across a woman who wanted to go to Dubai with the help of 
14  After her redundancy from the tea plantation company for which she had come to the South West Province, Mamie 
Pamella began running a small pharmacy in the village.
15  In Cameroon, mothers are often named after their children. Hence, Mamie Pamella is a popular way of referring to 
Pamella’s mother.
16  Original: ‘Plenty people don go!’
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Mr. James and who was from the same region of origin within the North West 
Province. The standard fee of 1,8 million CFA was too high for her and she was 
hence asking Mr. James whether it was possible for him to give her ‘assistance’. She 
wanted to pay but 1.5 million CFA. He replied by stating that would be the equiva-
lent of sponsoring part of the trip himself. Having worked closely with him, I knew 
that he was also in a position to offer the line for 1.3 million CFA. When I addressed 
the issue with him a few hours later, Mr. James explained that he did ‘not want to 
have to do anything again with family.’ Apparently, people from his home village 
had not been content with some of his services and had proceeded to complain. 
‘I’m here to earn a living’, he concluded. 
This anecdote illustrates the ambiguity of relations that Mr. James entertained 
with people in his village of origin and neighbouring villages in that region, and 
more broadly speaking with family claims. On the one hand, Mr. James focused 
on generating income for his NGO. On the other hand, I heard his clients ask many 
times for ‘assistance’ with their travel projects. In addition to working as a migra-
tion broker, Mr. James also became youth director for a council of elders in his 
village of origin and organised activities for village youth that were living in the 
South West Province. In public events, he spoke in terms of working towards the 
‘prosperity of the family of the Cameroonian nation.’ Yet, in practice, neither Mr. 
James nor Mr. Walter had a tendency to cater more for people from their home 
communities. 
Mr. James was from the same area of origin within the North West Province 
and one of his collaborators was a family friend to Pamella’s mother.17 Pamella’s 
mother had heard from people in her quarter that Mr. James had successfully 
sent people abroad. She wanted the same success that others had had for her own 
daughter. Mr. James’s elegant sense of dressing, his multiple mobile phones and his 
physically corpulent stature were all sure signs of wealth and status in Cameroon 
(Rowlands 1994). Given the prior failures of Pamella, trying to fall bush with the 
help of Mr. James appeared the safest way to attempt to connect the family to bush. 
Hence, Pamella’s parents were willing to try to ‘survive’ the younger ones with the 
help of Mr. James.
Relations between Mr. James and Pamella:  
authority, connections and education
It is striking that Pamella’s parents repeatedly chose to trust Mr. James the mi-
gration broker more than they trusted their own daughter. Mr. James only had a 
secondary school leaving certificate. Pamella had an undergraduate degree in law 
from a Francophone university. The following analysis of relations between Mr. 
James and Pamella may contribute to answering this puzzle. I will argue that the 
symbolic power of even just the semblance of international connections can out-
17  Within a larger picture, none of the migration brokers with whom I did in-depth research had a particular specializa-
tion in sending people out from within their own ethnic groups. Trust through ethnic networks can be crucial, but in this 
context needs to be expanded by trust that is grounded in a broker’s powers as evident in his connections to bush.
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weigh the benefits of education. The sexual economy of departure also influences 
relations between brokers and aspiring migrant women.
After her studies in Dschang, Pamella looked for work for one year. Then she 
courageously decided to get started in Douala on her own.  She arrived in Douala 
without money to pay rent and without a paying job. Pamella is bilingual, sociable 
and energetic. Yet, despite her skills and qualifications, Pamella had been techni-
cally unemployed ever since graduation. Paid employment is but a distant dream 
for large parts of the newly graduated youth in Cameroon. For the last few years, 
Pamella has had to put up with working ‘for free’ at a lawyer’s firm.18 
Despite her law degree, Pamella’s main financial support came from her sexual 
entanglements. Two ‘sugar daddies’ (to whom she referred as ‘Pa’) took care of the 
monthly rent and daily upkeep. She complemented her financial means with oc-
casional consultancies from the law firm, innovative trading schemes with scrap 
metal and small investments into land. She told me she was most discouraged by 
all potential employers that asked her to have sex with them first: ‘Phone calls at 
7pm asking you to come to the office!’ Unable at the age of 32 to fulfill social expec-
tations in Cameroon, Pamella’s strong desire to work money in bush took another 
turn. ‘I have suffered enough’, she told me. She now wanted to go to bush.
As mentioned above, Pamella would have preferred her parents to give the 
money to her to directly look for admission abroad. Yet, her parents preferred to 
work with Mr. James. Signs that demonstrated his connections to bush (foreign 
university posters, airline posters and foreign university prospectuses) filled his 
office.19 To Pamella’s parents, his connections were worth more than their daugh-
ter’s degree in law. Connections (thus not just to bush) in today’s Cameroon are 
important for employment possibilities. University graduates without connections 
will struggle to make use of their university degrees. As another informant and 
friend, Manuella, told me while still in bush: ‘I have seen my age mates, they were 
in university and I would have loved to be in that position. But I thank God, I’m a 
bushfaller though. [She laughs loud.] I’m a bushfaller though. I’m more than them 
somehow. I still thank God for that.’ 
Twelve months after my initial meeting with her parents, Pamella had still not 
left the country. In the course of many failed lines and empty promises, Pamella 
had grown increasingly frustrated with Mr. James. Initially she had heard that Mr. 
James could follow up documents right at the level of the Embassy. She had be-
lieved that he had connections at the Embassy. Yet after her parents had depos-
ited the first 500,000 CFA, Mr. James came up with a whole series of programmes 
(including also to Finland and Cyprus) – all of which failed. Pamella denied his 
proposal to travel out to Dubai because she believed that she would not be able to 
build a good life there. 
18  The firm is run by and dominated by Banyangis (South West Province). Even as an Anglophone in Francophone 
Douala, Pamella complained to me about internal dynamics at the law firm that tended to exclude and disadvantage 
her as a North Westerner.
19  While my association with his office certainly helped his authority in public perception, Mamie Pamella was fully 
aware of my role as a researcher and not collaborator of Mr. James. Once she asked me to encourage Pamella to go to 
bush and I gently refused and explained my own reservations, doubts and questions.
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On the day, Pamella and I met for the first time, Mr. James announced to me, 
and then later to both of us, that Pamella was going to travel out within two weeks 
– namely on the fifteenth of October. To my surprise, Pamella was not fully in-
formed about these new plans. Mr. James was spreading his information in differ-
ent ways to Pamella and me. He urged us to go out for drinks and happily cheer to 
the success of Pamella’s own bushfalling. As Mr. James proudly toasted to Pamella’s 
success, I realized that Pamella did not believe in her departure at all. 
Even though Pamella did not actually know the name of Mr. James’s agency, 
they were both very used to each other. The connection was quite personal and not 
business-like. Mr. James joked that he would like Pamella to have a child before she 
goes out to bush. Pamella was not in a relationship with Mr. James. Yet, like most 
big men, Mr. James liked to flirt and try his powers over women. Mr. James would 
have liked Pamella to work for his office. Pamella had already refused the small 
salary that Mr. James was offering his other employees and secretaries.20 With ref-
erence to the fact that Pamella was still childless, Mr. James insinuated that for 
her to give birth before her departure for bush would ensure Pamella’s continuing 
connection to Cameroon. Mr. James was here posing as a potential ‘Pa’ (i.e. sugar 
daddy). Yet, Pamella was not easily intimidated and jokingly ignored and con-
toured his advances. When Mr. James called her for a meeting after office hours, 
she refused to come and told him that she was not a toy. 
Pamella was educated, self-assured and aware of her privileged relationship 
with Mr. James. She knew about visa application procedures and flight costs. While 
Mr. James generally offered his Dubai line for 1,8 million, he was willing to send 
her to Dubai for only 1.3 million CFA. Although Pamella was much more privileged 
in her relationship to Mr. James than other clients, it nevertheless remained that 
Mr. James stayed in control as to where Pamella would go. When he thought he 
had an opening for Spain, he talked about Spain to her; and when he thought he 
had an opening in Australia, then he talked about Australia to her. Control over 
information centrally structures relations between brokers and aspiring migrants.
Again, despite her knowledge and education, Pamella was nevertheless de-
pendent on where Mr. James thought he had his respective openings. Pamella did 
not feel in a position to tell Mr. James to what country she wanted to go because 
she wanted to go to the country where he had ‘good connections’ and a ‘good line’. 
In contrast to any other potential client of Mr. James’s office or even his employees, 
Pamella knew that Mr. James had never travelled out of Cameroon. She proceeded 
to advise him: ‘It is not only sitting here. You have to go out, too.’
Although Mr. James had never travelled abroad, he was publicly recognised as 
a person of international standing. An acquaintance of mine even shared with me 
that she believed Mr. James had British nationality. Interestingly, whilst Pamella 
knew that Mr. James had never travelled, she did not know that, in terms of her 
education, she was actually better qualified than Mr. James was. Jokingly she called 
20  Salaries for his employees vary between 1500 to 80,000 cfa. With the presents and donations of a ‘Pa’ or two, her 
occasional consultancies and small-scale business activities, Pamella could make more money in Douala.
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him ‘chief ’ and insisted on finding out as much as she could about her supposed 
new line. ‘What do you have for me? Let it be a concrete programme.’ 
Mr. James planned for Pamella to travel to Ukraine with a visa for Ukraine. 
Through connections of his, he received an Italian residence permit from Italy. 
With this residence permit, Pamella was supposed to travel onwards from Ukraine 
to her chosen country of bushfalling within Europe. Mr. James probably preferred 
Pamella to not fly into Italy directly because Pamella’s passport did not - despite 
her Italian residence permit - hold any Schengen visa stamps. As for Pamella’s fi-
nal country of arrival, Mr. James recommended Norway where he had a contact 
person. In the beginning, Pamella was willing to do simple household work – just 
to be able to start somewhere. As Pamella was ‘smart’, her parents and Mr. James 
trusted her to figure out issues, such as working permits, along the way. 
Mr. James did not fully trust me and occasionally switched to speaking ‘kontri 
talk’ with Pamella in my presence.21 Despite his initial openness and invitation, he 
believed that all white people were potentially spies. What I learned about the Kiev 
line was mostly from Pamella who also sought my advice and opinion. Occasional 
English words came up amidst ‘kontri talk’. These words resonate heavily with what 
bushfalling has come to stand for: 
‘… connection… opportunity… success… assurance… confirm…landing… Ukraine 
no problem… Belgium, Germany, Norway, Sweden… line… document… figures… 
kontri man… doubt …. Your documents… they don’t want to see your visa.’
Two days before the supposed departure for Kiev, Pamella came to Mr. James’s 
office again. The close family friend (‘uncle’) who worked at Mr. James’s office did 
not know anything about her supposed departure. Mr. James ran the whole show 
himself. He had not even given Pamella the needed information. Everything was 
vague and up in the air. Despite the vagueness of her departure, Mr. James seemed 
anxious to strengthen his connections with Europe. For instance, he asked me and 
my friends (that came from Europe to visit during fieldwork) to marry him. He 
also had called Pamella just the Sunday before her supposed departure jokingly 
asking whether she would accept to marry him. With hindsight, his half-serious 
marriage proposals to both me and Pamella made more sense because he probably 
had never succeeded in sending anyone to Europe and was putting high hopes 
onto Pamella and the connections she in turn could generate for his business. The 
need for good relations and new connections is reciprocal. 
In their negotiations, Pamella tried to insist on what exactly was included 
within the fee and for her parents to only pay half of the money before departure. 
Complaining that he would not be able to generate any profit with this low price, 
Mr. James told Pamella that he was merely agreeing to the deal so that he could 
make a good name and win back the trust that he had lost due to the prior delays 
in departure. Nevertheless, Mr. James later made new financial arrangements with 
21  Even though Mr. James and Pamella could understand each other speaking the respective languages of their vil-
lages, they would not under normal circumstances speak these with each other. 
55
her parents who more easily agreed to Mr. James’s position that the line was going 
to cost 2.5 million CFA. 
The fifteenth of October came and passed by. Despite her supposed departure, 
Pamella had continued to pay house rent and play in the weekly njangi meetings. 
A substantial amount of her savings was still blocked in some business investment. 
Amidst all this confusion, Pamella called her parents to instruct them not to trans-
fer the remaining 1.5 million CFA. Mr. James passed through Douala again and 
wanted to spend the night there. Pamella told me that she sent him back to Buea. 
Multiple explanations were given for the new delay.22 
Then unexpectedly, exactly a month after the first promised departure date, 
the residence permit finally did come through. It was on a Wednesday that Mr. 
James called Pamella with that news. He wanted her to travel out the Saturday of 
that same week. Yet, Pamella still needed to unblock her savings from a business of 
hers, mobilize a ‘Pa’ of hers to give her money for trading, as well as to buy winter 
clothing. The Ukraine visa was only a one-month visa. If Pamella had left in one 
week’s time, only two weeks of its validity would have remained. She negotiated 
with Mr. James to make it the following Tuesday. Even at this point, Pamella was 
sceptical about Mr. James programme and was still hesitating on whether to go 
ahead or not. She told Mr. James not to think that the 500,000 CFA that her parents 
had already given him would push her to accept. All this while, Mr. James claimed 
that he had already spent two million on her programme. 
Yet, what troubled Pamella the most was the materiality of the actual residence 
permit and Italian ID card that Mr. James showed to her. The residence permit was 
an A4 sheet of paper that had a photo glued onto it. ‘Is it a true genuine permit?’, she 
asked me. The supposed ‘residence permit’ seemed too simple to Pamella; it could 
have been produced in Cameroon. So as to prove the quality of the document, Mr. 
James claimed that I had seen her residence permit, which was not true.23 
Pamella’s parents by contrast were overjoyed. As the ‘books’ had now come, 
Pamella’s parents were telling her to go and ‘walk’ (travel) with these books. After 
all, Mr. James had assured them that he was going to get the best books one can 
get for their daughter! Hence, Pamella arranged to hand over half of the remaining 
money on the Saturday before her departure. 
Yet, again there was a new delay. Mr. James had lost Pamella’s passport. I later 
found out that a mediator with whom Mr. James works had been attacked on the 
road from Douala to Buea. Passports with visas inside can be sold for high prices. 
Despite this mysterious attack, a few passports later turned up again. The recov-
ered passports included the one of Pamella. 
22  I was told that his partners in Europe posted Pamella’s papers not to Cameroon, but to Kenya. Pamella was told 
that his main agent was attacked in Douala. Neither Pamella, nor I were exactly sure what Mr. James had told Pamella’s 
parents. Mr. James did, however, go for drinks with Pamella’s parents. 
23  He had earlier shown me the residence permit that he had been sent for another client of his and I had translated 
what the document said. Pamella was present on this day and listened with great interest to my translations. Mr. James’ 
reaction told me that he had not before this enquired into the details of the residence permit that he had received 
through his contact people in Italy.
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Due to all the confusions and delays around Pamella’s supposed departure, her 
parents ended up defying their daughter’s precautions. They gave the entire two 
million CFA to Mr. James. As the lines were changing, the trust of Pamella’s parents 
in Mr. James had not diminished. Mr. James had told her father that everything 
was all right and that he needed the money to prepare Pamella’s final departure. I 
called Pamella a few days before her new departure date, but her number was no 
longer passing. After many delays, Pamella left secretly a few days earlier. Pamella 
had finally made it.
In the above description of Pamella and Mr. James, it becomes clear how im-
portant the dissemination of information is for the establishment and exercise of 
authority. Pamella did not have a great degree of control over the outcome of her 
emigration attempts because Mr. James did not share the details of his lines and 
programmes with her. It was also striking that Mr. James’s performance as a ‘big 
man’ and his emphasis on his ‘international connections’ outweighed Pamella’s 
much higher level of education. As a well-educated woman, she was not in a posi-
tion to change how her parents related to a migration broker of whom she had 
grown distrustful for a while.
Involuntary return: experiencing failure and seeing success
Pamella had left the country, but when a week later I prepared to visit her parents, 
I heard surprising news. Pamella had come back! Later Delphine pointed out to 
me that this was why people did not talk when they prepare to leave the country: 
‘Things can happen! People can do witchcraft. […] You might just come back.’ 
A few weeks later Pamella told me what has happened. Security staff at the 
Douala airport suspected her because of the Italian residence permit she was car-
rying. Just a few moments before being picked out, she had been required to de-
clare that she had sufficient financial resources to do business in Ukraine. She was 
hence in a difficult situation for negotiating with security staff. In the end, she lost 
a third rather than half of her 900 Euros she had on herself. 
Pamella paid 300 Euros to be allowed get on the plane. Yet, her journey never 
went beyond Kiev airport. As Pamella later told me, Mr. James had not bought the 
ticket himself. The same agent who had lost the passports of Mr. James’s clients in 
an attack had bought Pamella’s flight ticket. The agent had booked a flight for Pa-
mella and another client of Mr. James that brought them into the military airport 
of Kiev. Together with her travel companion, Pamella was sent back from Kiev to 
Moscow and then from Moscow to Dubai. In Dubai, their journey came to a mo-
mentary halt. There was no flight ticket for them to go to Cameroon. Given that 
Mr. James sends his clients out to hustle and fall bush, a return ticket is not at all 
required. His clients want a one-way ticket out of the country. 
On the phone, Mr. James first tried to persuade them to allow her to stay in 
Dubai. He was going to send his ‘contact people’ to try and ‘smuggle’ them out of 
57
the airport.24 Yet, seeing the environment at the airport, Pamella did not think that 
is was possible. She refused and insisted that Mr. James send them a return ticket 
back to Cameroon. 
Pamella wanted to avoid having the papers passed onto the Cameroonian po-
lice. On her way back from Dubai via Nairobi to Douala, Pamella spent the equiva-
lent of a monthly Cameroonian income (70 Euros) to get her Italian residence per-
mit and ID back from the officials. Once back in the possession of these documents, 
Pamella preceded to destroy and flush the residence permit down the toilet.25 ‘If 
not that, I’d still be in New Bell.’ 
New Bell is an infamously reputed prison in Cameroon. On a purely formal 
level, there might not be any legal provisions for imprisonment upon deportation. 
Nevertheless, it is common wisdom that state officials require financial payments 
to let deported migrants exit the airport. As one of my informants said, only those 
should try to fall bush that have family members back in Cameroon that can buy 
you out of prison in case of deportation. 
Upon first arriving at the airport, Pamella went straight to Mr. James’s house. 
For fear of shame and to overcome the first shock, Pamella stayed there for a few 
days before travelling the last few kilometres to her parental village. Pamella was 
contemptuous of Mr. James. She complained to me that he better start travelling 
himself before he claims to be in a position to smuggle people out of airports! ‘The 
highest that Mr. James has travelled is Yaoundé.’
Pamella no longer accepted the claim of Mr. James to be an ‘expert at travel-
ling’ – as he liked to speak of himself. Despite all of the pretensions and efforts of 
Mr. James, Pamella spitefully said that the work he did for her was fundamentally 
just ‘doki work’. The opening that he had found was not based on real knowledge 
or on genuinely powerful connections. He merely offered her papers – a residence 
permit he had been able to buy through the help of other mediators and brokers. 
Yet, despite her distress, Pamella did not blame Mr. James. She held the president of 
Cameroon responsible: ‘I blame Biya.’ Pamella considered conditions in Cameroon 
to be unbearable: ‘Oh Cameroon! I de mess mess man!’26 
In many ways, Pamella still depended on Mr. James. As she had run out of 
money, Mr. James gave her 60,000 CFA for travelling. Despite the failure of the Kiev 
line, Mr. James remained the ‘big man’ who hands out money to people around 
him.27 Mr. James informed Pamella’s parents by phone. When Pamella finally went 
to see her parents, she only stayed for a few hours. She explained the causes of her 
return to her parents who clearly understood and recognized the mistakes that had 
been made along the way. Yet, it was important to Pamella’s mother to first ‘cool 
down’ before going to see Mr. James. What counts the most to her was to see his 
‘countenance’. His personal attitude seemed more important to her than his actual 
24  It is possible that Mr. James had always considered Dubai as a back up in case the Ukraine programme was to fail. It 
is common practice for migration brokers to send their clients after the failure of one programme to a country that they 
know they can surely deliver. Otherwise, it would seem surprising that the flight from Douala to Kiev went via Dubai.
25  She kept the Italian ID card as a means of proof against Mr. James.
26  Translation: ‘Oh Cameroon! It messes people up!’
27  ‘Big men’, such as for example some wealthy landlords, can also give out money as gifts to their tenants. 
58
professional capacity. She wanted to see how Mr. James ‘felt’ and what his own 
‘plans’ were. ‘It’s his business. You must always have a plan.’ Although deeply disap-
pointed at Pamella’s return, her mother did not charge Mr. James’ with having been 
selfish or failing her daughter.
When Pamella’s father finally went to the office, Mr. James’ expression of regret 
about what had happened convinced Pamella’s father that there had been no bad 
intention. Clear arrangements were not made for future steps or alternative lines. 
Pamella’s father told Mr. James that he cannot add more money for another line 
and Mr. James accepted. He promised to come and visit Pamella’s parents at their 
house. In spite of the rather pompous failure, Pamella’s parents proceeded to wait 
for the next steps of Mr. James. 
After her husband’s meeting with Mr. James, Mamie Pamella explained to 
me that ‘nobody knew beforehand [that this would happen].’28 She compared Mr. 
James’s office to a camera. After all, she told me, the people who went during the 
time we had first met had all succeeded. Before you develop the film, you do not 
know what is really inside. The horizon of expectation vis-à-vis a migration broker 
always included the possibility of failure. A roll of film alone does not give an in-
dication of its photos. Before the development and printing in the dark room, one 
does not know what kind of photos will emerge or even whether any will appear. 
Striking in the aftermath of Pamella’s return is that daughter and parents com-
municated relatively little about the past event. Contrary to expectations, they did 
not form a united front against Mr. James. Mr. James succeeded in quickly align-
ing Pamella’s parents with him. Yet, Pamella and her parents did not meet again 
to discuss what they would like to do about the current situation. After her initial 
visit at her parents’ place, Pamella went to Douala where she also spent Christmas 
and New Year’s Eve. Although she herself had seen Mr. James in the meantime, it 
is only through me that Pamella learnt early in January that her father had gone to 
see Mr. James, too.29 
In the middle of January, Mamie Pamella went to Mr. James herself. Before her 
visit, she told me that Mr. James should just return the money ‘if the thing [was] 
above him.’ Yet, Mr James showed her documents and papers and talked. He said 
to her that Pamella’s passport had been sent to government people in Europe. She 
was supposed to fly out again on 28 January. Mr. James spoke to Pamella about his 
contact person from Ukraine who would come personally to Cameroon to take her 
there. When Pamella made personal enquiries with the sub-broker with whom Mr. 
James worked at the airport, she found out that the Ukraine man had long left the 
country again. As Pamella complained, he had the ‘power of the talk’. He is telling 
‘sweet stories’. 
Another promised departure day came and passed. Pamella confided with me 
that she suspected that his middlemen were using him. So as not to embarrass Mr. 
28  Original: ‘No man no bi know.’
29  Mamie Pamella felt very concerned for Pamella. She felt that she needed to give time to her daughter to overcome 
the shock. ‘She should rest. She is a small child. She can’t have my own ’heart. ‘She asked me for advice and I suggested 
that it might be good to have closer communication between family members so as to be able to push better for de-
mands with Mr. James.
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James any further, I avoided discussing Pamella’s return directly with him. When 
we eventually did discuss Pamella’s return, he told me that a big man does not give 
up easily. Whatever happens, he would learn and then continue. He told Pamella 
that he was going to try again to bring her to Ukraine. However, in Pamella’s pass-
port, there now is a stamp over her Ukrainian visa. While I managed to decipher 
the Cyrillic script with the help of some very rudimentary memories of the Russian 
alphabet, I guessed that immigration officials ‘cancel’ visas when they deny entry 
to a person. Mr. James, however, had told Pamella that her passport did not carry 
a prejudice against her.
Seeing his continued empty promises for supposed departure dates were not 
credible, Mr. James changed his approach and suggested starting a police enquiry 
against one of the mediators who had helped him to run the line to Kiev. He said 
that he wanted to pay back parts of the money that Pamella’s parents had given 
him, but did not have this money at his disposal. He argued that the Italian resi-
dence permit alone had cost him 800,000 CFA. Pamella knew that it would take a 
minimum of two years to take Mr. James to court to reclaim the money. Given that 
they are all from the same village, Pamella’s parents were also pressing for non-
confrontational solutions to the problem. As Mr. James promised to eventually 
return the money, he was winning time. 
Pamella’s parents had moved their household back to the North West Province. 
Pamella’s parents did not experience Mr. James’ prior delays in quite the same way 
as Pamella (or for that matter I) did. Pamella’s parents could not so easily under-
stand or measure the details of his lines, the various kinds of papers that could be 
produced by brokers, even the scale of wealth between various countries in bush. 
While Pamella grew increasingly sceptical during the long months during which 
she was supposed to go out with Mr. James, her parents did not necessarily see any 
of these delays as a sign of his potential lack of competence in the matter. After all, 
bushfalling is inherently dangerous and incomprehensible - hence the need for 
support of a broker. Money buys the connection that is indispensable to be able to 
make it abroad. 
The way in which Pamella and her parents understood prior failures differed. 
Mamie Pamella told me that the initial/first line to Cyprus had failed because the 
broker in question had not been straight. This explains the stress that she put on 
seeing the countenance of Mr. James upon her daughter’s return from Ukraine. 
The Embassy’s denial of a visa was Mamie Pamella explanation for the failure 
of her daughter’s second attempt to go to Cyprus. Who knows whether Pamella 
would have been granted the visa had it not been for the broker who prepared the 
application. What can be concluded from this case, is that doki line failures and 
visa denial failures due to stringent rules at the level of the Embassy cannot be 
distinguished from one another from the standpoint of somebody like Pamella’s 
mother or even Pamella herself. 
Even though Pamella’s mother had travelled to Germany once through her 
church, she did not distinguish between countries in bush where Mr. James had 
been sending his clients. Mr. James is considered successful because his clients 
are now all in white man kontri. The language of bushfalling and bush make for 
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a flat geography of migration. Yet, given my research with this broker, I know 
that the vast majority of his clients were actually leading their bushfalling lives 
in Dubai – not in Europe. Pamella’s ‘line’ was fundamentally different from his 
previous lines. 
Mamie Pamella does know that others have been right in their perseverance 
in falling bush. ‘People are going.’ ‘This is my own bad luck? Or it’s his own luck?’ 
Mamie Pamella told me about a person in her quarter who had just recently suc-
ceeded in going. This success case proved to her that it is right to persevere in 
the pursuit of travelling plans. She ‘sees’ success and interprets her own failure as 
‘bad luck’. 
While I do not know about the details of this specific person, I did do research 
with another informant who used to live in the same quarter as Mamie Pamella. 
Martina, too, gave her money to Mr. James and she was successful. Her ‘line’ to 
white man kontri took her to Dubai. Martina and her husband (to whom she is 
the second wife) lost money three times in different bushfalling attempts with 
various brokers and mediators. When I met Martina for the first time in the office 
of Mr. James, Mr. James was calling her husband and trying to persuade him to 
give money for a fourth attempt. Friends of Mamie Pamella know about Martina’s 
family. They know that she is now in ‘bush’. They know that she has sent money 
for Christmas! 
Yet, hurdles had marked even Martina’s final journey to Dubai.30 Because of 
bad documentation, Martina was first detained at Dubai airport for about a week 
before Mr. James finally managed to process a correct visa for Martina. At first, it 
was difficult for Martina to find work in Dubai. Hospitals were not recognizing her 
nursing diploma. All this while, her accommodation and visa renewals needed to 
be paid for. Martina survived in Dubai because her husband repeatedly sent money 
to her (at least another 1.3 million CFA).31 However, this fact hardly anybody knew 
about. What got people talking were the Christmas presents. Yet, the glory of her 
current success proved her resilience in pursuing bush right. Martina’s husband 
was thankful to Mr. James for having succeeded in sending his wife out. To have 
another family member out in bush is a source of pride and status for him. Martina 
is a success – whatever the sacrifices that she or her husband made on the way! 
Astonishingly enough, even Pamella’s deportation was taken calmly and did 
not fundamentally destroy their relations of trust. The failure of Pamella to actually 
go and remain in Ukraine was managed by Mr. James and her parents according 
to a set of rules and norms that were more rooted in social norms of Cameroonian 
society than in formalistically understood ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ of a economic 
business agreement. Mr. James needs trust, as well as a good reputation to be able 
30  I sincerely thank Michaela Pelican for her great team spirit in collaborating together with me in our respective 
research projects on the migration trajectory of Martina in both Cameroon and Dubai.
31  This is the equivalent of roughly 2,000 Euros. The woman who travelled out to Dubai on the same day with Martina 
had nobody who could send her money from Cameroon to survive. As a primary school teacher, she avoided repatria-
tion from Dubai by signing a work contract with a security company for three years, which had  extremely tedious work-
ing conditions and bad pay. As she needed to avoid repatriation to Cameroon at all cost, her visa regulations put her into 
a position in which she had no possibility of cancelling her three-year work contract.
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to continue to attract clients. It is clearly in his interest to be reconciliatory and to 
make good future promises about sending Pamella out through another line or 
about giving back the money. He was playing for time and projecting solutions 
into the future. 
Given that Mr. James genuinely tried to send Pamella out, they were disap-
pointed, but not angry with Mr. James. The real limit of trust in migration bro-
kers rests with selfishness. Mr. James has proven to be incapable of living up to 
his promises, yet, none of his behaviour pointed at selfishness. The ways in which 
money was transferred to brokers were evaluated heavily depend on levels and 
types of expectations of migration brokers. After all of Pamella’s bad experiences 
with Mr. James’s bushfalling lines, Pamella’s younger sister still seemed to have 
maintained a level of trust and admiration for Mr. James. She dated him and then 
became pregnant. Even if most ‘lines’ are for both men and women, relations be-
tween aspiring migrant women and brokers need to be understood also in relation 
to courtship practices and gender relations in Cameroon.
Secrecy also worked in favour of Mr. James. Pamella’s mother and father have 
no interest to talk about the embarrassment of a failed emigration attempt. Their 
bushfalling attempt needed to be kept secret so that future attempts would not be 
put at risk. The harmonious nature of relations was the way in which Mr. James and 
Pamella’s parents could deal with failure. Having said that, other alternative paths 
of action, such as a court trial against Mr. James, would not be possible either. 
Court trials take a long time, and brokers would be in a good position to influence 
the outcome of the decision on their own behalf.
In the above case study, I have analysed underlying reasons that motivated Pa-
mella’s parents to entrust money with the hands of Mr. James. This section of the 
chapter proposed that the very notion of risk in relation to monetary transfers needs 
to be contextualised into the life worlds of not just Pamella’s existence in Douala, but 
also of her younger brothers and sisters. In seeking to explain the choice of Pamella’s 
parents to entrust money with Mr. James, this section has also elaborated on the 
ways in which causes of failure remain largely invisible until the failure has already 
occurred. Pamella’s mother gave money to Mr. James because she needed to in or-
der to discover whether Mr. James could deliver and bring success. 
Vi c t o r i a ’s  b r o t h e r  g o e s  t o  C h i n a :  
t r a d i n g  t r a n s f o r m a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l s
From the above description arises the question as to how and whether relations 
between aspiring migrants and migration brokers change during moments of cri-
sis.  Through the next case study of Victoria’s brother, I will analyse dynamics of 
normative regulation beyond the framework of the law. I will argue that regard-
less of his actual capacities as a migration broker, Mr. Walter sells the potential to 
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transform an ordinary family into a bushfaller family. As a big man, Mr. Walter can 
(against remuneration) elevate others to the status of bushfallers. The legitimacy of 
the work of migration brokers is connected to this dispersal of powers and poten-
tial bestowment of status. 
Victoria was one of the brightest and most educated within her family. Her 
cousins ended their education at the level of GCE – the equivalent of the former 
O-level exam in Great Britain. She by contrast had started a degree course at the 
university and then did a year of accountancy training. Because of her special posi-
tion within the family, it was apparently always clear to her that one day she would 
go to bush. ‘As you are just leaving school, you really only want to travel abroad.’32 
Mr. Walter’s wife was a good friend of hers from both school and Church. Victoria 
lobbied her (paternal) uncle who happily agreed to finance her bushfalling project. 
Her uncle (the brother of her father) was a North Westerner who came down to 
make his fortune with cocoa farming in the South West Province. Victoria herself 
was born in the South West Province. As her parents were dead, her uncle was in 
charge of her. He handed over 1.3 million CFA to Mr. Walter in 2005, but things 
went wrong. Victoria was never able to go because – as Mr. Walter explained – he 
had had to spend her money on another purpose. He explained to Victoria that a 
client of his had attempted to rape a secretary in China and he had needed all his 
money to buy this client out of prison in China. Now there was no more money for 
him to send Victoria to China. 
Victoria struggled without success to get her money back. Victoria tells me 
how 2005 had been a bad year for Mr. Walter. After a series of failed migration 
programmes, he had had to go into hiding. He first went to Yaoundé and later 
disappeared to China. Even his wife with their three children and the secretary 
Delma had to move elsewhere for a while until matters calmed down. His church, 
the Christian Missionary Fellowship International, temporarily expelled him from 
membership. Delma explained that they did not like the way he was doing his 
business. Too many bribes, too much ‘ton ton’33 and other members of Church had 
unsuccessfully opened files with him for bushfalling. 34 
Victoria decided that she could not just sit and wait for Mr. Walter to arrange 
things. In retrospectively explaining to me how she dealt with this disappointment, 
Victoria told me that ‘to be a complete woman, you have to marry and give birth.’ 
After her failure to leave the country, Victoria instead married a North Westerner 
and gave birth. Once married, Victoria explained, you could not leave for bush 
again.35 Victoria’s paternal uncle was angry with Victoria for the failed bushfall-
ing attempts. He had been able to raise the money through his work on the cocoa 
32  Original: ‘As man de komot school, i dey hot for fall bush.’
33  ‘Ton ton’ is Pidgin and stands for indirect dealings and evasive manners.
34  Apparently, most of the other people from her Church had opened files with Mr. Walter in 2005 and had I been able 
to leave the country. Victoria notably talked about a friend of hers who went to Belgium. One success can overshadow 
many failures. 
35  At the time I met Victoria in Buea, she was just starting a course at the teacher training college. She was no longer 
motivated to go to bush. ‘My time has passed. I am on a different level now.’
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farm.36 As Victoria explained how her uncle raised the money, she puts her hands 
on her forefront to show the sweat that it took to work this money in the bush.37 
Victoria’s uncle accused her of having ‘eaten the money’ herself (Bayart 2009). 
Victoria fell severely ill for eight months and she strongly suspects her uncle to be 
at the root of her illness. He must have bewitched her out of his discontent over 
the failed bushfalling project. After Victoria’s marriage, her husband took it upon 
himself to pay back the debt to Victoria’s uncle. Three years after the initial failure 
to leave the country, her husband had already managed to pay back 650,000 CFA. 
As times became financially difficult, he sent his wife back to Mr. Walter to try to 
get the money back from him. It was during these days that I first met Victoria in 
the office of Mr. Walter. 
In their conversation, Mr. Walter reiterated that he did not have the money 
to be able to reimburse Victoria. My research assistant Delphine believed his nar-
rative. Over time, Victoria had grown very sceptical of Mr. Walter’s doings, yet, 
fundamentally still considered him not a feyman, but as a businessman in his own 
trade – a trade beyond comprehension. In a conciliatory voice, Mr. Walter offered 
that, if Victoria could bring him another client, he would be able to deduct money 
from that fee to give back to her. Victoria was not satisfied with this offer. She did 
not know anybody in her family or amongst her friends who wanted to go out. A 
few weeks later, her small brother had decided that he would like to go to bush. It 
is her only brother and hence the ‘chop chair’ of the family.38 He will have responsi-
bilities within the family and if he were to become a bushfaller, this would certainly 
be beneficial for the entire family. 
The family of origin is responsible for the bushfalling project of Victoria’s broth-
er. Yet, Victoria’s husband had already reimbursed Victoria’s uncle after their mar-
riage for the money that the uncle had spent on Victoria’s failed emigration project. 
Consequently, Victoria’s paternal uncle now had to give back the money that Vic-
toria’s husband had already reimbursed to him. ‘Let the uncle be fully responsible’, 
Victoria reasoned. Thus, Victoria’s uncle returned 650,000 CFA to her husband.
As Victoria came back to Mr. Walter’s office to announce that her brother was 
now willing to fall bush in her place, Victoria did not find Mr. Walter in his office. 
She tried to call him by phone, but none of his three numbers passed ‘Is this place 
really functioning?’ Victoria pointed her head at the office. The door to the simple 
office was small. The surroundings were dirty. Some people were taking computer 
classes in the front room. Although the office was always populated, it was difficult 
to ever see anybody really working there. In the absence of Mr. Walter, Victoria 
confided her worries to one of the employees. Johnson answers positively. ‘Yes’, the 
office functions, ‘the only problem is with the customers.’ Victoria asks whether 
there are not enough customers. Johnson answered that customer come, but do 
not always apply. His position appeared curious. Johnson vouched for the reliabil-
36  Since about 2000, cocoa sells quite well and those farmers do according to Cameroonians standards quite well. A 
plantation like Victoria’s uncle can generate in one year almost 3,000,000 cfa.
37  Here bush refers to farming the hinterlands. 
38  In the case of the death of the head of family, the ‘chop chair’ will become the new head of family.
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ity of the work of Mr. Walter’s office, but did not talk as if he himself was actually 
involved in carrying out the work. Even Victoria approached him almost as an 
external observer, rather than one of the people responsible for the operations.
When Victoria gave her money to Mr. Walter, his agency was called ‘Global 
Web Enterprise’. As Victoria narrated this to me, she turned around and tried to 
read the name on the poster next to the entrance of the small office in front of 
which we are sitting. This is the first time she has bothered to look at the poster and 
decipher the name. She did not particularly care for the agency or institution. She 
knew that she was dealing with Mr. Walter. She was disillusioned with him, his lies, 
and his ways. Yet, she did not see another way of going about bushfalling. ‘How 
does one do if you don’t go with these kind of people?’ She was interested to know 
whether Mr. Walter was establishing contacts with me to be able to send people 
out. When night came, Mr. Walter had still not made an appearance at the office.
A week later, Victoria’s brother Matthias –the now aspiring bushfaller – trav-
elled down from his uncle’s house to Buea. They caught Mr. Walter just a few min-
utes before he wanted to set off to Limbe. Invoking his powers, Mr. Walter prom-
ised ‘to perform’. He prided himself to have been given the ‘power of attorney’ 
in Malaysia.39 He proudly showed us the certificate. Within the same breath, he 
pointed to the photo of himself and the Chinese Ambassador in the room. ‘The 
Ambassador recognizes us.’40 
Having established his powers, Mr. Walter addressed Matthias: ‘You want to 
hustle, study...? Tell me what you want today.’ When Matthias explained that his 
uncle would like him to go to the U.S., Mr. Walter named the prices of his lines for 
Europe. Upon hearing the fee, Victoria cut the conversation short: ‘This is beyond 
me.’41 She did not have the financial power to reach to that level and mobilise more 
money for bush. Mr. Walter hence proceeded to promote China as a destination 
for bushfalling. If you have money, he explained to Matthias, you can do busi-
ness there. He spoke of possibilities to buy goods from factories, to act as a com-
missioner, to join in operations with other Cameroonians, to act as an interpreter 
or to teach English. He also mentioned medicine courses in English. Mr. Walter 
even told us that his junior brother preferred China to Europe. As usual, Mr. Wal-
ter offered information on salary levels in China and potential profit margins. He 
dropped numbers and conversion rates at an incredible speed. ‘I will start to per-
form’42, Mr. Walter concludes and goes on to talk a few words of Chinese.
Convinced by Mr. Walter’s talk, Matthias decided that he wanted to go to Chi-
na to hustle there for one year and then use one of Mr. Walter’s contact universities 
for medical studies. ‘My own level end[s] for visa and ticket. But since we know 
[each other]... I will help you with everything.’ Tuition fees are one million CFA. 
39  This means that he has been commissioned as a mediator by a university in Malaysia to recruit students for them 
in Cameroon.
40  I was not there when this photo was taken, but judging from the photo, I see no reason to put into question the 
authenticity of this photographic evidence of the personal connections between Mr. Walter and diplomatic staff at the 
Chinese embassy in Yaoundé.
41  Original: ‘My hand no reach for dey.’
42  Original: ‘I go start perform.’
65
Victoria calculated that this would require Matthias to have to save 100,000 CFA 
every month. Mr. Walter assured that this would be no problem – unless of course 
Matthias started to fall for and ‘perform’ with Chinese women. Matthias’s A-level 
results in the natural sciences were not a subject of discussion. Victoria hesitated 
and asked Mr. Walter the difficulty or ease of things would be for Matthias in Chi-
na. Mr. Walter responded that he could not ‘perform’ in his place. ‘I can only give 
you a channel to go. You have to be smart.’ 
The way Mr. Walter put matters, any failure would be Matthias’s responsibil-
ity and not the consequence of the kind of visa he had, the job market there and 
his own qualifications and connections. Mr. Walter managed affairs in such a 
way that many of his services were given out of kindness, but not as part of the 
actual agreement with his clients. Money negotiations are played according to 
Mr. Walter’s tune.43 
When Victoria wanted to leave the office, Mr. Walter asked her to ‘perform’. 
Victoria did not understand, yet, Matthias did. He took out 500,000 CFA and hand-
ed it over to his elder sister. His uncle had given him the money. Victoria was not 
aware that Matthias had this money on him, nor that her uncle had apparently 
already seen Mr. Walter in between. Mr. Walter did his calculations. He introduced 
a 25 percent reduction of the initial payment of 1.3 million CFA three years ago 
because he argued that ‘Victoria had not shown up for travel’ and then for the 
transfer of name. 
Mr. Walter took Victoria by surprise when informing her that the 25 percent 
cut was an integral part of their standard contracts: ‘We get standard contracts. 
These are the rules. I can bring you those.’ It is not clear whether Victoria ever 
signed such a ‘standard contract’. The 25 percent reduction boiled down to a loss 
of money of 325,000 CFA. He calculated that he already had a payment of 985,000 
CFA. The new China line cost 1.8 million CFA, which left 815,000 CFA still to be paid. 
He claimed that the uncle had already agreed to all of this: ‘I cannot cheat you by 
one Francs.’
Victoria held the money Matthias gave her and hesitated: ‘Money that I will 
give you the second time?’ Mr. Walter kept stressing how very fast Matthias could 
be leaving and she ended up handing over the money. The secretary Delma took 
the 500,000 CFA and the other employee Johnson took Matthias’s passport. Victoria 
told Mr. Walter again how very nearly she had died the last time she had given him 
money. Delma’s reaction to this was to stress that she ought to be glad that Mr. 
Walter was even recognising the money that she had deposited with him in 2005: 
‘Are you not grateful that he recognises you?’44 
As soon as Victoria handed over the money, Mr. Walter began calling Matthias 
‘boss’. Having now officially signed up for bushfalling, he advanced to the status 
of a real ‘man’. Matthias had a series of questions for Mr. Walter. As he got out an 
43  As Victoria did not have an idea about the prices for which other brokers currently offer their lines, she asked 
whether the flight would be included in the 1,8 million that the China line costs. She also mentioned that her uncle had 
wanted to know whether food would be included. Mr. Walter answered that the flight was included, yet the food not. 
‘‘The realities there are your own responsibility. Once you’re there in the plane, finances are finished.’
44  Original: ‘You no dye glad se I de recognise you?’
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empty form for a curriculum vita that he did not know how to complete, Mr. Wal-
ter responded: ‘I’m seeing a successful future businessman in front of me.’
By now, Victoria seemed more convinced of Mr. Walter’s powers and compli-
mented Mr. Walter for speaking with confidence. Mr. Walter replied: ‘I speak with 
confidence because I am a powerful personality [big boy]. I declare and I act upon 
my words.’45 As Victoria set of to leave, she asked him to dash her money. He stated 
that he never really carried money on himself because if he did, he would immedi-
ately spend the money. Just to fuel the car would cost him 50,000 CFA, he boasted. 
Victoria was impressed. ‘I cannot know this.’46 They are on different levels. She 
has never driven a car. Complimenting Mr. Walter, Victoria told him that people 
were saying that he was rich. Mr. Walter was pleased to hear this and laughed. He 
searched his pocket and finally found two 1,000 CFA notes. He handed them over 
to Victoria who thanked him. 
Symbolically, Victoria and Mr. Walter have turned the pages of past disputes. 
She has forgiven him past frustrations. By ‘dashing’ her a monetary gift of 2,000 
CFA, he symbolically accepted his role of protector and patron. His symbolic gift 
proved his generosity and goodwill (Daloz 2005: 168). Mr. Walter is a big and pow-
erful man who will do his best to look after his dependents – of which Victoria’s 
family has once again become.
He also helped out when it turned out that the uncle was reluctant to mobi-
lise yet more money for Matthias’s start capital in China. He agreed to print out 
a statement on his NGO paper specifying that one million CFA were necessary for 
Matthias’s accommodation and further bills upon arrival in China. With this paper 
in hand, Matthias was able to convince his uncle to give out another one million 
CFA. Seeing my surprise, Victoria explained, ‘This is Africa. If you merely tell him, 
he will not give it to you.’47 He would have been afraid of being duped once more, 
as Victoria’s uncle cannot read and write. Therefore, he had to ask somebody else 
to read and verify whether the paper was correct. With this pretence document [in 
Pidgin ‘lie lie document’], Victoria says it was easy to get the money from ‘Pa’. 
A few days later, the visa was indeed out. The remaining 315,000 CFA were 
handed over at the airport. A whole support group of about 35 family members 
came with Matthias to the airport to see him off. After his departure, neither Vic-
toria nor her uncle had any news for a very long time. Finally, at the end of January, 
I received a text message that ran the following way:
‘Hello jill, How are you? Please don’t be angry y I ha’nt cal sins I ariv.things ar stil very 
hard. Presently de ar celabr Chinese new yr til febr endingso no job til then. My no is 
(0086) 87450286754.Lots of luv.Matthias,Victoria’s brother’48
45  Original: ‘I talk with confidence because I be big boy. I declare and I act.’
46  Original: ‘I no fit know.’
47  Original: ‘If you tell i for your mop, I no go give you.’
48  For purposes of privacy, this is not the original telephone number of my informant. The writing, however, was left 
unchanged.
67
Mr. Walter never delivered any of the help and support he had initially so very 
generously promised. Yet, this was largely beyond vision to others. For most, Mat-
thias had gone out and was a bushfaller now. The speed of Mr. Walter’s action had 
proven his power. It was now up to Matthias to also ‘perform’ and earn money. 
Although Mr. Walter failed to send out Victoria, he did a few years later send 
out her brother. The family now finally had become a bushfaller family. Through 
this case study, I traced how relations between aspiring migrants and migration 
brokers are structurally embedded and regulated through normative frameworks 
outside and beyond the law. While Mr. Walter first failed Victoria, he did not turn 
out to be a feyman. He recognised her and through this proved his status as a big 
man. Through his final act, Mr. Walter proved his capacity to transform Victoria’s 
family into a bushfaller family. The symbolic value of this transformation needs to 
be taken seriously in an analysis of relations between migration brokers and aspir-
ing migrants. 
As patrons, migration brokers sell not the good of going out, but the potential 
for the aspiring migrant to become a bushfaller. One can only turn another person 
into a bushfaller, if oneself is such a person of power and status. A person who can 
pretend to be able to bring somebody else to bush is a ‘big man’. Big men, and by 
extension in my analysis, migration brokers, are according to Daloz social eleva-
tors (2002; 2005). They trade with the transformative potential of their clients. Mi-
gration brokers distribute resources and their work is hence seen as legitimate.
Just as crime is an insufficient mode of analysis for migration brokerage (Kyle 
& Liang 2001), relation between clients and brokers do not confer to ideal types 
of contractual business deals either. I have argued and sought to demonstrate that 
brokerage relations imply that the broker, with his superior powers and levels of 
connection, promises to protect and further the cause of his protégée. The broker 
promises to open up his own connections for the success of his applicants and pro-
tégées at the level of bush. The gracious ‘help’ discourse of both brokers is not just 
marketing strategy, but a lived and accepted reality of clients. 
Mr. Walter ‘dashed’ 2,000 CFA as a symbolic sign that he was accepting his 
responsibility for her and her brother. With the handing over of the money, the 
broker agrees to use his connections for the benefit (and mobility) of the respec-
tive ‘applicants’. When Victoria hesitated whether to trust Mr. Walter a second time 
with money, Mr. Walter’s secretary stressed that Victoria ought to be grateful that 
the boss ‘recognised’ her at all. The secretary did not talk about recognition of prior 
payments, but of recognition of Victoria as a protégée who wanted to gain access 
to bush. 
We have thus seen that brokerage relations are not to be summed up by a con-
tractual exchange of services against money. Aspiring migrants receive the favours 
of a person in authority to whom she and her family are bound in manifold ways. 
The norms that govern family and community affairs also govern these interac-
tions.
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C o n c l u s i o n
In this chapter, I have sought to provide a migrant-centred analysis of relations 
between migration brokers and aspiring migrants that does not foreclose conclu-
sions by directly equating legality with legitimacy. In the first case study, a migra-
tion broker accompanied one of his clients to the airport in Douala. In this case, I 
have argued that the deeds and actions of migration brokers need to be analysed 
in relation to the expectations and norms that aspiring migrants and their fam-
ily members hold and evaluate the authority and capacity of a migration broker. 
Expectations vis-à-vis migration brokers are formed in relation to the lived experi-
ence in a place of departure. From this perspective, migration brokers are impor-
tant regulatory authorities. 
The second case study of this chapter took an in-depth look at financial ra-
tionalities within the family of an aspiring migrant woman called Pamella. Her 
parents entrusted money with the migration broker Mr. James because alternative 
investments in Cameroon seemed even riskier. The case study of Pamella taught us 
that trust in migration brokers can only be explained if it is grounded in the moral 
economy of departure in Cameroon where crisis has become routinised (Mbembe 
& Roitman 1995) and failure to go out is the starting position of most aspiring 
migrant. 
The third case study underscored that the transformative potential of a migra-
tion broker can still be realised even many years after a first failed attempt and even 
for another member of family. Mr. Walter recognised his financial debt towards 
Victoria a few years after the initial payment and agreed to send her brother to 
China. This case study showed us that relations between migration brokers and 
aspiring migrants need to be analysed over a longer time span than the emigration 
attempt of only one individual. 
Together these three sections have illustrated that money transfers from aspir-
ing migrants to migration brokers need to be understood in a context in which 
brokers are not perceived as just commercial entrepreneurs, but also as well re-
spected patrons, authority figures and ‘agents of benevolence, goodwill and equity’ 
(Simon 2009: 198). Bush is a sphere to which only powerful people can gain access. 
The authority of migration brokers stands for and reflects hopes for global belong-
ing (Ferguson 2006: 174-175) and ambitions for success and status. Migration is a 
drive to enter into a relationship with the international ‘level’. This advancement 
to a ‘higher level’ requires the patronage of a person from bush, somebody in bush 
or a broker. 
Within a symbolic economy in which possibilities for migration are under-
stood as lines and as openings, aspiring migrants considered the potential failure 
of a migration broker in relation to the failure of embassies to give out visas. From 
the perspective of a society of departure, failed emigration trajectories with bro-
kers are similar to the ones withoutbrokers. As a consequence, migration brokers 
are not ‘other’ to aspiring migrants, but rather ‘allies’ and ‘helpers’ in a quest for 
both geographic and social mobility. The failure of a migration broker is also the 
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failure of the aspiring migrant. Without the broker, he or she would not even have 
had the chance or hope of being able to go out. Consequently, migratory risks are 
not located with migration brokers. Aspiring migrants are aware that some migra-
tion brokers can use and mislead their clients. Yet, migration brokers are not at all 
considered an obstacle to safe migration. Instead, migration brokers open up great 
opportunities and chances that are otherwise not available.
When taking the typology of dokimen, feymen and big man as a starting point 
for an analysis of migration-related risks, the location of risk in relation to migra-
tion changes. Within the consciousness of the aspiring migrants, ‘programmes’, 
‘lines’ and ‘openings’ are evaluated according to price, speed and safety. While a 
family might harbour doubts as to whether or not a migration broker could po-
tentially turn out to be a feyman, the respective risk of handing over money to 
this broker is evaluated in terms of the social status of the broker and the potential 
power of the papers that he will deliver for travelling. 
The migration broker is not blamed for the failure of an emigration as long as 
the willingness of a broker to facilitate emigration is not in question. Even in the 
face of failure, Mr. James and Mr. Walter were not considered feymen because they 
genuinely ‘tried’ to deliver the visas and make the people travel. Given the impor-
tance of intentions, one can conclude on a slightly different linguistic register that 
migration brokers are considered to have an obligation to deliver the ‘means’ of 
migration, but not the ‘ends’. During transfers of money, migration brokers take 
upon themselves the obligation to put means of emigration at the disposal of their 
clients. The ultimate goal of bush should thus become possible, but not certain. 
This nuance in migratory expectations explains why handing over money to mi-
gration brokers is a chance and not a risk. 
Aspiring migrants entrust migration brokers with money because other means 
of emigration are rare and not considered as fundamentally different from emigra-
tion trajectories without migration brokers. Once money is handed over to migra-
tion brokers, migration brokers are under pressure to try to send out their clients. 
Brokers are not mere businessmen engaged in the facilitation of emigration. They 
are also members of a community within which they operate. This aspect sets out 
frameworks that regulate relations at moments of crisis.49 Brokers who do not put 
their means at the disposal of aspiring migrants will be shamed as ‘feymen’. Migra-
tion brokers whose means are merely based on the imitation of papers will be de-
valued as ‘dokimen’. Migration brokers whose connections for once fail will be able 
to upkeep their status as ‘big men’ if they have past success cases to show for. 
I believe that the above case studies have helped to contribute towards an un-
derstanding of third-party mediated migration beyond the dichotomy of ‘perpe-
trator’ and ‘victim’ (Spener 2009: 162-200; Zheng 2010: 2-3). In view of future re-
search on migration brokers and human smuggling, my research demonstrates the 
need for more micro-level attention to individual, as well family and community-
wide relationship between migration brokers and clients. An analysis of migration 
49  For an analysis of how patrons are also under pressure to live up to the expectations of their clients, see Smith 
2007:13.
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brokers in terms of a potential (future) classification as either legal or illegal misses 
a vital dimension within emigration trajectories, i.e. the nature of the personal 
relations between brokers and aspiring migrants. These dynamics are always nec-
essarily geographically located and thus culturally specific. Yet, a mere analysis of 
relations between migration brokers and aspiring migrants in terms of patronage 
would not be able to account for the wider structural and legal context that pushes 
aspiring migrants to seek out migration through the services of migration brokers. 
In my chapter, I have sought to analyse the agency of aspiring migrants in relation 
to migration brokers in a wider structural context of dynamics of departure. 
Discussions of trafficking and smuggling explain migrants’ vulnerability and 
dependence vis-à-vis brokers in terms of the profit that migration brokers generate 
(for a critique see Spener 2009: 208- 213; Andrijasevic 2010). While the brokers of 
this study certainly also managed to generate a profit, I have argued that the lan-
guage of market relations does not do justice to broker migrant relations. Seeking 
to go beyond an analysis of relations between aspiring migrants and brokers in 
terms of either mere profit or patronage, it has emerged in this chapter that migra-
tion brokerage needs to be considered in terms of the sources and limits of trust.50
According to Möllering, trust is the basis for individual risk-taking behaviour 
or cooperation. Trust according to him is a mental process that covers expecta-
tions, the interpretation of a social reality and the suspension of doubt (Möllering 
2001: 412-415). Migration is framed as  risk in much public and academic dis-
cussion. This framework emphasises the momentary suspension of doubt within 
trust. Yet, as Möllering allows us to understand, interpretations of social realities 
and expectations are equally important to explain why aspiring migrants trust and 
enter into relationships with migration brokers.51
This chapter has demonstrated that the relationship between migration bro-
kers and aspiring migrants need to be understood in relation to other regulatory 
authorities and the ways in which aspiring migrants experience these. From the 
perspective of aspiring migrants, trust in migration brokers is not related to the 
respective legality of the brokerage service in question. The legitimacy or legality 
of a visa is not questionable simply because a broker was involved. In fact, from 
the perspective of an aspiring bushfaller, many times the migration broker gives 
out the visas. From this perspective, the warnings of the U.S. embassy with which I 
opened this chapter are simply not relevant for aspiring migrants.
Having in this chapter explained how and why aspiring migrants and their 
families relate to migration brokers, in the following chapter I will analyse the 
emergence of migration brokers in Buea and their connections to instances of 
stateness. As there are limits to trust between migration brokers and aspiring mi-
grants, I will explore what these limits of credibility are.
50  Trust can be understood as a ‘state of favourable expectations regarding other people’s actions and intentions’ 
‘(Möllering 2001: 404).
51  Spener, for example, argues that ‘the generalized situation of structural violence that constitutes [the] lived experi-
ences [of migrants] can prepare migrants to ‘pardon’ all but the most egregious abuses committed against them by 
their coyotes (2009: 227).’
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chapter 2 
The rise and fall of migration brokers: The 
limits of credibility beyond the law 
‘Good news! Good news! Good news!’ says one of the main advertisement posters of 
inacod entitled. inacod stands for ‘International Assistance for Community Develop-
ment.’ The poster of inacod announces its new ‘international work study programmes’ 
for the year 2008/09. As an organisation, inacod promises the following services: ‘ad-
mission and scholarships into foreign universities’, ‘foreign jobs’, ‘students’ orientation 
and career counselling’, ‘information about opportunities’ and ‘travelling assistance’. 
When I first met Mr. James, who runs the office of inacod, he explained that his work 
catered for needs in ‘development and education.’ His intention was to send people 
‘out’ for study programmes abroad, as well as for work placements. In addition to this, 
he applied for international grants for development projects and offered ‘career advice’ 
at schools. This career advice consisted of giving out information about some profes-
sional training schools in the country with which he had formed partnerships, as well 
as about his own services of being able to send people ‘out’. 
Mr. James also disseminates advice on travelling and advertisements for his or-
ganisation over the radio. At the beginning of my fieldwork period in September 2007, 
he regularly came to speak during a talk show on a local radio station housed just next 
6. Advertisement for a migration broker 
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to his office. In response to the questions of the local journalist on the downsides and 
risks of bushfalling, Mr. James replied:
This is not the first time that we are hearing that people are being duped. People 
have always been duped and will continue to be duped. Not until when they are well 
informed. Not until the government steps in to ensure that this organization […] 
should be carrying out their activities in the interest of the community. Because what 
INACOD does is not for the interest of INACOD, but for the interest of the community. 
The community needs to be well informed about realities of life. […] You want to 
travel to Italy. Ok, we will follow up for you to get the visa for you to travel to Italy. 
What do you want to go and do in Italy? What’s your intention of travelling? You 
want to go for work? For studies? Or for business? We know it and we counsel you. 
[…] So we try to get the best for our Cameroonian people. And we are represented in 
most of these countries.
In these radio shows, Mr. James presented himself as an expert on travelling and 
as one who could offer protection from the dangers of duping. Travelling, studying and 
job placements abroad are all beneficial for young people in Cameroon. As such, Mr. 
James positioned himself as working in the interest of either the ‘community’ or the 
‘Cameroonian people’. Mr. James had a vision and that vision was to ‘make globaliza-
tion a reality.’ In his discourse, Mr. James made strong connections between travelling, 
community development and globalisation. 
On a somewhat different discursive level, Mr. James also explicitly positioned him-
self as contributing to a fight against so called illegal migration. On Labour Day on 
the 1st of May, the staff of INACOD participated in a demonstration carrying signs with 
the INACOD emblem and reading ‘stop clandestine migration’. Not wanting to question 
his authority as a migration broker, I never asked Mr. James about his motivations for 
this action. Regardless of whether he considered the migration trajectories of his own 
clients to be legal, I silently took the signboards against clandestine migration as an 
advertisement granting further legitimacy of his work.
The office of the second migration broker, Mr. Walter, was located just a five minute 
walk from the entrance to the university campus. Just off the main road of Buea was a 
big colourful poster on the side of the street that showed an airplane entitled ‘dream-
lifter’, which carried clients to clean and shiny airports abroad. A skyscraper landscape 
spoke of the promises of another world. The contrast between the unpaved, uneven 
and stony road and the little office that Mr. Walter rented was stark. Next to one of 
the many buildings that would never be completed was another advertisement poster 
entitled ‘arrival’. White people walk in suits and with suitcases in an enormous airport 
equipped with unheard of technologies – in this case an underground subway system. 
The big slogan of the poster read: ‘So my dreams have finally come true. I am leaving 
for China. The beginning of a new life. Thanks to AALC.’ The full name of Mr. Walter’s 
organisation was ‘Africa Asia Learning Connection.’ The poster spoke of quality serv-
ice and provided all the necessary contact details to get in touch with Mr. Walter. 
The poster explicitly promised assistance with studies  (medicine, engineering, 
business and computer sciences) and work (teaching, business consultancy and im-
port export) in China. Yet, in radio announcements, the geographical scope of Mr. 
73
Walter’s agency was considerably bigger. The journalist of another local radio station 
was paid to include a few minutes of advertisement for AALC in his popular weekly 
programmes:
AALC is the office that is close to the ‘Amazing Pharmacy’ in Molyko. That’s the place 
where anybody who wants to go to bush can find his answer. Over there to get a visa 
for any Schengen country, it’s apply now and go tomorrow. What does that mean? 
From the day that you apply, just know that you must already start to pack your bag. 
It only takes five working days for your visa to reach your table. Any Schengen coun-
try: Sweden, Finland, Holland, Denmark, Poland, Germany! None of this means 
anything to people at AALC. Two year visa – bang! Three years visa – bang! Or to go 
to China? You will talk a bit of ‘yen hung’ – that’s not a small thing either. Africa Asia 
Learning Connection – they are the answer. Even Malaysia, anywhere you want to 
go, I’m telling you! Even Dubai – yes! Africa Asia Learning Connection can put you 
right inside the airplane. Say bye bye to your people at home. It’s behind Amazing 
pharmacy that you can find them. As I am talking, I ought to give you their telephone 
number: 99 40 25 38 or 33 33 57 94.1
In the announcement, the capacity and power of Mr. Walter’s agency seem 
almost without limit. The journalist improvises the actual announcements every 
time afresh. He goes to the same church as Mr. Walter, and they have been long-
standing friends. The radio announcement marked the speed of Mr. Walter’s work 
as one of the distinguishing criteria of the quality of his work and services. 
While the advertisement can obviously not be taken at face value, it does re-
quire serious analysis to understand why such claims and self-portrayals fall on 
fertile ground in a society of departure such I was studying in Buea. The INACOD 
signboard about stopping clandestine migration, in particular, presents a paradox. 
Why are migration brokers credible even as actors that fight illegal migration? How 
do migration brokers relate to the realm of the law?
The last chapter ended with an emphasis on trust between migration brokers 
and aspiring migrants. I will focus here on the limits of trust and credibility. In 
particular, I will ask how the limits of credibility relate to legal constraints. In do-
ing so, I will to explore the relative place of state-enforceable law as opposed to the 
binding rules and customs generated in the social field of migration brokerage. I 
will then develop a particular focus on papers. Through this focus, I will explore 
relations between migration brokerage and instances of stateness. I will further 
explore how they have been able to establish themselves as migration brokers, as 
well as how the migration brokers’ offices function. Through this analysis, I seek 
1  ‘aalc na that office wey e near amazing pharmacy for molyko. Na the place that wey any man wey e want fall bush, 
know say answer e don be. Because for them for get visa for go for any Schengen  kontri na cam now now, go now now. 
E mean say weti, from the day wey you apply just know say you must pack your bag because you get only five working 
days for your visa for reach for your table. Any Schengen kontri: Sweden, Finland, Holland, Denmark, Poland, German 
man all that things dem for Africa Asia Learning Connection na no nothing. Two years visa - pimp, three years visa - 
pimp. Or na for go for China, you talk small yen hung, no be na any thing. Africa Asia Learning Connection na ye be the 
answer. Or na Malaysia, any side wey you want go, I tell wona say…or na Dubai yo, Africa Asia Learning Connection di 
put you for aeroplane. Say kontri man bye bye. Na for back Amazing pharmacy them dey; even as I de talk so I must give 
you tigini tigini (contact number) again; 99 47 25 38 or 34 33 57 94.’
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to contribute towards an investigation of the place of the law within conditions of 
departure. 
Migration brokerage and state authority: l imits of credibility  
beyond the law
The smuggling paradigm considers migration brokers in opposition to the state. 
The distinction in definition of smuggling and trafficking is that smugglers violate 
state borders (Gallagher 2002: 25-27; van Liempt 2006: 27-28) and traffickers vio-
late the security of the migrants (Anderson 2007; Wong 2005: 80- 82).2 From this 
legalistic point of view, smugglers work against the state. This chapter will prob-
lematise the supposed opposition between migration brokers and state authority. 
While brokers produce papers that may result in what is characterized as il-
legal migration, laws of the Cameroonian state itself might not be violated. As 
pointed out in the introduction of this dissertation, questions on the respective 
realness or fakeness of travel documents will be raised only if and when they are of 
relevance to the actors in Cameroon. 
My exploration of the relevance and reach of legal framework within societies 
of departure can broadly be understood as a study of legal consciousness (Silbey 
2005; Fleury-Steiner & Nielsen 2006). This body of literature focuses on the under-
standings and meanings of law as they are manifest in social relations. Legal con-
sciousness studies takes seriously what people do and say about law and includes 
the practices and discourses into the definition of the subject. Legal consciousness 
is thus an important step towards engaging with a study of law beyond the mere 
material manifestation of its textual foundations. Rather regrettably, scholars of 
legal consciousness have not yet sufficiently explored how legal consciousness it-
self contributes to the making of laws and law. A heavy bias within the literature 
towards studies of legal consciousness in European and North American contexts 
currently exists (for an interesting exception see Kohlhagen 2006).
While migration policy classifies migration brokers in terms of their respective 
legality or illegality, I suggest that this approach towards migration brokerage is 
based on beliefs about the reach of the law. We have seen in the preceding chapter 
that trust in migration brokers was based on other criteria of credibility rather 
than on the law. Instead of thus presupposing opposition, I explore connections 
and overlaps between migration brokers and instances of stateness. With instances 
of stateness, I refer to an ensemble of state actors and state institutions, as well as 
its regulatory instruments (such as  papers) and normative frameworks (such as le-
gality). I use the term stateness because I want to also include modalities of power 
and representational discourses that draw on the state as a set of institutions or a 
discursive construction (Mitchell 2006: 177- 182; Gupta 2006: 212- 213).
When thinking about ways to conceptualise the production of travel permits 
by migration brokers, I draw parallels with cross-border trade. Bayart, Hibou and 
Ellis remind us that so-called informal traders exploit opportunities created by the 
2  For a historical and sociological discussion of how this legal definition came into being, see Ditmore (2003 & 2005).
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state (1999: 18). Migration brokers, too, can only do their work because of restric-
tive legal frameworks that produce a demand and a possibility for them to offer 
their services. Were it not for the restrictive visa policies and immigration legisla-
tion, migration brokers would never have come into existence and would never 
have become the gate-keeper of bush as a scarce resource. 
Not only migration brokers exist thanks to restrictive legal frameworks. Roit-
man and Hibou pointed to so-called informal manners of creating wealth that 
contribute to the viability of state power through the production of rents (Hibou 
1999; Roitman 2005: 151-198). For military personnel and customs officials, rent 
on fraudulent commerce can be more important than official salaries. In part, 
cross-border traders manage to pay their taxes through banditry (Roitman 2004b). 
Smuggling and banditry thus creates wealth that is channelled to instances of state-
ness both through tax, as well as through personalised transfers that complement 
the salaries of state officials. 
By focusing on connections and overlaps between smugglers, migration bro-
kers, road side bandits and state officials, the very boundaries between the sup-
posed realm of the market and the state become subject to questioning. Through 
the empirical material on the work of migration brokers, this chapter explores 
ways of thinking about these connections and continuities.
While tracing the rise – and current closure — of these two migration broker 
offices, I analyse the role and function of their brokerage services in relation to 
other regulatory authorities, such as the state. I will explore the function, structure 
and the (cultural and other) repertoires on which the brokers draw to institute 
their authority.3 Whilst one place is supposed to be governed by the laws of the 
law and the other by the laws of profit, I explore in this and the following chapter 
the importance of social law in both places. With social laws, I refer to norms and 
unwritten expectations, requirements and regulations. As regulatory authorities, 
both actors seek to establish control over migration trajectories.
The first section of this chapter will further look at the two key migration bro-
kers and situate them vis-à-vis other types of brokerages – both within and beyond 
the strict field of migration brokerage. In this section, I argue that the credibility 
of migration brokers needs to be related to forms of paper production in the Cam-
eroonian context of stateness. Through a close study of the biographical trajectory 
of Mr. James, the second section of this chapter demonstrates how migration bro-
kers manage and control connections and information flows. Hence, the limits of 
legal frameworks for the credibility of migration brokers become clear. The third 
section analyses how Mr. James’s office functions and how he relates to his em-
ployees. Through this discussion, the importance of information management as 
a crucial source of credibility for migration brokers becomes clear. The fourth and 
final section is dedicated to an exploration of state-enforceable legal frameworks 
as a supposed limit on the authority of migration brokers. It traces the trajectory 
of Mr. Walter as a migration broker.
3  I take here inspiration from Wacquant’s comparison between the prison and the ghetto as two institutions of racial 
domination (2000: 384). His work has helped me to look for commonalities between two different spaces.
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To  f o l l o w  d o k i :  t h e  p o w e r  o f  b r o k e r s  a n d  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o f  p a p e r s 
To follow doki – Pidgin for following up on paper work – has come to stand largely 
for preparing and trying to travel out. Wanting to go out is synonymous with do-
ing paper work. Papers hold strong powers over possibilities of mobility. Yet, many 
papers that are needed to apply for an international travel permit, such as for ex-
ample reference letters for internships or certificates to document work experience, 
are not automatically issued in everyday life in Cameroon. Many types of employ-
ment (including the one of my own research assistant) occur without written work 
contracts. Consequently, many forms of documentation have to be obtained and 
produced throughout preparations for departure. 
In this section, I discuss the credibility of migration brokers in relation to 
travel documents. Starting with the specific case of how I met the two key broker 
informants of this chapter, I then situate both migration brokers within a broader 
range of brokerage services. In the chapter, I argue that migration brokerage must 
be seen in relation to what it means for aspiring migrants to both acquire and use 
papers in Cameroon. The culture of the Cameroonian state (Bayart 1979) and the 
process of working its structure are crucial for the emergence of professionalised 
mediation. If access to services of the Cameroonian state requires professional me-
diation, then access to visas certainly does.
First encounters with Mr. Walter and Mr. James:  
the power of a connection
On the first day I met Mr. Walter, he was dressed in a red blazer, dark trousers, a 
yellow shirt and a tie. He was dressed both more formally, but also more colour-
fully than ordinary men on the streets of Buea. His clothing marked him as a big 
man who knew how to dress, i.e. how to ‘sape’. A man in his mid thirties, Mr. Wal-
ter is energetic and full of potential for even greater success in the future.  He was 
the former neighbour of my host mother. When they met by chance on the street, 
she told him about my research project. He immediately called me and rushed 
to drive to the cultural centre where I had been at the time of his call. As we met 
for the first time, we went to a café and he eagerly explained his business strategy 
to me. He presented himself as a young entrepreneur doing import/export with 
China, as well as running several NGOs. The activities of his NGOs had died down, 
however, because they lacked the ‘international power’. External financial support 
had not been forthcoming. 
He initially was more careful in his discussion concerning his bushfalling 
work, and gave the impression that it was more like a social service. He stressed 
that he sent out young Cameroonian business people that could not find work 
because companies were shutting down in Cameroon. He explained that he also 
helped to place motivated Cameroonian medical students with Chinese universi-
ties. Competition for places was strong and the attribution of places not always 
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entirely transparent. Given that the equipment at Chinese university hospitals was 
so much better than in Cameroon, Mr. Walter argued that 2,000 Dollars of tuition 
fees were not much to pay for the parents of such students. In the following two 
to three weeks, he was planning to send another about 50 Cameroonians to China. 
He planned to accompany them on their journey and he immediately proceeded to 
invite me to come along and join him. His friendliness made it clear that he would 
not have minded female company. He even implied that he would pay for my flight 
ticket. I vaguely replied with an evasive ‘maybe.’
From day one, Mr. Walter was extremely open with me. As I later found out, he 
enjoyed showing off his powers to just about anyone and was thus also open to col-
laborating with my research assistant. Parading through town with a white woman 
beside him was also an additional source of pride and prestige to his already im-
pressive reputation. Connections are key to his business activities he repeatedly 
explained to me. ‘Nothing is too expensive for some relation.’ 
A great part of why Mr. Walter was so enthusiastic about meeting me was be-
cause I was from Europe. ‘I want to have a breakthrough in Europe. If there is an 
opening for us …?’ Hence, I found myself in his office a mere two hours after our 
first initial encounter. Collaboration with me was a potential new avenue to new 
‘connections’ and new sources of ‘information.’ Both are two key sources of author-
ity that  - as we shall later see – constitute the ‘level’ and ‘powers’ of a migration 
broker. Although Mr. Walter never pushed the line on me, he did suggest that I 
could indeed make millions if I were to somehow make sure to send him univer-
sity admission letters in regular intervals. 
Mr. Walter was set out to impress during all our interactions throughout the 
year. For hours, he would discuss with Delphine and me over lunch or dinner his 
many ambitious plans and programmes. His capacity to imagine plans and projects 
- mostly in relation to bush – seemed everlasting. At one time, he had wanted to 
stop his brokerage work and instead set up a computer firm. ‘I’ve been raised in a 
straight way.’ ‘Money corrupts.’ The other moment, he planned on coming to West-
ern Europe with his NGO so that he can finally set up contacts there as well. He had 
also bought land in Buea to build and start a new school. He was going to provide 
scholarships for studies in ‘bush’ for students from his school. The bush element of 
his private school, he was confident, would draw many students.
After I had been researching for six months, he then came with the proposal 
of a contract marriage. Following my polite decline of the deal, his evening visits 
at my home nevertheless stretched still later. I confided my discomfort with one 
of my neighbours and pretended towards Mr. Walter to be an early morning per-
son. After this, Mr. Walter disappeared. He had gone to bush. On his return, he 
explained that he had travelled to Romania. His capacity to come and leave the 
country is a key resource for him as a migration broker. 
Although Mr. Walter once mentioned that my research could potentially close 
down lines, he did not consider that the consequences of my research project could 
be a threat to him personally. Lines are changing fast in his business. To be a broker 
means to always be on the move and seek out the next opening, programme, or 
opportunity. He considered himself too strong in terms of connections and powers 
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to give weight to the research project of a young woman. Furthermore, he knew 
and pointed out to me that people related, above all, to him as a person and not 
his agency as an institution. The name of his agency could be changed and so he 
did not mind that I took photos of his posters and advertisement material. He was 
proud of what he had achieved and established.
The attitude of Mr. James from INACOD had been similar. I had first sent my 
research assistant Delphine in the guise of a potential client of his. When I was later 
introduced to him via Delphine, Mr. James, proud of his agency, was open towards 
my questions and my research project. As a man in his late 30s, Mr. James sat in 
a big suit behind his office desk. Several phones and a closed laptop sat beside his 
desk, which was decorated with a map of the world, a plastic globe of the world 
and a small American flag. Behind Mr. James, was a poster from the University of 
Portsmouth and another world map. 
Mr. James is of a certain standing in town. Like any big man, he has a stom-
ach and proudly pats it while talking. He was always dressed in suits and always 
pleased to talk of himself as director. He had five staff members in his office in 
Buea. During my year of fieldwork, he opened another office in Bamenda with 
another seven staff members, as well as further contact points and potential new 
offices in Kumba, Yaoundé, Douala and Bafoussam. By the end of my fieldwork, he 
employed 26 people and, according to his records, had sent out 40- 55 people from 
his office in Buea within the year of 2008 alone.4 
Mr. James was not manifestly rich, but certainly unequivocally recognized for 
his position as an international migration broker. He was seen to be somebody 
of international level. A taxi acquaintance of mine was even convinced that Mr. 
James had British nationality.
During fieldwork, Mr. James repeatedly asked me to participate in radio shows 
together with him and to lecture in his career counselling activities. I did the latter 
once and otherwise remained evasive. In return for giving me research material 
and subjects, I opted to pass on information, such as web addresses, a directory 
with websites of scholarship granting institutions and a small prospectus listing 
MA courses available at a graduate school at my university in the Netherlands. All 
of these, he could have downloaded free from the Internet. Yet, he was extremely 
grateful to me. The brochures I had brought were proof of his international power 
and level of connection. I do not believe he ever knew how to use the website 
directory of scholarship granting institutions. The office did not have an Internet 
connection and, although he talked about sending down one of his employees to 
research the information in a cyber café, I do not think that he ever actually did 
this. I was more valuable as a source of connection than of information.
The logical pursuit of his quest for connections was to propose marriage to 
me, which he did. In contrast to Mr. Walter, however, he always had a very matter-
of-fact tone of proposing various types of marriage arrangements to me (with or 
without household tasks, excluding the necessity of childbirth or even any kind of 
4  No systematic and reliable records are made on people that are sent out. Hence this number represents the mere 
minimum for which I found written evidence.
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sexual engagement within the matrimonial union). In the course of a year, ever-
new ways of reacting to, dodging, evading and joking about the topic of marriage 
emerged. I insisted that I was already taken and jokingly suggested that he might 
like a friend of mine who was going to visit me in Buea. He accepted and thus 
changed his relation towards me. I was no longer a potential spouse, but in the 
absence of my friend’s biological family in Cameroon was now conferred the role 
of a member of his potential family-in-law. Because he did not know my friend’s 
mother, he conferred this role to me and started making his bridewealth payments 
to me. He gave me small gifts of money to buy mangos, a drink or just for my taxi 
ride back home. Delphine now jokingly referred to Mr. James as her brother-in-
law (in Pidgin ‘moyo’). 
When my female friend arrived from France, she gracefully accepted to go for 
lunch with Mr. James and me. Marriage came up in conversation, as did a photo 
opportunity. The picture of the three of us later appeared on a wall with other 
pictures in both his offices in Buea and Bamenda. The photos proved our official 
partnership. His demands for marriage began to ease off. 
Just as his openness and cooperation was key to my research, I, too, was an 
important resource for him. There was between Mr. James and me a sense of re-
ciprocal gratitude, scepticism, but also a humorously light and even intimate tone 
around our negotiations of marriage. Even after my friend’s departure, Mr. James 
dashed me money for transport. It is the way a big man treats a child, a potential 
lover or somebody within his responsibility. 
The status of migration brokers as ‘big men’ is always especially manifest in the 
ways they related to women – not just me. My informant Pamella (preceding chap-
ter) or female secretaries employed by Mr. James had similar dynamics. The two 
secretaries employed by Mr. James, for example, were replaced at an incredible rate 
every few months. It seems that none of them ever got beyond their trial period. 
When Delphine and I tried to explore why one after the other female secretary left 
the office, one of the former secretaries enigmatically told us that ‘some can bear 
what others cannot.’ 
Range of mediators for migration: dokimen, feymen and big men
At the beginning of my fieldwork, Delphine told me that a man in a beer parlour 
who claimed to be able to help her with a visa for bush had approached her. She 
laughed and explained that money to invite her for two drinks was not going to 
convince her he actually had the power to bring her to bush. If a man looks poor 
and he runs around claiming to be able to help people fall bush, then why is he not 
in bush himself? She did not believe the man in the beer parlour was genuine in 
terms of his ‘powers’. To her mind, he was only pretending to be a broker so as to 
impress and flirt with her. What is the landscape in which brokers like Mr. James 
and Mr. Walter operate? What different types of migration brokers exist?
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In the early 1990s, there were no migration broker offices in Buea. Yet, dur-
ing fieldwork in 2008, I came across a whole series of different types of migration 
brokerage:
Individual facilitators that address visa applicants in front of embassies; •	
Dokimen that specialize in the production of travel documents; •	
Individual agents with important contacts; •	
Fake agencies that offer services in (scam) emails;•	
NGO•	 s that send out members to conferences; 
Small trading companies that facilitate business visas in addition to their pri-•	
mary commerce; 
Out-sourced student recruitment centres for various private business schools •	
in Europe;5 
Well- established offices specialized in study and work migration, like the ones •	
of Mr. James and Mr. Walter
Mr. James was specialised in sending people to Dubai. Mr. Walter was known for 
his connections to China. At times, Mr. Walter would transfer a client who wanted 
to go to Dubai to Mr. James and Mr. James could transfer a client who wanted to 
go to China to Mr. Walter. Both had their specialisations. Yet, collaboration is rare. 
Both claim, try and were known in Cameroon to also send clients to Europe. While 
other facilitators might distribute flyers and put up posters, they actually made ra-
dio announcements and were visible through their respective offices. 
Mr. James had a small office on top of a cyber café and a money transfer compa-
ny. The signboard in front of the office drew attention to Mr. James’s office under the 
name of INACOD (International Assistance for Community Development). Mr. Wal-
ter had a small office right next to the university campus of Buea. A big signboard 
at the side of the road invited people to work over to his ‘Common Initiative Group’ 
called ‘Africa Asia Learning Connection’ (AALC).6 The office itself was small, staffed 
by two secretarial employees who received clients in the reception room while Mr. 
Walter was mostly travelling and working in much more mobile fashion.
Mr. James and Mr. Walter’s main strategies were using ‘document dispatch’, 
which does not put at stake the physical safety of aspiring migrants (Spener 2009:3 
123). Document dispatching is relatively expensive when compared to other strat-
egies of migration brokerage, like for example overland crossings. Nevertheless, 
state officials can reject travel documents - dependent on the intensity of controls 
and the nature of the travel permit. Various sorts of document dispatching are 
the most common form of migration brokerage in Cameroon. Those who cannot 
afford migration brokers are left with attempting to leave the country overland or 
trying their luck at an Embassy (see the following chapter).
5  I notably studied one office in Buea and Douala that had been officially charged by a series of business schools 
in Europe to recruit students. Entry into such programmes depended on the financial resources of the parents of the 
respective student and his or her marks at school. 
6  Common Initiative Groups have a slightly different legal status in Cameroon than Non-Governmental Organisations 
(ngos).
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Document dispatch involves the buying of papers from other mediators or 
directly from contacts within state institutions or other mediators, or the scanning 
and graphic production of counterfeit documents. I have never heard employees 
discuss the difference between papers that are bought from state institutions or 
mediators, or papers that are produced by the broker himself. For one thing, the 
employees of migration brokers with whom I worked were hardly involved with 
the actual preparations of departure. The many levels of mediators in the migra-
tion process concealed the differences between a travel document from a state in-
stitution or another mediator – but in certain ways also rendered these differences 
negligible. 
Clients are usually not given their travel documents until they arrive at the air-
port on the day of departure. Both brokers stated that clients might otherwise lose 
the travel documents or become subjects of witchcraft by jealous people around 
them. The power of travel documents is too strong to allow them to be held and 
stored by just anyone. Thus, clients do not usually have the means or time to know 
through which means their migration broker has been able to attain and provide 
them with travel documents. The only thing that matters on the day of departure 
is whether or not to they will be able to leave the country because they have the 
papers needed to do so. It is thus only during the actual event of the border cross-
ing that the powers of a travel document become apparent. 
Besides Mr. Walter, Mr. James and a former employee of Mr. James called Mr. 
Peter, I met three other migration brokers in Buea. Two of these brokers work to-
gether. Their services were much more limited. As a team, they mostly advertised 
seminars and conferences for the purpose of bushfalling. Without a fixed agency 
name or a steady office, they became individuals who happen to have a few pieces 
of information that can be useful in bushfalling. Their clothing, their behaviour 
and their language made it clear that they were ordinary people. No one would 
mistake them for real big men. Their credibility was not broad enough to establish 
any other claim. Even bushfalling had not made them successful businessmen. 
The opposite case was Mr. Ekkas; a successful businessman - and formerly de-
ported bushfaller - who every now and then used his business trips or connections 
to send one or two people out. His main profession was retail of electronic equip-
ment, such as mobile phones. He is the only broker to whom I ever talked who 
considered that sending people out was trafficking and that it was illegal to pass on 
visas to people who wanted to travel. Mr. Ekkas built up the capital stock for his 
current business while working as an undocumented migrant in bush. He became 
successful through bushfalling, and his extended experience as an undocumented 
migrant in bush most likely led him to internalise that it was illegal, as well as mor-
ally problematic to sell visas. 
If he nevertheless chose to on occasion to make a bit of extra money through 
sending people to bush, he only did so because he felt he had to compensate for 
heavy tax pressures on his two stores. ‘I’m doing anything because I’m obliged to 
meet up with government taxes.’ Taxation in Cameroon is unpredictable and often 
harsh. Just like in a popular song in Pidgin, my informants kept reiterating that 
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taxation was killing business.7 They regretted that many businessmen could only 
survive if they could pay bribes or had connections with state officials. This is also 
the reason why both Mr. James and Mr. Walter’s offices were registered as ‘Com-
mon Initiative Groups’ – a Cameroonian legal status for what might otherwise be 
considered an NGO. Only these supposedly non-profit and non-governmental or-
ganisations can hope to avoid the harsh demand of taxation officers. Thus to meet 
up with government taxation, Mr. Ekkas sought extra sources of income through 
occasionally operating as a migration broker. This very example demonstrates how 
strongly both illegal and illegitimate practices are intertwined with state practices.
Mr. Ekkas explained to Delphine and me that ‘bushfalling is lack of informa-
tion.’ According to him,  ‘anyone can make somebody to travel.’ Delphine contra-
dicted him ardently. She believed that only some people have the ‘power’ to send 
people out. Mr. Ekkas laughed and shrugged that there was no ‘magic’ involved. 
Yet, the world of bush is often beyond comprehension and a source of authority. 
This makes it comprehensible that those who make the transformation of ordi-
nary people into bushfallers are considered as having special ‘powers’. Mr. Ekkas is 
aware of these conceptions in town. ‘They look at us as if we were doing miracles. 
We’re not doing miracles.’ 
Being knowledgeable of openings and having connections to bush rates much 
higher on a scale of credibility than merely being able to produce or arrange for 
papers that can facilitate one’s attempt at emigration. Hence, Mr. James and Mr. 
Walter resisted being grouped within the category of dokimen. ‘We want things to 
be very moral, very straight. We’ve come here to stay,’ Mr. James explained to me. 
He declared to me that he was beyond doki work. He no longer needed to get his 
hand dirty with that kind of work. He claimed that he was able to replace paper 
work with knowledge and connections as a source of authority for his brokerage 
work. He said that he was now on a higher level as a broker. He was now sending 
out his clients through the specific knowledge of particular visa application proce-
dures or through the specific kinds of visas or residence permits that he could get 
straight from bush through new connections of his.
Both Mr. Walter and Mr. James saw the distinction between dokimen and the 
work that they do as important. Mr. Walter told me that he would always try to 
avoid being caught producing false papers, but obviously also relied on connec-
tions to make his work come through. Both Mr. James and Mr. Walter claimed to 
have risen beyond the stage of mere dokimen; they said that they did not get their 
hands dirty anymore. 
Big men can provide their clients with travel documents because they know 
about visa application procedures and entry routes or can acquire the necessary 
7  In a very interesting song, the artist Awilo sings about how he wants to fall bush. He connects bushfalling to the 
political and economic situation in Cameroon. Besides a lack of freedom of speech, he blames arbitrary and hard taxa-
tion practices for the lack of economic growth. A few selected lyrics of his song ‘I want to [be] a bushfaller.’ translated 
into English: ‘Political parties in Cameroon have become like ngos that fight for foreign aid. […] He [Paul Biya] said we 
should create great ambitions. But every time we stay behind to create [i.e. the great ambitions], taxation also creates 
in our back [i.e. wealth]. Where is the development then? Tell me!’ The original in Pidgin: ‘Partie politique for Cameroon 
e don turn like ngo, wey dem dey fight for foreign aid. […] Great ambition e don talk se we must to create this time. But 
time way we left back for dey create, taxation dey create too for we back. Whusy the development dey alors? Tell me!’ 
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papers, whether authentic or counterfeit, through their connections. These con-
nections can be both connections to state institutions or to other mediators who in 
their turn have connections to state institutions. In light of the potentially illegal 
nature of some of this work, how do aspiring migrants evaluate the trustworthi-
ness of the travel documents that migration brokers promise to give to them? 
Beyond illegality: powerful brokers and papers that work
All throughout the year of fieldwork, I was always struck by the way in which peo-
ple talked about getting their papers in bush. There are dokimen who are special-
ized in the production and sale of papers. Typically, doki papers are produced at 
the roadside by people working behind small tables and equipped with typewriters. 
Such dokimen can be found in front of official offices, such as the immigration of-
fice in Yaoundé. 
When I first learned Pidgin, I believed that the word doki had an illegal un-
dertone. Yet, when I asked a lecturer at the University of Buea to write a letter 
of invitation for me to apply for a six month research visa, my host mother and 
research assistant jokingly referred to this piece of paper as doki, too. They did so 
because it would have been more correct or official  for me to receive a letter of 
invitation from the head of department rather than from a simple lecturer. Had I 
thus attained my visa for Cameroon with the help of a dokiman? 
Navaro-Yashin suggests that a closer look at the production of documents as 
material artefacts and their inclusion into bodies of official knowledge unravels the 
potential fake ‘quality inherent to all papers and forms of documentation’ (2007: 
94). She points us to the importance of processes of production of official docu-
ments. Processes of paper production are complex. Therefore, papers are not es-
sentially legal or illegal. The example of my letter of invitation demonstrated the 
scope of interpretations that are possible for integrating papers into a body of legal 
documents. The Cameroonian Embassy accepted my letter of invitation and I was 
granted a legal visa. 
The word doki in Anglophone Cameroon points us towards the volatility of 
legal processes of paper production. In Pidgin, the word doki can refer to all forms 
of paper documentation. To further delineate precarious forms of paper produc-
tion and multiple levels of mediation within the context of Cameroonian forms of 
stateness, the next chapter on visa interviews will give a graphic example of how 
Delphine struggled to get a passport. In this section, I focus on discussing the im-
portance and normality of mediation within the Cameroonian context of stateness. 
Smith’s research on the ‘culture of corruption’ in Nigeria, for example, shows 
how state institutions and their services in Nigeria are only accessible through 
additional service providers, such as ‘touts’ (Smith 2007: 60). Similar to the cases 
of other countries on the African continent (Hornberger 2009: 90; Blundo 2006: 
809; Lund 2007), people’s strategies in Cameroon for approaching state institutions 
often is to try and personalise relations or, in the absence of this possibility, to pass 
through a mediator. Intermediaries can be independent businessmen, bureau-
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crats or extended family members. In the Cameroonian context, to attain papers 
through mediators is so much part of everyday experiences that they do not put 
into question the quality or legitimacy of the attained paper. 
While some intermediaries can be ‘venal and unscrupulous in their dealings 
with the public’ (Smith 2007: 60), Smith also reminds us that intermediaries also 
offer valuable services in the face of a corrupt and highly personalized bureaucracy 
(Smith 2007: 60). Even if mediators pursue their own interests, they often also allow 
their clients to save money and time. In the preceding chapter, we already saw how 
intermediaries within the field of migration are greatly respected and admired.
When after the end of fieldwork, I shared with Delphine the news that the two 
offices of migration brokers where we had conducted research were no longer in 
existence, she was shocked, but did not fundamentally change her view and evalu-
ation of the two brokers. In an interview a few months after her arrival in Europe, 
she told me the following:
I will respect both of them because they have the power to get the visa. They have 
the power to make you have the visa in your passports. I don’t know what they do or 
what it takes, but […] the important thing is that you are in Europe and it’s because 
of him.
Delphine’s statement illustrates an interesting type of consciousness regarding 
how the credibility of migration brokers is evaluated. With respect to the travel 
permits that migration brokers issue and give to their clients, what matters most 
to Delphine and other informants is not the ‘legality’ of papers but their ‘capacity’. 
The question to ask about travel documents is whether these papers ‘work’ and en-
able people to travel. In his discussion of the use and meaning of papers, Bakewell 
has come to similar conclusions. He distinguishes between states that look at paper 
in terms of their ‘symbolic’ value and the individuals of his research in North West 
Zambia who look at papers in terms of their ‘function’ (2007).8 
To be able to grasp how the rise and fall of migration brokers is understood 
and explained in the Cameroonian context, one also needs to think in terms of 
power. This is the way Delphine evaluated the credibility of Mr. Walter as a migra-
tion broker:
Even if they claim more than they actually deliver, if five people are applying and then 
you give visa to three or two persons that is something big. Because the five people 
could still go to the embassy on their own and none of them will have it. So if five 
people apply and two go, then it’s something to ride home with.
Respectively, the power of a broker is evaluated based on the power of his con-
nections and papers. 
Many times during fieldwork, I would not know the exact channels or proce-
dures through which either of my two key migration brokers produce the travel 
permits for their clients. Yet, beyond the limits of what I could empirically observe, 
8  According to Kohlhagen, different conceptions of paper are the consequences of the respective social and legal 
context of an individual (2006) and ought thus not be essentiallised as being either European or Cameroonian.
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the question of whether a travel document is fake or real is also in many ways ob-
jectively indeterminable or irrelevant. A so called fake travel permit can still work 
and allow the holder of the permit to cross a border point.9 
This chapter will continue to explore sources and limits of credibility of mi-
gration brokers using the terms of aspiring migrants and not in relation to state-
defined terms of legality and legitimacy. Having set out the moral economy of bro-
kerage in general and migration brokerage in particular, the second section of this 
chapter will be devoted to a study of Mr. James as a migration broker and how his 
credibility relied on the management of information and connections.
T h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  M r.  J a m e s  a s  a  m i g r a t i o n  b r o k e r :  
moral  economies of  connectivity  and information as  currency
This section focuses on the perceptions of people of Mr. James’s services. It then 
moves on to discus the personal emergence of Mr. James as a migration broker, his 
creation of INACOD as an agency and the how clients and people in Buea viewed 
and experienced it. The value of information and connection – to both the inter-
national level and appearances of stateness – are two key explanatory points for the 
emergence of Mr. James as a migration broker.
Perceptions of clients
The first thing that one sees upon 
entering the office of Mr. James is a 
big poster of a skyline of skyscrapers 
that resemble Hong Kong. On one of 
my first days, the secretary proudly 
told me that she herself had bought 
the poster and had put it up in the 
reception room (see photo 7). It’s a 
photo of Paris, she happily told me. 
The street hawker had told her that 
it was Paris. I double-checked the 
writing at the bottom of the poster, 
which was incomprehensible to me, 
but certainly was written in Chinese 
characters and not in Latin letters. She repeated that the poster was a photo of Paris 
9  The reverse can equally be true. The Canadian consulate section in Paris did not accept as being genuine an at-
testation in which I certified that Delphine had been working for me in Cameroon. The attestation was judged dubious 
because it did not contain enough ‘securities’. While Delphine’s work relationship might be categorised by certain state 
actors as ‘informal’, her work was certainly not illegal.
7. inacod: flows of information
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and none of my expressions of doubt led her to question the poster. Was I insult-
ing her poster by implying that it might merely be a city in Asia and not Europe? 
Whatever the value economy of her acquisition, she certainly chose to continue to 
believe what the hawker had told her. I was not enough of an authority on the mat-
ter and I did not consider it terribly important to insist on correcting her vision. 
She was happy to see Paris every day upon opening the door to her office. 
During the year of 2008, 784 by-passers had signed the registry of the NGO 
- showing that a constant and steady flow of people came to the office for informa-
tion and advice. Male by-passers outnumbered female by-passer by 5:1, and the 
ratio for those who actually travelled was one of 2: 1. The office of INACOD in Buea 
sent a minimum of 42 people out to bush in 2008, of which 34 went to Dubai.10 The 
other eight clients travelled to South Africa, Europe and, curiously enough, one 
person to South Korea. 
Within the course of my research period, I saw the office of INACOD rapidly 
transform itself. Initially, only two of the four rooms were sparsely furnished. Later, 
two sofas were added to the reception room and to Mr. James’ office. A two-meter 
big world map and several Swiss Air posters were added to the walls. An inflatable 
red plastic airplane hung in the reception room. Then collection of books of varying 
quality and on haphazard topics created the impression of a consultation library (see 
photo 8).
Posters from Portsmouth Uni-
versity and brochures from private 
business schools across the world 
were lying around and illustrated 
the level of international connec-
tion on which Mr. James relied for 
his work. To walk into the office of 
the director, one also has to pass 
one of the Swiss Air posters onto 
which an INACOD poster had been 
inserted. The Swiss air and INACOD 
poster were joined in such a man-
ner as to create the impression that 
the two were official ‘partners’. A 
few days before my departure, a new award with which Mr. James had been deco-
rated by a group of journalists called the ‘Watchdog Newspaper Group’ appeared 
on the walls of the office. In a frame and on very official looking paper the award 
reads: ‘The most reliable institute for international assistance to travel abroad - re-
view of agencies in the North West, South West, West and Centre Province.’ 
While the director received his clients sitting beside his laptop, I have never 
seen him work on the computer, nor have I seen the laptop actually switched on. 
10  This number is the bare minimum for which I have concrete evidence and excludes the welders and nursing pro-
gramme for Dubai. The actual number of clients sent out to bush is hence probably higher. Neither inacod, nor the 
agency of Mr. Walter (aalc) kept a clear record of whom they were sending out and where to.
8. inacod: international connections
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One day, he had trouble with his rubber stamp. The cushion was dry and the entire 
box was made out of plastic. ‘This one correct for you people,’ the director stated 
in an irritated manner. ‘It is not presentable.’ He then proceeded to ring the little 
bell he recently had installed under his table. On hearing the ring, the secretary en-
tered and the director ordered her to buy a better one. Hierarchal power relations 
are important for his position of authority and overall credibility. He was enacting 
the role of a director.
Mr. James loves to always refer to his international ‘partners’, of which I am one, 
too. A big photo wall in the reception room documents various activities, such 
as when the ‘American Biographical Institute’ gave him an award because he had 
‘changed and improved the life of people around him’. This award was well received 
in his office and community. Delphine was impressed. ‘A whole international 
something!’ she exclaimed. In addition, the secretary approvingly stated the status 
of Mr. James had futher improved: ‘The level of the director has become high.’11 
The American Biographical Institute (ABI) is a publisher based in the United 
States and specialized in biographical reference directories since 1967. It generated 
revenue from sales of certificates and books. Politicians and journalists denounced 
its awards as frauds. Yet, it was only on my return to the world of constant Internet 
access that the idea came to me to further enquire into this ‘whole international 
something’ Mr. James had won. For those in his office, this certification marked 
him as a man of international standing and certainly one with connections.
His clients respected this official air of his function. Despite her scepticism, 
Pamella still saw Mr. James as an Ambassador helping her leave the country. ‘Your 
job is not just for Cameroonians, for individuals. You’re like an Ambassador for 
Cameroon.’ Ambassadors are representatives of state authority. In the Anglophone 
Cameroonian context can also refer to the representation of villages or home com-
munities in other regions in Cameroon. I was struck during fieldwork to find many 
bars with names related to Embassies; some of these bars in the South West Prov-
ince included the names of villages in the North West Province.
In their interactions, Pamella did not only compliment Mr. James on being an 
Ambassador, she also referred to Mr. James as chief. By calling Mr. James a chief, 
Pamella confirmed his authority, but also his social role and responsibility. In his 
village of origin in the North West province, Mr. James was nominated national 
youth director. In this function, he organized football tournaments donated with 
prizes. He also proudly told me how he was intending to make connections be-
tween those in the village and bushfallers from his village of origin in the North 
West Province. 
When I talked with Pamella’s father about the difficulties and risks of bushfall-
ing, he told me that this was precisely why he went to ‘this new department’, refer-
ring to the office of INACOD. Concerning the necessary papers for travelling out, he 
assured me that Pamella already had a passport. ‘Yes, it is difficult to have a visa, 
but this department...office here can help.’ Pamella’s parents chose to trust ‘this new 
department’ set up by Mr. James. 
11  ‘The level of the director don up.’
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The word ‘department’ references a public authority and often is used in rela-
tion to state institutions. It is as if, for Pamella’s father, the manager of INACOD and 
the people at the embassy was part of the same official world. In this light, it is also 
understandable why Pamella’s parents had little doubts about the quality of the 
travel documents that Mr. James would produce for their daughter. 
When trying to ease Pamella’s scepticism, Mr. James boasted that an earlier 
client of his had managed to enter the infamously reputed airport of Charles de 
Gaulle with travel permits of the same kind. He explained that officials at the air-
port had scanned the paper under a machine and it came up good. ‘The security is 
inside.’ To demonstrate his point, he took a 10,000 CFA banknote and held it under 
the calculator on his table. He then pressed a button that switched on a blue light, 
which was meant to verify the authenticity of the 10,000 CFA banknote. He showed 
us how magically another layer of script suddenly appears on the banknote. With 
this powerful demonstration, the discussion of the quality of Pamella’s travel docu-
ments was closed. This act did not actually prove anything about the quality or 
nature of the papers that he promised to provide to Pamella. During the entire 
conversation, Pamella’s travel documents were discussed, but not actually present. 
However, to be able to make script appear where nothing could normally be seen, 
demonstrated and validated his expertise over matters of paper. The blue light ex-
ercise carried out with a bank note proved his authority and special knowledge.
Mr. James later mentioned to me that he had received Pamella’s residence per-
mit through a contact person of his in Italy. Yet, the details of how Mr. James at-
tained the travel documents with which he was promising to make Pamella travel 
was never a topic of conversation between Pamella’s parents and me. Mr. James 
was credible for Pamella’s parents because they did not trust themselves to work 
the necessary papers for bushfalling. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, they 
also trusted him because they were personally connected to him and because they 
believed in his claims to have very good connections. 
Mr. James liked to talk of his partners abroad, yet he had not heard a British 
person pronounce Portsmouth. I never heard anyone commenting on his pronun-
ciation of the town of Portsmouth. As I have already mentioned in the first chapter, 
Mr. James has never travelled outside of Cameroon himself.12 How was it thus pos-
sible for Mr. James to set himself up as a migration broker?
The biographical trajectory of Mr. James and the emergence  
of his office
Mr. James comes from a rather poor family in a small village in the North West 
Province of Anglophone Cameroon. Due to the economic and social circumstanc-
es of his early life, he only had a technical certificate upon leaving school. He re-
paired refrigerators and worked for a road construction company, while studying 
and saving money so he could go to school and pass both his O and A-level exams 
respectively in 1995 and 1997. With these qualifications, he was able to find work 
12  This fact only Pamella, but none of his other clients or employees were aware of.
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for a German NGO, and this was the beginning of his ascension to the status of a 
big man. He worked for the Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 
a prestigious semi-public German development agency. 
During his years with the GTZ, Mr. James was in charge of promoting health in-
surance and other forms of social security systems. During the time he worked for 
the international NGO, he began doing minor paperwork for people who wanted 
to go out. This doki work could be anything from helping people to fill in forms - 
e.g. visa or university applications - to establishing other connections or actually 
manufacturing papers. After a few years, Mr. James decided to open up his own 
NGO. When we met, INACOD was only about a year old. 
Most of the clients of INACOD go to Dubai. Because Dubai does not have an 
Embassy in Cameroon, Mr. James mediates between his clients and authorities in 
Dubai. The Dubai lines cost 1.8 million CFA and include a (one-way) flight, pick-
up from the airport, the visa, a few days’ accommodation and supposed assistance 
with the job hunt. The employees of INACOD in charge of funding proposals for 
development projects explained that they were dealing directly with the ministry 
of foreign affairs in Dubai, which had commissioned an agency to handle visas. 
INACOD scans the passports of its clients and sends these to the handling agency in 
Dubai. The visa is then sent to INACOD in the form of a letter. Instead of a stamp 
or sticker within the passport of the respective traveller, this simple piece of paper 
constitutes the permit to travel and allows for entry into Dubai territory upon ar-
rival at the airport.
 In part, prior successful travel programmes opened the path to new partners. 
For example, a nurse in Dubai helped Mr. James to send other nurses to Dubai 
for their respective requalification exams. With a regular contact person in Dubai, 
INACOD had truly gone international. Implying that there were also other offices in 
the world, the posters in Mr. James’s office now read ‘INACOD Cameroon’.
The money involved in bushfalling lines generates its own dynamics and ever-
new lines. One of Mr. James’s clients managed to find work with a company in 
Dubai as a welder. With time, he decided to give up on hustling and make his 
money through bushfalling. He made deals with companies in Dubai to recruit 
welders and mechanic drivers from Cameroon. These companies pay for the visas 
and flight tickets of their future employees. 
Some welders that came to the office were only really looking for a job - with 
no bushfalling intentions in their minds. Nevertheless, they had to pay for getting 
a job. At only 1.3 million CFA, this line is extremely cheap - particularly since it in-
cluded a fixed job upon arrival. In addition, these lucky bushfallers received a three 
year contract, which was remunerated with a monthly salary of 700,000 CFA - 1.000 
Euros - and included paid trips back to Cameroon every year. 
Within the whole field of bushfalling lines, this was an extremely good deal. 
For once, Delphine and I did not fight when she suggested getting her brother 
into this programme.13 Yet, this programme was also a good financial deal for Mr. 
James. The manager of the programme and his assistant in Dubai received 900,000 
13  He was rather unsuccessfully hustling in Malabo.
90
CFA of the 1.3 million CFA. With 35 places for welders, this left a profit of 14 mil-
lion CFA – roughly 21,300 Euro— for INACOD. ‘If we took 2.5 million, it will be 
business,’ Mr. James told me when we discussed the financial details of this Dubai 
programme for welders. 
Mr. James made sure that the available job openings were distributed across 
his various offices. On the phone, he reassured the office manager of Bamenda and 
promised a fixed rate of openings for his office as part of an effort to give prefer-
ential treatment to clients from the North West Province. He explained to me later 
that he introduced fixed rates for every office to have enough success cases in every 
region that could then draw in new clients. 
Connections are everything for a broker. At one point, Mr. James had a contact 
person in South Africa that could get three Cameroonian passports stamped with 
visas in Swaziland. The 250,000 CFA per passport he needed to pay in commission 
was minimal in comparison to the money he could ask for these passports from 
his clients. Another trick he used was to put Nigerian visas into the Cameroonian 
passports to increase the trust of the South African visa officials. None of these five 
successful South African visas allowed work, but that was not mentioned during 
his festive mood when he received the successfully stamped passports. 
Mr. James told me that people regularly come to his door and offer him new 
lines. He saw himself as a shield and mediator between those people and his clients. 
An agency can be less easily duped than an individual can. If anything goes wrong, 
he stands as a guarantee and will reimburse his clients at least 70 percent of the 
money they have paid.  At the end of the day, only one of his clients going to South 
Africa was allowed into the country. The other two were repatriated. Instead of 
reimbursing, he persuaded them to accept to go to Dubai. He knows he can always 
operate this line successfully.
In addition to the value of connections, information constitutes currency as 
well. People of Anglophone Cameroon commonly ask somebody in or with con-
nections to bush to find admission. Universities, too, are perceived of as closed. 
Hence a bulk of clients seeks the help of INACOD for admission with foreign univer-
sities. Mr. James had placed himself and his agency in this niche. Even though he 
has never been to university himself, he promised to find admission. To open a file 
with him cost 15,000 CFA. For assistance with the application, admission letter and 
visa application procedure, INACOD charged 300, 000 CFA.  
Mr. James’s key to success in these finding admission tasks was to offer and 
advertise American and British Universities that had off-site campuses in Dubai or 
other countries for which a visa could be acquired more easily than in the U.S.A. 
and Great Britain. These lines were not more expensive than ordinary bushfalling 
lines and he justified expenses for the often times high tuition fees with the poten-
tial to receive scholarships in subsequent years.  Without the work of Mr. James 
even these expensive international study possibilities would not have been known. 
He was creating value through channelling young aspiring migrants to these uni-
versities abroad. In conversation with his clients, he favourably compared these 
bushfalling lines for studies with the normal hustling way of going to bush. 
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A recent innovation in his office drawing a lot of attention was a blackboard 
publicly visible outside its doors with international job placement and scholarships. 
Although these ads were merely cut and paste from the Internet, they offered great 
respectability to the powers of his agency. In the absence of career centres for edu-
cational guidance, a commercial migration agency in the form of an NGO could of-
fer genuine services of information by making public such ads or having on show 
university prospectuses from abroad.
In the biographical transformation of Mr. James from a construction site 
worker to a doki man and then ultimately to a big man, we realised how impor-
tant knowledge and connections were. Mr. James began with the production of 
papers and then was able to establish himself as an equal partner to governmental 
institutions. Mr. James had been able to build himself up as a migration broker by 
coordinating between his clients and other brokers and mediators. Various levels 
of mediation existed and, in part, Mr. James was but the public face of underlying 
connections. 
While Mr. James’s social perceptions in town depended on his capacity to per-
form bush, his capacity to deliver depended on other layers of mediators. Legality 
was hardly visible or tangible for aspiring migrants within this scale of evaluation 
of the credibility of migration brokers. While mediation at various levels was cru-
cial for the success of migration brokerage, information on access routes and pro-
cedures was only very partially shared with aspiring migrants and even with col-
laborators. Relations between Mr. James and his employees were a pivotal example 
for analysing how information, even within brokerage offices, were managed and 
(not) shared. If the limits of credibility of a migration broker were not evaluated 
according to the potential legality or illegality of access routes to bush, then one 
must ask how Cameroonians interpreted the failure of a migration broker.
C l o s u r e :  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  a  d i r e c t o r  a n d  h i s  d e p a r t m e n t
A year after the end of fieldwork, I heard that Mr. James’s office had closed and that 
he was in prison. Was INACOD after all more of an ‘illegal’ agency that had to shut 
down because of the ‘criminal’ nature of its activities? Had his clients been wrong 
to trust him? These are typical questions outside observers in Europe have about 
migration brokers. Having explained how the value of information and connectiv-
ity were key to the rise of Mr. James as migration broker, this section focuses on the 
actual ways INACOD functioned. What caused the closing down of his office? What 
are his connections to instances of stateness – both territorial and deterritorial? 
There are two levels of analysis to the question of the limits of the credibility 
of Mr. James as migration broker. First at the most concrete level, I explore causes 
of failure and closing down of the office of INACOD. Secondly, at a conceptual level, 
I explore the limits of migration brokerage by exploring connections between the 
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confines of market and state. I do so by examining connections of Mr. James to in-
stances of stateness. By doing so, I seek to examine the limits of Mr. James in terms 
that are relevant to aspiring migrants in Cameroon. 
Limits of trust between migration brokers, mediators and employees:  
the closing down of inacod
After news had reached me that Mr. James has had to close his office, I asked the 
best friend of my former research assistant to investigate the causes of the sudden 
closure of the INACOD office. She was able to find out from former INACOD office 
workers that the manager of the INACOD office in Bamenda had employed a Fran-
cophone man called Bertin who promised to have a programme that could make 
eight people travel to Canada. The eight families each raised the required four mil-
lion CFA – roughly 6,000 Euros. The INACOD manager in Bamenda thus gathered 
32 million CFA – roughly 49,000 Euros — with most passed on to Bertin who was 
in charge of operating the programme. The families of the eight aspiring migrants 
had been told that the visas were ready and would be handed out at the airport on 
the day of departure. Bertin was not there when the families of these eight aspiring 
bushfallers turned up at the airport. Almost strangled that evening at the airport, 
apparently the police had to intervene and protect Mr.James from his clients.
Bertin had duped the manager of the INACOD office in Bamenda and both INA-
COD offices in Bamenda and Buea had to close down. Trying to calm down the 
situation, Mr. James managed to use some remaining INACOD funds to send six of 
the eight clients who had wanted to go to Canada to Dubai and Cyprus instead. 
Whether or not these clients liked Dubai as a country of destination, Mr. James, 
in this way, made them leave the country and thus turned them into bushfallers. 
However, one of these eight clients came from an influential family with many con-
nections within the justice system of Cameroon and thus filed a court case against 
Mr. James. He was put into prison for six months.
Wanting to understand better why Mr. James had ended up in prison, I asked 
my new research assistant to interview former employees of INACOD. Originally 
from the North West Province, Mr. Edward was one of these employees. He had 
worked as a teacher and had done many different projects for various NGOs before 
taking on a job with INACOD. He found that INACOD was original in that it was largely 
self-funded through its bushfalling projects. At times, clients were permitted to de-
posit land certificates as guarantees rather than actual cash payments. One of the 
clients who had signed up for Bertin’s failed Canada programme had done so. The 
land certificate of this client was worth five times the required 4.000.000 CFA for the 
programme.14 When the Canada programme failed, Mr. James was imprisoned for 
using the land for purposes not agreed upon by the father of his client. 
14  The manager of inacod and the father of the boy had agreed that the boy would send 4.000.000 cfa back to Mr. 
James upon his arrival in Canada. When the price for the programme had been paid, Mr. James was to return the land 
certificate to the father of the boy. 
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Mr. James had used the land certificate to secure a loan from the Bamenda Po-
lice Credit Union. Mr. Edward drafted a business plan for commerce in electronics 
between Dubai and Cameroon. And the Bamenda Police Credit Union was willing 
to fund this business idea on the condition of a security in the form of a land cer-
tificate. In contrast to the narrative of the other employees of INACOD, the project 
writer claimed that Mr. James misused the land certificate and the loan from the 
Bamenda Police Credit Union. He charged Mr. James with having squandered the 
money. When reading the interview transcript, I was struck at how closely the 
police staff had been involved in providing funds to one of the projects of INACOD 
right at the point of the fall of the office.
I was curious to find out more about how former employees and neighbours 
experienced the fall of INACOD. Had Mr. James lost his credibility after this fatal 
Canada programme? Six months after Mr. James’s initial imprisonment, I had a 
chance to travel to Cameroon. Although all employees of INACOD had to change 
their telephone numbers to avoid harassment from former clients, I was able to 
speak to all except the former secretaries. 
While the project writer blamed Mr. James for being greedy, another former 
employee (and director of a secondary school) thoroughly defended Mr. James. 
Not wanting to tarnish the image of the to him still existing agency of INACOD, 
this former employee told me that the entire fault lay with the office manager in 
Bamenda who had been duped by Bertin. In this narrative, Mr. James became a 
victim sent to prison for a crime he had not committed. Another former office 
worker of INACOD – a woman in her late 30s, mother of several children, lecturer 
at the university and PhD candidate – told me that she pitied Mr. James for his 
weaknesses because he was limited in his skills and had not listened to the advice 
of others. While acknowledging fully the limits of Mr. James’ capacity to deliver on 
his promises, she still maintained a level of respect for him, as her own brother was 
able to travel to Dubai with the help of Mr. James. 
The above case raises questions about the management of information and 
trust between the main migration broker within an office and his employees. In 
the INCAOD office in Buea, Mr. James employed two secretaries, two educational 
advisors, one programme manager and one public relations manager. They earned 
between 5,.000 and 85,000 CFA and came from the North West and South West 
Province.15 The failure of the public sector to make education a worthwhile em-
ployment activity is striking when looking at employees at INACOD. Two of them 
were qualified teachers who could not make ends meet and needed additional em-
ployment opportunities. The other was a Ph.D. student at the University of Buea 
who chose to temporarily give up her post at the university because employment 
by Mr. James was more profitable for her. Migration brokers are better employers 
than schools and universities. 
15  As a point of comparison, formally employed primary school teachers earn 110,000 cfa; secondary school teach-
ers can earn between 160,000 and 180,000 cfa and formally employed university lecturers earn 300.000 cfa. However, 
many times people work with other types of contracts in teaching and earn considerably less than these estimates. 
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Apart from a former employee called Mr. Peter and the project writer, employ-
ees did not know how any of the bushfalling programmes functioned. The two 
ever-changing female secretaries typed out occasional word documents, photo-
copied documents, ordered files and welcomed by-passers. Their workload was 
not heavy. They mostly sat in the office waiting for things to happen. 
The project manager of INACOD wrote, without any visible success, project pro-
posals that were supposed to attract funding for community development projects. 
The public relations manager arranged meetings at and with secondary schools. 
The two educational advisors were the most informed about the actual shape and 
form of bushfalling programmes. They would name price and destination, yet 
would know how these lines were actually operating. While motivated to send 
their own members of family out, they would not even know when a particular 
line had just failed. 
It seemed that the misinformation of employees at the office is not a coinci-
dence. A good employee was characterized by not challenging the monopoly of 
knowledge of the migration broker himself. Mr. James protected his status and the 
security of the programmes by carrying out most of the work himself. His employ-
ees had more of a representative function in the office, carried out publicity work 
and reinforced the status and level of a migration broker.
Mr. Peter was one of the few members of staff actually in a position to inform 
and make arrangements with clients. Mr. Peter is a South Westerner in his late 
20s from a polygamous family and had struggled during his studies because had 
not received sufficient financial support from his parents.16 With a university de-
gree from a Francophone university, Mr. Peter is bilingual and well qualified. Yet, 
he survived only with various small posts at different schools, as well as with the 
hours that he can work for Mr. James at INACOD.17 
Mr. Peter twice applied for a visa with the American Embassy and had been 
turned down both times. A few years after having been swindled in an attempt to 
fall bush,18 Mr. Peter found employment with Mr. James. He was one of the first em-
ployees who, in my research on migration brokerage, was actually able to inform me 
about the way in which some of the lines were operating. He was the first employee I 
had come across that understood what was happening at the agency. Then he disap-
peared. From one day to the other, he was no longer to be found in the office.
16  His father had sent out his half-brother to bush. At the point of research, the family had not had any news from the 
half-brother for more than ten years. His father was married to several women and it was not Mr. Peter’s mother who 
had given birth to the child that his father had sent out to bush. Mr. Peter thus blamed the failure of this bushfalling 
project in generating financial security for the family back in Cameroon on the polygamous nature of his father’s fam-
ily. The experience of having a half-brother in bush that never sent back money did nothing to change his fundamental 
belief in the possibility of bush a tout prix.
17  Mr. Peter worked as a discipline master, as well as a biology teacher at different secondary schools in Buea. He was 
not a civil servant.
18  He had received an email about a conference in the U.S. The flight was going to be free. The only condition was to 
mobilize another four people who were also to attend the conference with him. The registration fee for the conference 
was 250,000 cfa. The four young men hesitated when the bank account for the conference was located in Guinea Bis-
sau, yet, tried their luck. The day after the transfer the e-mail address was blocked. No further communication with the 
conference conveners was possible.
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I had conducted an extended interview with Mr. Peter before his disappear-
ance. When asked what he would do if he was given 2.5 million CFA, he said that 
would be just the money that it would take to establish himself with a different 
kind of bushfalling line. Instead of using the money to fall bush, he would set up 
a new line to make other people fall bush. There is money in bushfalling and Mr. 
Peter was well aware of it.
After a period of silence, the director finally explained Mr. Peter’s disappear-
ance. Mr. Peter had used the public face of INACOD to recruit clients, take money 
and then put them on separate bushfalling lines – lines that Mr. James did not 
know about. The whole affair flew up when the partners of Mr. Peter failed him 
and his clients returned to the office of Mr. James to complain. Hence from one day 
to the other, Mr. Peter was no longer working in the office. He had been fired. 
Yet, Mr. Peter had taken his experience and exposure to INACOD with him. A 
few weeks later, Delphine and I found a poster on the outskirts of Buea advertising 
a new bushfalling programme. No names were mentioned on the poster, so Del-
phine and I set out to explore who was the new broker in town. We ask a friend of 
Delphine to call and see this new broker and found that it was Mr. Peter. It appeared 
that he had his own contact people and had advertised a line to Dubai, as well as for 
studies to Scandinavia. He took his capital to try to set up his own business. 
Mr. Peter’s success would depend on his capacity to convince his clients that 
he had real connections to bush that make his lines feasible. If this failed, he would 
be considered a doki man who could help out, but not strong enough to guarantee 
access. This case illustrates well why it was so crucial for both Mr. James and Mr. 
Walter never to share their business secrets with their employees. Only one big 
man can manage bushfalling. Information is money and it needs to be managed 
and protected. Sharing information and the multiple levels of mediation put the 
services of migration brokers at risk. INACOD had to be closed because Mr. James 
trusted one employee.
While shocking and certainly of dramatic consequences for the families of the 
aspiring migrants who had given money to this programme, closures and failures 
were common. Given that bushfalling is inherently risky, the (temporary) closing 
of a programme, a line or even an office is in certain ways always anticipated or 
considered possible. As seen in the preceding chapter, its various causes were not 
easily distinguished. 
Before Mr. James set up his NGO, the office had already been connected to 
bushfalling. Another NGO called ‘Universal Link’ had sold migration broker serv-
ices for which the owner was also sent to prison for charges of duping.  People in 
the neighbourhood still remembered ‘Universal Link’, but when Mr. James arrived, 
there was no problem for him to set up INACOD in the very same office. 
When I asked my new research assistant to explore what people in the neigh-
bourhood knew about the closing down of INACOD, the stories varied greatly. Some 
accused Mr. James of being a feyman. Others pitied him for having been duped. 
In spite of the closure of INACOD, the success cases of the people that Mr. James 
did manage to send out before his failure continue to shine and carry importance. 
While fully aware of his limits and failures, the female employee who taught at the 
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University of Buea was still grateful to Mr. James for making her brother a bush-
faller in Dubai. However shocking and dramatic the consequences of failure are 
to the families that lost money in the Canada affair that brought about the closing 
down of INACOD, people in Buea also knew about those who successfully became 
bushfaller families thanks to the help and support of Mr. James. 
My former research assistant’s friend also discovered that the project writer 
was able to continue his work as a migration broker even without the office of 
INACOD. He boasted to my assistant to have sent out four people to Canada. It 
thus seems that an analysis of the limits of migration brokers cannot be limited to 
questions of illegality, naïve trust and criminal intentions. A demand for migra-
tion brokerage exists, as well as continued credibility even for brokers who were 
involved in prior failures. I will in the following sub-section look at the credibility 
of migration brokers as stake-holders within the economy of emigration by con-
sidering their connections to instances of stateness. 
Credibility and the realm of the official
During fieldwork, I was surprised to find that Mr. Walter and Mr. James both re-
ferred to aspiring migrants as applicants. When aspiring migrants came to both 
INACOD and AALC, they had to pay a fee to open a file for their registration. In both 
examples, migration broker offices seemed to take on the role and function of of-
ficials. Consequently, when aspiring migrants evaluated the quality of travel docu-
ments, they did not necessarily consider distinctions between state and non-state 
mediation as the most relevant or even apparent criteria. 
I will explore how migration brokers resemble and connect to state officials by 
exploring how INACOD, before its closedown, was positioned vis-à-vis state institu-
tions. The fieldwork material directed my attention towards a sphere of shared cul-
tural and symbolic repertoires that stretched and covered separate spheres of the 
market and the state.19 At a concrete level of personal connections, one can think 
of relations between migration brokers and state officials in terms of opposition, 
collaboration, connivance or resistance, however, my goal is to understand ‘cul-
tural framings of beliefs about the operation of legitimate power’ (Pitcher, Moran 
& Johnston 2009: 149). 
Migration brokers and state officials both belong to a realm of the official. I 
do not presuppose at a normative level that official means respectable and legal. 
Hibou (1999:80) points out that: 
the [very] division into formal and informal spheres is […] not a useful distinction 
since illegal practices are also performed in the formal sector, while so-called infor-
mal economic networks operate with well-established hierarchies and are fully inte-
grated into social life.
19  This argument does not foreclose that big men also rival the bureaucratic elite’s display of grandeur and notability 
(Ndjio 2006: 132). 
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Instead, I explore at a descriptive level how my informants conceive and con-
struct the legitimacy of power.
In line with his rhetoric on counselling, Mr. James had set up what he called 
‘educational guidance and career advice’. Throughout the year that I was present at 
his office, he managed to enter into more official partnerships with educational in-
stitutions and authorities, such as various secondary schools, professional training 
schools and the educational secretaries of various churches. The official partner-
ship agreements were formalised on paper stating that INACOD staff would provide 
career counselling and educational orientation at secondary schools, as well as 
help professional schools to recruit new students from the former. The equation 
is a brilliant one. Secondary schools are grateful for their students to receive in-
formation and guidance. INACOD had financial revenues through its placement of 
students with professional schools. When his friend from the University of Port-
smouth visited in Cameroon, Mr. James used the opportunity to visit his partner 
schools all over the region, to distribute flyers from the University of Portsmouth 
and to demonstrate to a wide audience how broad and well founded his interna-
tional connections were. 
For the longest of times, I avoided the repeated and insistent wishes of Mr. 
James for me to participate in these educational guidance activities. I did not want 
to proactively legitimise his authority and validate his great claims at having all 
these international partners. Delphine in particular, but even my host mother nev-
er shared my reticence. In the course of the year, we had discussed how I would 
go about writing a sample C.V. or a letter of motivation, or how I would use the 
Internet to search for internship possibilities or scholarship possibilities. Delphine 
argued that she had never heard about writing C.V.’s before and insisted that I ac-
cept to lecture on this subject. I thus talked for some 5- 10 minutes at the launching 
of the educational guidance programme at one of the secondary schools in Buea.20 
The official launch was part of the school’s morning assembly. The school chil-
dren respectfully saluted me, and men from INACOD dressed in suits attended the 
assembly hall. After the prayers and the national anthem, several speeches were 
made by INACOD staff, the principal of the school, but also by a representative from 
the provincial delegation for education. State authorities officially recognized INA-
COD’s educational guidance activities and Delphine argued that she considered it 
highly likely that with time the ministry was going to finance parts of these orien-
tation programmes.
After my small informative talk about the way in which a C.V. functions, Mr. 
James launched himself into a speech about the INACOD family. He talked about 
the present situation of Cameroon and the future of the country. ‘Everybody 
wants to be a bushfaller because our country does not provide the opportunities 
that we want.’ ‘There are many chances out there,’ he explained to the students at 
the Assembly. 
20  I tried to give some basic advice about how a C.V. ought to be written. I encouraged extra-curricular activities and 
internships. 
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INACOD is there to give assistance to people to go there. Their talents die here 
in Cameroon. Opportunities could be created in Cameroon, too, but there is a 
need for young people to be informed about educational possibilities and profes-
sional openings. Hence, INACOD has launched a programme in which it will give 
monthly talks and presentations at different secondary schools. ‘We’re here to give 
you information.
Mr. James described his foreign partner universities at the end of his talk. He 
closed the session by inviting the students to come and visit INACOD for advice on 
education. Mr. James marked out a position for his agency that responded to a spec-
tacularly well-balanced set of demands and pressures. With the fate of the country 
at heart, the INACOD family nevertheless has a superb advertisement possibility for 
its financially more rewarding bushfalling lines for both studies and work.
The various partnerships that Mr. James had been able to arrange prove that 
his vision of himself as a big man who works for community development in co-
operation with other important partners is not mere propaganda. Concerning 
his connections to instances of stateness, Mr. James also offered to process urgent 
passports. He had connections with doki people in town, as well as with police of-
ficials. For a given fee, he could deliver passports much faster than the usual route. 
Going through Mr. James had the advantage of a higher guarantee and more secu-
rity than through other less established brokers, facilitators or mediators.
Finally, in view of his new role for the fight against unemployment, Mr. James 
had also taken up contact with the National Employment Fund in Cameroon. The 
Dubai programme offered attractive working contracts to a series of welders and 
nurses from Cameroon. Mr. James informed me shortly after the opening of these 
Dubai programmes that the National Employment Fund would be paying half of 
the salary of the staff of his offices. With this step, he had come a long way towards 
his ambitions. In addition to more financial success than during his years of repair-
ing refrigerators or working for the German NGO, he received official recognition 
for his role and position within society. Where the government and state institu-
tions lacked the authority to assist the community and bring along development, 
Mr. James had filled the gap and responded to the needs of the market.
The above discussion of his actual partnerships and connections to instances 
of stateness help to explain why Pamella’s father referred to Mr. James as a director 
of a department. In the way in which Mr. James ran his development agency that 
equally functioned as a travel agency and as an educational institution, we see a 
creative mix of relational dynamics to state authorities in Cameroon and abroad. 
While almost emulating and fulfilling through his travel agency educational and 
developmental ambitions, Mr. James simultaneously worked through the services 
of other broker and mediators in the acquisition of passports or residence papers. 
However, he so strongly considered his real colleagues to be the educational sec-
retaries of churches and people within the ministries that he would have been of-
fended had I dared to compare him with doki-people.
Above I have illustrated personal connections between migration brokers and 
state actors, as well as similar functions, structures and cultural repertoires between 
migration brokers and form of stateness. Police offices, embassies and migration 
99
broker were all involved within the production and delivery of travel permits and 
fulfilled similar functions. Migration brokers referred to their clients as ‘applicants’ 
and ran offices in which they open ‘files’. Having in this section discussed connec-
tions and communalities between migration brokers and instances of stateness, I 
will in the following section go on to ask when and how state-enforceable laws can 
pose a limit to the work of migration brokers.
‘ T h e y  c a n  s e n d  h i m  b a c k ? ’  E x p l o r i n g  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  l a w
During fieldwork, Mr. Walter would always come and go. For a few months, he 
would be in China only to reappear all of a sudden. His movements were never en-
tirely certain. He could disappear and arrive at any moment. After a few months of 
absence, we suddenly saw him again in town. Delphine and I went to his office and 
we would chat. He leisurely told us that he had been deported and showed us the 
cancelled visa for China in his passport and a sticker that he had been removed. 
Delphine and I were both surprised – but for different reasons. I was surprised 
at how relaxed Mr. Walter stayed in the face of deportation. He did not indicate 
any concern at all for the future of his brokerage work. Delphine was surprised that 
it was possible for Mr. Walter to even be deported in the first place. Mr. Walter’s 
role as a patron conferred the status of children to his clients. In this role, he took 
care his clients. Delphine was surprised that there should be a limit to Mr. Walter’s 
power. ‘A man who can send people (children) out to bush, they can still send him 
back???’ After all, he was somebody who month after month turns people into 
bushfallers. 
In this section, the focus is on Delphine’s legal imaginary of Mr. Walter’s sup-
posed position vis-à-vis the state and its legal frameworks. In light of studies in 
legal consciousness on the ways law is experienced and understood, this section 
explores why and how Delphine’s utter disbelief at the deportation of a migration 
broker as powerful as Mr. Walter makes sense. Through this analysis, I also suggest 
that law is constituted by these experiences and beliefs, as much as by its textual 
foundations. 
This section first looks at relations between Mr. Walter and his employees and 
then at the personal development of Mr. Walter. Management of information and 
the tracing of connections are important in understanding the nature of Mr. Wal-
ter’s authority, as well as his position towards state authority. Through the case 
study of Mr. Walter, the final section of this chapter explores the limits of the law 
for the credibility of a migration broker in a place of departure. 
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Mr. Walter and his employees
Eight months after the end of fieldwork, I received news that Mr. Walter was no 
longer in Cameroon. During a later visit to Cameroon in July 2010, his former sec-
retary Delma complained to me that Mr. Walter had ‘left and abandoned’ her with-
out saying goodbye. Delma explained that she received death threats when clients 
in Cameroon noticed that Mr. Walter was not to return. She was even imprisoned 
for a few days. Mr. Walter’s lawyer helped her get out of prison, but the money that 
Mr. Walter sent was not sufficient. Delma had to add her own savings to get out 
of prison. Delma complained how Mr. Walter ‘suffered people all over the place.’ 
Besides having abandoned his clients, he also failed to pay out the remaining salary 
to Delma. According to Delma, it was not Mr. Walter himself, but a relative of Mr. 
Walter’s wife who ensured that the mother of Mr. Walter’s children could leave the 
country. She is now pursuing an MA degree (incidentally in migration studies) in 
Sweden. The children are with relatives of Mr. Walter in Yaoundé.21
These new events seemed to call into question the credibility of Mr. Walter as 
a migration broker. Yet, as we have seen in the case of Mr. James, the credibility of 
a migration broker could extend beyond temporary failure of travel projects. The 
same held true for Mr. Walter, who had already experienced a massive crisis with 
bushfalling programmes a few years before my arrival in Cameroon. He had not 
been imprisoned like Mr. James, but had had to take refuge in the capital of Yaoundé 
due to threats of clients in Buea. His church had excluded him from membership 
because they accused him of accumulating money through means that were not 
comprehensible and doing business that was not straight. However, despite this 
prior failure, Mr. Walter managed to return to Buea and to re-establish himself as a 
migration broker with the agency called AALC. The closing down of an office is thus 
not necessarily the end of the ambitions or credentials of a migration broker. 
Mr. Walter’s office consisted of two small rooms, decorated amply with photo 
material from China. As part of a new dynamic move within his agency, Mr. Walter 
later ordered Versailles style curtains to be placed as decoration along the ceiling. 
Despite the dysfunctional water toilet, Mr. Walter was clearly trying to give his 
office an air of importance and prestige. A photo of Mr. Walter with the Chinese 
Ambassador in Yaoundé hung on the wall.
His two employees, Delma and Johnson generally occupied the front room. 
Johnson used most of his time giving computer classes to his private students. He 
was paid 45,000 CFA and occasionally scanned documents and printed out applica-
tion forms. Delma earned about 60,000 – 70,000 CFA. In the morning and in the 
evening she came to open and close the office. For the rest of the time, she kept 
herself busy with small talk over the latest videos, gossip about university students 
and her church activities on Sundays. She had been Mr. Walter’s faithful compan-
ion for the longest of time. She knew approximately where to and for what prices 
Mr. Walter sent his clients out. When it came to any question outside this fixed 
21  I was able to confirm the information about Mr. Walter’s wife through a chain of networks of Cameroonian bushfall-
ers in Sweden.
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framework, she always sweetly and kindly replied that she did not know. ‘You have 
to ask boss for that.’ 
Her lack of curiosity and independent enquiry made her so valuable to the 
boss. She was the only one whom he trusted to carry and transport large sums 
of money for him. However, strange men knocked on the door of her one room 
apartment to claim some of the money. Nothing further happened and with a little 
bit of extra care, the business and work of Mr. Walter continued just as usual. 
Beyond the front room in which Delma and Johnson sat during office hours 
was an official reception room. If ever Mr. Walter actually was present actually in 
his office, he received his clients in this area explaining the programmes, took the 
money and handed out the visas. I was able to follow many a conversation between 
him and potential, current, former clients. Yet, most of the time, I waited in vain 
for things to actually happen. The reception room was mostly empty. Mr. Walter 
was a mobile man. 
At times, we would bump into each other at the cyber café opposite his of-
fice or in the computer room of the university. Despite all his profits, Mr. Walter 
somehow never bothered to install Internet in his own office. On such occasions, 
he would tell me about some of his most recent lines, actions, and programmes. 
He was busy reserving online flights for clients in China to go to Thailand to re-
new their visas there. He made hotel reservations. He met with contact people. He 
researched immigration rules and regulations. Everything occurred on the phone 
and over the Internet. 
Although Mr. Walter sent people to Belgium, he did not openly advertise this 
line. He was ambiguous about his lines for Europe. At first, he proclaimed that 
he ‘only proceeds in countries where we have 100 percent success. For Europe our 
links are not so direct.’ Yet, later he opened up and explained that ‘there is a twist 
to Belgium.’ He could process a person for China and then arrange for people 
in Brussels who helped his clients out of the airport and into the Schengen area. 
Mr. Walter often complained to me that what he could safely and securely offer in 
terms of his bushfalling lines was mostly not what his clients actually wanted. Visa 
regulations for China were not as stringent as within the Schengen area. His con-
tacts at the Chinese Embassy in Yaoundé were solid. 
Mr. Walter referred to the people sent out as applicants. The aspiring migrants 
applied with him for a programme or a visa for a specific country – just as they 
would apply at an Embassy. Certain elements in the way in which Mr. Walter’s 
office functioned, resembled the cultural and symbolic repertoires of state insti-
tutions, such as Embassies. Mr. Walter often walked around with several Cam-
eroonian passports of his clients in his blazer jacket. When clients registered with 
either Mr. Walter or Mr. James, they paid a fee and delivered their passport to the 
respective broker.
Mr Walter, in particular, liked to play and show off these passports. He often 
took out the passports and showed us the visas inside. Mr. Walter showed off his 
powers by waving a whole handful of passports through the air. The production 
of papers that work is associated with power. Only powerful people can produce 
papers that work. Yet, papers here are only part of the picture. Already stated when 
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describing Mr James, Mr. Walter, too, relied heavily on state connections and in-
formation management in the way he established himself as a broker.
Mr. Walter’s personal trajectory
Mr. Walter was able to conduct much of his work because he was a graduate of an 
elitist school attended by student that later become state officials. Originally from 
Mamfe in the South West Province, Mr. Walter began his career as a mathematics 
student. Many former classmates of Mr. Walters were among the political elite of 
the country or within the military. Even while at school, his dynamic personality 
helped him mediate positions with bureaucrats and political figureheads for his 
fellow graduates. Without such mediation graduates may not have found employ-
ment as civil servants. Mediation is deeply built into the functioning of the Cam-
eroonian state system (Bayart et al. 1999; 2009). 
Mr. Walter did work for a few years as a mathematics teacher. The  financial 
status of a teacher in Cameroon is modest and salaries of civil servants are often 
paid on an irregular basis. It is in this context that Mr. Walter tried to fall bush, 
but the British Embassy refused his visa. The Chinese Embassy was less stringent 
and he set off to establish trading activities between China and Cameroon. From 
there, it was but a small step to offer his insights of life in bush to also help others – 
against a fee –  to come to China. Mr. Walter did so in the form of an NGO and then 
sought to expand his networks to other areas of the world. 
Both the demand for emigration and the desire for others to commercially 
facilitate emigration are born out of the fact that, in Cameroon, there is little op-
portunity for success. Migration brokers and clients are not to be conceptualised 
as people who find themselves in opposition to one another. To the contrary, both 
broker and client share similarly difficult starting position and, in a certain way, 
can be said to form part of the same economy of the margins. Brokers have ei-
ther already been able to overcome their marginality, or they are in possession of 
knowledge, skills or connections that can contain the potential of achieving inclu-
sion into the territory of another state. Even failed emigration attempts can be the 
source of authority. After three unsuccessful visits to the American Embassy to 
apply for a visa, a friend of mine is now using her cyber café as a platform to help 
others – for a fee –  to fill in visa application forms and do the online bookings for 
visa interviews.
Mr. Walter’s days as a mathematics teacher are long behind him. He is the boss 
that does powerful businesses all over the world. He has in the meantime travelled 
widely. One day, he flicked through his passport that was full of visas for Burma, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. 
As Mr. Walter drove Delphine, his wife and me out from the small compound 
where his NGO is situated, a former colleague of his approached the car. In contrast 
to Mr. Walter’s  -  who was well dressed, strongly-built and equipped with a very 
fancy mobile phone— the former colleague’s car appeared thin and grey on the 
outside. He was begging Mr. Walter openly on the street for a small loan with 
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which to set up a trading activity with China. He was begging Mr. Walter for help, 
but Mr. Walter was sceptical. He had little time to spare. The colleague was sent 
away and Mr. Walter openly declared that he is not interested in this kind of col-
laboration. Mr. Walter continued to explain to us his great ideas and future plans 
for success. The former colleague was left behind.
Observing this scene, I was struck by the contrast between the colleague who 
was pleading at the car window and Mr. Walter who was elevated on his car seat. 
The most prevalent practice that generates values in contemporary Cameroon is 
bush and Mr. Walter was an authority that knew how to operate within this world. 
In contemporary Cameroon, feymen and nouveaux riches are affluent enough to 
provide financial assistance to the Cameroonian government and other state insti-
tutions (Ndjio 2006 a: 1). In this context, big men like Mr. Walter are admired and 
respected for more than just their wealth.
Mr. Walter was a credible migration broker also because he maintained former 
connections to state officials. Mr. Walter contemplated taking up an administra-
tive post within the local ministerial authority on education. This would place him 
well for some of his other bushfalling and business ideas. As a big man, Mr Walter 
could capitalize upon state functions. With no intention of going back to teaching, 
Mr. Walter told me that he had nevertheless succeeded in maintaining on paper 
his former post, as well as the salary that goes with the post. He was a flexible and 
savvy businessman who knew within which margins to place himself.
Mr. Walter told me repeatedly that he considered himself safe with respect 
to state authorities in Cameroon. Through listening to his phone conversations, I 
knew that Mr. Walter was also sending out the children of military personnel he 
knew from his days in Yaoundé. He had enough connections at that school to be 
able, as he put it, ’not to get into trouble’, if ever he were put on trial in court for the 
case of a particular client. Sometimes in his narrations, he talked to me about hav-
ing come back from a court. His narratives were always one of victory. When tell-
ing me about having had to go to court, he praised either the power of his rhetoric 
or the strength of his connections that had ended the trial.
Mr. Walter acknowledged his deportation in the following terms: ‘When the 
law catches you, then it’s like judgment day. There is no point of return.’ Mr. Walter 
was not obliged to tell Delphine and me about his deportation. Yet, he willingly 
and openly did so and even proceeded to show me his passport with the cancelled 
Chinese visa. The relaxed and even slightly amused tone in which Mr. Walter told 
us about his deportation suggested that in many ways he did consider himself too 
much of a big man to be threatened by the event of deportation. It constitutes for 
him just another challenge within the many challenges with which he was working 
on a daily basis to generate visas and travel permits for his clients. 
Despite Mr. Walter’s involuntary return to Cameroon, his deportation had lit-
tle impact on his brokerage activities and no impact on his status and standing in 
Buea. His connections to people at the Chinese Embassy in Yaoundé had not been 
damaged. Visas continued to appear on the passports of his applicants. As for his 
own capacity to travel, he informed me that he was going to purchase a Ghanaian 
104
passport and continue his journeys as a Ghanaian. I do not know whether this is 
what he did, but he certainly was able to continue his travels.
He explained that his deportation was a ‘sacrifice’. Apparently, one of his clients 
had gotten himself involved with fraud at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and other 
clients of Mr. Walter were at danger of deportation. To prevent this, Mr. Walter 
proudly tells us that he ‘sacrificed’ himself - not unlike Jesus - and ‘volunteered’ to 
be deported himself. He explained that he was powerful enough to be able to travel 
any time with another passport or under another name. He wanted us to believe 
that he ‘saved’ the others who could safely remain in China. Regardless of what 
actually had led to Mr. Walter’s deportation, with this narrative he was able to turn 
his forced return into an event that revealed his true powers.
In this sense, Mr. Walter’s deportation further revealed how powerful a patron 
he was. The week after Mr. Walter’s forced return from China, I encountered a 
severely worried mother of one of the Cameroonians in China. Due to the Olym-
pic Games that summer, many working visas of immigrants in China were not 
renewed. This severely affected the clients of Mr. Walter. He rented a set of apart-
ments where he gathered his clients so that they would not risk being picked up by 
the police. Yet, it seemed that they had little money left and were afraid to go out in 
fear of deportation by Chinese state authorities. The mother of one of these young 
Cameroonians was literally crying because she was worried whether her daughter 
even had food to eat. She had tried to send her money, but Western Union appar-
ently could not send money to China. Here, too, Mr. Walter was the saviour in 
need. ‘With one phone call, I can send the money.’ The crying mother gave him 
money and he promised to wire it to her daughter in China. His credibility was 
re-established and the cause of the suffering of the woman’s daughter was not as-
sociated with Mr. Walter’s personal wrong-doings. The credibility of Mr. Walter’s 
work was beyond questions of legal or illegal. 
C o n c l u s i o n
This chapter has sought to develop an alternative way to conceptualise the cred-
ibility of migration brokers – not in terms of the supposed legal or illegal nature of 
their work, but in terms of locally operated distinctions between dokimen, feymen 
and big men. Throughout this chapter, a discussion of the emergence of several 
migration brokers has revealed the importance of information, connections, and 
papers as sources of credibility. All three constitute value scales and assets that can 
enable access to bush. Starting from emic terminology, this chapter has proposed 
an evaluation scale of the powers of migration brokers that is very different from 
the one of smuggling and trafficking. 
In the first section, I demonstrated how travel documents from migration bro-
kers are considered within a continuity of forms of paper production that stretch 
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across different actors, but not necessarily fundamentally different spheres. The 
experience of paper in a Cameroonian context of stateness shapes expectations 
and perceptions of the potential power and credibility of migration brokers. There-
fore, the credibility of travel documents is evaluated in terms of their function 
(Bakewell 2007) and powers, rather than their locations and origins. 
Building on these findings, the third section established that the fall and fail-
ure of a migration broker is not considered in relation to the law either. Migration 
brokers are both personally and symbolically connected to state officials. As such, 
analysis shows that migration brokers base their capacity, as well as their legiti-
macy, on connections to instances of stateness, as well as its cultural repertoires.
Shown in the fourth and final section of this chapter was that the credibility of 
migration brokers are not at danger even when migration brokers are directly and 
personally confronted with an event in which their own papers are classified as il-
legal. After his deportation, Mr. Walter continued to be able to operate and make 
other people leave the country. 
It is striking that mediation even within and between agencies is an enormous 
field of activity much wider than the mere relation between one broker and one 
client is. What I studied was only the tip of the iceberg. Mr. James and Mr. Walter’s 
offices are in many ways merely public interfaces. In both offices, the visible staff is 
not all the main power on which the success of the enterprise relies to any signifi-
cant degree. Behind these big men there are other brokers and mediators. Migra-
tion broker offices are public. Yet, migration brokers are likely to be conceptualised 
as private actors. 
In the analysis of this chapter, it was shown that aspiring migrants do not 
always distinguish between state and non-state mediation. Boundaries between 
state and market hold neither ethnographically, nor conceptually. An exploration 
of how the terminology of dokimen, feymen and big men is used in relation to 
practices of paper production in Anglophone Cameroon points us towards the 
limits not only of distinctions between legal and illegal, but also of the distinction 
between forms of paper production within the realm of the state and migration 
brokers and their supposed boundaries. 
Aspiring migrants in Cameroon do not perceive of migration brokers as work-
ing against state actors. For big men, access to public institutions is important and 
is perceived of as an important means for (personal) enrichment (Daloz 2005: 163). 
Mr. James collaborated with educational state agencies, as well as with the National 
Employment Fund. Furthermore, Mr. James held a title in his village of origin. 
Mr. James skillfully built up his authority through a combination of what might 
be termed old and new types of authority (Daloz 2002: 278), while equally using 
money from his agency to finance career counseling. 
This is why I have suggested analysing the way that migration brokerages re-
late to instances of stateness in terms of productive overlaps. The two migration 
brokers I research were holding positions of authority and trust. Both were operat-
ing through offices and were engaged within the business of bureaucracy. In this 
chapter, I have shown that while state officials seek to monopolise the legitimate 
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means of mobility (Torpey 2000), migration brokers seek to control – and prefer-
ably monopolise — information and connections.
These insights help to explain why one of Mr. James’ claims to be fighting il-
legal migration is credible in the Cameroonian context. Mr. James is himself per-
ceived as an authority figure that does not simply mirror cultural repertoires of 
stateness, but also functions in similar ways. Migration brokers and state officials 
are connected. Besides personal connections, they also share symbolic and cul-
tural repertoires. Besides calling aspiring migrants ‘applicants’, opening ‘files’ for 
them, opening up ‘offices’ and employing ‘secretaries’, Mr. James produced and 
issued forms of documentation that allowed people to travel. 
In Cameroon, migration brokers are credible authorities because aspiring 
migrants evaluate migration brokerage less in relation to locations of paper pro-
duction and more in terms of the efficiency of travel documents. Having in this 
chapter analysed the limits of migration brokers in terms of both efficiency and 
credibility, the following chapter will explore how the law constructs locations of 
paper production as separate.
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Chapter 3 
Legality, luck and technologies of mediation: 
What does it take to get a visa?
During an open day at the U.S. consulate service in Yaoundé, the consul in chief 
explained to the journalists present that ‘applying for a visa is a straightforward 
and transparent process.’ He furthermore stated that ‘answering application and 
interview questions completely and candidly [would] allow [them] to give [ap-
plicants] the maximum benefit under the law, and help [them to] process [their] 
case quickly.’ The press conference was an opportunity – as the consul in chief put 
it – to ‘explain the law.’ 
While referring to the law, the consul himself also drew on notions commonly 
associated with market dynamics. The consul in chief referred to the ‘business’ 
of implementing and applying the law. He proclaimed that his consulate service 
‘provide[d] excellent customer service.’ His statements reflect a belief in the market 
as a place of fairness and transparency. In his mind, business did not seem to con-
tradict his simultaneous claim that the law guides visa application processes.
During the open day, the consulate service also showed a video usually viewed 
in the waiting room where applicants sit before their visa interview. The video con-
9. Bar near Douala: ‘Ambassade’ 
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veyed how Cameroonian policemen arrest visa applicants involved with fraud. The 
consulate officer in chief used the term dokimen in his talk following the video. 
The video drove home the point of the criminality of migration brokers. In the 
perspective of embassy staff, brokers and intermediaries are obstructions to the 
otherwise ‘transparent’ process of the application of the law within their decision-
making processes. The core message of the entire open day was that applicants 
should not seek out the advice or support of third parties.
Visa officials take great lengths to explain how the law guides application pro-
cedures. A great deal of energy was spent during the open day on condemning 
mediation. According to embassy staff, mediation is commercial and necessar-
ily external to the embassy. In contrast to the narrative of legality, my informants 
viewed visa application processes in terms of luck. Upon arrival in bush, Delphine’s 
position on bush at all cost changed in many ways. Yet her position, on what it 
takes to get a visa always remained the same: ‘If you are lucky, you will have the 
visa. If you are not lucky, you will not have it.’
In asking a male informant on his thoughts about what he thinks of visas, he 
answered that visas are a question of origin and of luck. The question of origin 
refers to the virtual impossibility for many Cameroonians to get a visa.1 In contrast 
to citizens of the European Union or the U.S., people with a Cameroonian passport 
have to engage with the regulatory regime of embassies on terms that make legal 
migration difficult, troublesome and sometimes impossible. As another informant 
of mine put it: ‘We are only taking the one month visa because the one that you 
really need, they will not give us.’ 
Most notably, I remember travelling in a taxi called ‘le sans visa’. Whenever I 
heard about overland migration without visas, it was by taxi drivers who had re-
turned from the ordeal. Precisely because not everyone can have a visa, these travel 
permits inspire many strong narratives and beliefs.  A man, who had called his 
tailor shop ‘passport couture’, told me that he wanted to assure the clientele of his 
shop that his products were of high quality, but also that wearing his clothes would 
bring his customers luck and success. Passports speak of international quality and 
visas of the potential for mobility. A visa in the passport elevates one to a higher 
status and can potentially improve the prospects of an entire family. 
The despair and frustration of those whose possibility for mobility had been 
blocked was always present. In the perceptions of many aspiring migrants, embas-
sies are places of danger and incertitude. Whether or not a visa will be granted is 
largely unpredictable and yet for many of crucial importance for their lives. Del-
phine expressed the uncertainty of visa application processes to me in these terms:
1  While legal forms of mobility are much more accessible to the privileged upper classes of Cameroonian society, 
procedures are nevertheless somewhat tedious for everyone. To attain the visas to European countries that do not have 
embassies in Cameroon (like for example Ireland), Cameroonians have to travel all the way to Nigeria. The regulatory 
requirements are so challenging that it often requires several trips to the capital in Yaoundé before a visa is actually 
given. Narratives of university colleagues that have had to undergo serious challenges and stern scrutiny of their travel 
permits when passing through various European airports are abundant. Even Cameroonians who have completed entire 
university degrees in Europe will be challenged at airports and hindered in travel projects through complicated regula-
tory procedures. The economy of passport regimes is such that the holder of a Cameroonian passport needs more 
patience and greater administrative skills to succeed in travelling through legal channels than other nationals.
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You cannot know what the embassy people want because even if you have everything 
and meet all the requirements, it is no guarantee.’ […] Sometimes you can have all 
the things needed, but you will not have the visa. There are people, like some lectur-
ers, who have been coming and going, coming and going, but sometimes they go and 
there are still complications to have the visa.
A staff at the U.S. consulate service informally gave me estimates that 10 out of 
50 applications for non-immigrant visas were accepted.2 The U.S. consulate serv-
ice, did not communicate their reasons for refusals for non-immigrant visas. The 
reasons and causes of application outcomes remain opaque for applicants. Even 
informants that regularly travel and do not have to fear a visa refusal would repeat-
edly laugh with me about the arbitrary nature of visa decisions: 
‘Are the embassy people stupid? What do they train in? They let through people with 
fake papers and they stop those whose papers are genuine.’ 
In this chapter, I question what it takes to get a visa. I compare conceptions 
of travel permits and money flows in exchange for travel permits among aspiring 
migrants and state officials. I shall place narratives of luck and legality in relation 
to mobility regimes  - or in keeping with the theoretical framework of this disserta-
tion – the regulation of emigration. 
The research on the internal dynamics within Embassies is based on two weeks 
of observation at the French Embassy and one week of observation at the U.S. Em-
bassy. In this chapter, I have chosen to focus on an analysis of the U.S. consulate 
service. The following chapter is dedicated to the French consulate service. Whilst 
the German and Dutch Embassy did not allow me access because of ‘privacy is-
sues’, the French and U.S. Embassy welcomed the research with the unspoken idea 
that this also provided a chance to clean themselves of undue allegations.3 
My research project also represented an opportunity for both consulate servic-
es to explain the difficulties of their work and to show how prior reforms have tried 
to improve the quality of the services provided to Cameroonian visa applicants.
After a short theoretical discussion of state regimes of mobility control, I will 
begin with an analysis of how luck and mediation are related to one another from 
the perspective of aspiring migrants. I will do so by tracing how Delphine acquired 
a passport, a visa and finally left Cameroon. I will then move to discuss connec-
tions of mediation from the perspective of consulate staff members at the U.S. con-
sulate in Yaoundé. I will close the chapter with an analysis of financial flows within 
consulate sections. 
2   For applicants applying for visas for university studies, success rates seem to be better. According to an estimate of 
the consulate officer, applicants had almost a 50 percent success rates. On the other hand, he complained that student 
visa applications were the ones that contained the most fraudulent documents.
3  I was able to gain access to the U.S. Embassy through a chain of personal contacts that had had their initial starting 
point in an acting group of which I was part in Amsterdam. As pointed out in the introduction, my access to the French 
Embassy was also facilitated by my alumni status as a graduate of Sciences Po Paris. Most Embassy staff within the 
French system would have passed through that school. I was thus easily credible as a potential ‘colleague’.
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Visas, legality and technologies of mediation
At the beginning of fieldwork, I showed my passport to Delphine. She was severely 
shocked and almost outraged: ‘This small thing – people die for this small thing? 
You put a stamp and then you can go?’4 Delphine was surprised to see the size and 
appearance of my Cameroonian visa. She was shocked that a mere stamp could 
grant a person the permission to travel.
Although airports and Embassies are places that fundamentally facilitate the 
ability to travel, the focus in public and academic debate is often on those cases in 
which travel is supposed to be illegitimate and needs to be stopped through the 
denial of a visa. As Salter puts it, ‘While the characteristics of the globalised world 
make movement necessary – in addition to desirable— the structure of the global 
mobility regime reinforces the act of crossing the frontier as an exceptional act’ 
(2006: 174). Yet, people that want to be mobile have not always needed pieces of 
paper from state authorities to have permission to move.5 According to Torpey, the 
rights of states to control the entry of people into their territory has, historically 
speaking, only gained its quintessential importance in the course of the twentieth 
century (2000: 159).
This chapter discusses strategies of both applicants and state officials to medi-
ate, influence and control the outcomes of visa application procedures. Embassy 
staff feels legitimated to denounce the fraudulent practices of migration brokers. 
Yet, contrasting perspectives from aspiring migrants help to unravel underlying 
assumptions of their understanding of legality (Silbey 2005; McCann 2008). I use 
the notion of technologies of mediation to go beyond the opposition between state 
officials and migration brokers. With mediation, I mean to the acts and factors that 
intervene for the purpose of bringing about a result.6 
I have drawn from the specific usage of the terms mediation and brokerage by 
Olivier de Sardan. Writing about the field of development interventions, he dis-
cusses development agents (2005: 166- 167) and development brokers (173- 178) 
under the same umbrella of mediation. Tracing the origins of development brokers 
back to colonial times (166), he writes that ‘any social process that brings localized 
low-level actors or groups into relationship with global structures (the town, the 
state or the market being the most obvious of these) requires the service of go-
betweens or intermediaries who occupy a clearly strategic function’ (173). 
Aspiring migrants and consulate officers both draw on technologies of media-
tion to control uncertain outcomes and consequences of visa application processes. 
I have developed the notion of technologies of mediation in inspiration of the work 
of Torpey (2000; 1998), van der Pleog (1999), Simon (2009) and Rudnyckyj (2004). 
4  ‘This small thing wey man fit die so? This small thing? You just stamp, then you fit go?’
5  During my fieldwork period in Cameroon, I have conducted several weeks of archival research in both Buea and 
Yaoundé. Through archival material, I traced historical precedents of travel permits in today’s Anglophone Cameroon. 
Based on this material, I could trace how the invention of travel permits and their increasing standardization produced 
the need for ever-greater degrees of mediation. There was not enough space to include material on the historical pro-
duction of illegality within this chapter. A separate article on this topic is in preparation. 
6  For other usages of the term mediation, see (Eisenlohr 2011: 1).
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I consider technologies in relation to governance (Salter 2006) and in the broadest 
meaning of the term (Rose, Malley & Valverde 2006). I thus consider not only fin-
gerprinting and the storage of the photos of all visa applicants on computer systems 
as technologies, but also paper and interviews (Van der Ploeg, 1999: 297- 298). 
While Cameroonians are very clear about needing mediation, embassy staff 
denies the existence of mediation within the walls of the consulate service. Yet, in 
practice, they are also using mediation. The narrative of legality hides these state 
practices of mediation. Instead of being exposed as acts of mediation, state prac-
tices of mediation are camouflaged - in the name of the law - through legitimiz-
ing expressions, such as transparency and neutrality. These discourses construct 
the supposedly disinterested, automatic and nonpolitical nature of state practices 
- which in fact are also practices of mediation.
I use the same notion of technologies of mediation to analyse both the strate-
gies of consulate officers and aspiring migrants because I want to study the very 
construction of some mediating devices as commercial and others as transparent. 
I am thus able to conclude that at stake in the warnings against dokimen is not a 
call against mediation per se, but an attempt of embassies to strengthen the state’s 
claim to the monopoly of legitimate mediation.
Tr a v e l  p e r m i t s ,  l u c k  a n d  m e d i a t i o n
In Cameroon, visa application processes are understood in terms of one’s luck. 
However, to interpret the probability of being granted a visa in terms of good and 
bad luck does not exclude the possibility for young Cameroonians to try to influ-
ence the probability of the outcomes of their visa application procedures. Aspiring 
migrants seek to influence the outcome of their visa application processes through 
prayer, migration brokers, advice, preparing well for the visa interview or the pur-
chasing of forms of documentation for the application file. 
Going from the Cameroonian immigration office (for the production of the 
passport) to the French or American Embassy (for the visa application), aspiring 
migrants have to deal with two different state cultures. In this section, I argue that 
understanding the process of engaging the Cameroonian state opens new paths 
for an analysis of the regulation of emigration and the respective role of migration 
brokers and embassies therein. The commonality and acceptability for Cameroo-
nians to contact migrating brokers needs to be placed into a context where it is 
normal to refer to intermediaries also when accessing a passport. I shall study the 
experience of regulatory requirements for passports and visas through the prism 
of Delphine’s own travel project. 
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Delphine’s passport: bridging the inside and the outside of institutional 
walls
Although Delphine had always intended to go to bush, when she was applying 
for a scholarship abroad, she did not possess a passport. Passport applications are 
normally processed in the capitals of each respective province, cost 50,000 CFA and 
take – depending on the province – up to three months. Delphine, however, only 
had two weeks to get her passport in time for her scholarship deadline. 
In panic, Delphine rushed to the immigration and emigration office of the 
police in Buea where she accidently came across a friend who had a friend with-
in the police in Yaoundé. Through this contact, Delphine planned to get what in 
Cameroon is commonly called an ‘urgent passport’. The price was 150, 000 CFA. 
Delphine hardly hesitated to pay the triple of the standard amount. When I tried 
to explore other solutions, Delphine told me: ‘Anybody of my level and standing 
has to be like this. […] I have to go.’ It was in this manner that Delphine left me in 
a great rush to go to Yaoundé. 
Under normal circumstances, most people’s finances are too tight to pay for 
the acquisition of a passport – or even a renewal. School fees, house rent, death cel-
ebrations, family members in the village, business investments, Christmas clothing 
are the usual financial demands. Without a specific ‘line’ or ‘opening’ in view, most 
people would not have 50,000 CFA to ‘dash to the government,’ as an informant put 
it. Ordinarily, passport fees are considered an unnecessary ‘gift’ to the government. 
Yet, at the same time, bushfalling is deeply associated with extraordinary financial 
sacrifices and with speed. Partly because bushfalling is such a risky enterprise, the 
processing of necessary travel documents often happens with an extreme sense of 
urgency. Many of my informants expressed that through speed one could avoid 
‘blockages’. Delphine’s willingness to spend triple for an ‘urgent passport’ reflects 
wider patterns. Given that connections and access to bush are an important asset, 
travel documents acquire a high-assumed value. 
Even though the contact people of other friends confirmed that 150.000 CFA 
was indeed the current ‘standard’ price for ‘urgent passports’, I remained worried 
whether the contact people of her friend in Yaoundé would prove to be reliable. 
Stories of duping are common. I suggested contacting the scholarship foundation 
to explore whether they could accept to process the scholarship application with 
the scan of Delphine’s identity card in the place of her pending passport. Delphine 
was skeptical and remained eager to rush to Yaoundé to process her papers. She 
did not want to put her travel project at risk. If a passport was required, she had to 
go to Yaoundé and pay the required money to attain an ‘urgent passport’. Delphine 
did not see a scope for negotiation with the scholarship organisation. After all, one 
does not negotiate with Embassies about formalities either. 
When her bus to Yaoundé broke down late at night, Delphine chose to hitch-
hike the rest of the journey. She would not take such risk under other circum-
stances. The day after, at the police station in Yaoundé, Delphine was immedi-
ately greeted with the question of whether she needed an ‘ordinary’ or an ‘urgent’ 
passport. Even if in the legal procedures of the police, there are no provisions for 
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accelerated passport procedures, ‘urgent passports’ are a common practice and 
Delphine was directly given this option. Preferential treatment – in exchange for 
money or facilitated through contacts – was common and even though ‘urgent’ 
passports do not officially exist within the legal regulations of the police, there is a 
‘standard’ price for them.
Through her friend’s help, Delphine was able to walk straight through to the 
office of an important commissioner at the police in Yaoundé. Distracted by other 
work, the commissioner did not ask Delphine for extra payment. Instead of the 
announced 150,000 CFA, Delphine only paid 60,000 CFA at the counter with another 
police man7 and was then given a number with which she could come back two 
weeks later to pick up her passport. 
Even through processing times were shorter in the capital than in the province, 
Delphine was not sure she would get hers in time. Two weeks later, Delphine and I 
travelled together back to Yaoundé. As we walked up to the ‘Délégation de la Sûreté 
Nationale’ (Delegation of National Security) to pick up Delphine’s passport, we 
saw a crowd of men beside a wall just opposite the police. Some typing machines 
sat on the wall. For a small fee, forms could be filled in there. As we kept walking, 
I was asked whether I wanted any services. ‘Would I like a passport?’ In case I did 
not have a passport, this man offered to ‘organise’ one for me. In informal conver-
sation, two other young men explained to us the kind of services that they could 
offer. A birth certificate is 20,000 CFA. A marriage certificate without legal registra-
tion is 40,000 CFA. A marriage certificate with legal registration is 450,000 CFA. A 
super-urgent passport delivered in but three days costs 250,000 CFA. A one-week 
urgent passport is 200,000 CFA. 
In asking about their work, these men responded that they did everything that 
related to legal papers. In discussion with Delphine, I was struck how she barely 
made a distinction between the kinds of legal papers she could attain here in the 
courtyard outside the walls of the police compound or within the compound of 
the police. In her view of the intermediaries that we had come across, Delphine 
did not take seriously or as self-evident the wall that separated intermediaries in-
side the police compound from intermediaries outside the compound. For her, the 
credibility of intermediaries did not depend on their relative position vis-à-vis a 
state institution. 
 At the police station, we met a queue of people trying to retrieve their pass-
ports. On a wooden table in front of the building, we saw piles of passports with 
numbers written on them. Eventually it was Delphine’s turn. ‘Who told you that 
your passport was ready?’8 The policeman angrily threw incomprehensible French 
at Delphine. With French only as a foreign language, Delphine did not understand 
the officer. Regardless of their proficiency, Anglophone Cameroonians must speak 
French in national state institutions. Even Francophone public servants fluent in 
English often agree to speak it only in exceptional cases. This linguistic challenge 
created another level of necessity for Anglophone Cameroonians to resort to in-
7  This was the only money Delphine paid. She had not paid any money before in Buea.
8  My own translation
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termediaries in their quest of passports or other types of documentation or state 
services. When spending a short amount of time observing application processes 
for identity cards and passports at the immigration office in Buea, I often came 
across cases in which applicants came with family members or friends to translate 
and mediate from Pidgin to either French or English.
Other people in the queue at the police station in Yaoundé kindly translated 
what the policeman said and explained that Delphine needed to go another place to 
retrieve a number for the retrieval of her passport. We followed the instructions, and 
crossed the yard and cut across another long queue. Still in the wrong place, those in 
other queues did not know how to help. A woman, who sold her at the police station 
each day, knew where we could look up the list with processed passports. 
We reached an unpaved backyard behind one of the main office buildings. 
There, between 10 and 20 applicants (mostly young and predominantly male) went 
through A4 sheets of paper in search of their name and the retrieval number of 
their passport. An abandoned car rusted away at the side of one of the walls. A set 
of desk drawers for index cards had been provisionally parked beneath one of the 
trees. Nearly a hundred A4 sheets of paper were attached to the walls with scotch 
tape. Names were not in alphabetical order. Respective applicants exchanged tips 
on how to understand the order within the seemingly endless list of printed names. 
This mutual support somehow alleviated the sense of frustration inherent in eve-
rybody making his or her way through the chaos. While searching meticulously 
through every sheet of paper for Delphine’s name, my high heel shoes sank into the 
mud of the unpaved backyard.
When Delphine concluded that her name was not on the wall, tears came out 
of her eyes. Getting a passport is much more than an administrative procedure. 
It was a big step towards her dreams and ambitions of bush. Delphine needed 
her passport ‘at any cost’ to be able to apply for her scholarship. Yet, the proce-
dures were unclear. An applicant next to Delphine asked whether she had applied 
for her passport on her own. Facilitation and going through contacts is common 
practice. An elder man said to Delphine that he knew somebody inside the police 
department and we exchanged telephone numbers. There were two policemen 
among those searching through the many sheets of paper. They had been sent by 
family members to facilitate matters, considering they would have better means 
to understand how things work or access to people who do. We exchanged tel-
ephone numbers with one of these policemen and later even got a lift from him. 
As two young women (one white and one Cameroon), Delphine and I easily man-
aged to establish the kind of contacts and connections that could help in our quest 
for her passport.
After all this confusion, frustration and fear, Delphine was full of joy when 
eventually I managed to locate her name after all.  We retuned to the original queue 
and she was promptly given her passport. Proudly holding her brand-new pass-
port, she asked me to fix the moment in a photo. One step closer to becoming a 
bushfaller, she had dressed up explicitly for this photo before going to the police. 
After having safely travelled back to Buea, friends of hers called with questions 
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about passports. She was now in a position to pass on information and advice on 
how to go about the process. She had now become an intermediary and facilitator. 
By approaching the intermediaries outside the police station as credible sourc-
es of official documentation, Delphine did not make a distinction between state 
and non-state intermediaries. By implication, distinctions between intermediaries 
cannot be taken for granted, but need to be studied.
Delphine’s visa and the remoteness of regulatory requirements
Delphine received the news that she had indeed been granted a scholarship to 
travel and study in Sweden with great joy. After celebrating, she needed to apply 
for the visa. Even with the scholarship, matters for the visa were more complicated 
than I had expected. It was very difficult to locate the correct Internet page for the 
Swedish embassy in Cameroon. The contact addresses of visa officials were located 
with yahoo providers. In the end, we only found the right kind of information on 
the exact contact details of the Swedish consulate service through contact people 
and friends of Delphine, which was the safest and most direct way for her to gain 
access to the consulate. 
Despite the scholarship that she had been granted, Delphine was afraid to re-
ceive a visa refusal – like most other people she knew. She believed that her entire 
life now depended on this visa. Both her families would be better off if only she 
could make it out. My host mother and I assisted Delphine as well as we could. As 
a university lecturer, my host mother advised Delphine to instruct the school in 
Sweden to post the letter of invitation ‘express’ and to both Delphine and the Con-
sulate directly. My task was to download the application form from the Internet. 
Delphine jokingly started calling us her doki men. Yet, even though she had two 
doki women supporting her with unknown and alien procedures, Delphine re-
mained fundamentally afraid over whether or not she would be granted her visa. 
When the letter of invitation arrived, Delphine spent a sleepless night wor-
rying over whether or not she would ever make it to bush. A mistake had been 
made; the letter of invitation was addressed to Delphine Matek Che and Delphine 
wanted her letter to be issued to Matek Delphine. The confusion had started when 
Delphine filled in her application form. She had put Delphine as her first name 
and Matek as her second name. As she read ‘family name’, she filled in her father’s 
name, which is Che. However, Che is not on any of her documents.9 
Within the Cameroonian system, Delphine does not have a family name. The 
only category available on her birth certificate is name and that reads ‘Matek Del-
phine’. The birth certificate does not suggest that Delphine and Matek are different 
categories of names. Matek is a name that stems from the village of origin of her 
(biological) parents, with whom she only lived the first five years of her life.10 She 
was the only one in her family with the name Matek.
9  For a discussion of the fairly recent historical emergence of last names, see (Scott 1998: 64- 71). 
10  Delphine’s parents were predominantly based in Tiko. Delphine’s mother, however, did regularly stay in an outskirt 
area of Buea to do farm work. When Delphine’s father fell ill, Delphine’s mother returned to Tiko. This is when, as Del-
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Delphine was thus very afraid they would not issue her a visa based on the 
name Delphine Matek Che. So when filling in the visa application form, Delphine 
resolutely decided not to repeat her prior mistake. She told me that this time shoe 
would leave the space for family name free. 
To leave the space for the family name open was to her was the truest way of 
fitting her names into the available boxes on the application form. While certainly 
true from her perspective, not having a family name would most probably not have 
worked for Embassy officials. As her dokiman, I thus advised her to pretend that 
Matek was her family name. With this pretend family name, Delphine eventually 
got her visa. 
States have embraced societies through bureaucratic mediating devices such 
as birth certificates and identity cards that are supposed to render legible the bu-
reaucratic subject. Yet, any identification is also the creation of a subject. As a visa 
applicant, Delphine thought of her name in a different manner from what was 
required for applications forms. She needed advice to fill in the form in a way that 
rendered her legible and viable as a visa applicant. She needed the support of other 
people so that the regulatory requirements of the consulate service could become 
legible to her. Yet, this process of mediation also transformed realities. These days, 
all administrative instances in Sweden treat Matek has Delphine’s family name. 
Delphine (newly baptized as Delphine Matek) did not trust the bureaucratic 
process that her application would undergo. Her fear was grounded in several as-
pects. Firstly, Delphine knew little about processes of visa applications. Through 
her social environment, Delphine just knew how hard and difficult it was to get a 
visa. Thus, it was difficult to believe that through her scholarship she now almost 
had an ‘entitlement’ to be granted a visa. 
Secondly, as the example of Delphine’s missing family name illustrates, the 
regulatory requirements of paper are at times far removed from local Cameroo-
nian realities. Bureaucratic norms do not easily coincide with naming techniques 
or practices in any given situation and thus require mediation and translation. We 
also saw that the Internet is not always as immediate and safe a source of informa-
tion as sometimes implied in the public relation work of Embassies. Imitations of 
government sites exist because of their potential revenue making capacity.
In Cameroon, the strangeness of regulatory requirements was a recurring 
theme in narratives of visa refusals. For example, embassies asked for bank state-
ments, yet only a small proportion of the population has a bank account. Bank 
statements are not only to prove the availability of sufficient financial funds. The 
function of bank statements - as explained by an American consulate officer - is the 
documentation of the economic activities of a person over the course of a certain 
amount of time. A profile of the economic, social and geographic ties of a person 
is created by way of their financial transfers. This technology of mediation draws 
up portraits of people through the markers left on a piece of paper through money 
transfers, card payments and cash withdrawals.
phine told me, it was decided that she was to stay in the house of the family that was then to become her new home.
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In Cameroon, only a small portion of financial activities and money exchanges 
pass through the banking system. Important savings occur through family meet-
ings and njangi groups.11 Cash payments mean that most forms of economic ac-
tivities remain invisible to the banking system. In such a context, profiles of people 
drawn up by a banking statement will be distorted. Even those who indeed have 
bank accounts use them less than cash, hence their economic and social activities 
would not properly be reflected by bank documentation. Most people’s economic 
and financial activities thus remain unintelligible to a consulate officer who starts 
to read the applicant through the piece of paper that is a bank statement.
The strangeness of regulatory requirements and their lack of intelligibility fur-
ther contribute to the need for intermediaries that facilitate the act of translation. 
Just duped by a facilitator, a neighbour stressed in conversation with me that one has 
to be very careful when trying to fall bush. ‘You can’t confuse things.’  ‘Your names 
have to be intact.’ In addition, even if one is working simultaneously in two profes-
sions, she told me, it was better to just indicate one. Otherwise misunderstandings 
might occur as to the nature of your ‘real’ work. My neighbour experienced the 
regulatory demands of papers as in contradiction to her own realities. Yet, as she 
was beginning to understand these regulatory requirements, she was eager to do 
her best ‘not to confuse things’. Hence, she decided do indicate only one of her two 
professions and made sure to stick to one particular order of her names. 
Regulatory requirements only allow that one version to be the ‘true’ version. 
In the course of failed emigration attempts, the above-mentioned neighbour had 
learned that she needed to translate her life so that she fitted the requirements 
and categories on the forms of the consulate service. Any doubt, or as she puts it 
‘confusion’, risks being interpreted as fraud. This act of translation between her life 
and the categories of the consulate office is mediated by the norms that underlie its 
categories. The conventions of the consulate are not self-evident and it thus takes 
skills, knowledge and experience to be able to operate according to its exigencies.  
Some regulatory requirements of consulate offices are remote rom the reali-
ties of many visa applicants in Cameroon. The study of Delphine’s experience of 
regulatory requirements has shown us how the intelligibility of regulatory require-
ments becomes part of a narrative of luck, and the need for mediation. In the next 
section, I explore various types of mediation that the remoteness of regulatory 
requirements produces.
Delphine’s departure: visas, mangos and foolishness
Anxiety and fear about her upcoming departure continued even after Delphine had 
a visa in her passport. Her new home university in Sweden assisted her with the pur-
chase of the travel tickets. Yet, stories of ultimate failure to leave the country were 
too common and Delphine remained uncertain about her eventual departure.
11  Njangi meetings are saving groups. They are often, but not always ethnically organised and divided by gender 
(Ardener & Burman 1996).
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I frequently heard stories about families that faced disappointments after ac-
quiring a visa and purchasing a flight. For instance, a person would be refused 
entry at the airport in the respective country because the visa was only valid for 
another few days. This feeds into narratives of refusals in terms of bad luck, witch-
craft and jealousy. It also requires an increased need for mediation.
On the day of her flight, Delphine hired a big van so that family members 
could go with her to the airport. The van meant to hold 20 people and was filled 
in the end with roughly 40 people. Friends and family dressed up for the occasion 
in their best church clothing. The back of the van was filled with cooked food. Her 
family and friends intended to stay until 02:00 at the airport to watch the airplane 
take off with Delphine inside.
I had already accompanied another informant called Martina with her extend-
ed family to the airport and knew this to be a very common procedure. Delphine’s 
fears on the evening of her departure were the same as Martina’s fears. Martina was 
leaving for Dubai with a visa that she had been given from the migration brokers 
Mr. James (see the preceding chapters). The origins of their visas mattered little for 
how Delphine and Pamella were apprehending their departure. In front of state of-
ficials who carefully examine anxiety in aspiring travellors (Gilboy 1991; Heyman 
1995, 2001), however, signs of anxiety are enough to warrant questioning, deten-
tion and even expulsion (Salter 2007: 59). The manner in which my informants 
received their visas, directly through the consulate or from migration broker such 
as Mr. James, made no difference. Aspiring travelers simply feel anxious in front of 
state officials (Gilboy 1991; Heyman 1995, 2001).
Delphine explained her fears to me six months after her arrival in bush: 
People like me will panic about visa even when we know that we are on scholarship. 
Luckily enough my kojo at one point suddenly became my doki man, calling the con-
sular office, trying to make me feel relaxed, following me to the airport….
Even in the case of a migration trajectory that would have been qualified by 
state officials in all ways as ‘legal’, mediation was important for Delphine’s sense of 
control over the outcome of her travel project. 
Aspiring bushfallers commonly refer to migration brokers because getting a 
visa is not understood as a question of ‘fair’ legal rules and ‘good customer serv-
ice’ – as stipulated in the opening quotes of this chapter.12 Fear and the need for 
an intermediary does not mean that state regulations for visas are being violated. 
Delphine’s case demonstrates how additional help was needed in order to be suc-
cessful at the application process.
Besides actual migration brokers, other sources of mediation exist. Families 
call on spiritual powers to obtain their visas. They fast and pray weeks in advance 
before travelling to the embassy. An informant told me how she prayed before 
going to the embassy: ‘Father, you know how much I spent for this passport. In 
12  Issues of luck are related, but also different from the idea that one can ‘buy’ a visa either directly or indirectly 
through acquiring (through whatever means) other pieces of documentation that would then ensure or at least increase 
one’s chances of being granted a visa. Money is one, but not the only avenue to try and influence the probabilities of 
one’s visa application to be successful.
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Jesus name, I cover this passport with your blood.’ Aspiring migrants are known to 
consult healers and witchdoctors. Ngambe men can give out medicine that the visa 
applicant will chew upon entering the embassy.13 Controlled by the power of the 
medicine, embassy officials are said to hand out the visa. 
Family members and friends often help with application processes, as well. A 
neighbour of mine told me about a family that had prepared a visa application for 
the eldest son. Because the younger brother of the eldest son had a higher level of 
education and was more articulate, the neighbour told me that it was decided that 
the younger brother should pose as the older brother during the interview. In this 
way, chances for a visa approval were considered higher. 
Both my neighbour and Delphine considered the one brother stepping for 
the other in a visa interview as legitimate and normal.14 When I asked Delphine 
whether she considered that any rules were broken by such a procedure, she told 
me the following: 
NO!! Why will they see it as breaking the rules? It’s just a way to help the family! 
There is just nothing wrong with that. He is just helping his brother to get the visa and 
at the same time he is helping the whole family, too. Because if the brother whom he 
is going in for gets the visa, then it for the benefit of the whole family.
This reaction to the story of the neighbour reflects Delphine’s understanding 
of visa application processes not being for the individual, but as a project for the 
entire family. As such, the mediation of family members is entirely legitimate and, 
to some degree, not even considered to be mediation. At another level, the deci-
sion of the family to send the younger brother also reveals an understanding of visa 
interviews as a technology needing to be mastered, rather than the transparent’ 
process the U.S. consulate officer told journalists on the open day.
I witnessed how visas were understood both as family projects and as tech-
nologies when listening to a radio show in Buea. A popular journalist discussed in 
Pidgin with his listeners whether or not a family in Buea had been right to curse 
their son when he returned from Europe at the end of the expiry date of his visa.15 
Five listeners who called in said that the boy had been right to respect the limits 
of his visa. Six listeners who called in argued that the boy had wasted a lifetime’s 
opportunity that was unlikely to repeat itself again. Given that his parents had 
spent a huge amount of money on his flight ticket, his return was considered to be 
irresponsible and ‘foolish’:
Things are difficult in Cameroon. As he’s already been able to get over there, he should 
try to work a little bit – send money from there. In my point of view, once you’ve 
13  Ngambe men are diviners bestowed with magical powers. 
14  As I was only told this story second hand, I do not know whether or not the two brothers were successful with their 
visa application.
15  In the course of my research period, the journalist and I became friends and he accepted to follow my suggestion 
for the particular theme of this talk show. He had run programmes and discussion on bushfalling before and was even 
closely involved with one of the two migration brokers with whom I worked in Buea (see the two previous chapters).
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already struggled so hard to even just get the visa, you go and then you come back. 
Most probably, it will be very difficult for him to get a visa again to go back.16
In the ensuing discussion, another listener established a metaphor between 
visas and mangos:
‘It’s as if a man climbs on top of a tree because he wants to harvest a mango. He 
touches the mango, but then climbs down again - only to pick up a stone and try to 
harvest the mango in that way. It’s foolish!17
Delphine also participating in the radio show said that, even for a person who 
had already managed to travel once, the chances of mastering the bureaucratic 
machine again and be granted another visa were too slim to risk a return. To her, 
mastering the technology once was not a guarantee for another visa in the future.
Uncertainty within the visa application processes is not equal for everyone. 
When Delphine described her fears at the airport, she referred to ‘people like me’. 
The narrative of luck is a well-founded narrative of those who have fewer tools 
to master the technologies that it takes to be granted a visa. In the next section, I 
look in more detail at the various technologies of mediation at play within the U.S. 
consulate section. I explore how some processes of mediation get legitimated and 
others delegitimated. I do so by ethnographically analysing the work and decision-
making processes of those actors in the position of power to hand out visas.
L e g a l  m e d i a t i o n  a n d  m e d i a t e d  l a w :  
b e h i n d  t h e  w i n d o w  o f  t h e  U S  c o n s u l a t e  s e r v i c e
To avoid statist portrayals (i.e. a perspective that sees like the state), it is important 
to ethnographically consider how agents that act in the name of the state oper-
ate (Mitchell 1991). This section of the chapter studies ethnographically how legal 
frameworks are interpreted, applied, performed and mediated within the consu-
late service of the U.S. Embassy. I ask how decision-making processes are governed 
at embassies. 
Salter pointed out that the right to be presumed innocent or to have a fair trial 
is held in abeyance at the border (2006: 169). As Spire has demonstrated, discre-
tionary powers can be crucial in the adjudication of the applications of (intending) 
immigrants (2008: 46). It is hence not just the illegal traveler that is ‘in a space 
16  ‘Kontri don strong and as e don reach for dey, e for dey try work small thing, dey send them money. For me, as you 
don struggle sote you don get that visa, you go dey and now e don cam back, some time e go strong for I for get that 
visa for go back for dey.’
17  ‘E dey like man wey e climb on top tree say e want go cut mango. Then e go, e touch the mango, e leave am - then 
come down, come pick stone begin to shoot am. That one na foolish.’
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of lawlessness’ (Khosravi 2007: 324). Within consulate offices, too, laws offer little 
protection to visa applicants. 
Salter puts forward that travelers (or in my case visa applicants) are ‘subject 
to the law, but not subject in the law (2006: 169).’ Rather than to talk of the rule of 
law, he suggests that ‘rule by decision’ would characterize governance dynamics 
better (2006: 182). Such a conceptualisation of the border foregrounds the use of 
sovereign force over the role and importance of the law. One of the promises of 
such a line of analysis rests with the demystification of ‘the law’ as a guiding and 
organising principle of processes at embassies. 
I argue that the narrative of legality is a legitimizing, rather than explanatory 
device. I first of all pay attention to elements of chance within processes of legal 
mediation. I then discuss assumptions that drive decision-making processes. Fi-
nally, I discuss processes of boundary-making between legitimate and illegitimate 
forms of mediation within the space of the embassy.
At McDonald’s: chance in the production chain
From the heat of the taxi to the cold of the entrance hall, I experienced heavy 
security checks while I had a last little chat in Pidgin with Cameroonian staff. As 
I then entered the main embassy building, a friendly American voice greeted me 
with, ‘Are you a citizen?’ I am, yet not of the United States of America. The floor 
was so shiny and clean, that I was almost gliding through the hall. I explained the 
purpose of my visit and was instructed to wait for the consul in chief in the waiting 
room. For a short while, I sat on the side of the Cameroonian visa applicants and I 
watched the video I described in the opening of this chapter.
Later in conversation with consular officers, I learned that the video serves 
more as a warning. At times U.S. consulate staff contacted the Cameroonian police 
about applicants that have committed fraud. Yet, this was not a usual practice. 
American Embassy officials did not want to give policemen further opportunities 
to receive ‘financial motivations’ in exchange for the release of people charged of 
fraud. Nevertheless, this video played in a continuous loop in the waiting room. 
The consulate office was being portrayed as a place in which violations of the law 
were persecuted harshly as acts of criminality.
Eventually, the consulate officer picked me up in the waiting room. He took me 
to the big open office where the consulate officers work. At the end of the big room, 
behind a multitude of desks and different workspaces, I see a series of cubicles. The 
actual office of the consulate section is a wide and open space. Yet, the desk behind 
the window where the consulate officers sit and take their decisions is a mere set 
of tiny office cubicles. Computer screens, other technical equipment, files, forms 
and a pile of passports were crammed onto the small desks. Each small cubicle has 
a window through which the consulate staff can see the visa applicants. Commu-
nication was only possible through the usage of loudspeakers. The consulate staff 
referred to these cubicles as ‘behind the window.’
At the side of the office next to the interview cubicles was a door that led to a 
small office where locally employed Cameroonian staff registered the visa fees of 
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the applicants and helped with other more technical tasks related to the processing 
of granted visas. Next to this small closed-off room, was another open space of-
fice where two more senior level Cameroonian staff worked. Both men are highly 
educated, very dynamic and in their late 30s.18 They were part of the anti-fraud 
unit and responsible for the investigation of various claims in application files for 
diversity lottery visas, as well as immigrant visas. 
The desks in their office were covered with photographs that consulate staff 
had identified as fraudulent. On one of the shelves, they proudly showed me a 
folder with letters of apology from Cameroonian applicants for having committed 
fraud. They traveled all throughout the country to investigate family ties of appli-
cants and conducted cross-interviews with the spouses of applicants for immigrant 
visas.19 One of the American consulate officers shared with me how sometimes 
he would walk into the interview room – reserved for immigrant visas and other 
matters – and asked the two Cameroonian staff to tone down the aggressiveness of 
their enquiries. 
The exercise of authority within embassies was organised according to layers 
of citizenship. Visa application fees were taken by Cameroonian staff. Fingerprints 
were taken by lower ranking American staff. Files were prepared by local Ameri-
can staff. The ultimate power to decide over a visa rested strictly with the consular 
officers. The interviews for non-immigrant visas that I observed ‘behind the win-
dow’ were all visa interviews for non-immigrant visas, thus for study, business or 
visiting purposes.20 During my period of observation, there were two consulate 
officers conducting the visa interviews ‘behind the window.’ 
One of the American consulate staff members was in his late 30s, white Ameri-
can, married and a former peace-corps volunteer. The other was older, not married 
and about to move to a new post on another continent. The young consulate of-
ficer was more advanced in his career and more professional and diplomatic in his 
conversations with me. In his explanations of his work, his intention was to inform 
and educate me, but he was simultaneously aware of how our interactions also con-
stituted an act of public relations. The older consulate staff officer was also white 
American, and more confidential and open in his remarks regarding his work and 
views of migration. He took my presence as a somewhat pleasant diversion from 
his daily routines and an opportunity to share his grievances about his work and 
the problems of migration.
Both officers would joke that they felt as if they were working at McDonalds. 
Instead of handing out burgers, they were deciding whether or not to hand out 
18  I did not have an occasion to conduct more extended research with these two young men.
19  At the French consulate service, Cameroonian staff has less autonomy and responsibility. French consulate officers 
send out Cameroonian staff to verify information in the town halls all throughout the country. However, the Cameroo-
nian staff in this case was sent out with empty forms to fill in the respective information from the birth and marriage 
registers. The actual comparison of this information with the information in the certificates submitted by visa applicants 
was conducted by French staff.
20  My discussion of visa application processes at the French Embassy in the following chapter is based on immigrant 
visas and thus already on this ground the analyzed visa application procedures of both chapters cannot be compared 
with one another.
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visas. In all their explanations to me, both officers stressed their ambition to be 
‘user friendly’ and ‘time efficient’. The measurement of the quality of how they were 
treating application files and taking decision was in their minds similar to the one 
at McDonalds. The objective they were trying to achieve was one of good service 
in little time. 
On average, not more than three minutes was spent on a single case. Both 
American officers referred to their work as being similar to the work at an assem-
bly line. The height of the piles of passports in front of the cubicles did not allow for 
much breathing space.21 Two consulate officers worked with anything between 100 
and 150 visa applications per day.22 The consulate officers proceed through a series 
of mechanical steps. Prefabricated refusal forms were available in both French and 
English. In the case of a refusal, the passport was handed back immediately. If a 
visa was granted, local American staff picked up the passports and processed the 
visa. Payments for the visas were taken before the interview. Everybody paid, re-
gardless of whether the visa was granted or not. 
When the tension became too high, the officers escaped back into the wide 
and open office space. Considerable stress was connected to making important 
decisions within not much more than one to two minutes per case. The pressure 
was released through jokes: ‘We have to send somebody every once in a while.’ 
Alternatively, ‘You feel warm and fuzzy today?’ 
Rule by decision
The decisions are based on interpretations of section 214(b) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA): ‘Every alien shall be presumed to be an immigrant until 
he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application 
for admission, that he is entitled to a non-immigrant status.’ To qualify for a visitor 
or student visa, an applicant must overcome the suspicion of being an intending 
immigrant. The law places this burden of proof on the applicant.  A visa will be 
granted if an applicant can convincingly prove strong ties to his country of origin.23 
The greatest majority of visa interviews ended with the consulate officer ticking 
and signing a form where this law is printed. 
The U.S. state department website names examples of such ties: a job, a house, 
land ownership, a family and a bank account.24 I followed many a case study of 
visa applicants at the consulate service. The process for reviewing visas does not 
allow for much concentration on individual details and specificities. The specificity 
is in the law and not in the individual person on the other side of the window. This 
means that the focus of attention is on legal frameworks and categories, which are 
the point of departure for decision-making processes. 
21  While the laws and procedures for non-immigrant visas are very different at the French and the American consulate 
service, both share very tight workspaces and heavy time constraints in their work.
22  Contrary to the expectations of my informants, there were no fixed rates for acceptance and refusals per day.
23  See also http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/denials/denials_1361.html
24  http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/denials/denials_1361.html
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Aspiring migrants first become visible to the regulatory authority of the em-
bassy through their application forms for visas. The consular officers pointed out 
to me that their decisions on non-immigrant visas were not paper-based. The con-
sulate officer often already chose the respective form after a quick glance through 
the application form as the applicant was still approaching the window. The im-
pressions (before and) during the interview were paramount to the decision of 
consulate officers to accept or deny a visa application.25 
The physical appearance and self-presentation of the applicant were crucial 
in the decision on whether or not the visa applicant will be seen an intending im-
migrant. In the encounter, officers searched for exceptions to what they considered 
to be normal behaviour. These norms stemmed from the life worlds of the visa of-
ficers. Deviance from the norm was registered as suspicion and thus in many cases 
as a cause for refusal. Nervousness, discomfort and anxiety were mostly read as 
signs of bad intent (Salter 2006). As one applicant approached the window, the of-
ficer next to me remarked how he did not think the applicant had ever worn a suit 
before. As another applicant left the window with a visa refusal, the officer shared 
with me his despair at the slowness and hesitations of some applicants in giving 
him answers. Applicants that want to leave for study projects, but speak poor Eng-
lish were not credible and risked not being granted a visa.
While standing behind the consulate officers, I was struck by how the spoken 
word of applicants was instantly converted into legal codes which the consulate of-
ficer then filled into the respective boxes on the computer screen. The answers and 
narratives were immediately translated into categories, such as purpose of travel, 
type of visa, type of family situation. Depending on these legal codes, the consulate 
officer took a positive or negative decision on the spot. 
Applicants could not see what the consulate officer typed on their computers 
and hence could not follow how what they had said was being translated by the 
officers. Through their own satellite Internet, officers accessed various databases. 
While the question and answer session occurred, the consulate officer could view a 
checklist of legitimate courses of study, as well as the track record of a person’s prior 
travel. Many times the respective refusal form had already been chosen before the 
interview began. Sometimes the form was already signed as the last questions were 
still being asked. Such observations helped to explain how and why informants 
experienced the judgment of their visa applications to be a question of luck. If the 
decision is yes, the applicant was saluted with a friendly, ‘Welcome to America’. 
25  While paper is not very important at the U.S. embassy for non-immigrant visas, this is different from immigrant 
visas. In this chapter, I only discuss non-immigrant visas. I will discuss immigrant visas for the case of the French con-
sulate service in the following chapter. With regards to non-immigrant visas at the French consulate, its regulations and 
procedures are very different from the U.S. consulate service. First of all, applicants at the French consulate are not a 
priori assumed to be intending immigrants. Secondly, the decision is not taken on the spot by the officer. In the French 
system, consular officers receive visa applicants and provide support and advice on the correct composition of the ap-
plication files. Certain questions are asked to verify that the application is coherent. The officers make small remarks on 
the file. Yet, the final decision is only taken in a second step by a so-called commission. This commission is de facto the 
diplomatic employee of the consulate service. The preparatory comments of the other consulate officers have divided 
the files into clear rejections, clear approvals and borderline cases. As a consequence, the role of the physical encounter 
is much more important at the U.S. consulate service than at the French consulate service.
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At times, the officers tried to bring me into the decision making process. ‘Here! 
What do you think?’ I felt very uncomfortable with the suggestion to actually par-
ticipate or even just give my opinion. Yet, both officers repeatedly spoke out invita-
tions to complicity. As men who were older in age, and also more advanced in their 
careers, they offered a share of their insights from their many years of experience. 
As a white woman of German nationality at a Dutch university, they assumed I was 
on their side. And part of their motivation to actually allow me to observe their 
work was for them to demonstrate how complex and difficult their work was. In 
the face of their invitations, I tried to avoid making statements the best I could. 
Yet, the vagueness of my responses to the files and cases obliged me to experience 
the set of expectations with which the officers were working. To quickly reduce 
applicants ‘with complex identities and claims to home into objects of danger or 
benefit’ (Salter 2007: 59) is precisely what makes you into a good professional at a 
consulate office. My reluctance to pronounce judgments was viewed as a lack of a 
capacity for intellectual sharpness.
The nature of the work and its dynamics were such that the only survival strat-
egy for the officers to cope with their work was to be constantly suspicious. To 
make time for careful analysis and ambiguity was to be inefficient and to fail in the 
job. To make space for doubt was to be naïve and to do the work badly. By contrast, 
to be suspicious was a sign of professionalism, as well as a means to cope with the 
workload. Officers dealt with the workload by looking for overall structures, pat-
terns and then the small oddity at stake that would make a case tilt towards the pile 
of folders of either visa denials or visa approvals. This disposition of the consulate 
worker meant that there was chance involved in whether or not applicants would 
be able to overcome the suspicion of the consulate workers. While consulate offic-
ers might point out that these elements of chance are mere moments of indispen-
sable imperfection, Spire has worked out that acts of administrative discretion are 
at the core of the politics of migration management (2007; 2008: 8).
The information that is extracted through the oral statements of the applicants, 
as well as implicitly through his or her clothing, body language, linguistic skills and 
bureaucratic norms is crucial for the decision making process of the visa officer. In 
the encounter, officers search for exceptions to what they consider to be ‘normal’ 
behaviour. These norms stem from the life worlds of the visa officers. Deviance 
from the norm is registered as suspicion and thus in many cases as a cause for re-
fusal. Nervousness, discomfort and anxiety are mostly read as signs of bad intent 
(Salter 2006).
In his ethnographic analysis of the work of immigration inspectors in the U.S., 
Gilboy found that official risk profiles are intermingled with national stereotypes. 
In a similar vein, Heyman has suggested that officers of the U.S. Integration and 
Naturalisation Service make decisions according to a covert classificatory system at 
the Mexican border that is developed in addition to the legal framework in which 
they operate and that relies on perceived moral worth, national origins stereotypes 
and apparent social class. In contrast to the state officials analysed by Gilboy (1991) 
and Heymen (1995), the visa officers with whom I worked did actually live in the 
country of the people whose cases they were treating and deciding. 
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Having wanted to focus mostly on the perspective of aspiring migrants, I did 
not conduct extensive fieldwork with consulate officers outside of their work-
space. However, from the interactions that I had with both American – but also 
French – consulate officers, their life worlds appeared to be most predominantly 
shaped by norms and values of their societies of origin and the wider expatriate 
community in Yaoundé. The degree of familiarity of consulate officers with Cam-
eroonian specificities in food, family arrangements and social life were mostly 
not particularly strong. Despite the Cameroonian staff employed at the embassy, 
the more senior U.S. consulate officer knew about salary levels in Cameroon only 
through his chauffeur and cook.26 His (domestic) employees were his interme-
diaries. If the norms against which visa applicants are measured and judged are 
fundamentally routed in societies of arrival, it becomes clear how and why there is 
an element of chance involved in the translation processes between visa applicant 
and consulate officer.27 
After the interview, visa officers took the fingerprints of the applicants and 
stored the digital photos of all applicants on their computers.28 Biometric data was 
assigned to all bodies that ask for a visa and subsequently stored within databases. 
Visa applicants did not have a choice in the matter. The biometric data of visa ap-
plicants was matched to a database with classificatory remarks. These classificatory 
included visa refusals, as well as remarks about potentially dubious papers within 
the application files. 
Visa refusals were stored in the computer and paired with the respective photo. 
Through the fingerprints, consulate officers could verify whether this particular 
person had already applied within the same embassy under a different name for a 
visa. An informant of mine in Buea told me that she had been ‘lucky’ that her visa 
denial had not been stamped into her passport. Yet, the denial and her photo had 
been stored within the computer system of the Embassy. In this sense, narratives 
of luck are a reflection of elements of contingency within the process, as well as 
of misapprehension and unintelligibility, but finally also reflecting the degree of 
powerlessness on the part of visa applicants. 
Mediated law, suspicion and the production of boundaries
I spoke about chance and the role of technologies of mediation within the struggle 
over probabilities in visa application processes. I now will discuss the framing of 
certain types of mediation as non-mediation and others as illegitimate. Consulate 
26  There was one notable exception to this more general lack of knowledge. Staff at the consulate office was acute-
ly aware of the terminology of dokimen in their speeches and warnings against migration brokers, they adopted this 
term.
27  For non-immigrant visas at the U.S. consulate, there is no system of reviews and checks. Whether or not visa ap-
plicants at the French consulate have a possibility to have their denial reviewed depends heavily on the type of visa for 
which they have applied, as well as on how they have been categorized as applicants in relation to French citizens or 
holder of French residence permits. 
28  At the French embassy, too, fingerprints are taken of all visa applicants and then shared with other European 
embassies.
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officers perform the law and construct boundaries between deserving visitors of 
the U.S. and potentially fraudulent and criminal visa applicants. Yet, they simulta-
neously also produce boundaries between different types of mediation.
U.S. consulate staff relied on predominantly three types of technologies that 
support consulate offers in identifying visa applicants and making decisions. These 
three technologies were forms of documentation, story telling and biometrics, that 
is, taking and storing digital photos and fingerprints. At Embassies, the identity of 
a visa applicant was operationalised through the information stated on the pass-
port, the matching application form and other supporting pieces of documentary 
evidence, such as bank statements, pay slips, letters of invitation or tax receipts. 
As Van der Ploeg points out, these practices do not simply determine pre-existing 
identities, but ‘establish identity in the sense that ‘identity’ becomes that which 
results from these efforts’ (Van der Ploeg, 1999: 300). 
It is because forms of documentation, interviews and fingerprinting establish 
identities that I take these technologies to be instances of mediation. While U.S. 
consulate staff would consider their own work to be transparent and immediate, I 
consider papers, interviews and fingerprinting as instances of mediation because 
I study different regulatory authorities at the same level playing field (Ferguson 
2006: 112). From this perspective, distinctions between acts of mediation within 
the supposed sphere of the state as transparent and immediate and, within the 
sphere of the market as money-driven and potentially criminal lose their appar-
ent self-evidence. This approach only becomes possible if one studies state actors 
without beginning to see like state actors (Scott 1998).
Mitchell has pointed out the need to ‘examine the political processes through 
which the uncertain yet powerful distinctions’ between state and society, or, in 
this case, state and market are produced (2007:170). As I have pointed out in the 
introduction of this dissertation, I wish to take up this call by analyzing state and 
non-state governance within a common frame and thus taking acts of boundary-
making as productive moments. Ferguson points out how state authorities spa-
tialise their power in ways that construct state authority to be ‘on top’, in terms of 
vertical height and all ‘encompassing’, in terms of spatial reach (Ferguson 2006: 90). 
Routine bureaucratic practices produce conceptions such as the one of ‘legality’ 
(Ferguson & Gupta 2002). In analyzing the governance dynamics that surround 
visas, this chapter studies an example of such bureaucratic practices.
The ethnographic vignettes above have already demonstrated the contingency 
of the officers’ decision making processes. Visa decisions were taken under cir-
cumstances of time pressure, incomplete documentary evidence, as well as inter-
pretations of applicant’s physical posture. These momentary decisions were then 
stored and rendered permanent within computer systems. 
The increasing reliance on – what I have worked out to be – sophisticated 
technologies of mediation occurred within a context in which embassies fashioned 
themselves as the protector of visa applicants who fall prey to the criminal work 
of dokimen. The video with which I opened this chapter simultaneously framed 
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the visa applicant as both threat and victim.29 As always potentially implicated in 
fraud, all visa applicants were a priori criminalised and suspicious as potential 
threats to national security. Yet, while all aspiring visa applicants were considered 
to be potentially illegal immigrants, the discourse that followed the screening of 
the video also allowed aspiring migrants appear as potential victims of dokimen. 
The naïveté of visa applicants let them fall prey to the deeds of both criminal and 
commercial migration brokers. Contingent decisions were rendered into perma-
nent truth claims in the name of the protection of visa applicants from illegitimate 
forms of mediation – namely dokimen and other types and causes of fraud.
When I asked the consulate officers about their perception of their work, they 
said they were trying to facilitate the applicants in proving the opposite of the as-
sumption of the law 214b. As consulate officers, they are required to adopt this 
posture. In such explanations both officers were performing the law by fashioning 
themselves as mere bureaucrats that operated only as instructed and guided by 
legal frameworks. 
In their own language, the officers told me that they tried to prevent people 
from ‘jumping ship’. To jump ship implies a betrayal of an allegiance or the aban-
donment of a commitment. In these terms, the officers talked about people enter-
ing the country for one purpose and then overstaying the legitimate length of their 
stay or using their visiting or student visa for other purposes. This is how officers 
legitimize their work. Both officers expressed that, when in doubt, they preferred 
to deny a visa to somebody who was genuine in his or her intentions to return to 
Cameroon after their visa expired than to risk granting a visa to somebody who 
might overstay their visa.
Consulate officers perform the law, but are simultaneously aware of elements of 
chance. Cameroonian interpretations of these moments of chance are luck. Refer-
ring to the common reliance of visa applicants on intermediaries, the more senior 
American consulate staff revealed some of the frustrations of his daily work: ‘They 
are trying their luck. […] You tell them that their documents are fraud, they smile 
and go away. […] An American would be crying and apologizing.’ 
It is striking that the officers themselves have integrated the notion of luck into 
their description and analysis of visa application processes. The above quote re-
veals that officers are aware of the perception of applicants of getting a visa in terms 
of luck. They acknowledged, as we have seen before, that they can at times be ‘soft 
and fuzzy’. However, in conversation with me, they interpreted these moments as 
mere instances of imperfection that are not systemic. 
The above quote also expressed the high degree of exasperation officers experi-
enced with the calm and seemingly indifferent attitude of Cameroonian applicants 
when charged with fraud. Consulate officers understand their work to be imple-
menting and interpreting the law - in and against the influences of illegitimate 
forms of mediation. Just as the narrative of legality delegitimizes the work of inter-
mediaries, the narrative of luck also delegitimizes the mediation of state officials. 
29  I thank Sarah van Walsum for having pointed this out to me during one of our discussions.
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Ironically, one form of officially recognized and legitimated form of luck exists 
within American visa procedures. Every year, the U.S. gives out 50.000 immigrant 
visas because of a so-called Diversity Immigrant Visa Programme. There is a fixed 
quote of diversity lottery visas for each country depending on whether this country 
has a low rate of immigration to the U.S. or not (see also Piot 2006). From October 
to November every year, anyone worldwide interested in an immigrant visa for 
the U.S. can make an entry. Per country, the winners are randomly selected. The 
lucky winners have to fulfill minimal eligibility requirements with respect to their 
educational level and their work experience. Yet, no other selection criteria are ap-
plied. With a high school degree and a minimum of two years of work experience 
in an occupation that requires at least two years of training, a lucky winner can go 
to the U.S. 
While practices at the U.S. consulate are interwoven by elements of uncer-
tainty, the source of credibility on which consulate officers base themselves is the 
performance of the law. Illegitimate practices of visa applicants, as well as their 
referral to illegitimate means of mediation give the law its appearance and im-
portance. When applicants gave, what sounded like prepared answers, the officers 
turned to me and implied that the applicant was lying because he had prepared for 
the interview. To try to influence the result of the visa interview – as one would do 
for a job interview – was judged illegitimate. I also observed how a consulate of-
ficer turned down a visa applicant for a lack of motivation for the respective study 
project. During the interview, the applicant said that he had come to know about 
the university through a family friend. Connections were not judged by the consu-
late officer to be a valid source of information. 
As explained before, the structure of the work at the consulate office demanded 
that applications were processed quickly for particular types of suspicion. In cases 
of female visa applicants, I witnessed a set of suspicions that were gender specific. 
A Cameroonian woman who had given birth in the U.S. was judged as a suspicious 
visa applicant. The officer explained to me that one never knows whether women 
are travelling to give birth in the U.S. so that their children will be American citi-
zens. For the same line of reasoning, I was informed by an officer that he turned 
down the visa request of a young woman because her clothing had been too lose. 
He was not sure whether she might be pregnant.
For an applicant to have a family with children can be a strong proof that his or 
her ties with Cameroon are strong enough to guarantee his or her return. Yet, I also 
witnessed how a consulate officer refused a visa request of a woman with several 
younger children in Cameroon. He turned to me after having signed the refusal 
form saying that he did not believe that the travel project of the young woman 
was credible. Who was going to take care of the children in the meantime? He had 
come to the assessment that the children of the woman were a reason for her not 
to travel.
I was surprised with the honesty and openness with which the elder consulate 
officer revealed how economics were part of his considerations. He had hesitated 
on whether or not to grant a visa to a young man who wanted to travel to Las Ve-
gas. When putting the passport of the applicant on the pile of successful passports, 
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he turned and joked that a man in Las Vegas would surely guarantee an inflow of 
money into the national economy. Needing to release the pressure under which 
he was working, he added: ‘I hope he won’t spread AIDS all over the place.’ Unpaid 
care work, by contrast, does not benefit the U.S. economy. Visa officers do not like 
to give visas to elderly Cameroonian women who come to visit their daughters 
in the U.S. They are suspected of overstaying their visas so as to take care of their 
grandchildren. 
There are many types of suspicious applicants. These likely candidates to ‘jump 
ship’ contribute towards the framing of state authority as being a manifestation of 
the ‘general’ interest and thus morally superior (Ferguson 2006: 89- 112). While 
the work of consulate officers is said to be transparent, the interactions between 
consulate officers and visa applicants were constantly fraught with misunderstand-
ings. Whether linguistically or culturally, there were many instances that required 
translation, explanation and mediation. 
Another applicant received a visa refusal amongst others because she had 
talked about wanting to visit her sister. In her file, it was marked that the relative 
whom she was going to visit in the U.S. was her cousin. In Cameroon, kinship ter-
minology is often based on social, rather than biological ties and it is common for 
children to grow up in households of other than their biological parents. Conse-
quently, distinctions between siblings and cousins or between nieces and children 
are not of relevance in everyday life. Behind the window at the U.S. consulate, 
however, only biological descriptions of kinship count. Socially adopted children 
are not considered sufficiently strong connections to motivate a family visit. 
Not all notions can be translated into legitimate or legal categories at the level 
of the consulate. I witnessed one case where a middle-aged woman wanted to trav-
el to the U.S. to visit her biological cousin (to whom she was referring as sister). 
The middle-aged woman had helped her relative when she had won the diversity 
lottery a few years ago and had for many years taken care of her relative’s children. 
Now her sister/cousin wanted to ‘appreciate’ (thank) her. The Embassy has no cat-
egory for appreciations. As the middle-aged woman did not have sufficient ties 
with Cameroon that would guarantee her return, she was not granted a visa.
During the visa interviews that I observe at the U.S. consulate, I saw how consu-
late officials established firm boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate forms 
of mediation. Anybody or anything that could have interfered with the visa applica-
tion process in front of the window was considered a potential source of distortion 
and fraud and viewed with great suspicion by consulate officers. Yet, translation by 
the consulate officer behind the window was considered neutral and transparent. 
One applicant, for example, worked with an NGO that was growing ‘eru’. The consu-
late officer was lost and turned to me. I could confirm that eru was indeed an im-
portant vegetable in Anglophone Cameroon. The man received his visa. When an 
elderly woman did not understand that her visa had been denied, the consulate of-
ficer called for help with his Cameroonian staff. The locally employed Cameroonian 
woman came to the window and spoke in Pidgin with the visa applicant: ‘Mamie, 
massa don deny visa. You no go go America. Put all that paper dem back for your 
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bag. May I no loss. Waka fine.’30 Had this woman come in the company of an inter-
mediary, this person would have had to justify his or her presence.
Any person accompanying an applicant in front of the window where the in-
terview is conducted is scanned and greeted with great skepticism. They have to 
briefly explain who they are, how they relate to the visa applicant and whether or 
not they have received money in exchange for accompanying the visa applicant to 
the interview window. Consulate officers also receive money in exchange for trans-
lating and interpreting the application files. Yet, because they do so in the name of 
the law, this does not put their credentials at stake. 
Consulate officers establish sharp distinctions between potentially fraudulent 
and criminal visa applicants and clients that deserve the treatment and services of 
a good customer. I observed how a little black girl of fourteen years entered the 
consulate section together with her mother. She claimed to be a U.S. citizen. Her 
mother was Cameroonian. The little girl claimed to have lost her passport. She was 
due to go to school the day after in the U.S. and she was requesting an emergency 
passport to be able to travel. Her story was greeted with skepticism. The young 
girl and her Cameroonian mother were allowed to come into a visiting room on 
the other side of the interview window, but were otherwise treated with the same 
rough tone with which visa applicants behind the window were treated. The situa-
tion was resolved when the girl produced an old and expired American passport. 
This one piece of paper radically changed the tone and mode of engagement. 
The fourteen-year old girl changed from being a potential source of citizenship 
fraud to an actual citizen. Now the only question in the minds of the officers was 
how to process her passport as fast and efficiently as possible to guarantee that the 
girl could attend school the next day. Having proven that she was indeed a citizen, 
the fourteen-year-old girl deserved the fastest and best kind of customer service 
that the consulate service could possibly provide.
The consulate officer took me into another room. It was here that empty pass-
port books are stored in a tall safe. ‘You are looking at a fortune here,’ he told me. 
He was aware that his work was part of an industry and laughingly joked about the 
millions of people who would be dying to have one of these passports. ‘That’s why 
they are locked into this drawer.’ 
The process of boundary making between legitimate and illegitimate media-
tion legitimizes state mediation. Due to the commercial and money-minded mi-
gration brokers, state officials need biometric data or inter-European data sharing 
systems. This ever-increasing degree of sophistication in technologies of mediation 
within embassy spaces is needed in the name of the protection of visa applicants 
and in the name of the law. 
The state monopolization of legitimate mobility control produces certain types 
of mediation as ‘legal’ and ‘legitimate’ and others as ‘illegal’ and ‘illegitimate’. The 
demarcation of certain types of mediation as ‘commercial’ and ‘criminal’ brings 
into being the very idea of ‘the law’ as an abstraction that is unmediated, imperme-
30  ‘Mother, the man has denied your visa. You will not go to America. Put those papers back into your bag. They should 
not get lost. All the best.’
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able to particular interests and ‘external’ to monetary considerations. In this sense, 
boundary making is productive of the narrative of legality that is assumed to char-
acterize and govern visa application processes. 
Tr a v e l  p e r m i t s ,  m o n e y  a n d  s t a t e  r e g u l a t i o n
In this section, I discuss the role and meaning of monetary flows in relation to 
travel permits and the state’s quest for a monopoly position within the regula-
tion of legitimate mediation (Torpey 1998). While consulate officers construct the 
distinctions between fees, commissions and bribes as self-evident, I demonstrate 
here how these distinctions are the result of different ways of framing the role and 
meaning of monetary flows. By looking for continuities between supposedly just 
returns of brokerage and illegitimate remuneration (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 168), 
I seek to return to the puzzle of how the sphere of market and state relate to each 
other. I do so by analyzing the conception of visas of a neighbour of mine, my own 
quest of a residence permit in Cameroon, as well as the function of financial flows 
within the U.S. and French consulate service.
Visas as tickets
A sales woman on the road at the entrance to my compound and I discuss my 
research project. ‘What is a visa?’ I ask. She replies to me in Pidgin: ‘Visas are like 
identity cards that you have to show to the police before you can pass through.’31 
She later further elaborated and explained that ‘visas are like tickets that you buy 
and then you can travel.’ So how is a visa different from a flight ticket, I asked her. 
She was surprised at my question and did not have a response. 
In Victorine’s answers in Pidgin, identity cards, visas and travel tickets all seem 
to merge.32 I suggest that Victorine invites us to reconsider the nature of travel per-
mits in at least two ways. Firstly, the roadside saleswoman can help us to rethink 
the connection between paper and mobility. Victorine’s response says she implies 
that visas are similar to travel tickets. As such, travel tickets constitute the permis-
sion to travel and visas are to be attained through money. Victorine does not seem 
31  ‘Visa I dey like identity card wey you e show am for police dem before you pass.’
32  The Pidgin word to catch all of these manifestations of paper is ‘book dem’ or ‘doki’. ‘I don get i book’ can mean 
that the speaker received his Bachelor degree, his passport, his vaccination card or even just a simple notepad. Given 
that Pidgin is not a fixed or closed system, it can always include words from other languages. Depending on the level of 
education, words from English can be borrowed and brought into Pidgin. Depending on the level of education, distinc-
tions between different forms of bureaucratic documentation can thus be made. Yet, the social context is such that 
people who only speak Pidgin and no English, will resort to the word of ‘book’ in reference to any form of documentation 
or paper.
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to make distinctions between the travel papers given by state authorities or by mar-
ket authorities. Both flight ticket and visa give access and allow for movement. 
Secondly, in what Victorine’s statement she implied that one ‘buys’ a visa to 
travel out. She refers to the money that is given when applying for a visa as merely 
money, but not as a ‘fee.’ Unwittingly, Victorine challenges – or at least does not take 
for granted - the neat distinction that is otherwise maintained between money that 
is given to Embassies as ‘fees’ and money that is handed over to brokers as a ‘price’. 
Price and fee are particular ways of framing monetary exchanges. Paying a fee 
confers the entitlement to have one’s case processed – not necessarily approved. 
Paying a price implies the delivery of a service or of a good. Both labels express 
certain understandings and social meanings of money (Zelizer 1997). The de-
marcations between money as a fee and as a price imply statements about the 
nature of the relationship established through the handing over of the money. 
Price establishes a supposedly commercial relationship and fees a bureaucratic or 
administrative one. 
Both labels are legitimising expressions that demarcate the nature of the au-
thority of the person to whom the money given. A person who receives a fee is 
authorized, restrained and guided by legal and administrative rules. A person who 
receives a price is placed within the logics of the market. These distinctive ways of 
framing money create divisions between various authorities that receive money. 
The framing of monetary exchanges in terms of either fee or price also legitimize 
and delegitimize an authority and notably mark them vis-à-vis the principles that 
are supposed to guide its action. Taking up Victorine’s cue, what happens if we 
think of the money that is given to brokers as fees and of the money that is handed 
over to consulate staff as price? 
Price and fee
Interpretations of the meaning and role of money within visa application proc-
esses vary greatly. The husband of an informant of mine who successfully went 
to Dubai with the help of the migration broker Mr. James (see the two preceding 
chapters) had the following to say about the failed emigration attempts of some 
of his younger brothers that he had sponsored earlier, ‘You pay for registration. 
They receive all the money and in the end they say you cannot go. They are mak-
ing their money. They are thieves. Why do they take money and not give visas?’ 
My informant’s husband is talking about embassy authorities. He understands the 
money he gave to the embassy was a price that he had to pay. He did not conceive 
of the money as a fee. 
One Cameroonian member of the U.S. embassy complained about acquaint-
ances of his in the following manner: ‘They just bring money and ask for how 
much and where they can get the visa. They are not even interested in information.’ 
The quote of the Cameroonian consulate official at the U.S. Embassy expresses 
outrage at the suggestion of aspiring migrants that visas could be attained through 
commercial means. Yet, it also implies a belief that information is key to mastering 
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visa application processes. As an employee of the U.S. embassy, he was willing to be 
a broker of information, but not of visas. 
The idea that travel documents are goods becomes more palpable when one 
considers the material basis of passports and the fact that, at times, a shortage of 
this material good can exists. When Cameroonian passports were changed over to 
standardized CEMAC passports, it became for a period difficult for Cameroonians 
to obtain passports.33 They were scarce simply because state institutions did not 
manage to print enough of them. It is possible that some Cameroonian state of-
ficials also benefitted financially from the resulting gap in demand and offer of 
passports. Yet, beyond these profits, this example demonstrates how passports that 
are issued by state authorities can be products on a market, rather than exclusively 
only documents that are issued. 
Another informant looked at all forms of paper as commodities. She had in-
vested money into papers to be able to go out and to ‘work money’ in bush.34 These 
papers included a marriage certificate and a business certificate. She needed these 
papers for the visa application. These papers had value in that they should enable 
her to travel out of the country to work money in bush. As the visa had then been 
refused, the purchased papers had lost their entire presumed value: 
Just like me struggling everyday to make papers and at the end of the day you don’t 
succeed. All the money you don’t see. You have the papers but what are you going to 
do with the papers?
During fieldwork, informants talked about spending money and having con-
nections when referring to bureaucratic processes. When I tried to get my own pa-
pers for my stay in Cameroon, I was surprised to suddenly find myself using exactly 
the same terminology. I ‘had spent my money’ and gotten my papers. When my visa 
expired and I needed to apply for another visa or alternatively a residence permit, 
information about processes, requirements and costs were not easily available. I had 
to travel to Yaoundé to enquire about the sort of documentation I should process in 
Buea to then bring these back for my application in Yaoundé. Instead of embarking 
on repeated 8-hour bus trips to Yaoundé, I received a residence permit in Buea for 
about half the money I thought I would have had to spend. The only downside was 
that I had no receipt to show for reimbursement with my university.
 A high-ranking person at the office decided to recognize and grant me the 
status of a student. Instead of having to apply for another visa, I was allowed to 
register as a student for a one-year residence permit. Due to the flexible interpreta-
tion of one particular rule, I could get a much cheaper carte de séjour (rather than 
an extension of my old visa). It cost me 35,000 CFA – roughly 50 Euros. This sum 
included other minor papers required for the residence permit. 
33  cemac stands for ‘Communauté Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale’ (Monetary and Economic Com-
munity of Central Africa).
34  To ‘work money’ is a Cameroonian expression that de facto refers to labour migration. People want to travel to ‘work 
money’ as opposed to working the field. The expression stems historically from the labour migration from Bamenda 
to the coast that inserted migrants into the money economy (amongst others Konings 1993, 1995, 1996 and Ardener 
1996). 
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I had given 35.000 CFA and in return had received the permit that I needed. 
The 35.000 CFA represented less money than I would have been required to spend 
in terms of fees for a renewal of my visa. I do not know the distribution of the 
35,000 CFA to various officials for the carte de séjour. I could not distinguish what 
portion was considered fee and what might be considered a price for the support-
ing documents. 
Visas as revenue
The money given to consulate officers is referred to as fees. Nevertheless, visas have 
an official revenue-generating function within consulate services. An accounting 
firm periodically comes and evaluates the cost of visa services of the American 
embassies in the world. Visa fees are then established based upon these reports. In 
principle, the ‘visa function’ is supposed to be 100 percent financed through visa 
fees.  At the U.S. consulate, most of the salary of consulate staff comes from visa 
fees. Visa fees also serve to pay for computer facilities, Internet connection and 
some of the office furniture.35 
Strictly speaking, the U.S. Embassy administration referred to visa fees as ‘user 
fees’. The money does not pay for the issuance of a visa, but for the processing of the 
application and the interview.  Money is not refunded if applicants do not receive 
a visa because the service was provided - even if not at all times to the satisfaction 
of the customer.
Consulate staff from the U.S. Embassy furthermore stressed in conversation 
with me that the above-described financial function of visa (or user) fees did not 
mean that U.S. consulate services were local businesses. Money obtained by consu-
late services for the visa (or user) fees does not remain within the consulate service, 
but is wired to a central account in the U.S. where it is distributed and dispatched 
globally to the various consulate services. Consulate services are thus not as local 
entities self-financed. However, the amount of money consulate services receive 
back from this central account does depend upon the number of visa applications 
that were processed. 
When considering the contrasting case of the French consulate service, I was 
able to witness similar financial dynamics. With respect to the connection between 
visas and financial procedures of the consulate service, I noted that visa applicants 
with the French consulate have to make their appointment through a call service 
that was entirely outsourced to a private company. Calling fees were high. This pri-
vatised call service company was entirely financed through the telephone charges 
of the visa applicants. 
The consulate service of the French Embassy was only very partially financed 
through money flows of the embassy. In contrast to the U.S. consulate in which 
applicants always have their interviews with diplomatic staff, the Frenc consulate 
service of Yaoundé only had one diplomatic staff. The other four consulate offic-
ers were French nationals that employed on the basis of local contracts directly in 
35  See also http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142155.htm
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Cameroon. The salaries of the locally employed French staff were not paid through 
the financial circuits of the diplomatic service in Paris, but through revenues cre-
ated by the visa application fees.  Every visa application contributes 40,000 CFA – 
roughly 60 Euros – to the maintenance of the consulate service. 
All officers within the service have a very direct relationship to the money 
made within the service. If they forget to charge the 40,000 CFA, they themselves 
had to reimburse the missing money. The first step in the interview encounter was 
always  the payment. At the end of the working day, all officers joined their cashiers 
and the revenue of the day was counted. Disappointment or joy depended upon 
whether or not the magic limit of one million CFA (1,500 Euros) had been reached 
in a day.
In some cases the refusal is immediately clear to the consulate officer. Yet, even 
if fraudulent traveller cheques have been found, all details of the applicant still 
need to be processed within the computer. A photo of the applicant was taken 
and stored in the computer system. With somewhat inefficient computers, these 
processes could take long and were frustrating. ‘So much effort for a simple no!’ 
complained one visa worker at the French consulate service to me. Yet, there was 
also a sense of relief in knowing that at least the efforts served to generate income. 
At the end of a long and frustrating intake procedure, the officer turned to me and 
jokingly said: ‘Another 40,000 for us.’ 
Torpey (by drawing on Weber & Noiriel) considers the historical emergence of 
identification papers and travel permits as an important regulatory tool for states. 
Within his argumentation, Torpey states that ‘identification papers of various kinds 
constitute the bureaucratic equivalent of money: they are the currency of modern 
state administration’ (Torpey 1998: 244). He points to the fact that travel permits 
do not only serve to identify the traveler. As a technology of governance, identity 
papers and travel permits are also a resource in the literal meaning of the word.
Instead of taking the existence of travel permits for granted, I discussed in this 
section the emergence of different border regimes and its connections to financial 
dynamics. By taking the invention of travel permits as the event, I have shown how 
conceptions of visas by applicants and visa officers begin to overlap when one con-
siders the financial flows that surround visa application procedures.
C o n c l u s i o n
This chapter took the narrative of luck as an occasion to ethnographically inves-
tigate visa interviews and connected decision-making processes for elements of 
chance and mediation. Luck and legality are narratives that mutually delegitimize 
each other. The narrative of luck undermines the narrative of legality by point-
ing towards elements of chance, contingency, but also arbitrariness. The narrative 
of legality and its counterparts, i.e. accusations of ‘illegality’, mark mediation and 
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money as external to the law. Application forms, supporting documents, inter-
viewing and the storing of photos and fingerprints are presented as straightfor-
ward instruments in what is said to be a transparent process. The narrative of luck 
reclaims and challenges the state’s framing of its own mediating technologies. 
Luck means that the granting of a visa is contingent and dependent on things 
that may or may not happen. When analyzing the visa application process at the 
U.S. consulate, we have witnessed the important role of chance within decision-
making processes. Consulate staff acknowledged chance, but framed it as a margin 
of error within the interpretation and application of the law. Applicants, by con-
trast, were aware that the convincing presentation of certain papers could enhance 
their chances of being granted the desired visa, but foreground the degree of un-
certainty and volatility that they experienced within the interpretation of legal and 
regulatory frameworks. 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the extent to which both legality and luck 
are belief systems that contribute towards the framing of some types of mediation 
as legitimate (and even immediate) and other as illegitimate. Processes of legal 
interpretation and application are always and necessarily mediated, and the work 
of facilitators and intermediaries needs to be seen within a continuum. All law is 
mediated, but not all mediation is legal. I have argued that the framing of certain 
types of mediation as ‘illegal’ should not be assumed, but taken as an instance for 
analysis.
In the first section, the analysis of Delphine’s emigration project demonstrated 
how remote the embassy requirements were for many Cameroonians. It was this 
type of the preposterous nature of regulatory requirements that necessitates and 
brings into being the work of intermediaries. Increasing degrees of standardisa-
tion require and evoke the need for more mediation. The case study of Delphine 
furthermore illustrated how mediation is important regardless of whether the visa 
was issued by embassies or by migration brokers. I also illustrated that anxiety in 
the face of departure does not depend on whether or not a migration trajectory is 
likely to be qualified by state officials as ‘legal’ or illegal’.
The case study of the U.S. Embassy demonstrated how the law was mediated 
through technologies. Consulate officers relied on papers, interviews and literal 
technologies, such as fingerprinting and the storing of photos of all applicants, to 
mediate their decision to grant or deny a visa. The case study also illustrated how 
within the interpretation and application of legal frameworks, there always were 
elements of chance and contingency. Therefore, what it took to get a visa was the 
mastery of mediating technologies that could limit the degree of contingency.  
In the third section, I have shown that the state’s quest for monopoly position 
was intrinsically intertwined with financial regimes of governance. Visas have an 
income-generating function for consulate offices. Money is not external or other 
to the interpretation and application of legal frameworks. Instead, the framing of 
financial flows to consulate offices as fees creates the appearance of state mediation 
as being external to financial flows. The framing of money outside the consulate 
office as price produces boundaries between authorities. Authorities that receive 
money in the form of fees are constructed as ‘legal’ and ‘transparent’ and authori-
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ties in which money is framed as ‘price’ are constructed fundamentally different 
and by extension as illegal’ and ‘commercial’. 
In the video discussed in the opening of the chapter, we saw how visa appli-
cants were simultaneously framed as potential criminals or victims of migration 
broker. Similar to the discourse and politics of human trafficking, the visa appli-
cant ‘guilty’ of fraud can escape the status of ‘criminal’ by becoming the ‘victim’ to 
the criminal dokiman. This positioning of visa applicants lets the state take on the 
role of a double protector. Through the work of the consulate service, the state is 
either protecting itself from fraudulent visa applicants or it is protecting innocent 
visa applicants who have fallen victim to criminal dokimen.36 It is this double-role 
of protection that legitimizes the authority of consulate staff at embassies. By ex-
tension, this double-role of protection also legitimizes the state’s monopoly over 
the legitimate means of mobility (Torpey: 1997). 
Torpey argued that studies of migration and migration policies have taken for 
granted the role of states and ‘have thus failed to see the ways in which regulation 
of movement contributes to constitute the very ‘state-ness’ of states’ (Torpey 1998: 
240). Through the lens of travel documents and multiple ways of framing money, 
I have sought to contribute knowledge to the construction of state authority and 
it supposed boundaries. The boundary-making between legitimate types and ille-
gitimates types of mediation is productive of the very notion of ‘the state’ and ‘the 
law’. It creates the narrative of legality that implies that ‘the law’ is guaranteed to be 
transparent and fair and thus by extension supposedly unmediated and external to 
monetary logics. 
This construction of the law legitimises the exercise of authority by state offi-
cials and their connected efforts to monopolise the legitimate use of violence. The 
framing of migration brokers in terms of crime, commerce and greed creates the 
state as the saviour of migrants. It is in this context that the productive functions of 
warnings against dokimen are best understood. The accusations against dokimen 
with which this chapter opened are not the condemnation of mediation per se, but 
rather as a struggle to establish the state’s monopoly over legitimate mediation.
36  I thank Sarah van Walsum for the discussion we had on this point.
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Chapter 4 
Security@marriage.fr: Marriage migration  
and the production of fraud and selfishness
At the French Embassy, two printouts of e-mails hung on the walls of the little cu-
bicle in which the consulate officers worked. In one of the e-mails, an elderly and 
sick French man, who is married to a Cameroonian woman in France, wrote to the 
consulate to denounce the fraud in which his wife is involved. 
I only needed a wife, not a forger-ess. […] We only live off social benefits because she 
never wanted to work and is sending half of all benefits down to her mother. […] The 
children and I can only watch the disaster. Thank you for your understanding and for 
protecting and helping me. Thank you.1 
He said that because he was ill with Parkinson’s disease, he was not in a posi-
tion to be in charge of the paperwork himself. The message is clear: Cameroonian 
1  Trying to feminise the acting of committing fraud, the man is here inventing a new word. With ‘faussiere’, he is refer-
ring to a person who commits fraud. Original: ‘On ne vit que des allocations familiales car elle n’a jamais voulu travailler 
et puis elle expédie plus que la moitie des allocations a sa mère. […] Les enfants et moi ne pouvons qu’assister au 
désastre. Merci de me comprendre me protéger et m’aider merci.’
10. Bar in Yaounde: ‘Ambassade’ 
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wives are selfish, lazy and greedy. While vulnerable French men want love and 
children, Cameroonian women are involved with ‘fraud’ or are ‘fake’ themselves. 
Marriage migration is thus a security issue for consulate staff at embassies in 
Cameroon. The eager search by consulate officers for fraud within marriage migra-
tion is all about protecting vulnerable French men from Cameroonian women who 
are only interested in money. French men are the victims of (Internet-mediated) 
marriages. Very much in contrast to the narrative of mail-order brides in which 
Asian women are the defenceless victims of brutal American or European men, 
Cameroonian women are said to lure French men with their beauty into disastrous 
marriages. One of the French consulate officers told me that she was using all the 
powers at her disposal to ‘protect the individual from the potential misuses of the 
powers of marriage.’2
When observing for a few weeks the work of the French consulate office in 
Yaoundé, I was struck by the tone used when talking about marriage migration.3 
It was articulated as a security issue and, more strikingly, the security threat was 
located with Cameroonian spouses and women. When questioning consulate staff 
at the Embassy that the cases of these e-mail posters surely must represent extreme 
situations, I was told that such narratives are much more common than I would 
think. The fact that these e-mails were pinned on the wall conveyed the inherent 
assumption within the regulatory dynamics of the state’s governance of marriage 
migration. The strongest suspicions upheld against applicants referred to marriage, 
fraud and money. Internet marriages were strongly condemned and women who 
engage in these were judged for being materialistic and selfish. The presence of 
even just a few of those e-mails within the office space of the consulate workers 
constituted justification for the rationale of consulate work – a regular reminder of 
the security issues at stake. 
In contrast to the above-described dynamics at the French consulate office, my 
research assistant Delphine and other informants looked with a great degree of hope 
towards the potential of Internet-mediated marriages with either a Cameroonian or 
a foreigner abroad. During the process of writing this chapter, I continued to re-
ceive repeated requests from a Cameroonian informant called Mamie Comfort: 
Hey Jill, you know I have only one thing that I will always ask you. A White Man 
who is serious about having a woman back here in Africa. I am not asking you for no 
other thing - except this. What do you think about this idea? Hey, I know it will sound 
funny to you but for me it’s real. 
This chapter will argue that Mamie Comfort’s e-mail request also stems from 
a set of security concerns. Mamie Comfort, in her mid 30s, was deported from 
the Netherlands to Cameroon about fifteen years ago. A few months after the first 
2  Within the general literature on human trafficking, the phenomenon of ‘mail order brides’ is often referred to as a 
specific subtype or form of ‘human trafficking’. My own work on Internet-mediated marriage migration builds on Con-
stable’s analysis of the assumptions on which the discourse of ‘mail order brides’ builds (Constable 2003). 
3  As pointed out in the introduction, I was able to access to the French consulate partly because of accidental chains 
of contacts and partly because trust was easily granted to a researcher who had graduated from the same school as 
most French diplomatic staff.
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e-mail, I received the following e-mail from her: ‘Hey, you know, I will not stop to 
ask you that you should look for me a serious man over there - who is interested 
in a real and honest relationship.’ She is hoping for a man who will be ‘serious’ and 
‘honest.’ Mamie Comfort’s repeated stress on the realness of what she is aspiring to-
wards seems to suggest that she, too, is afraid of fake offers of marriage that might 
come forward from abroad. Mamie Comfort wants to secure or obtain a suitable 
marriage. Only a ‘serious’ man can assure a marriage that safeguards her interests, 
needs and desires that are crucial to her personal well being.
To speak of the (human) security of aspiring migrants or their families 
(Doomernik 2004; Abiri 2000: 72-73) requires much more explicit explanation 
than to speak of the security of a nation state, its citizens and its welfare system. 
It is thus important to consider for whom security is an issue, from what security 
needs to be protected and for what ends security ought to be achieved (Tadjbakhsh 
& Chenoy 2007: 13- 21). Through empirical material on the life and emigration 
trajectories of Cameroonian women, this chapter seeks to contribute knowledge to 
the governance of marriage migration. By doing so through the notion of security, 
it puts into question different regimes of legitimacy. I hence analyse marriage visa 
interviews for what they can tell us about the regulatory logics that underlie the 
state’s construction of security and security threats.
In my analysis of the construction of security threats, I focus on the state’s 
engagement with migrant women and their families. Yet, migrant women face the 
regulation of both state and family authorities. In my chapter, I discuss how con-
flicting notions of security and multiple regulatory regimes feed into the produc-
tion of fraud and selfishness in relation to marriage migration. 
The aim of this chapter is to decipher how forms of regulation of marriage 
migration by both state and family connect and combine with one another. I take 
the theme of marriage migration as an occasion to study the different regulatory 
dynamics of as well as between the sphere of the state and the family. Although it 
could be very interesting, I will not focus on comparing the French and the Ameri-
can consulate services. Instead, I will focus on both consulates deal with the topic of 
marriage within their visa application procedures. While the French and the Amer-
ican state both come with their specific histories and cultures, they are united by 
important dynamics in their relation to aspiring migrant women from Cameroon. 
Interested in ethnography of regulation, I analyse each ethnographic case for what 
it reveals about state dynamics of regulation vis-a-visa Cameroonian women.
I want to demonstrate that instruments of control by both family and state 
follow different logics but in practice are both engaged in the regulatory ambitions 
over women. Both family and state regulation at times come together in their ef-
forts to keep control over the mobility (and sexuality) of migrant women. More 
insights on issues of fraud and security follow from this study of the regulation of 
marriage migration by both state and family. After a discussion of how marriage 
migration gets framed and represented differently by both state and family, this 
chapter will dive into the constructions of security respectively at the French and 
American consulate, then within family structures and finally from the perspective 
of an individual Cameroonian woman.
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B o r d e r  s p e c t a c l e s  o f  m a r r i a g e  m i g r a t i o n
I hope my study opens up a new view onto statist accusations of fraud and selfish-
ness at the consulate. It seeks to do so both by uncovering multiple security issues 
inherent to the topic of marriage migration and by unravelling assumptions on 
which these accusations are based within the regime of state regulation. Security is 
not an emic concept, but an analytical lens through which I analyse my empirical 
material. As an analytical lens, security enables me to shed new light onto the ‘bor-
der spectacle’ of marriage migration of which the opening e-mails of this chapter 
are an example (De Genova 2005: 242- 249).
Securitisation, security and marriage migration
In 2007, there were about 1.000 visa applications at the French consulate for fam-
ily reunion – this figure also includes visas for children rejoining their parents in 
France. Of these 1.000 visa demands, 730 demands were granted. While more than 
two thirds of all family reunion visas are granted, officers placed emphasis on the 
applications that according to them had be turned down. The focus of embassy 
staff is not on the number of legitimate and accepted visas, but instead there is 
recurrent talk of ‘fraud’ and the accusations of marriages of convenience. What the 
images, posters and public statements portrayed is not in alignment with the every 
day dynamics of actual functioning of the consulate service De Genova’s notion of 
‘border spectacle’ can usefully help to resolve this puzzle (2002: 436- 439). 
De Genova suggests that state officials perform spectacles of border enforce-
ment. Such ‘border spectacles’ render visible the illegality of migrants, but not the 
law that in fact produces the illegality of migrants. The legal production of illegality 
thus becomes naturalised and no longer seems to require further exploration. Yet, 
it is also why I ethnographically analyse consulate dynamics within a chapter on 
marriage migration. This study allows as to see how the very instruments that are 
used to authorise migration, such as for example visas and bridewealth payments, 
can simultaneously also produce risks. 
In the last decade, politicians and policy makers have increasingly framed mi-
gration as an issue of security (Nyers 2003: p. 1069; Spire 2008: 16). Firstly, the very 
process of securitization – and thus not migration itself – merits critical investi-
gation (Neal 2009). Bigo characterises the contemporary mode of regulation of 
migration in terms of a ‘governmentality of unease’. In his critique, the securitisa-
tion of migration has led to the development of profiling techniques and related 
technologies that help to determine who is to be surveyed, questioned, detained 
or removed from the territory of receiving nation states (Bigo 2002: 82). The open-
ing e-mails shown in this chapter show that the dynamics and political processes 
behind the framing of migration are concerns for security (Bigo 2002). A study of 
the very process of securitization can denaturalize contemporary common places 
on migration and security (De Haas 2008) and open up new possibilities for fram-
ing migration. 
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Secondly, the possibility of taking security as the starting point of analysis, 
albeit not in its supposed meaning and relationship to migration. Predominantly, 
these days the securitization of migration refers to the security of the national wel-
fare state (Spire 2008: 52) and its citizens that need to be protected from criminals, 
terrorists and other intruders (for an example Graham 2000: 186- 187). This reflects 
a statist way of understanding the security and migration nexus (for an analysis, 
see Gasper and Truong 2010: 10- 11). Where the threat to security is located de-
pends heavily on the standpoint from which the analysis is conducted.4 
Unravelling security agendas of state and family: visas and bridewealth 
payments
I approach the governance of marriage migration from the multiple perspectives 
of aspiring migrant women, state institutions and families. I refer to the significant 
influence and importance of the sphere of the family above all in two ways. First, 
members of family can be important in influencing, shaping or determining the life 
and migration trajectories of aspiring migrants. Migrants are thoroughly embed-
ded within family networks and it is thus problematic to treat or think of migrants 
merely as individuals (Bakewell 2010: 1692).5 As we shall see, family members can 
be key decision-makers or fundraisers (Stark & Bloom 1985: 174). Second, family 
norms and values constantly work to influence the choices and actions of aspiring 
migrants within their life trajectories. All aspiring migrants are always guided and 
informed by expectations and value systems of the family. Ideal type expectations 
of male and female bushfallers reveal standards and norms according to which 
families seek to regulate migration. The authority of the sphere of the family thus 
goes far beyond particular actions of individual members of family.
As we saw above, fraud and selfishness are important themes that emerge in 
relation to marriage migration and both are related to issues of security. When 
thinking about how security and marriage migration relate to one another it is 
important to consider a plurality of regulatory authorities with which aspiring mi-
grant women deal within their trajectories. Both family and state struggle to secure 
licences for mobility. Yet, family, state and individual Cameroonian women often 
have different objectives in relation to mobility. In fact, how all three operate re-
flects different notions of the concept of security. I analyse the different concerns 
of state officials, families and individual women through the notion of security 
because it allows me to put these different regulatory authorities on the same level 
playing field (Ferguson 2006: 112). I thus do not presuppose that certain concerns 
4  Gasper and Truong are that the human security framework is particularly helpful for an analysis of migration for 
principally three reasons. First of all, the human security framework supports human rights concerns. Secondly, the 
human security approach goes beyond the Westphalian framework that considers states as the main actors and cat-
egories of analysis. Finally, the human security approach can be less individualistic than a mere human rights approach. 
As a conceptual lens, human security allows ample space for the importance of communities, families and identities 
(Gasper & Truong  2010: 14).
5   For a rich analysis of migrant connections to family networks, see Moors 2003; Fleischer 2009; Drohtbohm 2009 & 
2010; Kastner 2010; Konig & de Regt 2010.
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are more legitimate than others, but instead study how the respective legitimacy of 
certain concerns is constructed through accusations of fraud and selfishness.
One of the objectives of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the governance 
of migration that includes the state as an actor, but explicitly goes beyond the vi-
sion and perspective of the state. The state as both a set of institutions and an idea 
significantly shapes migration trajectories and the respective scope of control for 
aspiring migrants over the outcome of their migration trajectories. Visas are an 
important condition of possibility for geographical mobility. States fix the legal 
frameworks within which aspiring spouses can join each other across state bor-
ders. Yet, as I have argued in the introduction of this thesis, to pay attention to the 
state as an actor does not mean to take up the perspective of the state. 
The border spectacle of marriage migration cannot be understood without an 
appreciation of how state actors have also created the need for this border spec-
tacle. Love as the foundations of marital unions (Pateman 1988: 154-188; Finlay 
& Clarke 2003: 416; Spronk 2006: 213- 254) has become a source of suspicion for 
consulate officers at the very moment in which marriage has been constructed as 
one of the few avenues of emigration.6 
To unravel multiple security agendas, this chapter will pay attention to visas 
and bridewealth payments. In very different ways, both visas and bridewealth pay-
ments constitute instruments of control over movement. State authorities give out 
visas upon having both studied papers and received money.  The visa of a (deter-
ritorial) state authority grants permission to a person to move from the country 
of origin to the country of the visa provider. Bridewealth payments, on the other 
hand, sanction marital unions. A bridewealth payment is necessary to convince 
the bride’s family to allow the daughter to leave the household of her parents. De-
pending on the village of origin of the spouses, the family of the husband gives a 
certain amount of money, drinks, animals or other goods to members of the fam-
ily of the wife. By confirming that the husband now has control over the sexuality 
and further movements of the spouse, a bridewealth payment licenses a woman 
to move to the household of the man. Both bridewealth payments and visas hence 
represent particular modes of control and regulation within the sphere of the state 
and the family respectively.7 
This chapter explores security issues through the example of marriage related 
cases of migration because marriage holds the potential to blur boundaries of le-
gal citizenship. Through marriage so called foreigners become and give birth to 
citizens. Thus, trajectories of marriage migration arouse a particularly strong set 
of suspicions at the level of state authorities. During my two weeks at the French 
consulate, I observed eight marriage interviews. Out of the 43 other visa inter-
views I observed, seven cases that were also related to issues of marriage. Marriage 
certificates are crucial elements of visa application processes. They can become 
6  I thank Sebastien Chauvin for having pointed out these interlocked dynamics to me.
7  It is important to reiterate that neither state nor family are bounded units that clash and contradict each other at 
all times. In fact, I will demonstrate that state effects cannot be understood without studying the sphere of the family 
and vice versa.
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important for example to prove the status of the applicant or to certify the status of 
the relative in France whom the applicant wants to visit. Marriage as a particular 
type of family dependence is thus a crucial topic at Embassies, as well as for the 
ambition of mobility of women in Cameroon.
In relation to marriage visa interviews at the consulate, embassy staff and visa 
applicants ask themselves a set of security related questions.8 Consulate staff ra-
tionalizes their work through a narrative of wanting to ensure the safety of their 
own citizens, as well as the body of the nation. At the same time, Internet-mediated 
marriages, marriages with foreigners and marriages with Cameroonians abroad are 
ways for Cameroonian women to achieve both social and geographical mobility. In 
a context in which the consequence of the structural adjustment programmes still 
endure; geographical mobility in Cameroon has become synonymous with social 
mobility and by extension greater human security for the future of the entire fam-
ily. Consequently, women in Cameroon conceive of marriage migration in relation 
to their own understandings of what security entails.
Money, sex and Internet-mediated marriages in Cameroon
The most common representation and reference to Internet mediated marriage in 
Cameroon during my fieldwork period was a song called njumboss. (Njumboss is 
a slang word that refers to an elderly rich man.)9 ‘Mother, life in the village is dif-
ficult! I will go to town to try and build up my life.’ These are the lyrics of the hero-
ine of a popular song sung by the Cameroonian singer Erico.10 The refrain goes 
‘njumboss@yahoo.fr’ and the song was extremely popular in both Anglophone and 
Francophone Cameroon. ‘Mother, I will surf on the Internet to find my white man 
– even if he has a snake.’ ‘I will send out photos on which I’m all naked. And even 
if the photos will be distributed all over the place… me I found him!’ The heroine 
of the song is clear that she is the one who sought out her fate and is thus willing to 
accept the consequences. She willingly takes the risks that the white man to whom 
she refers as njumboss can turn into a snake that would over night either swallow 
her up or steal the eggs in her womb and thus make her infertile. She searches for 
her white man under the address of njumboss@yahoo.fr. A njumboss is a particular 
kind of man or boyfriend and is similar in meaning to the term mboma that refers 
to elderly married and rich men. Literally speaking, mboma means python. 
Seeking out sugar daddies and white men - over the Internet or otherwise – is 
not free of dangers. Nevertheless, the community was rattled by at least one case 
per year where female university students – at the university where I did my field-
work – put naked photos of themvelves onto the Internet. In the case of the pop 
song, the strategy of the heroine is successful. After many hardships and struggles, 
8  What I call ‘marriage visas’ are technically speaking visas for family reunions.
9  Njumboss is a very recent term that emerged as a combination of njumba boyfriend) and boss (big man). Some 
understand njumboss to refer to white old men or sugar daddies. The term njumboss can also refer itself to the women 
who date ‘big men’ such as sugar daddies or white old men.
10  For the complete lyrics, see annexe 4.
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she eventually is able to increase her social status and finally leave the misery of the 
village for a better life not just in town, but also through her white husband poten-
tially even abroad. Through the help of night-work and the Internet, the heroine 
gets married to a white man. ‘I planted macabo, but nothing came of it. I planted 
yams, but nothing came of it. I even planted tomatoes, but nothing came of it. Me 
at a lamp post in Douala – that works.’ In the music video, we can physically trace 
the changes in her social status. In the first scene, the heroine wears a wide-open 
kabbah (a wide open dress cut out of wax prints). Then later she is wearing leather 
boots and a tight black dress. Despite the potential disgrace of prostitution implied 
in the film clip, the heroine at the end of the film is dressed in a white wedding 
dress. The caption at the end of the video informs us that they ‘lived happily ever 
after and had many mixed children.’ 
Although the heroine had taken risks, she had secured a white man without a 
snake. Through her marriage to the white man, her social status was secured.11 The 
film illustrates the transformative power of marriage making up for anything else 
that had come before. In the song, marriage is a means for the heroine to finalise 
her quest for social mobility and greater security. The social status of marriage in 
general – but more specifically to a white man or a man in bush – can wipe out the 
potential disgrace of sex work. 
Johnson-Hanks suggests that Cameroonian women seek Internet-mediated 
marriages not only as a sign of the new, but also as a means of attaining long-
standing, ‘traditional’ elements of marriage that the economic crisis has made 
increasingly unattainable (2007: 642).  Marriage to a ‘white man massa’ (white 
husband or boyfriend)12 becomes a replacement for bridewealth.13 Given current 
economic circumstances, it is ever more difficult for Cameroonian men to live up 
to the level of ‘seriousness’ that is expected of a potential husband. Income levels 
are so low that bridewealth payments are ever more difficult to finance. Cameroo-
nian women furthermore like to know that their future husbands will be in a posi-
tion to act as a breadwinner assuring a good standard of living and education for 
the children. Such dynamics are crucial for any discussion of marriage migration 
in Cameroon.
The likelihood for a Cameroonian woman to seek out marriage through the 
Internet depends on personal attitudes and views on marriage, courtship and sex-
uality. These attitudes and views partly depend on their respective social position.14 
Johnson-Hanks’s analysis of Internet-marriages in Yaoundé focused specifically on 
a group of women that belong to a middle class (2007: 643). It is certainly not 
11  Nyamnjoh and Page demonstrate that this increase in social status can be ambiguous. At times, Cameroonians can 
look down on Cameroonian women who marry white men (Nyamnjoh and Page 2002: 624).
12  Massa is Pidgin for ‘man’ and is derived from ‘master’.
13  Bridewealth payments are a transfer of goods or money from the kin of the groom to the kin of the bride. It’s a prac-
tice that links the family of origin with the family of procreation. In the anthropological literature, bridewealth has often 
been explained as payment made in exchange for the bride’s family’s loss of her labour and fertility within her kin group. 
Through bridewealth, marriage is hence intrinsically linked to transfer of money or goods. For some key literature on 
marriage payments in Cameroon see (Guyer 1986; Ardener 1996: 176, 200 and 234; Brain 1972: 118- 131; Ogbu 1978).
14  For a detailed study of sexuality and self-definitions amongst young professionals in Nairobi, see (Spronk 2006).
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the poorest of Cameroonian women who would feel inclined to seek a husband 
through the Internet. 
While an Internet-mediated marriage has become an important reference 
point for Cameroonian women with ambitions of mobility, this njumboss@yahoo.
fr phenomenon needs to be seen in relation to both its legal and economic con-
text. These days, physical mobility is one of the few access routes - particularly for 
women – for social mobility. Within a context of generalised imposed transconti-
nental immobility, money from bush is more than a means of payment; it is also an 
important source of security and status. In the case studies of this chapter, I hope to 
show that bush even becomes a currency through which (bridewealth) payments 
can be made. 
Chances of being granted a visa are low outside the realm of marriage. Moreo-
ver, while job opportunities in Cameroon are scarce and often financially not very 
rewarding, they are often likely to compromise or challenge the physical and sexual 
integrity of women. Stories circulate with great frequency of young women asked 
to first sleep with their potential employer to secure employment. Referring to 
Nigeria, Smith talks about ‘men in positions of power’ that ‘expect sex in exchange 
for employment, promotions, business contracts, or even just the promise of no 
further harassment’ (Smith 2007: 80). While sexual exchanges with potential or 
current employers can secure a job, they put women at risk in other ways. 
The njumboss song offers insights into the role, place and meaning of money 
in relation to both marriage and courtship.15 The heroine sings: ‘If you don’t have 
money, stay where you are! Stay where you are! Stay where you are!’ Consulate 
officers are aware of special hotels in Cameroon and Gabon where Cameroonian 
women supposedly work as prostitutes. Consulate officers believe that they often 
do this work in the hope of perhaps one day also being able to get married to a 
foreign citizen. Yet, very different ways of framing money in relation to sexual 
exchanges exist.16 
While the film clip of the song is explicit in its reference to commercial sex 
work on the street, the song lyrics only once, through the word ‘lamp post’, refer to 
professional sex work. The importance of money in courtship practices in Cam-
eroon is much more generic in its relevance. ‘While love can also come in,’ my 
research assistant Delphine would assure me, ‘like a plant requires water, a woman 
will still always need money.’ Money in this context becomes a sign of the serious-
ness of the respective suitor. There is no specific term that refers to money attained 
through sugar daddies or boyfriends. After all, ‘money does not have a colour.’ 
Who gave you the money or how you got the money does not matter. Internet-
mediated marriages can thus only be understood within the context of what court-
ship and marriage stand for within the West African context in which matters of 
15  For detailed studies on this theme in Nigeria and South Africa, see Cornwall (2002) and Hunter (2002).
16  In this context it is important to also mention the social practice of honouring the female ‘partner’ with presents 
(Bouly de Lesdain 1999: 45). To be sponsored means to have sexual relations with one or several stable men against re-
muneration (Seraphin 2000: 170). For a woman to be ‘sponsored’ by a lover is a material gain. Even if the family benefits 
from these material gains, ‘sponsorisation’ might still remain morally suspicious. For the woman in question a gain in 
status plays itself off against moral dynamics.
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exchange in courtship and marriage practices are often less framed by the ideology 
of love (Smith 2007: 79). Husbands have to be chosen according to where they can 
bring you – both in terms of social and geographical mobility. Money is the first 
indicator of this capacity. 
In Cameroon, marriage constitutes a migration strategy for women, but less 
so for men. During my days at the consulate office, I did not observe an interview 
with a Cameroonian man who was planning to travel to France for marriage-re-
lated reasons. Consulate officers did not have the same set of accusations against 
Cameroonian men. In contrast to the few male cases presented, the marriage mi-
gration trajectories of Cameroonian women were mostly deeply inscribed in con-
tinuity to courtship and marriage strategies in Cameroon. In Cameroon, husbands 
pay bridewealth when bringing the woman from her family of origin into her new 
family of procreation. Men are expected to have a minimum amount of resources 
to enable the mobility of Cameroonian women.17 In the Cameroonian context, 
marriage thus is a question of mobility for women and not for men.18 
In countries of destination, marriage constitutes an important resource for 
both men and women. Fleischer demonstrates how undocumented migrants man-
age to legalize their stays through marriage (2010). Yet, as we shall later see, in the 
case of Cameroonian migrants abroad that already have residence permits, con-
ceptions of bridewealth continue to influence attitudes towards marriage and the 
associated mobility of women. Even in this context, marriage is more important 
for the ambitions of mobility for women than for men. Distinctly different security 
agendas are at work when embassies investigate marriage migration.
S t a t e  a n d  S e c u r i t y
French consulate: securing paper, money and mobility
In visa application processes in connection to marriage migration, French con-
sulate officers determined whether: a) the legality of the papers that have been 
submitted has been confirmed: and b) whether the marriage intentions of the 
17  Goheen describes a trend for women in the Grassfields to choose to stay single, rather than to marry, because the 
burden of having to supply most of the necessities of life to the husband is perceived too high (Goheen 1996: 180;  185). 
Many men can no longer expect to marry and found a family, since they have no capital or credit to offer a dowry (Roit-
man 2004: 95). Women have to wait as men can’t always afford marriage (Seraphin 2000: 197).
18  The few cases of Cameroonian men that I came across in Cameroon who wanted to travel (and potentially migrate) 
through the help of marriage were driven by other logics than the ones of courtship and marriage in Cameroon. A de-
ported neighbour of mine asked me for a marriage certificate and offered 1.000.000 cfa (roughly 1.500 Euros) in return. 
The two migration brokers with whom I worked both at one point suggested that they would appreciate a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ with me. It was implied that this would be a welcome return token on my part in exchange for the research 
that I was allowed to carry out with them.
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Cameroonian bride pose a problem. My ethnographic analysis of visa application 
processes in relation to marriage migration includes both an analysis of paper and 
an analysis of marriage interviews. I will first discuss how staff at the French con-
sulate seeks to govern papers and then how they seek (amongst others through 
papers) to control love. 
‘Even though we know that they [i.e. Cameroonian women] are only waiting 
for French nationality in order to be able to disappear into thin air,’ complained 
one officer at the French consulate, ‘once they are married, there is nothing else 
that we can do.’ In the view of this consulate officer, instruments of control at her 
disposal are limited. She explained that legally speaking, few reasons for refusals of 
visas of spouses of citizens exist. All French citizens have ‘liberty of union’ and are 
thus free to marry the person of their own choice. According to the officer, the only 
power she had to make sure that administrative procedures were followed. 
Consulate officers sought to establish sharp distinctions between the suppos-
edly ‘fake’ (referred to as ‘faux’ in French) and the supposedly ‘true’. Anything that 
was different from French norms risked being classified ‘fake’. In the case of mar-
riage visas, matters were furthermore complicated as Cameroonian state papers 
needed to be incorporated into the (in this case French) state apparatus. Once the 
marriage was found legal, the papers of the Cameroonian spouse became part of 
the body of knowledge of the French state. French citizens were not allowed to 
marry Cameroonians  with ‘fake’ papers. To prevent not only the integration of 
‘fake’ papers, but by extension of ‘fake’ people, the ‘truthfulness’ of marriage inten-
tions had to be tested in an interview at the embassy. The function of these inter-
views was to police the boundaries of who can be and become a French citizen. 
In principle, in the case of family reunions for spouses, visas were automati-
cally granted – yet under the administrative condition that the marriage had been 
officially transcribed in France. This transcription could take a long time if the 
couple married itself exclusively in accordance with Cameroonian state regula-
tions. Thus, the French consulate service recommended all couples first seek a cer-
tificat de capacité de marriage with the French consulate service before marrying 
before Cameroonian authorities.19 To gain this certificat de capacité de marriage, 
the Cameroonian spouse had, among other things, to pass a marriage interview 
with the French consulate service in Yaoundé. In this interview, the consulate offic-
er verified whether papers in the file had been legalized, i.e. recognized by French 
authorities as legal and true.20
In the context of these legalisation procedures, Cameroonian staff of the 
French embassy is sent to the respective town halls throughout the country. With 
only the registration number of the document in question, the Cameroonian staff 
was asked to look up and copy all the information contained within the respective 
document. If the information in the registry of the town hall was identical with the 
19  French citizens who want to marry abroad need to obtain prior to their marriage a certificate that proofs that he or 
she has fulfilled all formal requirements on the part of the French state. In the case of marriage abroad without a certifi-
cat de capacité de mariage, all transcriptions of marriages necessarily include an interview.
20  These papers include amongst others proof of nationality, birth certificates and proof of residence.
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information given by the person in question, the French authorities determined 
that the paper was legal and true. Any inconsistency led to the conclusion that the 
paper was illegal and ‘faux’.
The legalization processes through which papers (above all birth certificates) 
were authenticated reveal both the power and impotence of the, in this case, 
French state authority. On the one hand, French consulate authorities refused to 
recognize a priori the validity of papers issued by Cameroonian authorities. On 
the other hand, legalization processes determined the legality of a piece of paper by 
comparing it to other pieces of paper that were issued by the same Cameroonian 
state authorities. 
While the non-recognition of a piece of paper constituted an acute burden for 
visa applicants, legalisation processes themselves were somewhat circular proc-
esses. In some cases, Cameroonian applicants could challenge and overcome prior 
judgments of their papers as illegal by hiring a lawyer who would conduct enquir-
ies and issue a jugement suppletif. The introduction of this jugement suppletif as an 
alternative way of establishing the legality of (birth) certificates partly responds to 
the volatility of the basis on which the above legalization processes come to their 
conclusions. A privately paid fee for a jugement suppletif could pave the way to the 
legalisation of a piece of paper. In this case, the financial costs for the advocate were 
considered a fee and not a price. 
In conversation with me, consulate staff estimated that about 70 percent of 
all papers, documents and certificates they received in general visa applications 
were fraud. In the case of marriage migration, French consulate officers feared that 
Cameroonian women would declare to have children that were not biologically 
theirs. They also feared that Cameroonian women were still married to other men 
without having properly gone through a formal divorce.
Consulate officers took any unclarity or potential contradiction between pieces 
of information as points of suspicion that spoke against the honest and good inten-
tions of the aspiring migrant. In this analytical move, consulate staff assumed that 
the Cameroonian state produced forms of documentation for its citizens that were 
comparable and/or compatible with the regulatory demands of its own regime of 
stateness. While incompatibilities and points of incoherence within forms of docu-
mentation were mostly assumed to be a sign of bad-will on the part of the visa ap-
plicants, Cameroonian visa applicants could at times also have incoherent papers 
because of the ways in which Cameroonian state administrations function. Within 
a context of suspicion at embassies, there was little space for interpreting incoher-
ence as the consequence of bureaucratic error.21 Mistakes could occur within any 
state administration and particularly so if the level of training and education of 
bureaucrats is relatively low.22 
21  A consulate officer at the French embassy explicitly told me that she did not care whether or not a visa applicant in 
front of her was the victim of her own state administration. Her role, she told me, was to enforce the regulatory require-
ments of the French state.
22  In the case of Delphine’s identity card, the respective officer copied the profession of her mother into the wrong 
field. Thus Delphine has since the age of sixteen been by profession not a student, but a ‘housewife’.
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Constant suspicion and accusations of fraud thus need to be understood with-
in a context in which aspiring migrants were dealing with two forms of stateness 
– one territorial and deterritorial. Procedures to obtain different kinds of papers 
(e.g. marriage certificates) are different within different state cultures. Inconsisten-
cies and tensions will arise for any mobile person trying to reconcile administra-
tive demands from two different state authorities. Even for highly educated people 
that are accustomed to high levels of bureaucracy, marriage migration could create 
situations of deadlock and impossibility. Given the complexity of the various regu-
latory demands of different state authorities, de facto complete adherence to rules 
constitutes the miracle. 
Despite the contingencies involved in the determination of whether or not 
pieces of paper are authenticated as legal or faux, birth certificates were key for 
marriage visa applications.  As the officer explained to me: ‘I refuse [to grant per-
mission] because I do not know whom I have in front of me.’ One of the marriage 
interviews that I attended involved a young woman. She was pregnant from her 
fiancé with whom she lived in Cameroon. She was not applying for a visa, but for 
the certificat de capacité de marriage. They refused her the certificat de capacité 
de marriage because her birth certificate had been established as illegal. She was 
guilty of having handed in a birth certificate that did not meet the requirements of 
the French consulate and she was obliged to wait. She could not marry her French 
husband before giving birth to her child.23 We were all in the same room: the young 
pregnant woman, the consulate officer and me. Yet, the officer considered the se-
lection of pieces of information generated within a birth certificate to be the most 
reliable access route to truth – which in this case was the reality of who was sitting 
in front of the consulate officer in the room. What mattered was legal and not so-
cial personhood. The spectacle of border enforcement that marked Cameroonian 
women as security threats also constituted part of a struggle to institute the legiti-
macy of certain access paths to truthfulness over others on which state authorities 
could draw to exert their authority.
The enormous transfer of authority to paper needs to be considered in rela-
tion to some of the circumstances in which all papers are produced. Delphine told 
me that at the age of five she had complained bitterly that she could not yet go to 
school. She had not yet reached the official age for school and her elder brother 
went to the town hall. For a mere 5,000 CFA (about eight Euros; which is the stand-
ard amount of money to be given for a birth certificate), he was granted a birth 
certificate that would allow Delphine to go to school as desired. For all official 
purposes, the date noted on the birth certificate became her date of birth. For her 
passport application, Delphine used the birth certificate that had allowed her to go 
to school. The legality of the paper did not pose a problem with Cameroonian state 
authorities. Yet, if one day she would want to marry a European, the history of the 
production of her birth certificate could backfire. Neither Delphine, nor I know 
23  If the couple had married without the certificate and thus exclusively with Cameroonian state authorities, the tran-
scription of their marriage certificate would have taken a longer time because marriage without the certificat de capacité 
de mariage are more suspicious to French state officials than those conducted with the certificate.
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about the paper traces of her two birth certificates that may still be within the reg-
istry of the town hall in Buea. Within the paper and non-computerised records of 
the town hall, it would be extremely difficult to trace whether or not a person had 
already gotten a birth certificate prior to applying for another one. 
Zelizer’s work on different social meanings of money in different contexts can 
be useful to unravel the puzzle (1997). In her work, she demonstrates how money 
marks social relations and how social relations mark money (see also Bloch and 
Parry 1989: 19). ‘Multiple monies in the modern world may not be as visibly iden-
tifiable as the shells, coins, brass rods or stones of primitive communities, but their 
invisible boundaries work just as well’ (1994: 24). Money can for example come in 
the form of a fee, of a bribe, of a bridewealth payment, as a price or as a gift. Con-
sulate offices might reject bridewealth payments as a traditional evil that was even 
further aggravated by the impact of money. Yet, the families of the spouse might 
frame the very same transfer of money as a legitimate procedure that seals and 
thus secures a marital union. Just as some security agendas are taken more seri-
ously than others, some framings of monetary transactions also seem more natural 
or legitimate than others. Conflicting views on whether a transfer of money in 
exchange for papers is understood by aspiring migrants and consulate officers as 
paying a price, a fee or a bribe are key to open up for analysis the way in which the 
legitimacy of different regulatory authorities is constructed.
One of the consulate officers managed to capture well the ironies involved 
within paper regimes of regulation. When she told applicants that their papers 
were illegal, she complained to me, ‘It doesn’t disturb them. They will go and buy 
another one.’ The officer was horrified to find that Cameroonians perceived pa-
per acquisition from state authorities as ‘buying papers’. Yet, the social meaning 
of money was not fixed (Zelizer 1997; Parry & Bloch 1989; Guyer 1995; Maurer 
2006). The distinction between money paid to a lawyer for a jugement suppletif and 
money for a certificate given to a Cameroon office worker was not self-evident. The 
framing of both payments as fees legitimised the forms of paper production that 
both lawyers and state officials use. Yet, in both cases, papers were produced and 
the production of paper was connected to financial transfers.
As laid out in the preceding chapter, money was always involved in forms of 
(bureaucratic) paper production. Yet, some money transfers in exchange for pa-
pers were framed as fees and some as price. These framings construct some finan-
cial transfers as legitimate and others as potentially illegitimate. Papers deemed the 
product of illegitimate financial exchanges were referred to as fraud. Papers from 
fees were deemed legitimate sources of truthfulness. The demarcation of some 
forms of paper production as fraudulent contributed to the construction of the 
legitimacy of state authorities. Narratives of fraud and accusations of dishonesty 
and lying were part and parcel of attempts to enforce and re-establish a monopoly 
position for state authorities.
As we have seen in the preceding chapter on general visa application processes, 
the very labelling of certain transfers of money as fees and of others as bribes is 
an attempt to establish authority over what constitutes legitimate modes of paper 
production and what does not. The French consulate office stressing that birth cer-
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tificates have to be singular and immaculate expressed both a desire and an anxiety 
on the part of the state to identify its citizens and non-citizens and to govern and 
manage them accordingly.
French consulate: securing marriage, love and citizens
Beside the issue of the legality of birth certificates and other documents, the mar-
riage interview also served to test the marriage intentions of the Cameroonian 
spouse, as well as to gather information on the case for the unlikely scenario that 
the certificat de capacité de marriage would be denied on these grounds. These 
interviews have become compulsory since March 2007. The interviews were de-
signed to check for lies and inconsistencies within and between the narrative, the 
documents and the data that already stored on the applicants within the computer 
system from prior visa application processes. The information was complied and 
tested for internal coherency, as well as compared with computer data that might 
have been entered upon a prior visa application of the aspiring Cameroonian 
spouse. Some of the women knew that they were coming for an interview, others 
were taken by surprise. 
During fieldwork, I observed eight marriage interviews. The interviews were 
held within the main administrative building of the Embassy and the officer in 
charge was part of the diplomatic staff.24 The officer who allowed me to observe the 
interviews was a woman in her mid 50s. In what follows, I will concentrate on the 
case of one woman in particular. I had never met Claire before the interview, nor 
did I see her again afterwards. All that I know of her case stems from the moment 
of the interview itself. The focus of the analysis will be on the communication dy-
namics between officer and visa applicant, rather than on the marriage and migra-
tion trajectory of Claire herself. 
‘When and how did you meet?’ ‘Where?’ ‘Did he write to you first or you?’ 
‘How did it go?’ ‘When did you start talking on the phone?’ ‘Was the website geared 
towards French men or could a Cameroonian man also have responded to your 
add?’ The consulate officers asked question after question and noted down all of 
Claire’s answers into the computer file. From the answers that Clair gave through-
out the interview, I gathered that Claire had put her profile on a dating website 
(called www.chichou.com) with the explicit purpose of getting married. After two 
months of online correspondence, Claire started to talk over the phone with her 
fiancé. Two years later, they decided to get married. Claire is in her 30s. Her fiancé 
is in his 40s and already has one child from a former marriage. The couple had not 
yet met in person. 
‘Are you sure it’s the man of your life?’ ‘Who talked first about marriage?’ ‘If it 
does not work out, will you come back to Cameroon? What will you do if it does 
not work out?’ After a short pause, Claire delivered the correct answer. ‘I will go 
back home.’ The officer nodded contently, wrote down the answers and contin-
24  By contrast, non-immigration visa interviews are conducted mostly by locally employed French staff in a reception 
space at the entrance of the Embassy.
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ued to check further details. ‘What is your future husband’s address?’ Telephone 
number? Job? Salary? Claire laughed in a shy manner. The officer said that it’s nor-
mal to know the salary of your future husband. Claire thus overcame her inhibition 
and told us that it was one- thousand nine-hundred and six Euros and thirty-three 
cents. The officer gave me a side-look. She later explained that the woman in ques-
tion ‘ha[d] prepared well for her interview.’ 
The encounters between the consulate officer and the Cameroonian women 
were fundamentally pre-structured and predetermined through the interview 
questions and its inherent assumptions. A great deal of rather intimate data was 
gathered, although much of it was rarely used for denials. The only real turning 
point at which Claire could have lost access to the certificat de capacité de mariage 
was when the officer asked her about her prior travel projects. She had never trav-
elled before in her life. ‘Have you ever asked for a visa before?’ asked the officer. 
The first reply of the woman was to deny this. The officer looked at her computer 
screen and asked again. ‘No? Are you sure? This is a crucial question.’ After a little 
bit more insistence on the part of the officer, the woman changed her response. 
She ‘admitted’ to having asked for a visa with the French Consulate in 2002. At that 
time, she tried to go for training with an NGO, but the visa had been denied. ‘We 
are here to arrange this marriage. Be honest with me and I will be honest with you,’ 
the officer explained and continued to compare the new information with data on 
the computer from prior visa applications. The officer was checking for ‘lies’. There 
was no ‘lie’ in that file and thus this prior application did not block Claire in her 
current procedure.
The question catalogue continued. After having gone through Claire’s employ-
ment history and the couple’s marriage plans, future life prospects were examined. 
‘What will you do with your child in Cameroon?’ ‘If you want to have children 
in France, where will you keep them?’ ‘Have you already spoken with the mother 
of your future husband on the phone?’ During a prior marriage interview with 
a French male citizen resident in Cameroon, the officer had excused herself for 
having to ask certain questions. In this prior case, the couple was living together 
and the woman was expecting a child. The French husband was present during the 
interview. Upon seeing the stomach of the woman, the officer had exclaimed: ‘That 
says it all!’ Childbirth automatically validated the supposed love that motivated 
and founded the marital union. 
At the end of the interview, the officer printed out the interview material and 
asked Claire to sign the document. The interview was over. As Claire got up, she 
asked a question. The meaning of her question was not immediately clear, but 
then she understood that the fiancé would soon be coming to Cameroon. She had 
scheduled this appointment in the hope of being able to get married when he vis-
ited her. The consulate officer was taken by surprise. ‘You did not tell me every-
thing!’ she exclaimed in an annoyed tone. Thirty minutes of intense questioning 
had not allowed for space for the woman to unfold her story. The time had been 
structured by the consulate officer’s questions and she had not anticipated the fi-
ancé of this woman to be so committed to the marriage to have already booked a 
flight. While the officer was visibly beginning to look at the matter in a much more 
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positive light, she explained that there is little she can do to speed up the legalisa-
tion processes of the documents of the Cameroonian fiancé. Yet, she had a warmer 
and friendlier voice. A first layer of suspicion had been eliminated.
At the French consulate office, visas in relation to marriage with a French citi-
zen come under particularly strong suspicion. As the supposed ideal type of dis-
interested love is never made explicit, all marriages to white men become directly 
associated with fraud. This becomes evident in the posters with which I opened 
this chapter. 
Within the midst of his divorce, a French husband wrote in an email posted on 
the walls of the consulate: 
My life has been destroyed by these women without any faith or scruples that only 
wish to enter France for reasons of nationality to then send back the money of their 
white husband to Yaoundé. […] I have been the victim of extortions from the stair-
case of the airplane right through to my return. I’ve paid my worthless marriage 
certificate with two bottles of Whisky and 50,000 CFA’ (roughly 80 Euros).25 
Based on one particular case, all Cameroonian women in this e-mail poster 
were portrayed as entirely instrumental and thus implicitly contrasted to suppos-
edly love-driven and vulnerable French citizens. All that Cameroonian women 
were said to want is citizenship, driving licences, allocations and the capacity to 
bring over family members. 
A well-organized network in France (with its centre in Paris) informs your beautiful 
Cameroonian ladies about any possible allocations. Without scruple or love, they 
know more about social benefits than the French. One goal only: to send as much 
money as possible to Africa.’26 
In this email, responsibilities and obligations towards families of origin were 
dressed up as greed.27 Appalled by such interest-driven behaviour, the French man 
who was in the midst of his divorce discredits his former wife of any form of love 
and emotion and concludes his mail: 
The ‘white sweetheart’ is but a good – just as the conceived and nationalized children 
of course. They don’t stop at anything. Know that a wife who is not found suitable 
in Cameroon is immediately and without explanation sent back and divorced; thus 
imagine how information on French social protection is received!?! In France it’s a 
25  ‘Ma vie est détruite pour ces femmes sans foi ni loi qui ne souhaitent que rentrer en France pour la nationalité et 
envoyer tout l’argent de leur ‘blanc’ à Yaoundé. J’ai été racketté de l’escalier de l’avion jusqu’au retour. J’ai payé mes 
actes de mariage ‘bidon’ contre deux bouteilles de Whisky et 50.000 Francs cfa.’
26  ‘Un réseau fort bien organisé en France, (le noyau dur à Paris) renseigne vos belles Camerounaises sur toutes les 
prestations disponibles. Sans scrupule et sans amour, elles en savent plus que les français en terme d’allocations. Un 
seul but: envoyer le plus d’argent possible en Afrique.’
27  Interestingly, the commodification process is supposed to operate exactly opposite to the discourse of mail order 
brides.
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divorce without end. They don’t mind to have sex during three or five years pretend-
ing to be in love!!!28 
Since the love of his wife was fake, the statement of this former husband im-
plies that the marriage had never been truly consumed. Only sex with true love 
intentions validates a marriage. He labelled his marriage as a marriage blanc, i.e. 
a marriage that is fake. He called his marriage invalid because the supposed ideal 
type of totally disinterested love did not drive it. 
In this light, the types of social regulations applicable within the legal system 
in France to cases of divorce seem exaggerated and unnecessary to the author of 
the e-mail. The French husband called for a greater convergence of the authority 
of husband and state. In the context of the French consulate, love is also the narra-
tive that renders invisible the interests of the French state.  Only those women are 
allowed into the body of French citizens who convincingly disavow prior loyalties 
to their family of origin and thus promise to become good and safe citizens by sub-
mitting - in the name of love - their own sense of initiative and autonomy to their 
new husband in France.  
The above discussion illuminates that legal frameworks of state regulation 
always express and seek to impose certain gendered norms and specific family 
conceptions (for a more detailed discussion of how different dimensions of state 
power are not gender-neutral, see Brown 2007). The sphere of the state is deeply 
infused with family norms.29 Laws reflect gender values of given states and socie-
ties, as well as larger global economic developments (Van Walsum forthcoming). 
After 1961, for example, Cameroonians that wanted to travel were required by the 
newly independent state structures to apply for exit visas. Married women who 
applied for these exit visas required the written authorisation of their husbands.30 
In the context of marriage migration and security issues, it becomes important to 
28  ‘Le ‘chéri blanc’ n’est qu’une marchandise, tout comme les enfants conçus et nationalisés bien sûr. Elles ne reculent 
devant rien. Sachez qu’une femme qui ne convient pas, au Cameroun, est répudiée sur le champ sans explication, alors 
imaginez l’information sur la protection sociale française!?! En France c’est un divorce interminable. Et elles s’en fichent 
de coucher pendant trois ou cinque ans en faisant semblant d’être amoureuse!!!’
29  During the British mandate, colonial officials responded in similar situations very differently to demands on the part 
of family members for repatriation. In a letter a younger brother wrote in 1953 to colonial authorities (welfare officer) 
about his long lost brother who keeps refusing to come back home and fulfil his family responsibilities. In this case, the 
answer from the District Officer in Victoria was as follows: ‘You must understand that it is impossible to force any person 
to return to his home against his will. If your brother is unwilling to return to you of his own free will, there is nothing you or the 
government can do.’ (Tc (1953) 1 Buea) In the case of women and particularly so when in connection to prostitution, the 
official response could be quite different. Concerning a woman who has left her husband, but is refusing to return ‘home’ 
to her parents, the District officer in Victoria writes in 1953: ‘Under the Native Authority Ordinance this woman can be com-
pelled to go home and fined if she disobeys.’ Her ex-husband had mentioned in his letter to the authorities that his woman 
had started to ‘misbehave’ and instead of returning home to her father ‘chose to be a prostitute.’ (Tc (1953) 1 Buea) 
30  The decree n 62-DF-23 of the 17th of January 1962 instituted the federal passport and introduced other forms of 
regulation for the emigration of Cameroonians from the territory of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. So as to obtain 
an exit visa, Cameroonians leaving the country needed for example to pay 50.000 cfa to the Cameroon Treasury. This 
money was to ‘guarantee’ the ‘repatriation’ of the person asking for the exit visa. To obtain a passport it was required 
to be in possession of a birth certificate, a certification of nationality, a tax certificate and married women needed the 
authorization of the husband and a copy of their marriage certificate (Tb (1954) 4 Buea). Those travelers with official 
orders of mission, administrative agents or people in possession of a return ticket were exempted from this regulation. 
Today, the conditions for granting (issuing) of passport and exit of nationals are provided by decree Nr. 90/1245 of 24 
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critically analyse which particular set of family norms is assumed and promoted by 
both consulate officers and family members of aspiring migrant women. It is also 
within these struggles over multiple understandings of family norms and woman-
hood that diverging, as well as converging security agendas express themselves.
Finally, marriage can never be the union of two individuals only, regardless of 
the cultural and geographical context. The need to secure French citizenship leaves 
out of the picture that inter-Cameroonian marriages also have to struggle through 
important issues of conflicting loyalties between families of origin and families of 
procreation. This chapter will examine an example of this in the upcoming discus-
sion of the case of Nuretta. 
It is perhaps this overt stress on individuality that has given rise to a very wide- 
spread myth in Cameroon about marriage in bush. Accustomed to a multitude of 
marital unions (legal, religious and traditional), Delphine and others would re-
peatedly insist and defy any doubt on my part: ‘In Europe, they have contract mar-
riages.’ She would explain to me that contract marriage in Europe are signed and 
after a few years (when you have your papers) cancelled again. Delphine’s belief in 
contract marriage in Europe helps to see marital unions in a different light. Mar-
riage in Europe today relies on the legal form of a contract and is predominantly 
based on the union of two individuals (rather than families). By definition, a con-
tract can also get annulated again. Whether the money transferred in exchange 
for the marriage certificate was a fee or a price does not matter, as ultimately the 
marriage was only a contract between two individuals. 
Implicit assumptions on love and selfishness that set the tone in the consulate 
section similarly diffuse the case of Claire. Claire was under suspicion during the 
interview for being Cameroonian and having vested interest and loyalties with her 
family of origin. Yet, in the case of a marital failure or breakup, she was also ex-
pected to return ‘home’ to Cameroon.31 While the marriage interview tested love by 
gathering information on the past and future plans of the couple and their level of 
familiarity with each other, it is de facto relatively rare that the data actually is used 
for visa decisions. The extended efforts put into recording large amounts of rather 
intimate information ought to thus be seen as part of the production of a spectacle. 
So far, I hope to have demonstrated how consulates create through constant 
accusations of ‘fraud’ a spectacle of border enforcement. Constant accusations of 
fraud serve to legitimize certain versions of marriage and to delegitimize others. 
Emphasis on prior and parallel loyalties on the part of the Cameroonian female 
spouse is deemed as selfish. Accusations of selfishness (but then in a very different 
sense) are also important within the regulatory framework of the family that I shall 
discuss more closely in the following section. For the sake of comparison, I shall 
first lay out the regulative framework for issues of marriage related mobility at the 
U.S. consulate in Yaoundé.
august 1990. The ordinary passport is issued by the Delegate General of National Security or by Head of Cameroon’s 
Diplomatic and Consular Missions Abroad.
31  Claire is exposed to entirely contradictory expectations here. She has to convince the officer in front of her both that 
she is and that she is not attached to her family of origin in Cameroon.
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The bureaucratic production of fraud and selfishness at the  
U.S. consulate
When I stepped behind the window where visa applications are conducted in the 
U.S. consulate, I found entire tables covered with marriage photos ascertained as 
‘fake’. Most of these ‘fake’ marriages are between Cameroonians in Cameroon with 
Cameroonians that either have residence permits in the U.S. or had won the D.V. 
visa lottery. The two Cameroonian staff of the anti-fraud unit of the U.S. Embassy 
took their turn to show me the best and most obviously ‘fake’ marriage photos. 
Often the photo editing is visible at first sight. Proportions, scales and physical 
space do not fit neatly together. Other times, the ‘fake-ness’ of the photo seems less 
obvious. Yet, the two officers eagerly point out to me how this or that pose is not 
at all ‘natural’. 
Visas for applicants whose spouse is already in the U.S. are largely processed in 
the U.S. itself. More visible for me at the Embassy in Yaoundé were cases of mar-
riage in relation to diversity lottery visa applications.32 These visas are immigrant 
visas. The lucky winners of the diversity visa programme still have to go through 
an application process after having won the lottery. The lottery winners are only 
granted their visa if they can prove to fulfill all conditions and requirements that 
are attached to the D.V. lottery. Requirements on educational background and pro-
fessional experience are relatively low. If officers detect ‘fraud’, the visa will not be 
granted. 
Most commonly, ‘fraud’ is detected in relation to family dependants and 
spouses. Any spouse or dependent of a diversity visa lottery winner automatically 
gains immigration rights. Family connections come under tight scrutiny. At times, 
consulate officers carry out extended investigations in the places of birth of ap-
plicants and their dependents. If consulate officers ‘detect’ an element of fraud in 
the application, neither the D.V. winner nor his or her dependent (i.e. spouse or 
children) will go to the U.S. 
In the case of applicants who have married after having played the lottery, con-
sulate officers proceed to closely investigate.33 The Cameroonian staff that works 
within the fraud prevention unit of the embassy conducts split interviews with 
both spouses. In these interviews, the spouses are separately interviewed on the 
nature of their union. Future plans of the couple as well as living arrangements 
were also tested. 
These investigations are complemented by a general visa interview by an Amer-
ican born U.S. consulate officer who then either grants or refuses the visa. While at 
the consulate office, I observed several interviews and refusals of this nature. 
‘Is this your true wife? I believe that you are legally married, but is it your true love? 
Did you marry her because of love or because you wanted to immigrate together? Is 
32  As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the U.S. government issues every year a limited number of visas through 
a programme called diversity visa lottery.
33  A minimum of one year passes between the visa lottery entry and the actual departure for the U.S.
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your real intention to spend the rest of your lives together, or rather to immigrate to 
the U.S. together?’34 
If the U.S. consulate officer determines that the marriage was only for immi-
gration purposes, but not for love, then the marriage certificate can be considered 
invalid and the visa can be denied. If at this moment the lottery winner insists that 
the woman standing next to him is his ‘true wife’, but prior investigations of the 
anti fraud unit have already produced evidence to the contrary, then the U.S. of-
ficer will not only refuse the visa, but also sign a 6C1 form. 
This form amounts to a ten-year ban on entry to U.S. for the respective ap-
plicant for having used ‘fraud.’ This is the ultimate tool of punishment available 
to the consulate officers. Yet, as we shall see in the case of Josephine, the effects of 
such a form of punishment are minimal for those who have never been granted 
a visa from an American consulate office. What does the marriage security nexus 
look like from the perspective of family networks? This chapter will now turn 
to the cases of Josephine and Nuretta, with complementary elements from Del-
phine’s case.
Fa m i l y  a n d  s e c u r i t y
Before I ever met Josephine, she had tried four times in a row to leave the country. 
All four times her attempts had faltered. In all her attempts, courtship and mar-
riage were crucial. I was first introduced to Josephine by one of her boyfriends, a 
lecturer at the University of Yaoundé. Josephine was in her mid 20s and had just 
finished her Bachelor dissertation. During her entire university studies, Josephine 
had been what in Cameroon is called self-sponsored. Her parents in Bali (an An-
glophone village in the North West Province) were farmers and could not afford 
to send her to university in Yaoundé. Yet, as a young and smart woman, she had 
learned to find means to receive enough money from various men so as that she 
could complete her studies.
In the first year of her university studies, Josephine gave 500,000 CFA to the 
same broker with whom her boyfriend had been able to fall bush a few months 
earlier. The remaining two million CFA were to be given upon arrival in Belgium. 
The 500,000 CFA had been raised through the men in her life. While her boyfriend 
had been able to travel with the help of this broker, Josephine herself did not 
34  This quote stems from a visa application interview within the context of a diversity lottery winner. A distinction 
needs to be drawn between the way in which marriage figures for immigrant and non-immigrant visas. For the U.S. 
Embassy, my observations on the ways in which applicants and consulate officers invoke marriage are limited to non-
immigrant visas and to diversity lottery visas. I thus do not have ethnographic material on how marriage to U.S. citizens 
or Cameroonian nationals with residence rights in the U.S. figure in relation to standard immigrant visa application 
processes. 
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receive anything in return for her money. The broker disappeared into thin air. 
Her first bushfalling attempt had failed. Yet, her motivation to try and fall bush 
remained. Retrospectively, Josephine explains to me her desire for bush in the 
following manner: 
The thing is, one always has that feeling that when you go to bush, you can bring 
down mountains. You can form a river in the desert. You just have the impression 
that when you go to bush, your family’s future, your success, your family’s brightness 
is assured. You just feel like when you go to bush even you as an individual, you 
change status. You become somebody.
Four years later, her cousin who is a medical doctor won the Diversity Lottery. 
To help Josephine, the cousin and Josephine got a marriage certificate together. 
He just called me one day that I should come and let’s go and sign some papers. But 
we did not go and sign any paper in any court or in any council. The papers were 
brought at home and we just signed them there. And then we went and took two pic-
tures. That was all. So, I didn’t even know how he was going about the thing. 
At that point, Josephine felt confident that she was now able to go to bush. In 
anticipation of her departure, Josephine stopped going to classes. 
I just knew that okay, fine, it’s D.V. It’s lottery and anybody who wins lottery goes. 
[…] Those are some of the things that made me to [delay] my school. Because at one 
time when you are going to school and there is this bush thing that comes, you are 
just like ok fine, by the end of this year I’m going to bush, why should I go to school. 
You stay without going to school. Again waiting for your bush to come. And bush 
never comes.
Eventually the U.S. Embassy turned down the visa for both Josephine and her 
cousin. When the cousin received the decision, he did not inform Josephine im-
mediately. Josephine only found out when she asked her cousin many months after 
the final decision of the consulate. Her second opening to bush had closed down.
Two years later, an ex-boyfriend of Josephine, from her village of origin in Bali, 
called her up from the U.S. He had first asked Josephine to send her documents to 
him so that he could get admission for her in a school in the U.S., but Josephine 
had not followed up on that request. The Bali boy became angry over this, but 
called after some time again. Josephine remembered how he had told her that he 
really loved her and now wanted to settle down. She remembered how he reasoned 
that ‘it is preferable to settle with somebody you have always known than some-
body you just met.’ He told her that he did not trust girls in the U.S., and Josephine 
accepted the engagement proposal: ‘I said ok. I just said okay. At least now I have 
a bush boyfriend.’ 
During the time of their engagement, Josephine explained to me how her 
fiancé was always afraid that perhaps she was already married. As a proof of her 
seriousness, the Bali man asked Josephine to provide him with her ‘electronic 
passport’  (i.e. e-mail password). Josephine at first refused, but after insistence 
from her brother who was favouring this engagement to a bushfaller from their 
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village of origin, Josephine gave in and the Bali man was thus able to read all her 
e-mail communications.35
When Josephine asked the Bali boy when he could come to Cameroon, he 
said it was not possible. Once he had made sure that people in Josephine’s family 
would be in a position to finance her trip to the U.S., he put Josephine in touch 
with a friend who had just won the D.V. lottery. A wedding of convenience to this 
friend was supposed to allow Josephine entry to the U.S. Finally arrangements 
for the paper wedding with her fiancé’s friend who had won the D.V. lottery were 
made, but then Josephine was lucky to win the D.V. lottery herself. Looking back 
at her engagement with the Bali boy, Josephine speculated that he did not have his 
residence permit in the U.S.
Josephine dropped her engagement with the Bali boy amongst others because 
he had failed to prove his seriousness. Money is an important proof of serious-
ness for Josephine. That is why she was also not interested in looking for a white 
husband over the Internet. ‘We talk the language of CFA here. If whites don’t give 
money, then my family will die.’ Yet, the Bali fiancé had been giving her even less 
money than an ordinary boyfriend in Cameroon would have. He had once asked 
her, for example, to cook for her future in-laws. The money that he had sent for the 
food was not sufficient for a meal. Josephine laughed as she told me how she just 
used the money to drink with her girlfriends. She later took money from one of her 
mbomas (an older man with financial resources whom she was dating) and cooked 
for her supposed in-laws. 
Even though she did not receive financial support, her family-in-law were sus-
picious of her. They were jealous and thought that they were not receiving money 
because the Bali boy was sending his money to Josephine. ‘They just know that I’m 
married to a bushfaller,’ complained Josephine to me.
When playing the D.V. lottery, Josephine had chosen to submit the form with 
the address of a family member who lived in the U.S. Josephine’s cousin, who is a 
medical doctor and with whom she had attempted a marriage when he had earlier 
won the lottery, had provided Josephine with the address. Given the unreliable 
nature of postal services in Cameroon, it is a common practice for those who play 
the lottery to submit their application with addresses abroad. It is even said that 
a foreign address heightens one’s chances of winning in the lottery. Therefore, the 
news that Josephine had won the lottery first reached the brother of her cousin in 
the U.S. who then communicated the message to her cousin in Cameroon without 
informing Josephine directly. Josephine explained: ‘He just told him that you see, 
now Josephine has won this D.V. stuff so you guys are just supposed to hook up so 
that you can travel together and that will be beneficial for the family.’ 
Josephine’s cousin in Cameroon developed a strategy for Josephine’s diversity 
lottery application that would make her migration trajectory as desirable as pos-
sible for the entire family. Josephine was to marry a younger brother of the cousin 
with whom she was previously going to go to the U.S.  Josephine explained:
35  Her bush fiancé asked her for her password for her email account as a sign of seriousness and truthfulness. Hence, 
it was not possible for her to create a new account and pass on the password of this fake email account to her fiancé.
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The decision was not mine. […] Immediately that I had won the lottery had been an-
nounced, the question was with whom I would get married. And if I had now wanted 
to start arguing with them, they would have said that I’m wicked. So, I didn’t even 
want to try arguing.36 
Although one of her aunts did not agree with her cousin’s decision, Josephine 
felt obliged to make a marriage certificate with her cousin. Josephine was afraid of 
being accused of ‘selfishness’. ‘You cannot deny or change them. They will just say 
that you are selfish and that you don’t want other family members to prosper.’ 
Refusing a marriage arrangement would have been interpreted as an inaccept-
able act of selfishness on the part of Josephine that goes against the welfare of 
the family. She did not feel that she could put the security of her own mobility 
over the access to mobility of others in her family. Delphine noted that she would 
have never accepted a cousin’s decision over her own D.V. lottery; yet, Josephine 
in her own case did not feel that she had a choice. Selfishness is a strong accusa-
tion and the perception that one is trying to prevent the prosperity of others can 
draw witchcraft into one’s sphere. At the same time, complying with the demands 
of her cousin put Josephine in conflict with the regulatory requirements of the U.S. 
consulate.
Josephine and her cousin filed their visa application together. To prove the 
authenticity of their marital union, they also made photos. Josephine gave me a 
few of these photos. She and her cousin posed in a public garden in Yaoundé as a 
couple. When I asked Josephine about their decision to make both a marriage cer-
tificate and the photos that show evidence of the bridewealth payment, Josephine 
explained the following: 
Is it a matter of making decisions? It’s like… you know you have these papers that 
come? And when you win they send you this document and in that document you 
have a list of things that you are supposed to take to the Embassy. So you just have to 
compile those things. It was just logical that we had to celebrate the traditional mar-
riage because we had to make it authentic. The U.S. Embassy is a serious place. They 
don’t take anything lightly. Your papers should convince them.  
To further convince the embassy, the entire family got together in Josephine’s 
village of origin to celebrate the traditional wedding. To show that it is ‘a real au-
thentic something.’
Josephine explained to me how her family members put camwood onto her legs 
and shared palm wine amongst each other. The ancestors needed to bless and rec-
ognise the union. From the perspective of the family, the traditional wedding was 
much more problematic than the legal wedding was. The wife of one of Josephine’s 
uncles, who had indeed been able to travel to the U.S. with the help of the D.V. lot-
tery, was one of Josephine’s few family members who opposed the traditional wed-
ding. ‘She was like doing this traditional thing and putting that camwood on the 
leg is too much. […] She was the only one that was scared.’ This aunt of Josephine 
36  Original Pidgin: ‘And now if I for want start argue, them for say I wicked. So I no be want just argue.’
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opposed the coupling of the two cousins because she had in Josephine’s words ‘pity’ 
for her and wanted her to be able to go. Yet, the aunt also opposed the traditional 
wedding in particular. ‘Some things practiced during the traditional wedding are 
very symbolic,’ explained Josephine to me. ‘You are abusing the ancestors. It is dan-
gerous. The ancestors will be angry.’ When discussing Josephine’s fate,DelphDelpD 
Delphine pointed out that disrespect of laws might get you into prison, yet disre-
spect of ‘tradition’ and ‘ancestral things’ can cause you to die.
Possibly, to spread the costs of the application amongst more people, Jose-
phine’s cousin also decided that Josephine was to adopt a child for the purpose of 
the diversity visa application. At the end of its procedure, the U.S. Embassy rang 
Josephine and asked for the child’s birth certificate, the death certificate of the bio-
logical mother, as well as photos of the mother’s funeral. First, the embassy wanted 
the documents within a week. Immediately after the first phone call, the embassy 
called back and asked for all documents and photos the following day. Josephine 
was being tested as to whether she had all the requested items readily available or 
not. When the consulate rang the third time, they had gone all the way up to her 
village of origin where the marriage with her cousin had been registered. They 
asked Josephine where the adopted child was at that very moment. In the end, 
Josephine’s visa for the U.S., as well as the one for her husband and adopted child 
was denied. Her fourth attempt at bushfalling had faltered.
Although Josephine knew that it was her ‘forced’ marriage and the adopted 
child that caused the denial of her visa, she took the visa denial with a great deal 
of calm. For her, this failure to go out was no different from her prior failures to 
fall bush. Moreover, the ten-year ban did not change things much, as all her prior 
applications had also been turned down. 
By the time I was leaving Cameroon, Josephine was busy with hospital visits. 
She was planning to have a child with one of her boyfriends (who was of course 
already married). She was aspiring to marry a rich and older man as a second wife. 
As such, she argued, she would have more independence and could still go on 
studying for her Master degree in sociology. Not being able to fall bush, marriage, 
childbirth and education constituted her alternatives. Josephine had sought out 
security in migration and was now seeking it out through other channels.
The decision of Josephine’s cousin had endangered her D.V. visa. She was 
obliged to act in what, at the time, appeared to be in the interest of the family. 
Josephine’s scope for action at this point was severely limited through both legal 
(im)possibilities of mobility, as well as the demands from family members. These 
family pressures are not fully recognised by embassy officials. As the border spec-
tacle of migration through incessant talk of ‘fraud’ constantly locates the security 
problem with the migrant, less attention is paid to wider frameworks that push 
and encourage certain attitudes and choices on the part of visa applicants and their 
families. Let us pause to consider the financial aspect of Josephine’s last failed at-
tempt to use her D.V. lottery win to travel to the U.S.
The U.S. consulate estimated that the application process cost between 200,000 
and 300,000 CFA. Yet, Josephine reported that each time she spent between 300,000 
and 700,000 CFA. Given these high costs, it is difficult for an individual alone to 
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raise the necessary money for a lottery visa. The entire family had to come together 
to support the lucky winner. If the family cannot provide the finances for the lot-
tery winner, the lucky winner can marry and then in-laws will be responsible to 
finance the D.V. application process (see also Piot 2010: 79). In this context, paper 
marriages with other family members are difficult to refuse. An individual is rarely 
able or even willing to pay for the entire application process. Josephine’s cousin 
was financially responsible for all papers and costs for the application process. The 
cousin got part of this money from his family, and some he had to borrow.
D.V. lottery winners quickly become part of an economy of family and fund-
raising obligations (Piot 2006). This economy ranges from family arrangements for 
fundraising efforts, to marriages with the purpose of funding applications, to more 
commercial types of deals. Consulate staff told a story of a secondary school teach-
er that had signed up all of his students. He would be the first to know when one 
of his students had won. He had arranged for all correspondence to pass through 
his postal address. He thus did his best to financially benefit from the fact that his 
student had won the lottery by making announcements on the radio that she now 
needed a spouse. 
However, it is important to emphasize that the economy that surrounds D.V. 
lottery winners (and all visa holders in general) is not merely driven by commer-
cial interests. Given the weight of financial investments for bush, financial efforts 
for access to bush are spread out over many heads and shoulders. Whatever the 
amount of money contributed to the bushfalling project of an outgoing bushfaller, 
such initial financial investments establish linkages with migrants who can thus 
never be reduced to being mere individuals. 
When Delphine was following up her own documents for her visa after having 
won the scholarship, Delphine did not use the money that she had earned with me 
during her time as research assistant for her visa. She explained:
‘I’m not going for my own good. […] I’m going for the good of all the family.’ Any per-
son who gives no matter how small an amount to a member of family who is about to 
leave the family will be tied and connected to that bushfaller soon to be. 
Aspiring migrants and aspiring spouses at times feel obliged, even forced, to 
follow and fulfill the requirements of their family members. The wider social ex-
pectations are, as we have seen, in Josephine’s case extremely real. However, state 
authorities in their regulation of migration often consider migrants merely as indi-
viduals and fail to recognise these pressures.37 
37  When it comes to issues of sexuality and marriage, the regulatory interest of state and family authorities can 
converge. In my archival research, I found it interesting to note how family members, at times, looked towards state 
authorities to implement what could not be solved or enforced at the family level. Archival sources document how 
husbands or fathers wrote to colonial administrators of the British mandate to request passports to reclaim their wives. 
Other times, husbands demanded passports not to be delivered to their wife so that they would not ‘prostitute’ them-
selves. In the early 1950s, for example, Banyangi women in the Mamfe area (North West Cameroon) traveled manifold 
to Fernando Po (today’s Malabo island just across the sea from the South West Province). Concerns about the position 
of these mostly unmarried women in Fernando Po arouse and the fathers and brothers of these migrant women referred 
themselves to colonial authorities for their respective travel document so that they could go to Fernando Po and bring 
back their female members of family. 
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During fieldwork, I repeatedly heard stories of people cursing a person who 
had gone out and then decided to come back at the expiry date of the visa. A per-
son, who in this foolish way has given up on the chance of a lifetime, risks being ac-
cused of laziness or stupidity. I have witnessed a consulate officer mock a migrant, 
who had told her that he had been obliged to overstay his visa and work ‘illegally’. 
The ridicule in her voice is supposed to render impossible the consideration that 
indeed this migrant did consider himself ‘forced’. The consulate officer’s joking 
narration of this anecdote serves to present as ridiculous alternative authorities to 
her own. 
Yet, families are themselves multiple forms of regulatory authority. Families of 
origin and families of procreation can compete with each other over decisions and 
resources. In addition, even within just the family of origin or procreation, a fam-
ily network can be divided by strife. Hence, the family is far from being a unitary 
actor. This chapter is not about family dynamics per se. It is about how regulatory 
ambitions of state and family actors intersect. Having established the importance 
of the authority of the family in relation to dealings with the state, the following 
section will trace in detail the governance of marriage migration from the perspec-
tive of a Cameroonian woman called Nuretta.
C a m e r o o n i a n  w o m e n  a n d  s e c u r i t y
While many women dream of falling bush through finding a husband abroad, 
most never are in a position follow through. As the case of Josephine illustrates, 
narratives of engagements that are broken or of visas never granted are very com-
mon indeed. In my research, I came across a case in which a bushfaller abroad was 
using his position in bush as a feyman by tricking Cameroonian women into fake 
marriages. After having spent money on papers for her departure for the U.K., my 
informant never heard from her supposed fiancé. In this light, Nuretta’s ultimate 
success in departing was surprising and unexpected by everyone. After three long 
years of being engaged with her Cameroonian fiancé without a single visit of his 
from the U.S., Nuretta surprised even her closest friends. She had obtained a visa 
for the U.S. and only two weeks later left on a plane to rejoin a man whom she had 
never before seen in her life. 
I learned about Nuretta’s case of marriage migration through Delphine, a very 
close friend and age-mate to Nuretta. We had discussed the case of Nuretta and 
had planned to establish contact to explore whether Nuretta could become one 
of our informants. Yet, her departure took us by surprise.  Although I had by the 
time of writing established contact with Nuretta through Internet and phone, the 
research data below predominantly reflect Delphine’s perspective onto Nuretta’s 
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case.38 I also include material from later phone calls with Nuretta in the U.S., as 
well as discussions and disagreements that Delphine and I had with respect to 
Nuretta’s case. 
Nuretta left Cameroon half way through my fieldwork period and yet she left 
me with important puzzles. Just like in a popular pop-song called ‘njumboss@ya-
hoo.fr’, Nuretta’s husband abroad had found and chosen her based on a photo. It 
was difficult to understand why her fiancé was serious about the marriage, even 
though he had never come to Cameroon for a visit. In what follows, I will discuss 
how in Nuretta’s case security articulates itself with sexuality, legality and the so-
cial status of families. Marriage certificates, visas and bridewealth payments are 
all regulatory instruments that license the mobility of women. I will first discuss 
Nuretta’s case from the perspective of courtship and marriage choices. I will then 
conclude with an analysis of her case from the perspective of family dynamics.
Nuretta: securing sex and marriage
Just like the heroine of the song, Nuretta got her bushfaller husband through a 
photo. When a close friend of Nuretta’s mother had won the D. V. visa lottery, she 
helped him with the costs of the visa application process and the flight to the U.S. 
When in the U.S., the friend and social uncle of Nuretta failed to meet the expecta-
tions of Nuretta’s mother for remittances. However, he did become engaged to the 
sister of Nuretta’s mother, and when this engagement broke off, asked for photos of 
Nuretta and her siblings. Wanting to buy Christmas gifts and clothes for them, he 
needed to know their sizes. He showed around the photos of his niece at a monthly 
meeting in Maryland for people from his village. One of the men present at the 
meeting liked the photo of Nuretta and the two began communicating. Eventu-
ally they were engaged. Thus, the mediating role of family members for Nuretta’s 
engagement and eventual marriage was crucial.
At first, Nuretta hesitated on whether or not to accept the engagement pro-
posal. The encouragements from her mother, sister and friends like Delphine 
played a role in Nuretta’s acceptance. Still, she did not only accept the offer be-
cause Thomas was a bushfaller. He was a serious alternative to local men in other 
ways. Before communicating with Thomas over the phone, Nuretta had been dat-
ing a student at the university. While she liked the student, Nuretta’s great fear 
was that the student boyfriend might not be serious about their relationship. As a 
test for his seriousness, she suggested to not have sex before marriage (or at least 
before her graduation). 
When Delphine and her elder sister persuaded Nuretta to accept the engage-
ment proposal of the bushfaller, sexual dynamics changed. Because Nuretta’s new 
fiancé was in the U.S., she was no longer under daily pressure to have sex. Her 
engagement with somebody abroad reduced the risk of losing her virginity before 
38  Delphine was one of Nuretta’s closest friends. To analyse Nuretta’s case allowed me to study a case of marriage 
migration through research material that was generated by somebody who herself was deeply involved with the theme 
of outmigration and marriage.
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marriage. Whenever somebody from their village of origin would travel back to 
Cameroon, her fiancé would be sending her deodorants, perfume, hand cream, 
T-shirts and shoes. These gifts and, at times, money were consistent signs of his 
commitment and seriousness. Thus after their engagement, Nuretta’s mother could 
already slightly reduce the money she needed to put aside for her daughter.39 
Nuretta’s fiancé did not come for a visit for four years. In my personal view, 
being engaged for so long to someone she had not met in person was risky. Yet, 
Delphine and Nuretta did not view a fiancé’s visit before marriage as crucial. As 
neighbours, former classmates and close friends, they were very intimate and 
shared their doubts and hopes. If Thomas had come to Cameroon, reasoned Del-
phine, the couple would have needed to spend some time together – maybe in a 
hotel room. It would have been very difficult for Nuretta to refuse sex in those 
circumstances. Her long distance engagement, however, allowed her to be free of 
the anxiety of losing her virginity. The kinds of guarantees, protections and safe-
guards Nuretta was seeking were different from the ones I had assumed she would 
need or desire. She looked at the engagement more from within a perspective of 
marriage than of migration. 
For Delphine, too, the real threat did not rest with an unknown fiancé. While 
sex with mbomas (who are by definition already married) occurs clearly for the 
sake of money, the role and meaning of sex with bushfallers is more ambiguous. A 
bushfaller, could during a visit in Cameroon, make promises of marriage only to 
disappear after his departure. Delphine called these bushfallers thief lass run - that 
is, they steal sex and disappear. In this context, the geographical distance secured 
Nuretta’s marriage and her virginity to a potential thief lass run. Many such cases 
exist, in which Cameroonian women cry or are pregnant from bushfallers that dis-
appear from their lives after departure.40 The real risk, from Delphine’s perspective, 
were thief lass run bushfallers.
Given the ongoing crisis in Cameroon, bush raises issues of financial security 
– which are also connected to the seriousness of potential partners in marriage. 
From this perspective, the security threat is posed by a situation where more and 
more men in Cameroon are no longer in a position to live up to the expectations 
and responsibilities of marriage (Goheen 1996). More and more men cannot afford 
the costs of bridewealth. As more men are obliged to stay single, women have to 
turn to other places and means to seek and fulfill expectations of marriage as an 
39  When Nuretta completed her B.A. degree in biochemistry, her fiancé refused to send money for her inscription at 
M.A. level. It was only with her mother’s money that she was able to apply for admission. Yet, Nuretta was not admit-
ted and thus stayed at home after her graduation. In the end, Nuretta and Delphine were happy that Nuretta had not 
continued her education after her Bachelor’s degree. If Nuretta had started an M.A. programme in Cameroon, she would 
have needed to complete the programme before she could have rejoined her husband in the U.S. 
40  A visit from Thomas would not have been a strong guarantee that he would actually marry her and ‘take her over’. 
As Delphine stressed, marriage would have even become less certain if Thomas had already gotten what he wanted 
during a visit, i.e. sex. Retrospectively, Delphine shared with me how she and Nuretta congratulated themselves on the 
way things had gone. It was precisely Thomas’s physical distance in bush that had protected her virginity and that had 
made  her marriage plans so very safe. Over the phone, Nuretta told Delphine how happy her husband had been when 
he found out upon Nuretta’s arrival in the U.S. that his spouse was a virgin. Now her husband treats her as a queen and 
has even bought her a car as a gift.
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avenue for a better and safer life. Through his presence in bush, Nuretta’s husband 
was able to secure for himself and his wife the kind of life that many other men in 
Cameroon currently could not. 
While the French consulate views loyalties of aspiring Cameroonian spouses 
to their families of origin as a threat, family connections were the safety that al-
lowed for Nuretta’s marriage migration. The case of Nuretta also shows us that ac-
cess to a livelihood and security can be more important than access to migration. 
Nuretta sought marriage above and before migration. She did not mind migrating, 
but did not plan it with the same sense of determination as Josephine.
When thus discussing marriage migration, it is important to consider the lo-
cally available alternatives. Whether migration becomes possible or not, women’s 
options are vastly determined through marriage. As much as they aspire to mi-
grate, families even so expect marriage. After her graduation, Delphine told me 
that now it was ‘either marriage or bush’. When she was browsing the profiles of 
men on www.tagged.com, she was not doing this as a mere instrumental route to 
get to bush. She was doing so because marriage at this point was becoming ever 
more inescapable and having a bushfaller massa would at least allow her to travel. 
Mobility remains an important factor within marriage consideration even af-
ter arrival in bush. After Delphine had been in bush for six months, a Nigerian 
man in Switzerland proposed marriage to Delphine. He wanted her to look after 
his business in Nigeria. For Delphine, this was out of the question. Her cousin in 
Switzerland shared Delphine’s rejection of the proposal and joked that she would 
rather like to find a husband for Delphine to go to the U.S. Whether in bush or in 
Cameroon, husbands have to be chosen according to where they can bring you to 
– both in terms of social and geographical mobility. 
Delphine is clear and out-spoken about the terms and conditions on which she 
will agree to marry. When she will marry, her husband will have to agree to bring 
over one of her younger sisters and brothers. Since she was already in bush and 
hence saved him the effort of bringing her there, it then was his responsibility to 
bring over another family member. Delphine’s vision of the terms and conditions 
under which she would agree to marriage stemmed from a deeply ingrained un-
derstanding that a man has to pay a bridewealth for his future spouse. 
As times change, currencies change, too. Today’s currency is bush. Access and 
connections to bush are of such value that bush can be a considered a monetary 
system to make payments. In the case of marriage, access to bush can be a means 
of payment that replaces bridewealth payments (Johnson-Hanks 2007). In this 
sense, bush has also come to replace the value of means of bridewealth payments 
available to men who are in Cameroon. A husband in bush has to be able to bring 
over his spouse. It would be difficult for a Cameroonian woman already abroad to 
marry a man who is still in Cameroon. Thus in these cases, aspiring Cameroonian 
husbands might have to accept to ‘bring over’ family members of their spouses. 
Delphine’s expectations of her future husband also explain why marriage is 
less important in men’s strategies for emigration. It is not within the Cameroonian 
matrix of marriage for a woman to bring over a man. That’s is the man’s domain. 
In a rap song, a young woman rebuffs her boyfriend with the following line: ‘It’s 
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your love that I am supposed to eat?’41 The hero of the song consequently decides 
to go to bush. He is falling bush to bring back food to his girlfriend in Cameroon: 
‘Le Camer a les dents.’ ‘Cameroon has teeth,’ meaning it’s a tough terrain to survive. 
Being in bush or going to bush can enhance a man’s scope for marriage. Yet, for 
him, marriage cannot be – or rarely is – the tool that enables migration. 
While the njumboss song tells the story of marriage to a white man, more 
often than not, these bushfaller marriages occur between Cameroonian men from 
bush (the West) with women from their own respective bush (village of origin). 
Many times, both families of origin of the spouses of bushfaller marriages are 
from the same village of origin. Bush takes on a double meaning here: first, as 
the authority of the global and secondly as the authority of the family back in 
the village of origin. Both dimensions of bush are connected.42 Families of origin 
assert their expectations and norms over the individual emissaries in bush and 
make sure they stay connected (however global their aspirations) also to their 
bush back in Cameroon. In discussions of Internet-mediated marriages, it is im-
portant to stress continuities between marriage migration and marriage, mobility 
and money in Cameroon itself.
Nuretta: securing bridewealth and status
Both of Nuretta’s parents were very happy that their daughter was going to get mar-
ried to a bushfaller in the U.S. Although they had never met Thomas in person, they 
did not  (just like Nuretta) have any worries or concerns about Thomas’s character. 
Nuretta’s uncle was connected with Thomas through the monthly meetings of all 
people from Nuretta’s village in Maryland. Uncle Richard would not have allowed 
for the engagement if Thomas had been known to be troublesome character. Fam-
ily and village networks provided for additional security for Nuretta’s marriage and 
migration trajectory. When Nuretta, nevertheless, was a little nervous about her 
marriage with a man she had never met, Delphine reassured her friend and argued 
that ‘a man who can be patient with [her] for four years and could send money for 
the process of [her] documents’ should most probably be a nice man. He did not 
have to spend his money to bring over Nuretta. He could have also gotten married 
to other Cameroonian girls who already were in the U.S. In addition, he at one 
point refused a girl in the U.S. who was from his same village. As both families 
lived in the same quarter together with Delphine, gossip was running high. These 
were all guarantees for the safe future of Nuretta and her marriage in the U.S.
At first, I was surprised that the bridewealth was only paid after Nuretta’s ar-
rival in the U.S.43 Traditional weddings do not require the physical presence of the 
spouses and are important celebrations for a marital union to be fully valid. Po-
tential husbands are expected to enable social (and at times geographical) mobility 
41  Original: ‘C’est ton amour que je vais manger?’ Musician: Koppo. Song title: ‘Je go’. Refrain : ’Si tu vois ma go, dis lui 
que je go.’ (Translation: ‘If you see my girlfriend, tell her that I’ve left.’)
42  For further details on this connection, see my discussion of the case study of Manuella in the forthcoming chapter.
43 For further details on marriage practices and kinship structures amongst the Bangwa, see Brain’s work (1972: 118- 154).
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and at times, mobility can be more important than marriage itself. The bridewealth 
issue was hence also considered in relation to the mobility issue. Nuretta’s mum 
contended the following in conversation with Delphine: ‘[If] the man would have 
[…] given the bridewealth, […he could still have kept] her here for the next ten 
years. […] The most important now is that she is there and she can support us.’ The 
risk here lies in one’s daughter being condemned to staying in Cameroon and the 
family not receiving help and support from bush. 
Nuretta’s father refused to receive the bridewealth payment before Nuretta had 
travelled because he prioritised migration over marriage. Even though the visa 
had been granted, the travel project needed to remain secret (see introduction of 
the thesis) and, furthermore, Nuretta explained that her father preferred the two 
spouses to know each other before they were to marry traditionally.44 
Threats to the social and financial security to families back in Cameroon can 
also arise through conflicting loyalties between families of procreation and origin. 
Long after Nuretta had already arrived in the U.S. and had given birth, Delphine 
(now in Sweden) called Nuretta’s mother. In their discussion, Nuretta’s mother was 
praising her daughter and how much she had done for her. ‘Your friend has really 
helped us. Who says that girls are no good? I’m really very happy. My child is really 
making an effort.’45 When Delphine called Nuretta directly afterwards to share how 
very happy and proud her mother was, Delphine had to keep the phone call short. 
Nuretta’s husband was at home. Delphine did not know how Nuretta had managed 
to raise the money that she was sending home to her mother. Perhaps Nuretta was 
managing to send home more money than her husband did. Thus, the phone call 
had to end there.
Such conflicts between family of origin and procreation also explain why 
Nuretta and Delphine were glad that Thomas had not come to Cameroon for a 
visit before their actual marriage. Such a visit would have meant an incredible fi-
nancial investment for Thomas. The entire extended family of Thomas would have 
expected gifts, presents, support, a party and potentially investments into housing 
or business projects for specific family members. 
Given that Nuretta was engaged, it was the responsibility of Thomas and his 
family to ensure that she would be able to travel. They had thought about process-
ing a marriage certificate through connections, but, in the end, did not have to 
because she had won the D.V. When she won the D.V., her husband first wondered 
whether she could legally marry a brother of his.  Nuretta tells me over the phone: 
‘I would have loved to do it… to help my brother in law… but my husband decided 
for me to come alone.’
Interestingly, Nuretta was not involved in the D.V. lottery herself. Her hus-
band played the lottery for her and then also managed the application process 
afterwards: 
44  After the visa had been issued, both families celebrated a formal introduction. After her arrival in the U.S., Nuretta 
became pregnant within the space of two months. As bridewealth payments should not be made while a woman is 
pregnant, the celebration of the bridewealth payment was further delayed.
45  Original: ‘Your friend don helep we plenty. Who say girl pikin no fine? I dey really glad. The pikin de really try.’ 
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He was the one that was telling what and what document to make. Even the driving 
licence, he was the one that told us to do it. Have I ever been to the U.S. or do I know 
how these things function? I don’t know.
It is the man’s and thus by extension the man’s family’s responsibility to bring 
the woman over and Nuretta was following his instructions. Marriage is the af-
fair of not two individuals, but two families. The family of Nuretta’s father were in 
charge of her journey to the U.S., not she. 
Many families in Cameroon prefer bushfallers to the immediate bridewealth 
payment. This also comes also out of conversations that Delphine had with her 
friend’s mother after Nuretta’s departure. Mamie Nuretta explained to Delphine 
the following: 
The important thing is for my daughter to be there and not for the man to come. The 
man could still have come, get married to my daughter, but there is no guarantee that 
she will eventually follow him to the U.S. So I think it’s God’s work. I think it’s God’s 
work. I thank God for that.’
Nuretta’s mother is thanking God that her daughter had been able to follow her 
husband to the U.S. The irony is that one of the main family expectations is that 
bushfallers ‘carry over’ their other members of family or spouses. Legally speaking, 
this might also be framed as ‘smuggling.’ Yet, for family members it constitutes an 
enormous source of help and support and in most cases the only avenue for being 
able to leave the country at all. Bushfallers even have the social responsibility to try 
to bring over another member of family. This contradiction between the notion 
of ‘smuggling’ and the notion of ‘carrying’ or ‘bringing’ somebody over points me 
back to the importance of considering both the authority of family and state. 
C o n c l u s i o n
This chapter has worked out how struggles over the legitimacy of various regula-
tory authorities result in accusations of fraud and fears of selfishness at the Embas-
sy. Within the phenomenon of marriage migration, multiple regulatory ambitions 
become visible. State officials and families both have their own perspective on what 
norms they try to secure. From the cases delineated in this chapter, we can see how 
the spheres of state and family – in their efforts to regulate the mobility and sexual-
ity of women - often intersect and at times even reinforce each other.
This chapter has opened with quotations from e-mails from French men who 
accuse Cameroonian women of fraud and of selfishness. Consulate officers at the 
French Embassy identified with the core message of these e-mails and considered 
them as justifications for their work. Regulatory dynamics at both the French and 
the American consulate office are driven by fears and accusations that visa appli-
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cants and their family members might be committing fraud for their own egoistic 
purposes. Through these accusations, state authorities locate the security threat 
with visa applicants and aspiring spouses. 
Following De Genova’s argument on the legal production of illegality, this 
chapter has explored the bureaucratic production of fraud and selfishness. In other 
words, rather than taking at face value the location of the security problem with 
the visa applicants, I have analysed the very process that constructs these visa ap-
plicants as fraudulent and selfish. What has emerged from this analysis is that reg-
ulatory dynamics at consulate offices reveal normative assumptions on legitimate 
monetary exchanges, marital unions and family loyalties. It is by seeking to impose 
these that consulate officers construct visa applicants in general and aspiring fe-
male spouses in particular as supposedly ‘fraudulent’ and ‘selfish’.
At the most basic level, the case study of Josephine has demonstrated how very 
important family networks are for the regulation of migration. Families constitute 
an authority that obliges migrants to act in specific ways. While consulate offic-
ers might seek to ridicule the regulatory authority of the family, these obligations 
are serious and important for (aspiring) migrants. In fact, insecurities are created 
through the very fact that state and family fail to take seriously their respective 
authority. Family authorities mark visa applicants and aspiring spouses as selfish 
when they do not comply with expectations, even if this brings the aspiring mi-
grants in conflict with regulatory dynamics within the realm of the state. State of-
ficials do not respect, understand or want to understand the regulatory dynamics 
that underlie certain actions and vice versa. Regulatory expectations from within 
the realm of the state and the family thus create difficult and, at times, impossible 
situations for aspiring migrants and spouses in particular.
This chapter also demonstrated where and how - from the perspective of an 
individual Cameroonian woman - security issues are located. Contrary to expecta-
tions at consulate offices, what has emerged from this analysis is that Nuretta actu-
ally sought out marriage above and before migration. Attitudes towards Internet-
mediated marriage migration thus need to be placed in the context of expectations 
of marriage and possibilities for security in Cameroon itself. To understand the 
bureaucratic production of selfishness and fraud, the role and place of money in 
courtship and marriage practices and of paper in trajectories of marriage migration 
need to be considered also from the perspective of young Cameroonian women.
I want to close the chapter by returning to the different visualisations of the 
security, marriage and migration nexus that we have encountered throughout the 
chapter. At the U.S. consulate, a whole table of marriage and courtship photos visu-
ally reminds consulate officers to remain vigilant in the face of ‘fakeness’. These 
photos, amongst others, proved Josephine’s case at the U.S. consulate to be ‘fake’. 
Both she and her cousin were refused a visa. Yet, in her own narrative, she was 
driven by the fear of ‘fake’ visas, ‘fake’ brokers or husbands and fiancés that were 
not serious. While migrant women at Embassies are seen through the almost ex-
clusive prism of paper, representations of marriage migration and security differ 
within the realm of the family. The photo that Nuretta sent to Delphine is one of 
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her proudly carrying her newborn baby girl and happily smiling in front of an 
Obama poster in a clean and comfortably modern apartment.
At the French consulate, e-mail posters located the threats to citizenship 
boundaries with the selfishness and fake intentions of Cameroonian women. Jose-
phine, Nuretta and Mamie Comfort (who wrote to me asking me for a serious 
husband to marry) all have their own set of security concerns and fears of ‘fake-
ness’. The point is not only that locations of security threats are multiple, but that 
security threats also cross over each other. What is marked in French e-mail post-
ers as acts of selfishness constitutes the primary duty of a daughter towards her 
family of origin in Cameroon. Accusations of selfishness on the part of both family 
members and state officials thus serve to reign in and control bonds of loyalties and 
membership of mobile spouses. 
The conclusions of this study have taught us that accusations of selfishness on 
the part of both families and state actors constitute control mechanisms and regu-
latory ambitions - regardless of the normative framework. Having explored the 
regulatory authority of the state in the preceding chapter, I had to shift to include 
the regulatory authority of the family in this chapter to be able to make visible the 
regulatory dynamics that produce fraud and selfishness. In the next chapter, I will 
further shift towards the perspective of family networks. The effects of state regula-
tion, I will argue, only become visible through this shift of perspective.
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Chapter 5
Unlucky, but worldly: The moral economy 
of deportation in Cameroon
Bushfallers are highly valued because they can change the fate and future of an 
entire family. This raises the question of how the danger of deportation affects the 
special status of bushfallers. It became clear to me how valued bushfallers are when 
Delphine and her friends discussed an incident they had heard about on the radio. 
In the course of a minor dispute over the car’s paperwork, a bushfaller on visit 
to Cameroon got shot dead by the police. ‘A whole bushfaller! They shot a whole 
bushfaller! Not even a normal man like me, but a whole bushfaller!1’ The surprise 
and shock of Delphine and her friends was not about the abuse of police power, but 
towards the consequences of the death of a bushfaller for his the family. A bush-
faller life is worth more worth than of ‘normal’ people. Expectations and hopes of 
the whole family are projected onto the family member who is in bush. Bushfallers 
are the ‘sunshine in their family’ and family responsibilities are on their shoulders. 
Then, what happens if the bushfaller of the family is deported back to Cameroon? 
1  The term whole bushfaller is part of the Pidgin terminology and expresses the sense of worth and value of the bushfall-
er in question. In Standard English, one might want to translate this expression as this person being a real bushfaller.
11. Bar in Bamenda: ‘Wisdom Embassy Annex’ 
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Deportation can be defined as the ‘compulsory removal of ‘aliens’ [or non al-
iens] from the physical, juridical and social space of the state’ (De Genova & Peutz 
2010: 1). At the most basic level, deportation is an instrument of the state’s attempt 
to regulate migration.2 Besides the physical removal of undocumented aliens, de-
portation policy is guided by the motivation of politicians and government officials 
to want to stop further ‘irregular’ migration. Politicians legitimise deportation pol-
icies through notions such as national sovereignty and citizenship.3 Deportation 
policy is supposed to discourage potential future migrants from endeavouring to 
reach the territory of European or other nation states. 
Within anti-trafficking policies, return programmes are considered a ‘remedy’ 
to the exploitation and human rights abuses of the person considered to have been 
‘trafficked’.4 The underlying assumption is that women are safe at home and in 
danger away (Agustin 2002; Alpes 2010). This chapter questions this view, as well 
as the assumption that deportation could have a deterrent effect on migratory de-
cisions. It does so through a close analysis of how deportation becomes visible in 
Anglophone Cameroon, as well as through a study of the trajectory of one woman 
who migrated and was later deported. The main case study of Manuella will be 
contrasted with the experiences of a few other women and men who have also 
experienced deportation. 
Within political science literature, the issue of deportation is seen predomi-
nantly as a public policy issue. Consequently, deportation is often analysed in 
terms of state sovereignty and the state’s capacity for migration control (Guirau-
don & Lahar 2000; Leerkers & Broeders 2010), but also in terms of the limits to 
the exercise of force within liberal democracies (Ellermann 2009; Freeman 1994; 
Gibney & Hansen 2003) and in terms of citizenship (Walters 2002; Nyers 2003). In 
contrast to the perspective of the state and its implications for public policy, this 
chapter explores the event of deportation from the perspective of individuals and 
their family networks in Cameroon.5 
In this chapter, I seek to explain the paradox of deportation and people’s unas-
sailable trust in bush through an exploration of the moral economy of deportation 
in Cameroon. In line with my overall research question on the sources of vulner-
ability for migrant women, I examine how the social status of deported migrant 
2  A look through history reveals that deportation law only emerged in the late nineteen and twentieth centuries 
(Torpey 1998).
3  De Genova argues that deportation is a ‘complex socio-political regime’ that both ‘manifests and engenders domi-
nant notions of sovereignty and citizenship (De Genova and Peutz 2010: 2).’ As such, deportation does not simply flow 
out of dominant notions of citizenship and (state) sovereignty, but contributes towards constructing and rendering 
them dominant or seemingly natural.
4  For the sake of the criminal persecution of so called traffickers, many destination countries now provide tempo-
rary legal stays to ‘victims’ who agree to cooperate with police authorities. Such programmes are, however, limited in 
time. Migrants, who do not want to cooperate with the police, go back to the status of undocumented and deportable 
migrants. After the court case, it can be possible for ‘trafficking victims’ to gain legal papers on humanitarian grounds. 
However, this is not guaranteed. The default position even for ‘trafficking victims’ always remains the one of deportable 
alien.
5  Another stream of research looks at social movements and political struggles that form themselves around the is-
sue of deportation on the sub-Saharan African continent. For still-ongoing research in this field, see Clara Lecadet and 
Stephan Dünnwald.
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women relates to issues of marriage and sexuality. What impact does a forced re-
turn have on the lives of migrant women and their family members? What impact 
does the issue of deportation have on migratory decisions of aspiring migrants in 
Cameroon?
M o r a l  e c o n o m y  o f  d e p o r t a t i o n
By answering the above question, I seek to work towards a detailed analysis of the 
moral economy of deportation in Cameroon. With moral economy of deportation, 
I refer to the production and circulation of values, emotions and norms that are 
evoked by the event of deportation (Fassin 2009: 1257). While deportation is an 
instrument of state authorities, I will not consider deportation from the perspective 
of state authorities. Instead I explore the moral yardsticks in Cameroon that family 
members and society apply to measure the success and failure of migrants, as well 
as the ways in which deportation does and does not become visible in Cameroon. I 
shall use insights from the moral economy of deportation in Cameroon to unravel 
the legal consciousness that feeds into the widespread belief by policy makers in 
countries of arrival that deportation could serve to discourage further emigration.
Within the moral economy of deportation in Cameroon, deportations are re-
ferred to through the expression of ‘being sent back’. Distinctions between differ-
ent types of forced returns are not relevant. In a survey of different neighbour-
hoods in Buea, 75 percent of all respondents had a family member who is in bush, 
42 percent had a family member who had come back to Cameroon to either visit or 
stay, and 9 percent declared to have a member of family who had been repatriated 
to Cameroon.6 In my compound of only 18 small studios, two or three people had 
been ‘sent back’ after longer stays in bush. Different police officers at both Douala 
and Yaoundé airports estimated that between twenty to sixty people a month were 
sent back because border officials at the destination airport refused entry.7 Actual 
deportation numbers (of people who had already entered the national territory of 
arriving states) are lower, but were still estimated by both police contacts of mine 
to be roughly fifteen per month.8
6  As I have discussed in the introduction, this survey covered 100 informants in different neighbourhoods. Given the 
shamefulness of deportation and its connected regimes of secrecy, the figure of nine percent of family members that 
had been sent back is indicative of a rather high rate of involuntary returns. If I furthermore relate the figure of 9 depor-
tations within my survey of 100 respondents to the figure of 42 respondents who indicated that they have a member of 
family in bush coming to either visit or stay, one could estimate that one out of five returning bushfallers may not have 
returned voluntarily.
7  From the context of my conversation with the respective officer, it was clear that he was referring here to travellers 
who were intercepted at airports abroad and never allowed into the national territory of other states.
8  According to a 2009 report of Centre d’information, de reflexion et d’echanges en matiere de franchissement des frontiers 
et d’immigration, 579 Cameroonians were deported from the European Union in 2006 and 467 in 2007 (quoted by Evina 
2009: 56). In 2009, the Netherlands coordinated two joint deportation flights for the European border agency Frontex 
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While deportation is a common phenomenon, it is guarded as a public secret 
in Cameroon (for open secrets, see Kosofksy 1991: 22). Even though most of my 
neighbours suspected or de facto knew about cases of deportation in our com-
pound, the unwritten rule of respect prevented people from openly speaking about 
it. The shame associated with a forced return is too deep. As a consequence of this 
moral economy of deportation, neither high deportation rates in general, nor the 
concrete experience of deportation (directly or through a family member) does 
anything to alter people’s ambitions for mobility. Despite high deportation rates, 
bush at all cost remains a highly desired project in Cameroon. 
The moral economy of deportation in Cameroon challenges the idea of depor-
tation as the ultimate failure. After four years of hustling in Switzerland, the key 
informant of this chapter, Manuella, had been deported.9 However, I was surprised 
to find how much people continued to admire her for her worldly status. This is the 
way a male friend of mine talked about Manuella after night out together in Doua-
la: ‘She is a woman of the world – a very refined somebody. The kind of person a 
man would like to go out with.’ The male friend did not know that Manuella had 
been deported. The manner in which Manuella dressed, talked and behaved made 
it clear that she had been to bush. Unlike most other Cameroonians, a deported 
person has been abroad and seen the world. 
As a deported migrant woman, Manuella was seen as ‘worldly’, yet also ‘un-
lucky’. It depends on circumstances, however, whether a deported bushfaller may 
be able to draw social capital from his or her prior exposure to bush, or may be 
judged for his or her failure to fully live up to the expectations of bushfalling. 
A relation of Manuella interpreted Manuella’s forced return in these terms: ‘She 
didn’t get lucky. That’s the thing that brought her back.’ The individual failure to 
remain in bush is linked to the bad luck of an individual and does not does usually 
put into question the faith invested into bushfalling. The success of others is too 
tangible and visible to let the evidence of an individual case question the profit-
ability of bushfalling. 
Manuella was born in 1981 in a small village called Babisi10 in the North West 
Province of Cameroon. The first time she migrated was during her teenage years 
when she was escaping a forced marriage in her village of origin. I was introduced 
to Manuella through her sister in law in Buea. Beltha had become my informant 
to West Africa. The carriers deported 103 migrants from the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Belgium, France, 
Spain and Austria to both Nigeria and Cameroon. Deportation rates are much higher for Nigeria than for Cameroon. 
Within the Frontex report, these deportations are referred to as ‘joint returns’. In 2008, two ‘joint return’ operations were 
carried out for Cameroonians. Germany coordinated a deportation flight for 26 Cameroonians and Togolese and the 
Netherlands coordinated a deportation flight of 16 Cameroonians. In 2010, the Netherlands coordinated another return 
operation for migrants from Nigeria and Cameroon. Data stems from the annual General Reports and the website of 
Frontex (http://www.frontex.europa.eu/annual_report).
9  ‘Hustling’ is a term used in Cameroon that refers to ‘working money in bush’, as well as fighting to make it and have 
success in bush. The term is also used more generally (i.e. not in relation to bush) when people talk about fighting to 
make a living and accepting any kind of work or means to try and have success. For the meaning of the term in Nigeria, 
also see (Chernoff 2003).
10  So as to guarantee a maximum degree of anonymity for Manuella, the name of her natal village has been changed 
to another village name in her area of origin.
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because she (just like Manuella a few years earlier) was also preparing to leave 
the country with a migration broker. After our first meeting in Switzerland, I was 
surprised to find Manuella at my doorstep only months later. How did Manuella 
experience her deportation and how did she cope with her new geographical loca-
tion and social setting? How did her close and distant families deal and react to her 
deportation? I shall examine perceptions, evaluations and consequences of depor-
tation in Cameroon by tracing four geographical locations in Manuella’s life story: 
Buea, Douala, Babisi and Abuja.
B u e a :  b a d  l u c k  a n d  s e c r e c y
‘When you are deported, it’s like a challenge. You want to go back to challenge what 
people think of you.’
A surprise guest at a njangi meeting: the public secret of deportation11 
On the 10th of April 2008, I walked up the main road of Buea and accidentally 
bumped into Jonathan, Manuella’s brother.  At Jonathan’s house, Manuella’s sister-
in-law showed me photos of Manuella in Switzerland. On that fateful day, Jonathan 
told me that Alisha was back. I did not immediately understand the significance of 
what he was saying. He used the name that Manuella had been using in bush. 
I found it hard to believe that he was referring to his bushfaller sister. Manuel-
la is in Douala? Different scenarios ran through my mind. Has she been deported? 
Has she given up and returned for good? What has she told her family? Will she 
be able to return to Switzerland? Jonathan was calm and seemingly unperturbed 
about this piece of news. I wondered about her brother’s understanding of the 
situation. ‘Why are you surprised?’ he asked me. ‘This is her home. It’s normal for 
her to come here.’ I asked him what Manuella’s plans were, but Jonathan did not 
know. They had not yet talked about details. ‘We are just happy to see her after all 
those years.’
Jonathan gave me Manuella’s new Cameroonian telephone number. Next to 
‘Manuella Zürich’, I stored her new number as ‘Manuella Douala’. ‘It’s like a dream,’ 
she told me as I called her up only minutes later. She was at the hairdresser in 
Douala. She explained that she had been staying in a hotel in Douala for the first 
four days. With her many nieces and cousins, it would have been very crowded for 
her to stay at any of her brothers’ places. She did not know yet what she wanted 
to do, let alone where she was going to stay. I offered my place for a few weeks in 
case she needed and wanted some more privacy. She was glad for the offer and 
11  A njangi group is a savings group that meets at regular intervals.
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explained that she would be coming to Buea on that same day. She invited me to 
join her that night for the monthly savings group meeting (called njangi meeting) 
at her brother’s house in Buea. 
That same evening, the members of the monthly savings group arrived all 
dressed in the same pattern of wrapper material in the living room of Jonathan’s 
house. While all members lived in Buea, everyone came from Babisi – Manuella’s 
village of origin in the North West Province. When I had first visited Jonathan’s 
house in October of the preceding year, the many photos of Manuella decorating 
the walls and the cabinet of the living room struck me. For example, Manuella 
dressed in white trousers and a blue summer top in front of a beautifully sunny 
lake in Switzerland; Manuella smiling into the camera inside a room; or Manuella 
smiling into the camera with friends. Aside from a few other family photos and a 
traditional gong from Babisi, there were only photos of Manuella. 
Even though Manuella had only occasionally sent presents to her family and 
only on very rare occasions money, she nevertheless had been the bushfaller of the 
family. While families in Cameroon are known to exert a great deal of pressure 
on migrants in bush, when I spoke with her sister-in-law Beltha last October, she 
did not seem worried nor dissatisfied. While she knew that Manuella did not have 
papers, she told me that she trusted things would become easier for Manuella with 
time. Despite Manuella’s still undocumented status in Luzern,12 Beltha had also 
signed up for a bushfalling line with one of the migration brokers in Buea. She told 
me with a wink in her eyes that one bushfaller was not enough: ‘Every family wants 
to have that name.’ 
Beltha had already stopped her payments when Manuella was still in bush. Yet, 
it was not Manuella’s deportation that had calmed down Beltha’s enthusiasm for 
bush. After many years of having worked on a voluntary basis with hardly any pay 
at the public hospital in Buea, Beltha had finally been given a better employment 
contract at the hospital. These days, she is fully employed and has just given birth 
to her third child. Consequently, Beltha’s husband decided to invest his money for 
her bushfalling project into building a house to rent out to tenants.
I had heard from Beltha, when I was in Cameroon for my pilot study in Oc-
tober 2007, that she had a sister-in-law who lived in Switzerland. I hence paid 
Manuella a visit when I passed through Switzerland on my way back to Europe 
that December. While airports reminded Manuella of the long weeks she had spent 
in prison there, she came to pick me up at the airport. I was loaded with gifts from 
Manuella’s sister-in-law: dried vegetables, dried fish, cracked melon seeds and a 
bunch of drawings from Beltha’s children. While riding the train to her house, 
Manuella cried as she read letters from her nieces. With occasional interruptions 
from her Nigerian boyfriend (in whose house she was staying), we chatted the en-
tire day and recorded a long interview about her past four years in Switzerland. 
In April 2008 (six months after having first been to the house of Manuella’s 
brother and five months after having met her in Luzern), I was now again in 
12  So as to enhance the potential for Manuella’s anonymity, Luzern is not the real name of the town where Manuella 
was staying.
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Jonathan’s living room. Yet, this time I was there together with Manuella.  She was 
one of the last people to arrive that evening. As she entered, she held the baby of 
one of her elder brothers in her arms. She was dressed in a trendy pair of bright 
jeans and a light pink blouse that closed around the neck. Her jewellery was fash-
ionable and her haircut unusual. Not plaited or covered by artificial hair (as is com-
monplace in Cameroon); her natural hair was cut in a fashion similar to haircuts in 
Europe. As the host of the evening, Jonathan welcomed in a speech the two special 
guests of the evening: Manuella and me. Jonathan explained that Manuella had 
just arrived and excused her for not wearing the njangi uniform as everybody else. 
Without ever having been physically present, Manuella had been participating in 
this monthly savings group for a while.13 It was thus a happy and special occasion 
to be able to physically welcome her in the savings group.
As food was shared, I noticed how intrigued Manuella was to be back at her 
brother’s house after these four years. She looked around the room stumbling 
across the many photos of her. ‘You are looking at your photos?’ asked her close 
friend and sister-in-law Beltha. ‘Yeah, my photos are everywhere!’ She was strug-
gling to remember people’s names. As the evening went on, Manuella received 
text messages and had missed calls from her Nigerian boyfriend in Zürich. Beltha 
admired Manuella’s flashy mobile phone and her digital photo camera. 
During the evening, we looked at Manuella’s photos on her mobile phone and 
digital camera. A photo of Manuella in a beautifully clean and modern car wearing 
a seat belt immediately revealed that this was a photo from bush. Other photos of 
Manuella in her apartment in Zürich were similar to the ones in the photo album 
and on the walls. She told us about her friends and their boyfriends. She explained 
to us how Cameroonian women in bush like to date Nigerians. ‘Nigerian men like 
to take care of girls. It’s in their tradition. You come to Europe. You need help. Why 
not?’ Another group of photos showed Manuella with friends on a night out in 
Luzern. The photos showed her eating, drinking and dancing. The final photo on 
her photo camera showed Manuella in a clothes shop. ‘This is a shop at Frankfurt 
airport,’ explained Manuella to Beltha and me. 
These photos gave the impression of a happy goodbye party and then an or-
dinary trip back to Cameroon. Yet, when dancing with her friends on that night 
in Zürich, Manuella had not been aware that only a few days after, she would find 
herself in Cameroon. Manuella’s departure had not been planned. To the contrary, 
she was with us that night in Buea for the village meeting only because a few days 
prior she had been deported. None of this was mentioned during the savings group 
meeting.14 From the vantage point of Buea, I was struck how invisible the reasons 
for her return were. Although her return had been forced, what became visible on 
that evening were her fashionable clothing, hairstyle, camera, phone and photos. 
They all clearly spoke of the promise of bush.
13  The monthly saving rates of this njangi group were between ten and fifteen Euros.
14  I do not know what Manuella discussed one-to-one with Beltha in my absence. Yet, there was not much time and 
space for one-to-ones and this was the first time that she was meeting her brothers after her deportation. After the 
njangi meeting, Manuella slept at Beltha’s place. The morning after, she came to my place; and already in the afternoon, 
she had left back again for Douala. 
181
While in Manuella’s case her brothers and close members of family knew about 
her deportation, they decided together not to tell the other relatives what had hap-
pened. As Manuella’s status as a bushfaller reflected positively onto her relatives 
too, they were happy and willing to keep the reasons of Manuella’s return a secret. 
Her presence in bush had notably been an important source of hope and status 
for her family. As Manuella herself puts it, ‘People look at you somehow differ-
ently when you have somebody abroad. I think it gives somebody some courage.’ It 
would have been shameful for the more distant relatives to know about the reasons 
of Manuella’s return. To return after many years in bush with ‘empty hands’ is likely 
to be considered as a sign of laziness. When explicitly asked about the reason for 
her return, Manuella explained that she had come back to Cameroon to marry.
Six months after this njangi meeting, Manuella reflected upon her deportation 
and her family’s reactions to it. 
My brothers knew about it and we decided not to tell the other relatives about what 
happened. But they could figure that out themselves you know. I mean I’ve been stay-
ing… if you come to visit, you cannot come and stay… I mean I have been staying 
now for six months so it is too much just to visit. So people will start figuring out 
themselves why she is still here, what happened and that stuff.
The stigma of Manuella’s deportation is not immediately, but always poten-
tially perceivable to her environment (on discreditable stigma, see Goffman 1963: 
41- 104). Consequently, Manuella and her family members were actively engaged 
in camouflaging the reasons of her return. 
With time, however, pressure on Manuella to leave the country was increas-
ing. Her appearance and the pretence of an imminent departure from Cameroon 
were crucial for her status. Without a plan for departure, her entire status as a 
bushfaller could collapse at any point and give way to accusations of laziness and 
uselessness. 
Remembering and narrating deportation: sex, marriage certificates and 
laissez passers
The morning after the njangi meeting, Manuella explained to me in private the 
details of her return to Cameroon. As soon as Manuella came to my room, I had 
to find a means to ask Delphine to leave the place. It was the first and last time 
during the entire research period there was something I could not immediately 
share with my research assistant. Although Delphine later knew about the reasons 
of Manuella’s return, out of respect she never spoke directly about deportation 
with Manuella. 
In her narrative, Manuella closely connected the reason of her deportation to 
her failure to arrange for a wedding. Having escaped a (traditional) marriage in the 
village, Manuella had found herself undocumented in Switzerland with a (civic) 
marriage as the only way to gain papers. One of the means Manuella used to seek 
out boyfriends in Switzerland: 
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If you start to find someone you end up sleeping with this man, sleeping with that 
man, sleeping with that man because you think they will give you papers. And that 
was the wrong idea they gave us.15
As none of her boyfriends had agreed to marry her (or was in a position to do 
so), Manuella decided to prepare for a paper wedding (marriage of convenience) 
with a Swiss man.  Yet she did not have enough time to follow up this procedure as 
she was intercepted beforehand and sent back:
Beltha had to send documents for me; the documents to get married and all that. 
That was the last document I was waiting for to get married. And I just spoke with 
her some few minutes before I got arrested.
As Manuella had gone to her official place of residence (the asylum home) to 
pick up her post, the staff at the counter told her to hold on and wait. 
Something told me it wasn’t right…. And immediately I stood up to leave the office….
Pamp! Polizei!16 The police had already come. They were really fast. Pamp! ‘You are 
under arrest!’ ‘They kept me locked in for three days. There was no shower. They only 
allow you to have a shower after two days. You cannot shower every day.
Manuella was arrested on the 3rd of April, but only arrived in Douala a week 
later.17 Manuella was lucky that she had somebody in Luzern willing to bring her a 
suitcase with some of her belongings. The things packed in a rush by her Nigerian 
boyfriend are the things that she shared as presents. The rest of her belongings are 
still in Switzerland. 
Manuella went from Zürich to Frankfurt and then had to sleep over several 
nights at the airport in Ethiopia before her flight back to Douala. In contrast to 
images of deportation in both activist and scholarly publishing that often portray 
people in shackles (De Genova & Peutz 2009), this was the way in which Manuella 
narrated her (forced) journey to Cameroon to me: 
Actually they know that you cannot go out because you need a passport to go out of 
the airport. So they don’t follow you around. They actually let you do whatever you 
are doing. You can only stay in the airport for years, but you will never go out. That’s 
what I know. It will be difficult for me to go out, so they didn’t even follow me around. 
I actually bought some little things at the Frankfurt airport. One police guy helped me 
because they won’t let me buy also if I don’t show them my passport. You know – at 
the Duty Free.’’ 
This was the photo of Manuella in the clothes shop she had shown to all of us 
the night before. The policeman had taken this photo of her on the day of her de-
portation. Later I found this photo of her posted on her Facebook profile with the 
15  The context of the interview I conducted with Manuella does unfortunately not give further information about who 
exactly Manuella is referring to here as ‘they’.
16  Manuella was using the German word for police, which is ‘Polizei’.
17  For the sake of Manuella’s protection, the date has been slightly adjusted.
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title ‘shopping time’. It was next to other photos of her in Luzern. The visuals of this 
photographic memory of Manuella’s day of deportation are striking. The photo is 
evidence of Manuella literally and figuratively dressing up her return trip to Cam-
eroon. For fellow travellers, the full significance and actual nature of Manuella’s 
forced journey was visible.
Upon her arrest, Manuella did not offer any resistance. ‘I didn’t want to fight 
with them. I even told them I wanted to go back.’ Manuella added that her family 
would not have wanted her to be in prison again. ‘I had wasted enough time.’ She 
thus called her brothers after her arrest to inform them of her coming. During the 
seven days of her journey, it was unclear when their sister would arrive, but they 
knew somebody from their village of origin who worked at the airport. They thus 
prepared for a safe arrival of their sister by giving this contact person about 100,000 
CFA (ca. 150 Euros). 
The reaction of Manuella’s brothers reflects a common understanding of how 
airport officials treat deported migrants. Another informant reasoned that she 
could hardly risk bushfalling because she did not have someone who upon her de-
portation would make sure that she would not end up in New Bell, an infamously 
reputed prison in Cameroon. Informants of mine told me of the extremely bad 
conditions in the prison. On her forced return after her failed attempt to travel to 
Kiev (see chapter one), Pamella, too, had destroyed her travel documents in the 
toilet of the plane before arrival in Douala. She explained: ‘If not that, I’d still be in 
New Bell.’ 
Deporting states do not acknowledge that families and deportees have to pay 
the police (or other officials) upon arrival so as not to end up in prison.18 Yet, even 
if technically and legally speaking, police officers do not have a right to hold up 
deported migrants, it is far from safe to trust the laissez passer to guarantee safe 
passage to deported migrants at their airport of arrival.19 Referring to the laissez 
passer that she had been given in Switzerland, Manuella explained that,
They had no right to hold me. But usually they just need any little motif to get money. 
That’s why they didn’t want these people to disturb me when I came. Because they 
always do that since they want money. And if you don’t give them this money, they 
have every right to put you into prison or whatever …
That is why her brothers gave money to their contact person at the airport. 
The irony is that documents that are issued through entirely legal procedures 
in countries of arrival do not always prove efficient at the airport in Cameroon. 
Although Manuella’s laissez passer would have been classified by state officials as 
entirely legal, it was the contact person from her village that enabled her to leave 
the airport without having to go through harassment or making further payments 
to the Cameroonian police. 
18  I am basing this on conversations with consulate staff from the German Embassy in Yaoundé.
19  The irony is that documents issued through entirely legal procedures in countries of arrival fail in the Cameroonian 
context to be efficient. Although Manuella’s laissez passer would have been classified as entirely legal, within the con-
text of an airport in a country of departure, it did not have the powers that state officials in Europe might believe it to 
have.
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Trying to leave again: the success and failure of migration
The morning after the njangi meeting and just before coming to my studio, 
Manuella had already gone back to the immigration office in Buea and applied for 
a new passport. For now, Manuella was hoping to be able to return to bush through 
the paper marriage she had already begun to arrange when still in Switzerland. She 
explained that she preferred to pay the man for the marriage because it meant that 
she was free to marry another man for love later on. From day one, Manuella’s life 
in Cameroon was geared towards a renewed departure. 
This desire to leave the country again needs to be seen in relation to the bush-
falling expectations that are levelled against migrants by their environment, but 
that she had herself, too. ‘You see how my family is here? They are not really starv-
ing. But I would like their level to be up.’ At my studio, Manuella shared how it was 
her dream to be able to buy a plot of land and build a house on it. ‘Like that on my 
next visit, I can just stay in my own house. And have a shower there.’ 
Immediately after her return, Manuella’s sister-in-law Beltha tried to put bush 
out of Manuella’s head. Yet, the humiliation of deportation was too strong for 
Manuella. ‘You know people here don’t have anything going. They will just talk. 
They will make you feel like a loser. This thing is shameful. It makes you feel like 
a loser.’ Like most other deported migrants, Manuella wanted to challenge what 
people thought of her.  ‘It’s like you went to hustle, you went to be somebody and 
you didn’t succeed. It’s like a failure, like you failed. That’s the problem. I feel like 
a failure.’ 
Manuella’s deportation points us to questions of visibility in relation to the 
supposed success or failure of her migration and life trajectory. Manuella showed 
me a photo that her sister-in-law had shown to me on my first visit to one of 
Manuella’s family houses in Buea. On the photo, Manuella is dressed in a spaghetti 
shirt and stands in front of a door. That is all. It looks like a very ordinary photo. 
Yet, Manuella tells me that the photo was taken during her first week in prison after 
her arrival. The walls of the prison – bare as they are – look better than the walls of 
many houses in Cameroon.20 
As I have pointed out, Manuella’s presence in bush had been a source of status 
and hope for the entire family, regardless of her daily reality in Switzerland. While 
details of Manuella’s life in Switzerland were not visible for her social network in 
Cameroon, people’s strong belief in bush even in the face of deportation needs to 
be compared to the overall life trajectories of migrants before migration and after 
deportation. The respective success and failure of a migration trajectory cannot be 
understood if the life trajectories of deported migrants before migration and after 
deportation remain hidden from sight. I will argue that Manuella’s determination 
to leave again for bush after her deportation needs to be analysed from the vantage 
point of her migration trajectories before her journey to Switzerland.
Manuella, at the age of fifteen, was forced to move into the house of a man 
with whom her father had made a marriage arrangement. She was to be the wife 
20  I do not know what her family knew of the context in which this photo was taken.
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of a farmer in his mid 30s who lived in Babisi. Even though Manuella’s mother was 
against the marriage and Manuella herself had suggested somebody else for mar-
riage, her father had insisted on the match. The future husband had been the first 
to propose and to pay the bridewealth. After a few weeks of forced sexual inter-
course in her new marital house, Manuella ran away from her village in the North 
West province to her elder brother’s home in Buea. 
After her escape, her elder brothers and sisters contributed money to repay 
the bridewealth that the father had received during the traditional wedding. In 
Buea, Manuella received training as a seamstress, but her brother refused when she 
expressed the desire to go to school. Manuella proudly told me that she managed 
to pay for her professional training school ‘herself ’. This meant that a boyfriend of 
hers had been willing to sponsor her for the training course. 
After completion of the school, she had to complete a year’s internship at a 
hotel. She was not paid during this period. It was thanks to a man she had met in 
the restaurant of the hotel that she was able to pay for her apartment, food, clothes 
and medical visits:
My level had changed because I had this man that was really, I mean he was really 
sent from heaven. Because he really changed my life actually, that man changed my 
life. I was not that poor that time, so they [her brothers] were already looking at me 
at that time differently. 
It was thanks to the man she had met in the hotel in Douala that Manuella 
began to have a greater degree of control over her life. ‘I needed help,’ reflected 
Manuella on her courtship practices. Thinking back to the men with whom she 
has been, Manuella shared with me: ‘I didn’t get it from my parents. They [i.e. the 
men] were my own parents.’ 
It was also the money from this man that enabled Manuella to finance a sub-
stantial part of her bushfalling project. 
I thought I should better risk going rather than staying here because the guy who was 
helping me was a married guy; we had no future together. He didn’t want me to go, 
but I thought we won’t live together for a long time you know. This relationship must 
end one day and if it ends how do I live, how do I continue my life?21 
Manuella’s decision to try and fall bush was driven by a quest for greater se-
curity in her life. She saw in bushfalling a risk, but at the same time the potential 
for a more long-term strategy for her life. Once she had made up her mind about 
bushfalling, she was able persuade her brothers to add the remaining money.
Upon her return, Manuella’s status vis-à-vis her close family members had 
changed despite the forced nature of her return. Manuella told me that they were 
treating her differently now. Before her departure, Manuella had been left at the 
mercy of boyfriends. Now, she felt she had a better position within her family. ‘I 
21  If this man had been in a position to marry Manuella, she might not have insisted on having to fall bush. Without 
paid work or the prospect of marriage, she figured that her life in Douala was not going to be sustainable in the long 
run. 
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feel special somehow and my opinion really counts, my opinion really counts in the 
family now.’ Although her brothers owned houses and had children, Manuella was 
on a higher level than him because she had been to bush. She was a worldly person 
who had seen and achieved what her brothers had not yet been able to achieve. 
Manuella’s insistence on wanting to leave immediately after her deportation 
was also connected to the success that other bushfallers have had. Manuella had 
travelled out together with a friend. Although this friend had been initially much 
more scared and much less determined, she managed to arrange for a paper wed-
ding with a Nigerian man. She has a child and works as a hairdresser in bush. She 
took the same risks as Manuella and in Delphine’s words ‘is fine now’. 
Manuella was merely unlucky when compared to the destiny of this friend. 
The visible success and wealth of bushfallers in Cameroon makes it difficult for 
family members to understand the fate of people who are ‘sent back’ in other terms 
than bad luck and laziness.22 Manuella needed to try and leave the country again to 
challenge what others were thinking of her. 
D o u a l a :  l e v e l s  o f  w o r l d l i n e s s 
‘I’m on a different level right now and I thank God for that. I’m not ungrateful. I real-
ly thank God for the experience that I had. But still I wish I could have accomplished 
my dreams - like other people they succeed in doing a lot […], which I didn’t.’
‘Maintaining one’s level’  after deportation
After the first week in the hotel, Manuella arranged to move in with her brother 
Edward in Douala. Manuella did not want to go back to the village. She preferred 
life in Douala, in the anonymity of a big town where there was greater freedom 
for her. In Douala, she felt freer in her actions than in Buea. At the house of her 
brother in Douala, she was free to come and go as she wished– including at night. 
While waiting and preparing to leave the country again, Manuella intended to 
use her time in Douala to pass her driving test and follow computer classes. Manuel-
la did not want to work in the hotel business for which she had been trained. ‘You 
work an entire month and at the end of the day,’ she shared with me, ‘you only have 
30,000 CFA [roughly 50 Euros].’ For such a small amount of money, it is not worth 
the effort. The monthly rent for a studio in Douala alone would cost about 30,000 
CFA. For a short time, Manuella considered training as a nurse – a profession with 
22  The shamefulness of deportation is related to the feeling of not having been able to achieve what one went out to 
bush to do, i.e. work and earn money.
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an acute demand in bush. Yet, the training period would take two years, which was 
too long for Manuella. She needed to leave Cameroon before then. 
With time, her Nigerian boyfriend in Switzerland stopped calling. Other 
friends in Switzerland were not calling either. The money in her savings account 
in Cameroon on which she was living was slowly decreasing. On a visit to Buea, 
Manuella told me about a new boyfriend. Her new man was married and accord-
ing to her, ‘gentle and generous’. He often took her out dancing and at regular in-
tervals gave her money to buy new clothes. Sometimes he even took her and his 
friends for small trips to the countryside. 
When in a fight with her boyfriend in Douala, Manuella explained how she 
would never allow this man to treat her like any other Cameroonian girl. Her con-
nections to bush meant that she was now on a different ‘level.’ ‘Ok, maybe I didn’t 
have papers, but I’ve been out there. I’ve seen some things.’ Manuella and her Cam-
eroonian man never discussed the exact reasons for her return. Despite her depor-
tation, bush had increased her status. In many ways, bush can be a source of status 
much beyond questions of remittances and legality. 
As Manuella and I went second-hand shopping at the market in Douala, a 
salesman annoyed us with his bargaining strategies and Manuella responded with, 
‘I’ve been inside an H&M.’ The sales man had not been inside an H&M and having 
been there made all the difference. Normally, she would not go about saying this, 
but as she explained to me: ‘I was getting annoyed with the guys.’ As we shopped 
for clothes at the market, we made a constant distinction between Chinoiserie and 
okrika. Okrika refers to second-hand clothes sent down from Europe. Even used, 
clothes from Europe offer better quality and a higher status than products from 
China (Séraphin 2000: 89-90). Manuella always bought okrika. 
Levels of worldliness also come with expectations and pressures. On several of 
my weekends with Manuella in Douala, her boyfriend took us out dancing. One 
evening, her boyfriend had promised, but then failed to call us. While waiting 
at her brother’s home, one of Manuella’s very close friends from her time at the 
hotel dropped by and asked whether she could bring in two male family friends. 
Manuella was in shock and horror. She did not have money to pay for drinks! Only 
when her friend had assured her that her friends had not come to get invited did 
Manuella allow them to enter the house. As a bushfaller, she always had to be care-
ful. Potentially, even men could claim or ask her for money. 
As Manuella’s boyfriend had still not called, Manuella eventually allowed both 
men to take us out for drinks. Later, they invited us to go dancing and, despite an 
initial hesitation, Manuella accepted the invitation. ‘I do not want to fall too low. I 
want to respect myself,’ she later explained to me. Manuella was not entirely at ease 
that other men were going to pay for us. For her sense of self-respect, it was better 
to only accept invitations from one man.23 
‘Soon,’ Manuella told me, ‘this fun and playing time will end.’ In discussion at 
my studio in Buea, Manuella shared how much her mother would like her to have 
23  After a few hours of dancing at the cabaret, Manuella’s boyfriend came in with another woman. He pretended that 
he was just about to call us to invite and bring us to the cabaret, too.
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a child now. Some of her younger brothers already had their second child, while at 
27 she had none. ‘I’m not getting any younger. […] I never thought I would reach 
this age without having a child. It’s unbelievable where I am coming from.’ 
What was important to Manuella’s mother in the village was neither her legal 
status in bush, nor her reason of return from bush, but whether or not Manuella 
was married and had given birth. Manuella’s mother had lived all her life in the 
village of Babisi. When Manuella had left for bush, she and her brothers had not 
informed their mother about their attempt at bushfalling. Now upon Manuella’s re-
turn, she was not informed about the reasons of Manuella’s return either. Manuella 
had explained to me that her mother would simply not understand notions like 
deportation or residence permit. I will go on to suggest that means of evaluating 
status in Douala also need to be understood in relation to realities in the rural vil-
lage of Babisi. 
The black bush and the status of an ajebotar
Manuella’s brother Edward ran a small commercial enterprise. His rented apart-
ment had a living room, a small sleeping room, a storage space, a connecting room, 
and a small kitchen and bathroom. Upon Manuella’s arrival, her brother and his 
wife moved to the hallway that connected the living room with the bathroom. 
Thus, Manuella could have her own room.
Manuella complained about the bucket showers in Edward’s house. The lack 
of water to flush the toilet shocked her. She was in horror at the degree of fat in 
the food. She was no longer used to the way and style of people in Cameroon. She 
also did not like her sister-in-law’s cooking. Manuella mildly commented that one 
could not blame her for it. ‘She is from the village.’ People from the village have not 
had the kind of exposure that she has had. 
Manuella’s sister-in-law summarised Manuella’s new status for me in this way: 
‘There is more ajebotar in her.’ Ajebotar is a Nigerian Pidgin term that has travelled 
to Cameroon via the locally produced movies on the Nigerian T.V. channel Afri-
can Magic. The term refers to the luxuries and comforts that only members of the 
upper-middle class in West Africa can afford. 
Beltha told me how Manuella struggled after her return to wash clothing by 
hand. Early in my stay in Cameroon, I confessed embarrassingly to Delphine that 
after five consecutive Sundays of spending hours scrubbing clothing by hand, I had 
given up on the exercise and had diverted to paying someone. She had laughed 
with pity and disbelief that I could find such an ordinary task too tedious to as-
sume. Yet, Beltha viewed Manuella’s struggle with hand-washing her clothes as a 
sign of achievement. ‘Her level has changed. […] Over there, machines do every-
thing.’ Manuella had become a little bit more of an ajebotar. 
Instead of the cheap chewing gum that one can buy everywhere on the street 
for a mere 100 CFA, Manuella insisted on buying chewing gum from the bakery. 
While the cheap chewing gum from the road is called ‘Hollywood’, the chewing 
gum ‘Leader Price’ from the bakery truly comes from bush. Leader price is a rela-
tively cheap brand of chewing gum in France; yet, its taste lasts longer than the 
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one of ‘Hollywood’. Foreign brands confer status (Monga 2000: 201). As Manuella 
would smile and point out to me, it is a gum that makes you feel fresh again.24 
Manuella preferred living in Douala because it offered her the greatest degree 
of bush-ness within the territory of Cameroon. People in the black bush already see 
the privileges and luxuries of life in the city as symbols of bush. In part, her efforts 
at setting up a new life in Douala were guided directly by her attempt and need to 
distance herself from village life. Yet, in some ways, her increase in status was also 
very real and not merely a question of perception management.
Beltha came from Babisi, the same village where Manuella was born. The 
wife of Manuella’s brother was taking care of both their baby and a child that Ed-
ward had with another woman before his marriage. In contrast to Edwards’ wife, 
Manuella was able to draw on savings she had sent back as an emergency fund to 
her brothers during her time in Switzerland. Sometimes Edward stayed out on a 
Saturday night without coming back. Whenever Edward forgot to leave money 
before going out at night, Manuella was able to give money to Beltha so that she 
could buy breakfast for the children. Manuella not only had greater status, but also 
a greater degree of independence, comfort and safety.
Illegality, status and family connections
Manuella changed her status and bettered her level in society. Nevertheless, she 
had not been able to live up to the dreams of bush. The humiliation of having 
been hindered and stopped so close to accomplishing her dreams remained with 
her, as well as others who have been deported from Europe. Although bush gen-
erates social status, the consequences of a deportation can be very difficult. Not 
everyone can keep the air of worldliness after a forced arrival back in Cameroon. 
Those at the very low end of society would not be able to camouflage the reasons 
for their return. 
On one of our hunting trips for good pieces of okrika clothing in Douala, we 
ran into a frustrated and angry market seller who had been ‘sent back’ after having 
spent a long time seeking refuge in the church of St. Bernard in Paris. ‘We leave 
to your place and all you ever ask is papers, papers, papers. You are asking too 
much. Does one ask you for your papers here?’25 The Francophone market seller 
was frustrated to see me walking about freely. ‘Our country is good, I will not go 
back.’ While this angry man kept shouting at us, Manuella was quiet. She did not 
want to reveal her own trajectory. She kept calm and later responded that I was not 
asked for my papers in Cameroon because I had my papers.
Most deported informants with whom I was doing research managed to main-
tain a certain degree of dignity due to the help of other bushfallers that regularly 
sent back money or goods for sale. A female deported informant of mine (Mamie 
Comfort) was able to survive through the sale of beauty products that her younger 
24  Freshness is precisely what is associated with bush. Informants would assure me time and again that staying in 
bush makes people ‘fresh’ and by extension their skin a little bit more ‘light’.
25  The conversation took place in French. The translation is mine.
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brother sent her from the U.S. And both my male neighbours, who had been de-
ported, also depended heavily after their deportation on the help of bushfallers in 
their family. It was only through family connections in bush that their rent was 
paid or that they could open small roadside businesses like, for example, a shaving 
stall. Deportation of some family members makes the help from other members in 
bush even more necessary.
Those deported without other family members in bush are hit hardest. After a 
few casual and short chats with one of the gardeners of my landlord, a man drum-
ming the front door of my studio awakened me at four in the morning. He was 
shouting half in Pidgin and half in German that his life was at risk and whether I 
could let him in.26 
It was the gardener. In our short chats, he had told me about his time in Ger-
many. His forced return to Cameroon was connected to a brother that had be-
witched him and a residence permit that had not been renewed. Now he was at my 
front door, hammering and shouting in German: ‘Police! Police!’27 In this late night 
enactment of the tragedy of a forced return, the trauma and desperation of these of 
these kinds of experiences was brought home to me. From what he was shouting 
that night, I gathered that he had gotten into debt after his return. Eventually, he 
left the compound, as the neighbours had asked him to. 
Deportation creates impossible life styles in Cameroon. This was evident in the 
degree of desperation in his voice that night. The secrecy that surrounds deportation 
generates extreme solitude. Family connections are crucial for deported migrants 
to manage tensions between deportation, bush and status. Manuella was fortunate 
that her brothers and sisters did not judge her to be lazy, but rather saw her return 
as a matter of bad luck and continued to respect and admire her worldliness.
26  Original: ‘I beg. Open the door. Es geht um mein Leben.’
27  Original: ‘Polizei! Polizei!’
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B a b i s i :  f a m i l y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a n d  m a r r i a g e 
‘I will be thirty and for me it is a big deal. Ok for you it is not a big deal because 
you have been reading books since small and you have where you are going to. But 
for me what do I again? What do I get? Maybe if I have my children that will be my 
own PhD?’
From bush to bush
After her return from Switzerland, Manuella stayed four full weeks in Douala be-
fore travelling to see her father and her mother in the village. Since she fled her 
marriage in the village, she had only once returned to Babisi before falling bush in 
Switzerland. When in Douala, Manuella decided to travel to Babisi on the occasion 
of an important family event. One of her elder brothers had died in an airplane 
crash a year earlier and her family organised a memorial service in the village. 
The long time span of eight years and the additional wait of four weeks after her 
return from Switzerland clearly illustrate how difficult and uncomfortable a terrain 
Manuella’s supposed ‘natural’ place of belonging had become for her (for this point 
see also Peutz 2006 and & Coutin 2010).
Manuella called me from the bus on her way to the memorial service. I was 
startled and didn’t immediately understand what she was saying on the phone. 
In addition to the poor connection, she was speaking in German. We had never 
spoken German to each other. Her German was very good and extremely fluent. 
She had called to greet me, but I am sure her co-passengers must have turned their 
heads to see somebody speaking an unknown ‘white man language’. Whatever the 
reasons for her return, she was somebody who made calls to bush people. 
Among the hustle and bustle of the memorial service, her own reappearance 
in the village could easily drown and pass less noticed. Whether she was returning 
from bush in Europe or from the wealth and comfort of a town like Douala was 
hardly known or visible to those of the village. From the perspective of Babisi, even 
Douala represented many elements of bush. 
When a few months later I travelled to Babisi myself, co-passengers in the taxi 
pointed out to me the bridge beyond which one was no longer connected to the 
world. ‘As you enter here, there no longer is any network. Your phone does not 
have any use again.’ Even though Manuella had not been able to fulfil her dreams 
in bush, it was clear that she was ‘on a different level’ than people in Babisi.
As a researcher I found it ironic that the ringtone of Manuella’s mobile phone 
sang njumboss@yahoo.fr (see preceding chapter for an analysis of the song).  In 
the video, the heroine of the song is seen in the village dressed in a long dress for 
women (called kabbah) and then climbing the social stairs of upward mobility. 
Manuella and the heroine were united not just by an Internet-mediated marriage 
with either a white man or a bushfaller, but also the origins in the rural bush. After 
the difficult life in the village, the heroine of the song leaves for a better life in the 
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city. The nightlife is but a temporary phase on the heroine’s way from the hard life 
of the village to marriage with a white man. In a similar fashion, Manuella not only 
compared her position after deportation to her existence in bush, but also to her 
origins in the black bush of the village. 
While Manuella sought to distinguish herself from the black bush to maintain 
her level in Douala, she was brought closer to the global bush through connections 
with and in the black bush. In what follows, I will trace how Manuella received a 
marriage proposal from a man from Babisi who lived in the U.S. Manuella’s migra-
tion trajectory demonstrates how intractably linked the different dimensions of 
bush and bushness are. 
 A bushfaller marriage and its repercussions
Two months after her deportation, as Manuella and I were again going through 
piles of second-hand clothes from Europe at the market in Doula, she received a 
phone call. On the phone for a long while, it was quickly clear that this was a call 
from bush. Only people in bush have the money to make long phone calls. In Cam-
eroon, calls are expensive and charged by the second.28 
After the call, Manuella explained that it was an ex-boyfriend from her previ-
ous time in Buea. Elias, the caller, was from Babisi, but has been in the U.S. for 
almost four years. He had gone to bush only half a year before Manuella had left 
for Switzerland. At the time, he had made a marriage proposal to Manuella, but 
she had refused. Over the last few days, they have been talking over the phone dis-
cussing marriage plans. This time Manuella was willing to accept Elias’s marriage 
proposal. ‘Are you happy about this now?’ Manuella asked over the phone. 
The night before, Manuella had picked up his father at the airport. The father 
of Elias worked for an International Organisation in Nigeria and he was on a visit 
to Cameroon. Only a few minutes after hanging up, Manuella received a phone 
call from him. He was on his way out of town and wanted to see Manuella before 
he left. We took the next taxi and rushed to have a drink with him before he left. 
The marriage proposal from a bushfaller from Babisi had come suddenly, but not 
inconveniently.
We still go dancing that night, but the next day Manuella got up after only 
a few hours of sleep. She was too excited. She prepared to rush to see her elder 
brother in Douala to tell him her great piece of news. She was going to get married! 
On the phone, her sister-in-law Beltha was very pleased with the news. On the 
same day, Manuella rushed to the hair salon. She was intending to go up to Babisi 
on Wednesday morning. The traditional wedding would take place the following 
weekend. In the absence of her husband who was still in the U.S., the bridewealth 
would be handed over by representatives of the family of Manuella’s husband.29 
28  If not in bush or a bushfaller, you have to content yourself with making short phone calls. Thus the game between 
Delphine, her friends and later me, too, became one of trying to make phone calls that were as short as two or three 
seconds.
29  As pointed out in the preceding chapter, it is a common for traditional weddings to be celebrated with one of the 
bushfallers absent.
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‘It’s something else that I need from a man now,’ explained Manuella to me 
about her decision to accept Elias’s marriage proposal. ‘I need to have a man that 
I call my own; not just date here and there.’ Manuella was happy and content with 
her marriage plan. She had known Elias for over eight years. As he also came from 
Babisi, she figured they would easily understand each other. Manuella explained 
how her father-in-law was married to a woman from another village. ‘The family 
is going out of track.’ Thus, Manuella’s father in law was eager to marry his son to 
Manuella, who was also from Babisi. 
With the traditional marriage, many dynamics were changing for Manuella. 
‘I belong to them. If I die, I will be buried in their compound.’ Manuella was now 
becoming the responsibility of her family-in-law. ‘My brothers can still help me, if 
they want,’ Manuella told me, ‘but it is not their responsibility.’ With this marriage, 
Manuella was onto new shores in more than one way. As she prepared to travel 
to the U.S., she no longer belonged to her family of origin. Similar to dynamics 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the bush of Babisi reconnected her to the bush 
of the U.S.
Manuella travelled up to the village for the second time after her deportation 
to get married. In the eyes of the inhabitants of Babisi, she was a clear success story. 
After coming back from bush for the first time, she was now travelling to Babisi to 
actually marry a bushfaller from the same village. A week later, Manuella showed 
me her marriage video. It is rare for traditional weddings to get documented by a 
video. Already this was a clear sign of status and success that can only be connected 
to bush. 
Manuella wore a wrapper material, an elegantly and fashionably cut dress. To 
prevent gossip and comments from the villagers, she covered her shoulders by 
wearing a leather jacket on top of her wedding dress. The dress code was shaped 
by the manners and fashions of both the black bush, as well as the worldly bush.30 
Pointing to her elder sister all dressed up in wrapper, Manuella explained how her 
sister was ‘used to life in the village.’ 
Three months after their traditional wedding, however, Manuella experienced 
her first disappointments. She was not sure when Elias would come to see her in 
person. He was not sending her money for her daily upkeep. Even when she had 
to go to Yaoundé to process her passport, Elias did not send her enough money. 
Manuella was only able to survive on her savings and on the additional help that 
she was still receiving from her boyfriend in Douala.
Nonetheless, Manuella received phone calls from some of Elias’s aunts for 
money. They were expecting Manuella to have money, by her own doings or 
through Elias. If she declined, Elias’s family members could suspect her of waste-
fully using and ‘eating’ Elias’s money. After her marriage, both her family of origin 
and of procreation looked up to her as a bushfaller and were expecting gifts and 
financial support. 
30  While the black bush is a term that is used in Cameroon, I introduce the term worldly bush here merely for ana-
lytical purposes so as to clearly distinguish between the two meanings of bush. Normally speaking, it is the context in 
Pidgin that determines what kind of bush is meant respectively. 
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A few days before a family meeting in Buea, Manuella came to visit me. She 
was down and sad. One cousin had asked her for a phone. Another would be 
returning to school.  People around her were beginning to beg her for things she 
would leave behind after going back to bush. As I accompanied Manuella from 
my studio back to her brother’s home, we came across a distant friend. ‘What 
did you bring for me?’ Manuella’s well-rehearsed answer was: ‘What I brought is 
already finished.’
Even though Manuella was not legally married to her husband, people were 
expecting her to go back to bush. The pressures on here were getting too high. Her 
savings were gone. She needed to leave the country. As a former bushfaller, life in 
Cameroon had become untenable for Manuella. Nevertheless, she was glad and 
fortunate that at least her marriage to Elias covered up the reason for her return to 
Cameroon and, more importantly her continued stay. 
Saying goodbye to your parents in the black bush
The papers for going to the U.S. were taking a long time to be processed. Manuella 
hence decided to join her father-in-law in Nigeria while waiting to be able to travel 
to the U.S. When Manuella travelled to Babisi to say goodbye to her mother and 
greet her father in hospital, Delphine and I decided to accompany her there. It is 
Manuella’s third visit to Babisi after her forced marriage eight years earlier and her 
second visit after her deportation half a year earlier.
As we reached Babisi, Manuella tried to avoid the market place so that she 
would not have to greet everybody. Even though the rain had stopped, Manuella 
was walking with her umbrella. It allowed her to hide her face. Not everybody 
knew, but most people would suspect that she was a bushfaller.31 Before we went to 
the compound where she grew up as a child, she bought some sweets, drinks and 
biscuits.32 The house in which she was raised was built of stones, but the house of 
her elder sister was made up of red earth. We dropped our belongings at the house 
of Manuella’s elder sister and prepared to leave by bush taxi for the village in which 
Manuella’s father was hospitalised.
 Manuella was wearing high-heeled shoes and a white scarf around her shoul-
ders. She carried a black handbag and a small office suitcase with her clothing. 
Delphine was dressed in jeans. The bag with food we brought to the hospital was 
so heavy that she had given up on elegance and style. The bag had ended up on 
Delphine’s head. The night before when taking the overnight bus in Douala, all 
three of us had struggled to carry our bags from one bus station to the other. Yet, 
in Douala, both Delphine and Manuella had refused to balance the weight on their 
heads. This manner of carrying baggage was reserved for the village. 
As we waited at the roadside for a bush taxi, I took some photos. Later Manuel-
la told me that that one of the motorcycle drivers I had photographed used to be 
31  This assumption was even strengthened on this specific visit where I was accompanying her as a white person to 
the village.
32  People are used to kola nuts, but it is not every day that they eat biscuits and drink sweet drinks.
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the husband of one of the daughters of her elder sister at whose house we had just 
been. Just like Manuella and her elder sister, Nathalie had been married in a tradi-
tional manner during her mid teens. She gave birth to two children, but when the 
beating increased she eventually fled the marriage.33 
After having seen Manuella’s father in hospital, we travelled back to Babisi to 
see Manuella’s mother. Out of her eight children, only two were still living in the 
village. Manuella’s siblings had offered to bring her to a house with electricity, run-
ning water and mobile phone network, but Manuella’s mother had turned these 
offers down. She wanted to be close to the farm. She preferred living in her own 
bush. Although her leg was hurting her, she worked the fields every day. 
The morning after, Manuella’s mother gave her blessings for Manuella’s jour-
ney to Nigeria. The first time that Manuella had left for bush, she had gone without 
informing her parents. This time she had her mother’s blessing. As we walked with 
our luggage in a wheelbarrow down to the main road, we passed a villager who 
stood and stared. Afterwards, Manuella complained how everybody was just greet-
ing and waiting as if she would always have money to hand out. While still waiting, 
a brand-new Mercedes passed. Delphine confirmed that this car could only be the 
car of a bushfaller or an official from the ministry in Yaoundé.
While we slowly travelled back on motorbike taxis to the nearest town where 
we could get a bush taxi, Manuella reflected on her life and her past in the village. 
‘It is a miracle to be where I am now!’ She looked back to the village and thought of 
the life trajectories. The villagers’ lives could have easily been hers. Like her elder 
sister, she could have been working the farm. Just like her niece Nathalie, she had 
been married at an early stage and without her consent. 
Manuella might often be sad and frustrated. Yet, when thinking back to the life 
in the village, she still thought of her life as better. ‘I’m just happy I’m married and 
that I belong somewhere.’ Financially, she was not well off, but at least marriage was 
giving her a certain status and level of respect. ‘I have a direction to go to.’
A b u j a :  s e x u a l i t y  a n d  s t a t u s
‘I’m leaving now. I’ve just told my family if they ask, you people should just say she 
went back from where she came from.’
Going back to where you came from
Manuella’s new direction was Abuja. Although the preparations for the legal wed-
ding in Nigeria were advancing slowly, their project to have children was, for both, 
33  At the time, Nathalie was in Yaoundé trying to earn a living as a seamstress. Manuella’s marriage needs to be seen 
in relation to what marriage represents on a daily basis in Manuella’s village of origin.
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proof that they were serious about their marriage. Manuella had a wooden statue 
of a mother breastfeeding her child hanging on the wall of her room in Douala. 
She had also gone to see a doctor to stop contraception. Manuella’s commitment 
and intention was clear, but Elias’s behaviour created doubt. For instance, when 
Manuella’s father fell seriously ill, Elias failed to react, call or send money. 
When leaving Cameroon, Manuella told her boyfriend in Douala that she ‘was 
going back to where she had come from.’ He did not know about her traditional 
marriage with the bushfaller from Babisi in the U.S. At this stage, it was also not her 
imminent departure for the U.S. that was the most important element for Manuel-
la. Given how long (eight months) Manuella had been staying in Cameroon after 
her deportation, it was high time for her to leave the country again. Referring to 
her U.S. visa, Manuella said: ‘I knew that it will take a while, but then I didn’t mind 
and I still even don’t mind. As long as I could stay out of this country I don’t mind, 
really I don’t mind.’ 
When saying goodbye to her sister-in-law in Buea, Beltha told Manuella: 
‘Thanks to God, you’re on a different level now.’ Manuella replied that this was only 
true in a small way, but Beltha insisted that God had lifted her up at last. Beltha 
seemed to be joyful and proud that Manuella was now married again to a bush-
faller. This time, she was not going to struggle the way that she had in Switzerland. 
In this way, Manuella left Cameroon on a positive note eight months after her 
forced return. 
Manuella lived in the house of her father-in-law in Abuja, Nigeria. There she 
was in charge of preparing breakfast and a small dinner for him every day. Her hus-
band again postponed his visit to Nigeria, yet had sent over money so that she could 
take evening classes. Manuella was thrilled to finally receive formal education.
Just before Christmas, she accompanied her father-in-law back on a visit to 
Cameroon. She called me, but I did not want to answer immediately because tel-
ecommunication in Cameroon is expensive. If Manuella was short of money, I pre-
ferred to call her back. I hesitated, but the phone kept ringing. When I finally did 
answer, she had guessed my thoughts: ‘You can pick up the phone. I’m a bushfaller.’ 
Merely staying with her family-in-law in Abuja gave her back the means to be and 
feel like a bushfaller.
Her family-in-law could hear us speak in German on the phone. Except for the 
fact that she was now ‘walking with her family-in-law’ and was no longer (as she 
put it) ‘in control of her programme’, her short visit in Buea resembled her earlier 
bushfaller visits directly after her return from Switzerland. She passed down cloth-
ing of hers to the children of her brothers, bought sweets for them, toys and soap 
for the newborn baby of the family. The fact that her return to the African conti-
nent had been caused by a deportation had almost become invisible at this stage. 
To a large extent, Manuella was capable of performing a bushfaller visit.
Four months after Manuella’s departure, Elias finally came to Nigeria and they 
got legally married in Abuja. However, while waiting for Manuella’s immigration 
visa to get processed in the U.S., communication between the couple deteriorated. 
When Manuella’s mother was also in hospital, he failed to call her. Two months 
after the civic wedding of Manuella and Elias, I received an urgent phone call. I 
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could immediately tell from Manuella’s voice that something was happening. It was 
a series of misfortunes.
First, her cousin came to stay in the house of her father-in-law in Abuja and 
had stolen money from the house to give to swindlers. She was now back in Cam-
eroon. But this was not the reason Manuella called. Elias had told her about a 
Cameroonian friend in the U.S. who had called the police when his wife tried to 
leave him. Manuella told me that she did not want the life that she used to have in 
Switzerland in which she was always hiding from and afraid of the police. She also 
did not want to be a prisoner of her husband either. 
Manuella was worried about her marriage and doubtful whether it was going 
to work out between her and Elias. A week later, Elias sent her a text message say-
ing that he wanted to divorce. Now Manuella could no longer stay at the house of 
her father-in-law in Abuja. She was obliged to travel back to Cameroon. Manuella’s 
divorce was a big shock to her family. This was the second time that she had left tra-
ditional marriage. With the disgrace of this divorce, life in Cameroon became even 
more impossible for Manuella. Strife and conflict broke out between Manuella and 
Elias’s family. Blame for the divorce was put on her.34 
While her family (of origin) asked her to stay in Cameroon, Manuella wanted 
to return to Nigeria. She called me up from Cameroon and again spoke German: 
‘It’s not that easy to live here. I do really want to return – no matter what my fam-
ily says.’35 The humiliation and shame that went with repeated marriage failures 
in addition to her increasingly difficult economic situation would have been too 
much for her. 
Manuella defied the advice of her elder brothers. Manuella was also driven out 
of the country by family expectations from more distant relatives. The family plays 
an interesting double role for bushfalling dynamics. Migration studies literature 
has documented how the need to take care of the family constitutes an important 
motivating factor in migration decisions (Stark & Bloom 1985; Massey et al 2005: 
21- 22; and for the case of Cameroon, see Fleischer 2007: 434- 437 and Pelican & 
Tatah 2009: 239- 241). However, in Cameroon I often witnessed how young Cam-
eroonians were trying to fall bush at all cost, like in Manuella’s case, as a means to 
escape family pressures and expectations. 
Delphine, too, would implicitly admit that family expectations drive people 
out of the country. She insisted that giving 1.5 million CFA to a broker was a better 
investment than buying herself access to the post of a civil servant. She argued that 
the physical intimacy to family members and their constant demands and pres-
sures made it much more difficult for anyone to really establish him or herself in 
Cameroon. When in bush, there is always the choice of sending money home or 
not. Bushfalling can thus be both a way to flee and to satisfy the family. 
34  Her former husband claimed back the money that he had spent on her, as well as the money that was lost when her 
cousin had fallen prey to feymen in Nigeria. Manuella was angry and refused. Her father-in-law ordered her to come to 
Cameroon to meet him there for customary court proceedings. She had to give up on her classes and risked missing the 
deadline for signing up for the end-of-year exams. Yet, upon her arrival in Cameroon, the court proceedings did not take 
place. In the end, her father-in-law dropped the demands.
35  Original: ‘Es ist nicht so einfach hier zu wohnen. [..] Ich möchte schon zurück – egal was meine Familie sagt.’
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Despite the divorce, Manuella was determined to continue her studies in Abu-
ja. While her family continued to think she was staying somewhere in Douala, 
Manuella secretly left for Abuja. Manuella and I continued to communicate over 
the phone and Skype. With time, Manuella won the sympathies and support of a 
politician in Nigeria. He started to cover her school fees and she moved into his 
house. In Abuja, Manuella was then able to pass her exams. At the end of the se-
mester, she proudly sent me her exam results by text message.
Through the help of her new boyfriend in Abuja, Manuella also found a bush-
falling line for her two brothers. Jonathan was supposed to go to Britain and Ed-
ward was supposed to go to Canada. ‘This is something very big for my family. 
They are all excited now. It would be such a good thing for my family.’ If it goes 
through, Manuella would be extremely proud that she did it. To offer these bush-
falling lines was a way for her to redeem her own divorce. In the end, the brothers 
travelled to Nigeria, but the project did not go any further. When I asked Manuella 
about this, she replied: ‘They are not serious. They don’t have any money.’
The big surprise came when in February, I received another phone call from 
Manuella. It was a 0044 number. Manuella was in London! ‘I didn’t tell you because 
I wasn’t sure.’ Manuella had asked me for a letter of invitation to the Netherlands, 
but she had never followed up on the initial request. In fact, the British Embassy 
had denied her the visa twice, but then the third time it worked. She told me that 
she merely travelled to London ‘to validate her visa.’ She had a six-month visa with 
multiple entries. ‘I will only be here for one week.’ She was planning on returning 
for another visit soon. By collecting entry and exit stamps through frequent travel, 
Manuella was hoping to build up credit for a future visa application for the U.S. 
‘Next time, they’ll know I’m a good client.’ 
Experience has taught Cameroonians to think of their passports in terms of a 
moral hierarchy of worthiness. With two validated U.K. visas, Manuella reasoned, 
she would have a better chance to obtain a Schengen visa and then be able to apply 
for a U.S. visa. For her, part of the cost of a U.S. visa was successfully obtaining a 
U.K. and a Schengen visa beforehand. For Manuella and other informants, there is 
a clear chronology and thus hierarchy of the worth of visas. While not a reflection 
of formal law, this hierarchy does fix the respective status and level of worldliness 
of a person. 
I observed similar understandings of the various levels of power that a pass-
port can attain through its visas with other informants, notably Delphine. When 
in Sweden for her MA, Delphine attended a conference in the U.K. only because she 
wanted to have a British visa in her passport. Many visas, and above all valuable 
visas like a British one would bring her closer towards global travelling after her 
graduation. As I hang up after my phone conversation with Manuella, I store her 
new number on my mobile phone under ‘Manuella London’.
Trafficking numbers: 0034, 00237, 00234  and 0044
The chapter opened with Manuella’s forced return to Cameroon. Instead of her 
Swiss 0041 number, she suddenly had a Cameroonian 00237 number. In the above 
199
sections of this chapter, I discussed the ways in which Manuella experienced, un-
derstood and reacted to her return. Particularly in view of the wider moral econ-
omy of bush and deportation, Manuella had to do her utmost best to return to 
‘where she had come from’. Through her passage to Nigeria, she acquired a 00234 
number and eventually a 0044 number. Through these telephone numbers, she 
could again be identified as a worldly person.
Nation states define the supposedly ‘natural’ place of belonging, and depor-
tation is based on these presuppositions. I propose that telephone numbers and 
telephones are an alternative means for Cameroonians to claim citizenship and 
construct belonging.36 In this analysis, I have taken inspiration from Chu, who 
demonstrates how the notion of belonging is not just about physical travel and 
place of origin, but also about a particular way of “inhabiting the world” (2006: 
396). As we shall see below, international numbers are highly valued goods with 
which people bargain and trade. For instance, phones that are presents from peo-
ple in bush have a higher value than other – also imported – phones. 
When still in Cameroon and only dreaming and fantasising about making it 
to bush, Delphine told me: ‘The first thing that I will buy for my mum when I’m in 
bush is a phone.’ It was not that Delphine could not have bought a mobile phone 
for her mother with the money that she was earning as a research assistant working 
for me. ‘Anyone can buy a phone these days, but hers will be from bush,’ explained 
Delphine. It is not the phone that matters here, but the place where it comes from 
and what that says about the person holding the phone. ‘She will be holding it 
and she will know that the phone has come from bush.’ Her mother does not have 
formal education. She cannot read and write. She does not speak English. ‘When 
she is in a meeting and she has a phone,’ Delphine explained, ‘then her level will 
be seen as higher, because her phone will be from bush.’ Telephones from bush are 
signals of a person’s status and level of belonging.
In addition to phones from bush, international phone numbers are important 
status symbols. Now that Delphine was in bush, she vigorously watched over who 
had her Swedish mobile phone number or not. Her younger siblings were strictly 
instructed to first ask her permission before passing on her telephone number. 
One the one hand, Delphine preferred only selected people to have her number 
as a simple means of protection. She did not want to be bombarded and bothered 
with more requests for money and support. On the other hand, this traffic in num-
bers is also related to social status and belonging. When after fieldwork, I called to 
greet informants in Cameroon, I was often asked for my telephone number in the 
Netherlands. Again, Delphine was firm in qualifying whether or not I had been 
close enough to an informant for him or her now to have my telephone number. In 
36  When arguing that Manuella’s bushfaller status after deportation might also represent a claim to global citizen-
ship, such a claim co-exists with other forms of belonging, such as for example the linkage that she is simultaneously 
upholding to her village of origin in the North West Province in Cameroon. For examples of how claims to autochthony 
are implicated and related in complex ways to globalisation, see (Geschiere 2009: 1- 35; Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000). 
For examples of how migrants connect themselves to their native villages, see (Ndjio 2009; Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 
1998).
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her mind, she was always reasoning in terms of how this or that person would then 
go on to show off about having my number in their phone directory. 
Having 0031 or 0044 numbers in your phone directory says something about 
the level of your connections and thus also your place in the world. A bush number 
in your phone directory is a source of pride because it manifests a connection to 
bush. In Fergusons’s terminology, the constant quest of Cameroonians in Cameroon 
to know and have the international telephone numbers of bushfallers constitutes 
a ‘claim for equal rights of membership in a spectacularly unequal global society’ 
(2006: 174). With a national passport that gains little recognition on a global stage 
(and in this sense constitutes a hindrance to being granted a visa), bush numbers 
are guarded, protected and trafficked. International phone numbers have become 
an alternative means to identify the status and level of a person’s connections. 
When still on fieldwork in Cameroon, I had been puzzled by how often bush-
fallers were changing their telephone numbers. No visiting bushfaller was ever in 
a position to pass on his telephone number to me. The standard explanation was 
always that upon their return to bush, they were planning on changing phone pro-
vider and would thus have a new number. Citizenship is always based on inclusion 
and exclusion. For claims of belonging to upkeep their value, access needs to be 
selective. Most bushfallers were thus actively engaged in protecting their interna-
tional phone numbers. Only the closest family members could be trusted with the 
international contact details of a bushfaller.
The importance of telephone numbers as claims to worldliness needs to be 
seen in relation to the current state of imposed immobility for many on the con-
tinent that is lack of visas and deportation. Many Cameroonians who try to leave 
the country fail to do so. Those deported will try to leave again for bush, yet most 
people will not manage to do so. The same is true for Mamie Comfort, whose case 
I will discuss as a contrasting case in the following section. Ten years after her 
deportation from bush, Mamie Comfort would constantly give me the telephone 
number of her deportation lawyer in the Netherlands and then ask whether I had 
contacted this lawyer. Years after her deportation, she continued to hold onto his 
business card. His 0031 number was with her.
Deportability and sex
Mamie Comfort was deported after six months of hustling in the Netherlands. I 
met her through a common friend who looked up to Mamie Comfort – a woman 
in her late thirties – for useful advice on bushfalling. When telling her story about 
her time in the Netherlands, Mamie Comfort always stressed how close she had 
been to marrying one of the men she had been dating in bush. To Mamie Comfort, 
deportation was a question of bad luck and courtship was a way of actively working 
towards one’s luck. Her stories of courtship in bush served as proof that she had not 
been idle. She had not been lazy, but merely unlucky that she was sent back before 
she had been able to marry.
While it is impossible for me to draw overall conclusions on how experiences 
of being deported differ by gender, Mamie Comfort did point out to me certain 
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aspects of her deportation trajectory that she experienced as specifically linked to 
her status as a woman. First of all, as a female bushfaller, she told me, one is ex-
pected to return not just with money, but also with a husband and potentially with 
children. She had given birth to one child in her late teens. Yet she had returned 
from bush without money, without goods and without a husband. Her status in 
society upon her return was very low. She imitates people’s reactions to her after 
her forced return: ‘Who are you? Are you a woman? You can’t give birth again? […] 
Because coming back without having brought something back, you are in trouble 
– especially when you are a single woman.’ 
Mamie Comfort’s statement reminds us of the importance of family dynamics 
and social expectations for the way in which forced returns are experienced and 
perceived in Cameroon. The family largely decides which aspects of deportation 
become visible and which ones remain invisible. Evaluations of returns depend on 
marriage, childbirth and the capacity of returned bushfallers to maintain connec-
tions to bush despite their return. 
Even though Mamie Comfort was deported after only six months, she suffered 
greatly from bad rumours upon her return to Cameroon.37 Unlike Manuella, she 
did not have the necessary skills and support from her family to be able to capital-
ise on her stay in bush in the ways that Manuella did. Mamie Comfort could not 
keep her forced return a secret. Until recently, she did not have a family member 
in bush – only an older sister who was trading with bush. Mamie Comfort did not 
therefore have the same security net that my deported neighbours had. For years, 
she suffered from bad gossip and social prejudice. 
Mamie Comfort told me that she found subsequent marriage attempts in Cam-
eroon hindered through the social stigma of deportation. She suggested to me that 
her status as a deported migrant woman put her moral credentials in doubt and 
made her subject to accusations of feymenia: 
Whenever they see somebody who wanted to go out with me, they will tell him don’t 
go out with her. She went to Europe and she was repatriated. And so she will just take 
money from you and go to Europe. It was Europe, Europe, Europe! If I’m with any 
man, they will tell him she will take your money and go back. She will collect money 
from you and go back.
Unlike Manuella, Mamie Comfort was never again able to convince state au-
thorities that she was in Manuella’s words ‘a good client’. Her visa request with the 
U.S. Embassy to look after her brother’s child in the U.S. was turned down. And 
her visits to dating sites and requests to help her look for a white husband had not 
borne fruits either. Both for Manuella and Mamie Comfort, access to their pre-
ferred place of residence was crucially linked to courtship and marriage. Just like 
the heroine in the Njumboss song, escape from the hard life in the village neces-
37  The longer a bushfaller has been to bush, the higher the expectations and demands on the part of his family are 
likely to be upon his or her return.
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sarily passes through men. In many ways, sexuality for women is crucial for access 
to legality in bush.38
The vulnerabilities of so-called ‘trafficked women’ are mostly conceived of in 
terms of their sexuality.39 What we can see in the case of Manuella and Mamie 
Comfort is how the state of deportability has created a new set of vulnerabilities for 
both of them. Already dependent on boyfriends for survival before falling bush, 
Manuella’s scope for legalising her stay after bushfalling depended on a boyfriend 
being willing to marry her. After deportation back to Cameroon, her dependence 
on men for survival continued. Yet, now the moral economy of deportation – char-
acterised as discussed above by secrecy, camouflage and shame – made her life in 
Cameroon untenable. She depended on her new boyfriend in Abuja to both sus-
tain and help her for her future travels. 
B a d  l u c k ,  b a d  b e h a v i o u r  a n d  l a z i n e s s
Cameroonians view deportation as a result of bad luck, bad behaviour or laziness. 
When the police apprehended an undocumented informant in the Netherlands, 
I was surprised to see no changes in the attitudes towards bushfalling with her 
family members in Cameroon. Even though their sister was in the hands of the 
police, my informant’s younger siblings continued with their original plans of giv-
ing their sister’s money to a migration broker so they could also fall bush. The 
brother of my informant regarded his sister’s failure to obtain her papers in bush 
as a result of being just a woman. Women are not smart or strong enough to fight 
for their papers.40 He was convinced that had it been him who had been in bush 
for so long, he would have already established the connections that it takes to get 
papers. Implicit in his view of his sister’s failing was that she was too lazy or weak. 
The younger sister of my informant also remained untouched by her sister’s fate. 
She thought her sister was merely unlucky. The mother of the informant was not 
38  I have already discussed in the marriage chapter (ch. 5) how marriage constitutes an access route to bush for 
women, but not for men. This also has consequences for the ways in which the effects of deportation can be remedied 
for both men and women.
39  Sources of vulnerability that are related to legal frameworks in receiving states are rarely seen and given their im-
portance (Alpes 2010; Kapur 2005; Anker & van Liempt 2011).
40  Paper controls in bush are understood against the backdrop of what papers means, how one gets them and how 
they are regulated in Cameroon. Controls of identity cards, for example, are extremely common in Cameroon. Several 
road blocks interrupt any journey to a neighbouring town. Ever varying authorities control identity cards and other forms 
of documentation for the taxi drivers. The ensuing conversations in the communally shared bush taxis are very open and 
often very explicit in their discussion of financial details. It is commonly understood that policemen take it in turns and 
at times even pay higher officials for the right to conduct these road controls. All passengers know that taxi fares cover 
whatever financial transaction necessary between taxi driver and policemen. It is also common public knowledge that 
police controls of identity cards intensify just before Christmas and before the start of the new school year. It is during 
these times that official authorities have the greatest need for additional sources of revenue. For a more detailed discus-
sion of different types of roadside controls, see Arifari (2006).
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so much concerned about potential deportation than about her daughter still not 
being married. Such a continued state of celibacy caused a moral problem of social 
standing and behaviour.
In the end, the police released my informant. Instead of assuming that illegal-
ity caused deportation, the family members focused on the success of their sister 
– proven by the money she had sent for her younger siblings’ own bushfalling 
project.41 My surprise at the reactions of my informant’s family members was based 
on my own assumptions – namely that there is an almost automatic logic to the 
application of legal frameworks. My fear about the potential deportation of my 
informant was informed by a legal consciousness that presupposed that illegality 
is the cause of deportation. 
Deportation is constructed in Europe and the U.S. as the logical and thus legit-
imate response to the phenomenon of unauthorised migration.42 Yet there is a gap 
between large financial investments in immigration detention and the actual rate 
of physical expulsions of migrants from the territory. At one level, one can explain 
this gap through legal complications that hinder the implementation of expulsions. 
Yet, at another level, deportation policy is arguably less driven by the actual inten-
tion to remove undocumented migrants from national territory, but rather by the 
need of politicians and government officials to manage popular anxieties and to 
assert state control at a symbolic level (Leerkes & Broeders 2010). 
I want to go further and suggest that low rates of deportation stimulate us to 
spell out and provincialise the legal consciousness that feeds deportation policy in 
Europe. Academia studies what people say and do about law under the umbrella 
of legal consciousness (Silbey 2005; McCann 2008). Scholars of legal conscious-
ness study understandings and meanings of law as they circulate in social rela-
tions. Perceptions or images of deportation as a policy instrument do not express 
aptitude, knowledge or competence. Instead perceptions, images and beliefs all 
form an integral part of the collective construction of legality. Legality is a wide 
range of constructed meanings only loosely tethered to legal texts and their of-
ficial interpretations and applications in institutional contexts. The assumptions, 
norms and belief systems on which these social meanings of the law are based are 
the backbone of the legal consciousness of people within a specific temporal and 
geographical context. 
Contemporary beliefs in Europe presuppose that illegality causes deportation. 
Illegality is an important precondition for deportation. Without illegality, there 
cannot be (legally-sanctioned) deportation. However, as low deportation rates 
demonstrate, illegality does not immediately cause deportation. For an undocu-
mented person to be deported, he or she needs to be apprehended by the police 
41  According to Boussichas, undocumented migrants might remit less money, but bring back more savings than docu-
mented migrants. For a quantitative analysis of how documented and undocumented migrants remit differently in the 
U.S. Mexican context, see Boussichas (2009).
42  In contrast to this understanding of deportation as a mere logical response, Walters brings to the surface in his 
argumentations that deportation is in fact a ‘legalised form of expulsion’ and that deportation law is founded on a series 
of legalised discriminations (Walters 2009: 69- 101).
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which in its turn is more or less likely dependant on the gender, skin colour and/or 
work place of the respective migrant. 
A metaphor can illustrate better how and why illegality is a mere precondition, 
but not a cause of deportation. A legal consciousness that attributes causal powers 
to the element of illegality, for example, is similar to an argument that insists that 
road accidents are caused by driving. Although most road accidents presuppose 
driving, the actual causes of accidents are irresponsible behaviour, inattention, al-
cohol and/or a lack of skills.
De Genova has argued that the deportation regime is effective not because a 
few migrants are expulsed from the territory of the state, but because the regime 
as such engenders the constant state of deportability (2002). All undocumented 
migrants at all times are potentially subject to deportation and thus more vulnera-
ble.43 This vulnerability, according to De Genova, renders deportable migrants at-
tractive employees. While the focus of my own work rests with the ways in which 
migrants themselves and their families understand and relate to deportation, the 
distinction between deportation and deportability does help to illuminate com-
mon conceptions of the causes of deportation in Cameroon.
Deportability, for example, lets the Cameroonian interpretation of deporta-
tion as caused by luck appear in a different light. Although all migrants without 
appropriate documentation are subject to deportation, only some actually do get 
deported. These are the unlucky ones. If one focuses on individual probability, it 
makes sense to interpret the likelihood of deportation in terms of chance. Despite 
the rhetoric of border control, deportation is de facto not the supposed systematic 
result or automatic consequence of illegality. 
Within the moral economy of deportation, bad luck can both be entirely con-
tingent or the fault of a person because he or she behaved badly or was lazy. The 
concept of deportability (and its inherent argument that migrant labour is de-
sired in its vulnerable and deportable form) helps to understand these interpre-
tive frameworks of bad luck and laziness. Bushfallers who behave badly or do 
not work hard enough get sent back because they are lazy. Their workforce is no 
longer desired. 
When discussing deportation with my research assistant, Delphine used to tell 
me that her parents and people in her quarter believed that one gets sent back 
from Europe for acts, like for example ‘peeing’ on the street or ‘aggressing’ women. 
Deportation in this view is experienced as a type of sanctioning of a moral kind 
of citizenship. Only those who behave well were allowed to stay. In these cases, 
deportation is said to be the personal fault of the deported person. 
The causes of deportation that Delphine’s parents speak of are remarkably 
gendered. It is men who are said to be deported for having peed on the streets 
and for being aggressive with women. While, legally speaking, neither offence 
constitutes a legal ground for deportation, the gendered nature of these causes of 
43  The presence of migrants in receiving states is desired in this ‘deportable’ state because it is this deportability that 
renders their work more attractive to the societies in the places they live and work (De Genova 2002). 
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deportation can be said to reflect dynamics of deportation policy.44 Controls for 
deportation are often conducted in publicly open work spaces. Migrant women 
that work as cleaners or care givers within the realm of private homes or do un-
paid domestic work – as girlfriends or aspiring wives – are less exposed to the 
dangers of actual deportation.45 
The deported migrant women with whom I talked in Cameroon explained 
repeatedly and vehemently the cause of their deportation as their failure to marry. 
Whether within an interview situation or in a more informal encounter, their nar-
rative of deportation always started with an account of how they had sought out 
marriage and how they had been very close to having gotten married. De facto, 
marriage to a national or to somebody with a residence permit will in most cases 
confer rights to the spouse in question. As such, deportation is experienced as hav-
ing been caused by the failure to marry and not by the absent residence permit. 
C o n c l u s i o n
Media and policy debates often argue that people in West Africa would not mi-
grate if they knew more about life in Europe. Through the detailed case study of 
Manuella and the other contrasting cases in this chapter, I have sought to demon-
strate what otherwise is invisible from the standpoint of the receiving nation state 
in Europe. Details about Manuella’s forced marriage in Babisi, her alleviation to 
more high-scale dating due to her connections to bush upon her return to Douala, 
as well as the impossibility of her life in the place of her state-defined ‘natural’ 
place of belonging are all aspects that remain largely invisible to the spectator in 
Europe. On the basis of this research, return programmes for so called ‘traffick-
ing victims’, but also general deportation programmes, might want to consider the 
sexual economy into which returned migrant women are placed upon arrival in 
their country of nationality.
Deportation creates vulnerabilities for migrants – which in the case of deported 
migrant women have direct consequences for the ways in which they can and have 
to engage in courtship practices, marriage intentions and childbirth plans. While 
Manuella had already escaped a forced marriage in her teenage years and survived 
with the help of men before her travel project to Switzerland, her forced return to 
Cameroon aggravated her situation. After deportation, life in Cameroon became 
impossible for Manuella. Her escape route was a marriage with a bushfaller in Ni-
geria. Yet, even when her bushfaller marriage fell through, Manuella opted to stay 
44  In this sense then, deportation policy is efficient because it reminds migrants that their deportable status obliges 
them to work hard, behave well and in the case of women, to stay within the ‘private’ realm and seek the protection of 
a husband.
45  An officer at the information and transparency office at Frontex informed me that they unfortunately do not gener-
ate gender-specific deportation statistics.
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with a new boyfriend in Nigeria rather than return and face up to family pressures, 
bushfalling expectations and the lingering suspicion and shame of deportation.
The case studies of Manuella and Mamie Comfort have placed the act of de-
portation into a longer time period, as well as into its social context in Cameroon. 
Manuella was not merely an undocumented migrant woman who failed with her 
asylum request and was subsequently deported back to her ‘natural’ place of be-
longing. As we saw in Manuella’s case, a forced return is by far not the end of 
migratory ambitions. From the geographical standpoint of Cameroon, Manuella’s 
deportation was only one moment in time. As such, the act of deportation should 
not be overestimated as a potential solution to dynamics of so-called illegal mi-
gration. The overall meaning and significance of both her migration to Switzer-
land and her later deportation need to be seen in relation to her life before and 
after deportation. 
Despite the shame of deportation, Manuella remained in many ways a worldly 
person able to overcome (even if only for a short while) the exclusions imposed 
through the current migration regime. In the context of her deportation (which 
in Ferguson’s or Nyers’ terms could also be described as a state of abjection),46 
Manuella’s ajebotar ways of clothing and eating served to maintain and prove her 
worldliness.47 This continued bushfaller status was possible through active moves 
on her part to camouflage the reason of her return, as well as her courtship and 
marriage strategies. The length of the stay abroad, family connections (also to 
bush), as well as courtship and marriage all determine whether or not deported 
bushfallers can safeguard the secret of the nature and reason of their return. 
The chapter has also elaborated on other frameworks for evaluating the respec-
tive success or failure of a migrant woman than the one of legality. Although deeply 
shameful, a forced return does not constitute the ultimate failure. Because Manuel-
la married a bushfaller after her deportation and was able to leave the country, her 
overall migration trajectory was still perceived by most of her acquaintances as 
a success. Marriage and childbirth constitute two important moral yardsticks in 
Cameroon according to which family members and society will evaluate the rela-
tive status of a migrant and a female migrant in particular. Sex and marriage do 
not only determine social status, but also serve to fix a person’s place of belonging. 
Once Manuella had married her American bushfaller, she belonged to his family 
and thus she moved to Nigeria. Regardless of whether or not Manuella was already 
legally married, her family expected her to then rejoin her husband in the U.S. 
In reference to regimes of belonging, I return to the anecdote with which I 
began this chapter – on the bushfaller who got shot by the police. The life of a 
bushfaller is worth more than the life of an ordinary Cameroonian because a bush-
faller has been able to realise worldliness. The life of a ‘big man’ in Cameroon is 
also worth more than the value of an ‘ordinary’ man. Both have gained access to 
46  ‘Abjection refers to a process of being thrown aside, expelled, or discarded. But its literal meaning also implies not 
just being thrown out but being thrown down – thus expulsion but also debasement and humiliation’ (Ferguson 1999: 
236). For a discussion of abject cosmopolitanism, see (Nyers 2003: 1072- 1075).
47  Ferguson talks about a claim to global belonging and a refusal to accept the current state of abjection (Ferguson 
2006: 174- 5).
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another level of belonging. Going to bush ‘a tout prix’ is thus not just the pursuit of 
illusions and dreams. It also is the quest for status and global inclusion. Even if only 
in its deportable form, bushfalling as a form of labour migration offers the promise 
of increasing the worth of one’s life. 
The above explanations go a long way in explaining why both the possibility of 
deportation and deportation itself do nothing to destroy or limit the attractiveness 
of bush. We have seen that narratives of return are carefully managed both to avoid 
shame, but also to be able to keep drawing on the asset of having and being con-
nected to bush. The costs it takes to get to and remain in bush render the enterprise 
so very profitable in terms of the status and benefits it procures. I wish to go further 
and suggest that deportation reinforces the worth and value of falling bush at all 
cost. If bushfalling includes the possibility of deportation, migration can poten-
tially become more beneficial if several family members hustle together in bush. 
In this sense, deportation does not discourage migratory decisions, but makes the 
migration of other family members of undocumented migrants in Europe all the 
more necessary.
Policy makers assume that higher deportation rates would discourage undoc-
umented migration because they assume that illegality is a relatively immediate 
cause of deportation. In Cameroon, however, bad luck, bad behaviour and laziness 
are said to cause deportation. While bad behaviour and laziness imply the fault 
and responsibility of the deported migrant, bad luck does not. All three causes are 
linked to the traits of individual people. Whether the fault of an individual or not, 
deportation is always potentially shameful, but never structural. Deportation does 
not call into question the belief of the profitability of bushfalling because its causes 
are rooted in the individual.
The rhetoric of migration policy locates the fight against so-called ‘illegal mi-
gration’ at the core of the rationale of deportations. This chapter concludes that 
deportations do not so much flow out of the condition of illegality, but construct 
the notion of illegality. The question of why aspiring migrants continue to fall bush 
in the face of the danger of deportation stems from and even feeds into a belief that 
attributes a quasi-automatic power to migration law. Through a critical analysis of 
the narratives of bad luck, laziness and bad behaviour, I have located illegality as a 
precondition, but not direct cause of forced return. The moral economy of depor-
tation in Cameroon has allowed me to unravel the legal consciousness that feeds 
into and comes out of migration policy. 
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Chapter 6  
Bush at all cost: Migration trajectories 
at their point of departure
‘I really wish my parents had been caught during the slave trade. They would have 
directly given birth to me as a bushfaller and I wouldn’t have had to suffer the way 
that I am now suffering.’
The quote comes from a roughly 19 year old boy who spoke to my research assist-
ant Delphine at a roadside store in a small seaside town close to Buea. While the 
boy was not basing his statement on an actual evaluation of working and living 
conditions of West African slaves in the past, his statement is indicative of the 
terms in which he is experiencing his existence in Cameroon today. For him, to be 
obliged to live in Cameroon is to suffer. The young man certainly also expressed a 
preference for slavery because he idealised life in the West. Yet, his statement can-
not be limited exclusively to this. His statement also refers to the fact that many 
descendants of slaves are now American citizens. As such, they are in a better posi-
tion to take care of themselves and their families. And just like bushfallers, they are 
free to travel through the world.
12. Bar in Bamenda: ‘Ambassador’
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This book is written in reaction to, on the one hand, trafficking and smuggling 
discourses in Europe, and, on the other hand to the strong belief in the possibilities 
and potentials of bushfalling I encountered in Cameroon. My dissatisfaction with 
trafficking and smuggling discourses inspired me to empirically research percep-
tions of potentially exploitative labour migration among people directly involved 
in an area of departure. My research has demonstrated that women’s migration 
trajectories are not just characterised by vulnerabilities, but that in certain respects 
their strategies  - for instance in relation to courtship and marriage practices - are 
also enabling. Furthermore, this thesis has demonstrated that it would be mistaken 
to assume that migration is the act that creates vulnerabilities in the first place.
I wanted to avoid being prejudiced by notions of exploitation and abuse that 
are commonplace in countries of arrival. Therefore, I first focused on horizons of 
expectation of aspiring migrants. Placing these in a wider context, I illuminated 
how state institutions, migration brokers and family members interact to shape the 
context in which migration trajectories take shape. I argued that the dependence 
of aspiring migrants on multiple regulatory authorities produces contradictory ex-
pectations and pressures. This multiple dependence can help to understand what 
makes young Cameroonians migrate at all cost. Market, family and state authori-
ties compete with each other over the regulation of movement.1 This competition 
has currently distributed migration costs unfavourably towards migrants rather 
than states or families. 
In this conclusion, I begin by recapitulating the theoretical and methodologi-
cal stakes at play in the preceding chapters. In the second section, I illustrate how 
a study of socio-economic exchanges, sexuality, marriage practices, and migration 
brokers in Cameroon can shed new light onto the discourse and politics of human 
trafficking. In the third section, I explain through locally available terminology 
why certain warnings against going to bush at all cost do not fall on fertile grounds 
within the moral economy of departure in Cameroon. I do so by analysing local 
perceptions of success and failure; flows and interpretations of information; as well 
as conceptions of access paths to bush and the respective place of the law. I will 
conclude by opening up my work on migration and vulnerability towards ques-
tions on the governance of migration and the distribution of social risks.
Po l i t i c a l  a n t h r o p o l o g y  o f  m i g r a t i o n
The paradigm of trafficking has given birth to unfounded representations of why 
and how young women in West Africa seek out migration. To explain local per-
ceptions of potentially exploitative labour migration as well as bushfalling at all 
1  This becomes visible in conflicting views on legitimate forms of paper production, multiple meanings of monetary 
transfers and normative assumptions around marital unions.
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cost, I ethnographically studied the factors and actors that lower or heighten the 
capabilities of aspiring migrants to realize their ambitions of mobility. This is an 
important move because the recent literature on transnational migration often fails 
to deal with legal constraints (Conway 2000; Carling 2002: 10). Through a political 
anthropology of migration, I have thus integrated the effects of migration control 
into my explanations of how migration flows are shaped, both by the authorities on 
the spot and the potential migrants. 
High aspirations and low capabilities
The particular focus of my research was on the attempts of people in countries of 
departure to become migrants (Carling 2008: 1455). This transition is extremely 
volatile. In the preceding chapters, we have witnessed the attitudes of Delphine, 
Pamella, Victorine, Nuretta, Josephine and Manuella towards migration brokers, 
family members and state officials. As one of my key informants, Delphine was 
the only one able to achieve her ambition and dream of falling bush. At the end of 
fieldwork, Pamella and Victorine stayed behind and Manuella had been deported 
back to Cameroon. Thus in this study, I have analysed migration choices and eval-
uations from the vantage point of enforced transcontinental immobility.2
On the basis of fieldwork in Anglophone Cameroon, this study brought for-
ward an ethnographic description of the world in which young un-married women 
from Anglophone Cameroon aspire to leave the country. I focused on how young 
Cameroonians translated migration aspirations and decisions into actual emigra-
tion trajectories (Carling 2002:10). I used the notion of multiple regulatory author-
ities (Roitman 2005) in order to overcome the limiting idea - more or less implicit 
in many studies of migration - of the state as the main or even the only author-
ity involved. Instead, I analysed how state, family and market created a complex 
configurations that constrain migrants in their initiatives. To trace constraints by 
different authorities, I followed how aspiring migrants deal with paper, marriage 
and money. 
My focus on the different meanings and implications of paper, marriage and 
money within trajectories of departure allowed me to study why people aspire to 
migrate, but also how in the context of low migration capabilities, they seek to 
establish a degree of control over the outcome of their emigration attempts. Based 
on Sen’s theoretical work on development (1999), de Haas defined migration capa-
bilities as ‘the social, human and material capital individuals are able to mobilise 
in order to migrate’ (2010a: 16). As a study of migration capabilities, my research 
addressed both the actions that aspiring migrants took to establish control over 
the outcome of their migration trajectories (Wong 2005: 87), as well as the ‘struc-
tural frame of opportunities and barriers’ in the context of which aspiring migrants 
sought to leave the country (Carling 2002: 26). 
2  Based on Cape Verdian experiences, Carling, in particular, has stressed the theoretical importance of studying mi-
gration also from the vantage point of involuntary immobility (2002: 6).
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In this study, I suggest that migration currently manifests itself in Cameroon 
in the form of bushfalling because high aspirations for migration combine with 
relatively low capabilities. To understand the making of high aspirations and low 
capabilities, it is crucial to study the regulation of emigration ethnographically.
Ethnography of the regulation of emigration
Given the difficulties of departure, I wanted to research how the governance of 
migration is conceived of and experienced by aspiring migrants. To achieve this, I 
have combined the methodological tools of anthropology with a political interest 
in the regulation of migration. I have come to frame this research as an ethnogra-
phy of the regulation of emigration. 
First of all, both my interest in local perceptions of trafficking and smuggling, 
as well as my curiosity about what makes young Cameroonians migrate at all cost 
required an ethnographic approach. I chose to work ethnographically because I 
wanted to know how aspiring migrants and their family members experience the 
regulation and governance of migration. Rather than studying migration through 
the categories and lenses of the state, I opted to study the state’s regulation of migra-
tion ethnographically and especially from the point of view of migrants. Through 
this ethnographic approach, I attempted to see the state without ‘seeing like the 
state’ (Scott 1998). 
Secondly, I focused on emigration because I wanted to shed light onto migra-
tion trajectories from a novel geographical and temporal standpoint. My focus on 
conditions of departure has allowed me to counter-weigh the heavy bias on im-
migration in migration studies (De Genova 2002; Bourdieu & Wacquant 2000). 
Instead of looking at migration as immigration, I studied the coming into being of 
emigration trajectories.
Thirdly, I focused on regulatory dynamics because I wanted to shed light onto 
the processes that decrease migrants’ potentials to have control over the outcomes 
of migration trajectories. As stated above, I focused particularly on the regulation 
of migration through a plurality of regulatory authorities (Roitman 2005). Inter-
ested in the sphere of state, market and family, I ethnographically looked at the 
ways in which migration is regulated by migration brokers, state officials and fam-
ily members. I have coined this ensemble as regulation and these actors as regula-
tory authorities.
Emigration trajectories take shape both because migrants make choices and 
because other actors (such as migration brokers, consulate officers, other state of-
ficials and family members) make demands on migrants and connote migration 
trajectories as respectively legal, legitimate, profitable and/or their opposites. By 
studying the hurdles and openings in young people’s quests for mobility, this study 
has sought to theorise the structural context in which trajectories of mobility are 
attempted and pursued.
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The construction of the state’s monopoly of the legitimate means of 
movement
Interactions and frictions between different actors help to explain how the costs 
of migration are produced. In this study, I examined competing moves, but also 
overlaps between different regulatory authorities. My conclusions demonstrate 
how the state’s monopoly over the legitimate means of mobility is continuously in 
the making. 
State actors use different strategies in trying to monopolise and thus legitimise 
state authority. To do so, state authorities need to distinguish themselves from oth-
er authorities. They accusingly ascribe monetary motives to migration brokers and 
family members. Yet, money plays an important role within embassies, too, and 
migration brokers do issue travel papers that enable people to travel. The analysis 
of this study has hence suggested that boundaries between market, state and fam-
ily need to be studied as constructions that serve a function, rather than as self-
evidently distinguishable spheres.
State authorities also seek to monopolize their power position through spa-
tialising techniques.3 The spatialisation of the state’s position as all-encompassing 
in terms of spatial scope and ‘above’ in terms of vertical height feeds into the con-
struction of state power as superior in terms of interests, knowledge and moral 
purpose (Ferguson 2006: 92). In the chapters on consulate offices and marriage 
migration, I demonstrated how state authorities actively engage in the legitimation 
and delegitimation of mediating practices. In drawing boundaries between its own 
practices and those of other actors, state authorities construct vertical and moral 
superiority. By default, family members are imagined as below the state and as nar-
rowly representing only limited interests. 
Imaginaries of how authority formations are spatialised contribute heavily to 
the legitimation or delegitimation of actors and their instruments of regulation. 
We have seen, for example, in the chapters on visa applications and marriage mi-
gration, how accusations of commerce and crime against migration brokers and of 
fraud and selfishness vis-à-vis migrants and their family members serve to repre-
sent the state as being morally superior. The moral and spatial superiority of state 
authority relies on the ideal-typical construction of state power as vertically above 
and spatically all-encompassing (Ferguson 2006: 92), but is also grounded in com-
bats against against fraud, selfishness, illegality and criminality.
Accusations of fraud and selfishness feed into the construction of the state’s 
monopoly over the legitimate means of movement by delegitimizing and con-
structing other regulatory authorities as morally inferior and less universal in their 
represented interests. When one tries to study the construction of the apparent 
monopoly for legitimate mobility control, one can recognise how state authority is 
implicated in the production of fraud and selfishness that it ascribes to others. It is 
not just the border spectacle of migration control (De Genova 2002), but also the 
necessity for the spectacle that is created by state actors. 
3  This spatialisation of state power is produced  through routine bureaucratic practices (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
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Migration restrictions, for example, make marriage a more prized means of 
migration. This makes it even less likely that marriage will be based on ‘pure love’. 
In this way, all international marriages come under suspicion. This suspicion then 
justifies controls, interviews, tests and extra procedures. At the same time that state 
policies transform marriage into a desirable migration tool, the discourse around 
border control stresses the sacredness of the matrimonial union and ‘pure love’ as 
its only legitimate foundation.
Studying the construction of the vertical height of authority formations fur-
thermore allows us to become aware of how some of the key terms through which 
we are used to look at migration are framed by state authorities in ways that legiti-
mise its own authority. The term fee, for example, legitimises monetary transfers to 
consulate officers – even when the visa is not granted. By contrast, the term price 
delegitimizes monetary transfers to migration brokers – even if the travel project 
is successful. As scholars of migration, we can only begin to grasp the nature of the 
political and moral economy of migration if we agree to give up constructing our 
analysis from the assumed monopoly position of the state. 
In the coming two sections, I will discuss belief systems that come out of and 
feed into terms such as legality, smuggling and trafficking. More studies that inte-
grate a critical degree of awareness of the normative assumptions inherent in the 
regulatory instruments of the state are necessary to be able to understand – rather 
than to manage and control – migration trajectories. 
Fr o m  h u m a n  t r a f f i c k i n g  t o  t h e  s e x u a l  e c o n o m y  o f  m o b i l i t y
Before travelling to Cameroon, a staff member at a Dutch NGO gave me a flyer that 
had been prepared for a prevention campaign against trafficking in Anglophone 
Cameroon. The flyer read:
‘Europe a paradise? Don’t believe all the stories!’ •	
‘Did someone promise you a better life by going to Europe? Warning to Wom-•	
en!’
‘Never give your passport to anyone.’•	
‘For many women like you their job is underpaid; often they end up in pros-•	
titution.’
The warnings and advice on the flyer come from the assumption that women 
are subject to exploitation because of the possibility that they will work in prostitu-
tion, because they lack information about realities in Europe and because of their 
relationships with migration brokers. Doubtful about these three sources of vul-
nerability, I have studied attitudes towards sexuality, courtship and marriage, flows 
of information, as well as migration brokers.
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My study of the sexual economy of mobility and of migration brokers in Cam-
eroon sheds new light onto potentially exploitative migration trajectories of wom-
en. My main conclusions on this point are that the human trafficking paradigm is, 
in parts, based on a European-centric understanding of socio-economic sexual ex-
changes and that the gender and sexuality of women can also constitute an element 
of empowerment within migration trajectories. Our enquiry has also taught us 
that sexual vulnerabilities of aspiring migrant women, vis-à-vis migration brokers, 
stand in a continuity with courtship practices in countries of departure and that it 
is, by far, not always migration that creates these vulnerabilities in the first place.
Prostitution and sexuality
As a consequence of my interest in sex trafficking, I started exploring the emigration 
trajectories of, at first, only women.  Upon embarking for research in Cameroon, I 
expected to find gender-specific access-paths to emigration. While interactions be-
tween aspiring migrants and migration brokers function in gender-specific ways, 
all migration brokers, with whom I conducted research, offered access to emigra-
tion for both men and women. During the entire fieldwork period, I only twice 
heard through hearsay about brokers who occasionally only sent out women.
In relation to female migration trajectories, I was also expecting the issues of 
prostitution to be more prominent. Yet, the topic of prostitution barely emerged. 
Aspiring migrant women engaged with migration brokers and potential husbands 
abroad in continuity to courtship practices (Tabet 2004) and gendered power dy-
namics with ‘big men’ in Cameroon. The case studies of Manuella, Pamella, Del-
phine, Josephine and Nuretta have shown how, for women in Cameroon, sexuality 
is well entrenched in everyday life as an instrument of advancement. Pamella, for 
example, has a law degree, yet, has to survive on sugar daddies. She and other 
young women have told me repeatedly about requests for sex when hunting for 
jobs and speaking with potential employers.
Contrary to the discourse of trafficking, which by definition presupposes vic-
timhood, the women at the core of the preceding chapters all actively sought out 
migration. The only exception may perhaps be Pamella. The emigration attempt 
that I analysed in the second chapter was the outcome of heavy pressures by her 
parents. Her prior attempts at emigration, however, were initiated on her own ac-
count. And while writing the dissertation, I heard news that Pamella had - through 
the help of a boyfriend - managed to arrange for a study project in Sierra Leone. 
Although I do not know about the details of how Pamella was able to leave for an 
MA programme in another West African country, I find the fact that a boyfriend 
of hers was involved significant. Courtship and marriage open up a wide array of 
possibilities for mobility to women. 
So-called sexual exploitation can also best be discussed in relation to the sex-
ual economy in societies of departure. Manuella, for example, had been married 
in her mid-teens by force to a peasant in her village of birth. Through this horizon 
of expectation, her quest for papers in Switzerland – partly through sex – takes on 
a different meaning. Manuella looked at sex for papers not as an act of prostitu-
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tion, but as a quest for a greater degree of control over the outcome of her life and 
migration trajectory. 
De Haas has pointed out that advancement in migration theory is only pos-
sible if we conceptualise migration as an intrinsic part of broader process of social 
change (de Haas 2010a: 3). In this dissertation, I studied migrant vulnerabilities in 
relation to the overall life stories of aspiring migrants. 
Marriage and courtship
Debates on trafficking often also include issues of Internet-mediated marriage 
migration (Wijer & Lap Chew 1999; Chia-Wen Lu 2005; Constable 2005: 63- 90). 
My research has indeed revealed marriage as one of the few female-specific means 
of emigration. 
For men in Cameroon, marriage to Cameroonian women in bush does not 
constitute a means of emigration because they are expected to pay bridewealth. 
The geographical position of men in Cameroon does, in most cases, not enable 
them to pay bridewealth and the additional travel costs to bush. Hence, it is mostly 
Cameroonian men in bush that bring over Cameroonian women for marriage. 
For Cameroonian women, marriage and courtship hence provide an opportunity 
structure for social and geographical mobility.
Internet-mediated marriage migration is often discussed within the trafficking 
literature in terms of elements of abuse and lacking agency (Glodava & Onizuka 
1994). In Cameroon, however, women who are able to travel out of Cameroon 
through marriage are mostly - although not exclusively - admired for their new 
gain in social status (Nyamnjoh & Page 2002). While Internet-mediated marriage 
migration is furthermore portrayed in the media as occurring between white men 
and Cameroonian women, I encountered during fieldwork many cases of Internet-
mediated marriages between Cameroonian spouses. These marital unions across 
borders did not only occur between spouses who both came from Cameroon, but, 
as witnessed in the chapters on marriage and deportation, even from the same vil-
lage of origin.4 
At the French consulate, I witnessed how discussions of marriage migration 
were driven by suspicions of Cameroonian women who were said to be involved 
in fraud and accused of cold-heartedly pursuing migration at all cost.5 Internet-
mediated marriage migration and marriages with bushfallers or foreigners abroad 
are, in many ways, in accordance with marriage practices in Cameroon. The ongo-
ing crisis makes it difficult for men in Cameroon to become serious marriage part-
4  In both Nuretta’s and Manuella’s cases, village connections were instrumental in enabling them to attempt another 
departure. Yet, the cases are less reported, probably because they would seem less spectacular for a European audi-
ence.
5  Within the discourse on mail order marriages, it is the Asian bride that is said to be the commodified victim of the 
marital union. Within the discourse on Franco-Cameroonian marriages, by contrast, the French husbands are said to be 
at risk of being used for the purposes of Cameroonian women. It would be important to conduct further research on why 
commodification processes are said to function in such different ways within marriage migration in different geographical 
contexts.
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ners. For women, marriage with Cameroonians abroad and foreigners, in general, 
constitutes a way of achieving conventional expectations attached to married life 
(Johnson-Hanks 2007). 
I found during my fieldwork that sexuality, courtship and marriage were con-
sidered assets more often than as sources of vulnerability.6 Nonetheless, women 
can be faced with acute vulnerabilities with respect to courtship and marriage 
practices. Return programmes in the form of ‘rescue’ programmes for trafficking 
‘victims’ or actual deportation programmes would do well to consider the sexual 
economies that returned migrant women face upon return. 
Migration brokers and migrant vulnerabilities
On my very first day at the office of the migration broker Mr. Walter, a woman 
who went there to get information was sceptical about talking to me. Later on, 
she told me that she had suspected me of being a migration broker myself. ‘There 
are women who come here to collect girls. They sponsor everything.’ She had sus-
pected or at least wondered whether I was that kind of woman. She was willing 
to invest a lot to be able to fall bush, yet, she was still careful in evaluating which 
migration broker to trust. 
The official view, like the trafficking discourse, connects migration brokerage 
with the vulnerability of potential migrants. According to these sets of assump-
tions, it is dangerous to migrate with brokers because they generate profits. Yet, 
within the moral economy of departure, it is not brokerage itself that creates vul-
nerabilities. Migration brokers have become central actors because many Cam-
eroonians experience their existance as being closed off from the world. As a con-
sequence, to travel and to migrate implies overcoming closure – which in turn is 
only possible through connections or migration brokers. Aspiring migrants see 
migration brokers as enabling people.7 Without their patronage, access to bush is 
in most cases not possible. 
While trust in migration brokers is strong, it is not unlimited. To understand 
the limits of trust, one needs to first understand the sources of credibility of migra-
tion brokers. Trusting the genuine intentions of migration brokers often depends 
on speed. Migration brokers that take a long time, have a greater potential to dupe 
their clients. Migration brokers are furthermore trusted because of their connec-
tions to the outside world. The transformative potential of migration brokers and 
their symbolic importance of being connected to the international level help to 
explain why families are willing to transfer large sums of money into the hands of 
migration brokers. 
Within the moral economy of departure, the intentions of migration brokers 
are the most important evaluation criteria for their credibility. A migration broker 
6  For an analysis of sexual services as a tool of empowerment and point of negotiation for women even within marital 
unions, see an example described by Brain (1972: 139).
7  Family members abroad were also crucial facilitators of emigration, but often cannot bring over aspiring migrants 
without the help of migration brokers .
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can fail with a travel project and still be credible. First, even if migration brokers 
fail to deliver on their promises, they fail where most others would also have failed, 
too. Second, we have, indeed, seen in the first and second chapter that the promises 
of migration brokers to (in the words of Mr. James) ‘make globalization a reality’ 
have a worth and value even beyond their actual fulfilment. A broker with enough 
credits, that is past achievements, can afford temporary failure because they are 
believed to be powerful due to their connections to state actors or international fig-
ures. Any connection to bush has worth and value. This is why giving money to a 
migration broker makes sense even if there is the possibility of being duped or the 
‘programme’ of the broker failing. At minimum, the transferred money constitutes 
an investment into a patronage relationship and establishes a connection. 
In my analysis, I made it clear that migration brokers are expected to deliver 
the means, but not necessarily the ends of migration. This is not dissimilar from 
consulate offices that charge visa fees and request multiple forms of documentation 
and certificates regardless of whether or not a visa is in the end delivered. In chap-
ter three, I also demonstrated how visa fees are sources of revenue for consulate of-
ficers. While state authorities construct the work of migration brokers in terms of 
commerce, embassies also collect money. Hence, aspiring migrants do not always 
make boundaries between state and non-state mediation processes and, at times, 
talk about ‘buying visas’.
While travelling via migration brokers is said to be dangerous because of their 
high failure rates, positive outcome of visa applications with embassies are far 
from certain either. Many aspiring migrants who approach migration brokers had 
prior to this failed with their visa application at embassies. It was striking in my 
research how potential migrants felt acutely vulnerable in their relationship with 
consulate officers. Informants told me about the money they had lost in applying 
for visas with embassies as much as they told me about migration brokers who 
had duped them. 
Many of my informants experienced visa application processes in terms of 
luck. In doing so, they foregrounded the volatile nature of the interpretation and 
application of legal frameworks. The analysis of consulate offices has revealed 
how decision-making processes on visa applications are contingent and medi-
ated through technologies, such as paper, interviews and literal technologies. Our 
enquiry has also taught us how remote regulatory requirements at embassies are 
from the realities lived by aspiring migrants. Mediation is hence both an integral 
part of how consulate offices operate, as well as needed by aspiring migrants - re-
gardless of whether their migration trajectories are likely to be classified by state 
officials as ‘illegal’ or ‘legal’. 
Locally grounded terminology  - as for example the one of feymen, dokimen 
and big men – sheds new light onto migration trajectories that in countries of ar-
rival might otherwise be framed as smuggling or trafficking. Migration brokers 
who lack the intention to actually send people out are called feymen. Migration 
brokers who only imitate travel documents are called dokimen. Migration brokers 
who are able to send out their clients because of their connections are considered 
big men. The latter are the type of migration broker aspiring migrants hopes to 
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encounter. The danger of giving money to migration brokers consists in mistaking 
a feyman or a dokiman for a big man.
While anti-trafficking campaigns might warn women against giving away their 
passports, migration brokers were often actually the ones to have produced and 
given these passports to aspiring migrants in the first place. In this study it has also 
been shown how migration brokers, at times, know as little about working condi-
tions in countries of arrival as their clients know. I will, in the below discussion of 
the moral economy of departure, further explore the circulation and evaluation of 
the stories and promises of bush.
Fr o m  b u s h f a l l i n g  a t  a l l  c o s t  t o  t h e 
m o r a l  e c o n o m y  o f  d e p a r t u r e
To be able to explain what makes young Cameroonians want to migrate at all cost, 
I studied the ‘moral economy of departure.’ With this notion, I refer to the produc-
tion and circulation of values, emotions and norms as they are evoked by the event 
of departure (Fassin 2009: 1257). Only an intimate understanding of how the costs 
of migration are understood and experienced in Cameroon can help us uncover 
the rationality that leads people in Cameroon to choose for bush at all cost. I will 
focus in particular on evaluations of costs and gains, flows and interpretations of 
information, as well as on the place of the law within conditions of departure. 
The costs and gains of migration
To explain people’s willingness to make high investments and sacrifices for the 
sake of being able to fall bush, it is crucial to take seriously the values and norms 
of a society of departure. In my examination of how the costs and gains of bush 
are experienced by (aspiring) migrants and their families, I suggest that bush as an 
asset has generated new value scales.
First, the costs of migration have to be seen from the perspective of people in 
places of departure. While some of the stories of my informants are appalling, in a 
Cameroonian perspective, emigration figures largely in terms of success stories. To 
Delphine, for example, the interviews of undocumented migrant women in Europe 
she transcribed did not elicit discouragement about the potential of bushfalling. 
Clearly, she had different interpretations of what constituted a migration failure. 
When I expressed my concerns about the dangers incurred by undocumented 
informants and their struggles without papers, Delphine would instead admire 
them for being abroad and for being able to send 30 or 50 Euros every few months, 
or an occasional 300 or 400 Euros in the case of a funeral. The marker of illegality 
did not for her mean that she would evaluate a trajectory as a failure. Regardless 
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of whether or not a bushfaller has a work permit or a residence permit, his or her 
migration trajectory can elevate the social status of a family back in Cameroon. 
Leaving for bush at all cost is considered an access route to success in a context 
in which everyday life has come to be defined by a routinised state of crisis (Roit-
man & Mbembe 1995). While not everyone is certain to succeed in leaving the 
country and making it, the difficulties of the everyday in Cameroon are certain. 
Given that immobility constitutes the baseline uncertainty of every day life, migra-
tion, despite its uncertainties, is seen as an opportunity. If migration involves sac-
rifices and investments, then those sacrifices and investments need to be compared 
to the chances for success and failure available in the context in which aspiring 
migrants make their choices. 
Many bushfallers have to delay their return or visit to Cameroon because they 
have not been able to generate enough money to be able to live up to the financial 
expectations by their families in Cameroon. While an individual migrant has to 
make sacrifices in trying to live up to the demands of bush, these sacrifices are legiti-
mate and desirable from the perspective that it aids to the well-being of the family.
Second, the gains of bushfalling have to be viewed within the context of the 
dynamics in the place of departure. Access to bush by even just one family member 
can signify a source of protection from other risks and costs of life. I have demon-
strated in chapter two how financial investments into bushfalling are considered 
in terms of ‘surviving the others’. Pamella’s parents justified the investment of an 
entire pension scheme into the bushfalling project of one family member because 
they considered that bushfalling – like no other investment project - held the po-
tential to generate future gains that could ensure the education and future projects 
of other family members. Bushfalling has become an attempt for Cameroonians to 
access greater social security. 
Bushfalling at all cost is also considered profitable because of the assets that 
access to bush can generate. People like to go to bush at all cost because bush 
has come to define success itself. Bushfallers can generate further connections and 
openings that can enable others to migrate, as well. Bush is not only an important 
source of money supply, but also a source of value beyond actual presence in bush. 
In the chapter on deportation, we witnessed how Manuella was able to draw on her 
connections for social status despite her deportation. 
Bush has become a standard against which the value of things is evaluated. 
Goods from abroad (even second hand) as well as money from abroad have a dif-
ferent value because they have been sent from abroad. Bush money, for example, 
is spent differently to money that has been earned in the country. Its value is not 
measured against the time or effort it would take to generate this money in Cam-
eroon. When Delphine received money from a former boyfriend of hers in bush, 
for example, she shared some of the money with me and we went on a festive out-
ing for clothes shopping. Under other circumstances, Delphine would not have 
had the social status or financial power to grant me such a gift. 
It was striking how bush, as an asset, also transforms family configurations 
(Piot 2010). As I have analysed in the chapter on marriage migration, bridewealth 
payments can be replaced by the respective husband’s presence in bush. I also ana-
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lysed how Delphine, upon arrival in bush, was clear about accepting to marry a 
Cameroonian man in bush only if he would agree to bring over a member of her 
family. Delphine was thinking about her social and geographical location as an 
asset. If she was already in bush and her potential husband no longer needed to 
bring her to bush, then her family network needed to gain in another way. Instead 
of bringing over herself, Delphine wanted her potential husband to pay for the 
journey of one of her family members. Family and marriage obligations are trans-
formed through the value system of bush. Bush figures strongly in matrimonial 
strategies. Instead of paying bridewealth, Delphine’s future husband would have to 
engage with a migration broker to bring a younger sibling of hers to bush.
The value of international telephone numbers and international phone calls 
taught me how bushfallers are implicit in the production of bush as a highly valu-
able because scarce asset. For many young Cameroonians, it is a source of pride 
and status to have a bush number on their telephone. To protect themselves from 
unwanted social pressures, bushfallers, by contrast, often chose to control access 
to their international telephone numbers. The control of bushfallers over their tel-
ephone numbers contributs to the value of international telephone numbers as 
signs of social status and sources of social security. International phone numbers 
are traded and protected as scarce goods to which access has to be regulated. The 
sense of bush as a source of assets is hence in part maintained by the regulation of 
bushfallers themselves.
The value system that has been generated by people’s conceptions of access to 
bush is one of the key factors that makes young Cameroonians want fall bush at all 
cost. Two other explanatory factors have emerged in the above discussion. First, 
the potential costs of bushfalling are lower if the meaning of a failed investment is 
contextualised within the routinised state of crisis in Cameroon today. Second, the 
uncertainty of investments into bushfalling are also lower if measured against the 
potential gains of bushfalling as experienced and understood by family members 
in Cameroon.
From uninformed choices to the economy of migratory knowledge
We saw in the introduction of this study how the research on bushfalling did not 
discourage Delphine to fall bush herself. I found it remarkable that during field-
work, Delphine did not investigate the scholarship institutions and programmes 
that I had passed on. She was not the only one to handle information I offered in 
unexpected ways. The secretariat at the INACOD office continued to believe that the 
poster with the skyscrapers behind her desk was Paris. Mr. James and Mr. Walter 
also valued me more for the contacts and added prestige that I generated than for 
the information that I could have provided. 
My research showed that Delphine and other acquaintances did not take seri-
ously the authority of the information that I could pass onto them about procedures 
of immigration and realities in countries of destination. Flows of information and 
its interpretations are crucial in explaining people’s resilience in continuing to be-
lieve and pursue success in bush at all cost. With the economy of migration knowl-
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edge, I refer to cultural and societal factors that structure the flow of information 
and influence the construction of meaning. They chose not to take heed to infor-
mation I offered because their location and experience had taught them to think 
of access paths and hurdles to emigration in terms that rendered my information 
largely irrelevant.
Within the many months of fieldwork, information on legal frameworks or 
procedures was hardly ever a point of discussion. Instead, access to bush was 
figured in terms of openings, lines and connections. If access to bush is realized 
through connections, information on immigration procedures has no value for 
potential bushfallers. For my informants, speed, power and connections were im-
portant in seeking access to bush. The information I might have been able to pro-
vide was neither trustworthy nor pertinent also because many aspiring migrants 
stand a small chance of being granted a visa at an embassy.
When Delphine became a bushfaller – that is, when she was in Sweden - I 
was struck by how her attitudes towards bush at all cost were changing. Over the 
phone, she talked to her friends for the first time about the difficulties of living and 
working ‘illegally’ in Europe. Delphine knew, however, that she had only a small 
chance of being taken seriously. Her new position in bush meant that she was no 
longer a trustworthy source of information on bush. Successful bushfallers might 
want to prevent the success of others and thus spread information that is not to be 
trusted. Those Cameroonians still hoping to travel out of Cameroon consider the 
complaints and stories from bushfallers about the difficult realities in bush as mere 
signs of wickedness. 
Jealousy, fear of witchcraft and the consequent imperative for secrecy can help 
to explain high degrees of optimism among young Cameroonians of certain classes 
about the potential of bush. Aspiring migrants have to fear the jealousy of people 
in Cameroon who might want to prevent their travel projects. Jealous acquaint-
ances can engage in witchcraft to prevent the success of others. Failure of travel 
projects is often explained through and blamed on witchcraft. 
Fears of jealousy, witchcraft and failure mean that aspiring bushfallers must 
keep their travel projects secret when trying to leave the country. In the introduc-
tion, I analysed how selective the circle of people can be that is allowed to know 
about a departure project. It is secrecy that protects aspiring migrants from the 
jealousy of others and thus from witchcraft. Within the moral economy of depar-
ture in Cameroon, it is not information, but secrecy that renders migration safe.
Through this imperative for secrecy, information about access routes and pos-
sible hurdles circulate only in very restricted ways. Even when information circu-
lates, it is not always trusted or considered to be relevant. People who return after a 
temporary stay abroad often find that others do not believe their migration stories. 
The more privileged social classes of Cameroonians are not credible when they 
return from a visit because they have the opportunity to be granted another visa in 
the future. They have no reason to overstay a visa. Less privileged Cameroonians 
who voluntarily return before the expiry date of their visa are suspected of not be-
ing serious or judged for being foolish, egoistic and irresponsible. They are not sure 
to be granted a visa again in the future.
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Many Europeans think that West Africans want to migrate because they lack 
information and idealise life in Europe. We have seen in the preceding chapter that 
migration choices and emigration strategies are developed under circumstances 
more complex than having or not having information. In Cameroon, the desire to 
fall bush at all cost is largely considered to be a sign of ambition and determina-
tion to be successful in life. One should ask, not what people know or do not know 
before departure, but how they come to trust and interpret information that they 
do have. 
In the light of the above insights, the deployment of ever-greater financial re-
sources into prevention and sensibilisation campaigns that try to convince aspiring 
migrants to stay at home is bound to fail. If information campaigns do not offer 
real avenues for migration, the information provided is most likely to be taken as 
either untrustworthy (because aimed at preventing the success of others) or irrel-
evant (because it refers to access paths to bush unavailable to many).
Migration failures and the place of the law
Delphine’s changing discourse on bush at all cost demonstrates another important 
point. Why did she only begin to think about legal frameworks as hurdles to suc-
cessful bushfalling once she had herself spent some time in bush? 
People’s firm beliefs in bush at all cost can be better explained against the back-
drop of how the causes of failure are understood in Cameroon. Legal beliefs carried 
by migration policy position illegality as a key aspect of the failure of migration 
trajectories. Yet, during fieldwork I have encountered very different explanations 
for migration failure. 
Within the moral economy of departure in Cameroon, failure can be caused 
by laziness or selfishness. If bushfallers in Europe do not remain in close contact 
with their family members in Cameroon after arrival in Europe, families experi-
ence this rupture and (often financial) disappointment in terms of ‘being forgot-
ten’. It is lazy or otherwise immoral bushfallers who forget their family members 
in Cameroon. Through this terminology, the migration failure is blamed on the 
migrant. He or she is too lazy to work or too selfish to maintain family connec-
tions. The possible undocumented status of some bushfallers is only one among 
other obstacles to success.
Local perceptions of migration in Cameroon can unravel beliefs about the 
functioning of the law. For policy makers, undocumented migrant’s failures are 
caused by illegality. Whether or not undocumented migrants work hard, or how 
they choose to use the money are only secondary considerations. Yet, selfishness 
and laziness have real explanatory power for family members in Cameroon. They 
know that many bushfallers without papers were able to have success in the end. 
Manuella’s travel companion (see chapter on deportation), for example, was able 
to earn enough money to arrange for a paper wedding with a Nigerian man with 
documents and now has her own residence permit in Switzerland. She made it 
and this proves to family members in Cameroon that illegality is not a reason 
for failure.  
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From the above considerations, we can conclude that legal frameworks on mi-
gration control are not as omni-present and all-pervasive as the spectacle of border 
control tries to make the European public opinion believe.8 The individual disposi-
tions of a migrant, as well as other entirely contingent factors within a migration 
trajectory, can be as important or more important than the structural precondition 
of illegality. In the chapter on deportation I concluded, for example, by pointing 
out how illegality is an underlying precondition, but not an automatic cause of 
deportation. Whether or not the condition of illegality leads to deportation hinges 
on contingent factors, for instance, the gendered nature of the work place. This is 
reflected by my research finding that deportation is talked about in Cameroon in 
terms of bad luck, bad behaviour and laziness. Within the moral economy of de-
portation in Cameroon, these three factors - but not illegality - cause deportation. 
As a consequence, high deportation rates do nothing to lower people’s enthusiasm 
about the possibilities of migration. Success in migration is a question of working 
hard and trying one’s luck. 
My research findings have led me to reconsider both the beliefs that feed into 
and come out of migration policy, but also the very questions that are asked. The 
idea that deportation could or should discourage further migration decisions is 
based on the belief that illegality automatically causes deportation. Following Law 
and Society scholars, I refer to a set of beliefs about the functioning of the law as 
a type of legal consciousness. Legal consciousness studies have tended to examine 
more the consciousness of people exposed to the workings of the law, than those 
who are said to be its professionals. Yet, as I have demonstrated above, through an 
empirical study of the place of the law and its experience, underlying sets of beliefs 
that policy makers hold about the law can be made explicit, too. 
Much can be gained by analysing the belief systems of both policy makers 
and migrants. The challenge of such an endeavour is two-fold. First, there is the 
challenge of how to relate the legal consciousness of policy makers with the legal 
consciousness of migrants. It would be too easy to take the legal consciousness of 
policy makers as rational and legitimate and the legal consciousness of migrants as 
irrational and illegitimate. This is why I have analysed how the legitimacy, rational-
ity and moral superiority of state authority is constructed through accusations of 
fraud, selfishness, commerce and criminality.
Second, there is the challenge of not essentialising difference or creating un-
warranted dichotomies. In my study, I noted how from the perspective of depar-
ture, the failure of migration trajectories with or without migration brokers looked 
very alike. I was struck during my fieldwork period how legal frameworks did not 
figure in the explanations of whether or not brokers were able to send people out 
of the country or not.  
8  Illegality is a qualification that at points of departure has not necessarily yet been determined. While demarcations 
of migration trajectories as illegal get enacted by state officials during the course of a migration trajectory, people in 
Europe nevertheless always asked me whether I was working with legal or illegal migration brokers. To think in terms 
of whether or not residence permits are likely or not in the future to get demarcated by state officials as legal or illegal 
and to then qualify these documents essentially in these same terms is in my view to think and see like the state (Scott 
1998).
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Another research finding was that aspiring migrants evaluated travel permits 
given by their brokers not in terms of their potential future classification as legal or 
illegal, but according to their efficiency. From the perspective of departure, what 
mattered was the capacity and power of papers to make people travel.  This study 
has further also illustrated how Delphine – because she was able to travel – shifted 
her position on migration failure and the place of the law after her arrival in Swe-
den. As soon as Delphine’s geographical position changed, her reading of access 
paths and hurdles to migration changed, too.
I hence conclude that the above evaluations of the quality of paper in terms 
of efficiency ought not to be constructed as a Cameroonian legal consciousness. 
The above-described set of assumptions and beliefs by aspiring migrants about the 
place of the law is not one that is specific to Cameroonians, but one that is specific 
to the context of departure. Beliefs about luck, laziness, selfishness and bad be-
haviour correspond to the experience of imposed immobility at the geographical 
and temporal position of departure. It is above all mobility that brought Delphine 
closer to the beliefs of policy makers who foreground the automatic, rational and 
legitimate nature of law. 
T h e  g o v e r n a n c e  o f  m i g r a t i o n  a n d  t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  r i s k s
Policy debates on human trafficking often seek to establish typologies of potential 
‘trafficking victims’ and ‘traffickers’. Attention is directed to the socio-psycholog-
ical factors that render an aspiring migrant potentially ‘victim’ to exploitative la-
bour migration. Through this focus on types of people who can become ‘victims’ 
and types of people that could become ‘traffickers’, the legal and economic context 
in which aspiring migrants relate to migration brokers in their quest for mobility 
gets obscured. 
This project has instead asked why there is a demand for migration brokers 
and how aspiring migrants relate to migration brokers, as well as to other regula-
tory authorities. I studied emigration desires and decisions in relation to actors 
(such as migration brokers, consulate officers and family members) and in relation 
to less intentional and more structural constraints and difficulties (such as legal 
frameworks, moralities and debts). It is insufficient to merely look at the individual 
level. The phenomenon of bushfalling and trafficking do not exist merely because 
individuals and their members of family chose to migrate at all cost. It is important 
to also study the production and distribution of costs.
Economic, political and legal constraints impose choices on aspiring migrants 
and thus produce the costs of migration. Labour migration occurs – as this study 
has demonstrated — within the interstices of expectations, pressures and regu-
lations of the states, families and market forces. Receiving states, sending states, 
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family networks (often transnational ones) and individual migrants can have very 
different expectations of migrants. All three will evaluate in different ways what 
constitutes an acceptable risk and a legitimate care need.9 
Delphine did not just want to migrate at all cost because she was ill informed 
– let alone simply desperate. Ultimately, she wanted to fall bush at all cost because 
she saw travelling as an avenue for social mobility and a means to take care of her-
self and her family. The original question as to what makes young Cameroonians 
want to migrate at all cost might be re-formulated on the basis of my research. A 
new question may ask why social risks and care needs are distributed at a global 
level in ways that provide incentives for exploitative labour migration.10
The dynamics that make people migrate at all cost can only be structurally 
changed if, through the governance of migration and development, we seek more 
equitable distributions of social risks between individuals, families and states. Sim-
ilarly it remains vital to stir public debate about what people in countries of arrival 
do not know about, as well as about how they wish to interpret the realities of aspir-
ing migrants in countries of departure. This book is an attempt in that direction.
By researching what makes young Cameroonian migrate at all cost, my study 
has unravelled how migration law and policy is based on normative assumptions 
about money, paper and marriage. By studying rather than presupposing the place 
of the law in conditions of departure, I suggest we will be able to come to under-
stand why migration is connected with high costs for some and not for others. 
In writing this book, I have tried to show how close attention to the moral 
economy of departure and the plurality of regulatory authorities that direct poten-
tial migrants can surpass simplistic analysis of migration in terms of legal versus 
illegal, as some sort of fixed opposition. With a greater awareness of the plurality 
of controls and the conflicting norms involved, a study of the governance of mi-
gration becomes possible that is attentive to the state as a regulatory authority, but 
does not take for granted its supposed moral and spatial superiority.
9  While migration is in Europe predominantly framed in terms of risks, for example, it was more considered as a 
life-changing opportunity and great fortune in Cameroon. With a migratory risk, I refer here to uncertain and negative 
outcomes of migration.
10  While the defence of the welfare state against fraud is these days at the core of a restrictive immigration discourse 
(Spire 2008: 52), migrants have built up safety mechanisms beyond government-sponsored insurance systems and 
reciprocal family networks. These migrant strategies to secure life trajectories and meet care needs of families in coun-
tries of origin are enabled and limited by national and global regulatory structures.
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Annexes
Graph 1: If you were to receive 2,5 million cfa what would you do with the money?
Source: quantitative survey conducted in May 2008 amongst 100 respondents in different neigh-
bourhoods in Buea, South West Cameroon .
Graph 2: Wanting to and trying to fall bush
Respondents without bushfalling motivation 20%
Respondents with bushfalling motivation who have not attempted to travel 51%
Respondents with bushfalling motivation who have attempted to travel 29%
Aspiring migrants who have unsuccesfully tried to fall bush 83%
Aspiring migrants who have been able to attain a visa 17%
Source: quantitative survey conducted in May 2008 amongst 100 respondents in different 
neighbourhoods in Buea, South West Cameroon
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Table 1: Trying to fall bush
Respondents who did not hold a passport: 66%
Respondents who held a passport:
Amongst passport holders, 11 respondents had not applied for a visa with an embassy
Amongst passport holder, 18 respondents had unsuccessfully applied for a visa with an 
embassy
Amongst passport holders, 5 respondents had been granted a visa
34%
Total 100%
Source: quantitative survey conducted in May 2008 amongst 100 respondents in 
different neighbourhoods in Buea, South West Cameroon
Annexe 1:  Methodology of quantitative Survey
My research assistant and I carried out 30 questionnaires in Miles 16, 30 question-
naires in Bonduma and 40 questionnaires in Buea Town. The random sample was 
collected on a selected road in each of these three quarters. Miles 16 is a more 
suburban settlement at the outskirts of Buea with a low level of education amongst 
its population and a high rate of farmers. Bonduma is situated between the student 
area of Molyko and the old town of Buea Town and is where I was living myself 
throughout fieldwork. In Bonduma, we carried out surveys with immediate neigh-
bours of mine, store keepers and other workers further up my road. Buea Town 
used to be the centre of Buea. We carried out the survey in both the quarter of 
Buea Town where the Bakweri live, as well as in the immigrant quarter behind the 
market.
Whenever possible, respondents filled in the questionnaires themselves. So as 
to avoid confusion, however, we often resorted to reading out and explaining the 
different questions to our respondents. So as to ensure the trust and confidence 
of respondents, the survey in Mile Sixteen was carried out by Delphine herself. In 
Buea Town, I worked together with another research assistant who had conducted 
prior surveys for an NGO in the quarter. 
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Annexe 2: Questionnaire of the quantitative survey
Profile of the respondenta) 
Geographic location:
Miles {{ 16
Bonduma{{
Buea Town{{
Gender:
Male{{
Female{{
Age range: {{
10{{ - 20
21{{ - 30
31{{ - 40
41{{ - 50
50{{  and above
Ethnic group:
Name of ethnic group (please write): …………………………………….
Please tick:
NW {{ province
SW {{ province
Other (please specify): ……………………………………………{{
Marital status: 
Married{{
Single{{
Divorced{{
Separated{{
Come-we-stay{{
Widowed{{
Number of children: ………………………………………………………
Educational level: 
primary (class {{ 1- 6)
post-primary{{
secondary (form {{ 1- 4/5, GCE and Cap)
high school (lower and upper sixth, A-level){{
university{{
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Professional activity: 
Farming{{
Business{{
civil servants{{
unemployed{{
 others (please specify):{{  ………………………………………… 
General perceptions of migration:b) 
What do you understand by ‘bushfalling’? (Please explain briefly)
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
What do you understand by ‘bush’? (Please explain briefly)
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
Motivation to fall bush:c) 
Have you been to bush? (please circle) Yes/No
If yes, where? ………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
Would you like to fall bush? (please circle) Yes/ No
If yes, where? ………………………………………………………………
Have you tried to fall bush?  (Please circle) Yes/No
Do you have a passport?   ·
Yes/No
Have you ever gone to an Embassy to get a visa?   ·
Yes/No
Have you ever gone to any place or person that helps people to fall  ·
bush? Yes/No
Have you ever paid money to any place or person without being able  ·
to go? Yes/No
Would you borrow money to travel?   ·
Yes/No
If you were to receive 2,5 million CFA what would you do with the money?
Bushfalling{{
Business{{
other{{
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Family:d) 
Do you have a brother/sister/cousin or child in bush? (Please circle) Yes/
No
If yes, please circle: Male/Female
If yes, Where? ………………………………………………………………
Has anybody in your family ever tried to fall bush? (Please circle) Yes/No
Do you have a brother/ sister/ cousin or child that has already gone  ·
to the embassy to get a visa? Yes/No
Do you have a brother/ sister/ cousin or child that has spent money  ·
on bushfalling without being able to go? Yes/No
Have you or your brother/sister/ cousin/ child/ parents ever bor- ·
rowed money to travel? Yes/ No
Do you have a brother/ sister/ cousin or child that has been to bush  ·
and who has come back? Yes/no
If yes, did he/she return voluntarily? Yes/No ·
If no, was he/she repatriated? Yes/No ·
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Annexe 3: Lexicon and abbreviations
Ajebotar Ajebotar is a Pidgin term from Nigeria that has travelled to 
Cameroon via popular soap operas on Nigerian T.V. channels 
like ‘African Magic’. The term refers to a lifestyle that only 
members of the upper-middle class in West Africa can afford.
Bush Respondents in the survey gave the below definitions of bush:
‘White man kontri’
‘All European and American countries’
‘Non-African countries’
‘Out of Cameroon, even Nigeria, because you can go there 
and things become better’
‘Even Equatorial Guinea can be considered bush because peo-
ple make money there and it is better than Cameroon.’
‘It can be anywhere, even in Africa, because there are some 
African countries that are better than Cameroon, where you 
can go and make your life.’
‘Any country better than yours’
‘Bush is the developed country’
‘Bush is any country where people go to in search of greener 
pastures or to acquire skills (knowledge)’
‘Bush means a place where people go to help and develop 
themselves and their family’
‘Bush is anywhere fruitful where success is obtained’
‘The place you go for a better future’
‘Where there might be ample of opportunity, a place of 
plenty’
‘It is a place that you can achieve something after hard work’
‘Bush is a place where you can survive’
Bushfalling In my survey, I asked respondents to explain what they meant 
with bushfalling:
 ‘It is to go abroad and hustle to send money to your family 
and also to better your life.’
‘To go to white man kontri’
‘To go work money in white man kontri’
‘To go abroad in search of greener pastures’
‘To travel overseas in search of jobs to come and better your 
family condition’
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Bushfalling  
(continued)
‘To go and fight for your future abroad’ ‘Wash clothes, 
take care of their grandchildren, work and send money 
home’‘People from mostly less developed countries travel 
to the developed countries for greener pastures’ ‘Going to a 
place out of your country where you can make quick or fast 
money’
‘Because of poverty find money there and then come back 
here’
‘People leaving their country and going anywhere where they 
will be able to help their family in one or two things’Ability to 
travel out of the country to search for money’
‘Bushfalling means going out due to hardship and no job after 
your education to help your parents, too, so that their lives 
will be better since the country of the white man has jobs and 
money’
‘‘To leave your country to another country for adventure’ 
‘It is an ideology developed by most Africans and Cameroo-
nians especially about leaving home for foreign lands’
Cam no go  ‘Com no go’ is a Pidgin term for ‘immigrants’. It refers to 
people from the North West Province that now live in the 
South West Province.
To chop moni Literally: to eat money; figuratively: to steal, waste, enjoy and/
or misuse money
Cyber massa Husbands that are found through the internet. Massa is de-
rived from ‘master’ and refers generally to men and husbands.
To dash moni To give away money as a gift to someone else (mostly from a 
person of greater status to a person of lesser status)
Dokimen People involved in the production of (travel) documents 
D. V. Every year, the U.S. gives out 50.000 immigrant visas because 
of a so-called ‘Diversity Immigrant Visa Programme’. There 
is a fixed quote of 'diversity visas’ for each country depending 
on whether this country has a low rate of immigration to the 
U.S. or not. The winners of the lottery have to fulfill minimal 
eligibility requirements with respect to their educational level 
and their work experience.
Feymen Con artists, trick businessmen
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To follow a line To follow a line means to pursue a goal and/or pass through 
somebody to achieve something beneficial, like for example 
bushfalling’. To follow a line can hence refer to:
‘following up documents to fall bush’
generally ‘struggling to fall bush’
but also ‘dating a boyfriend’
To go the lie lie way To fall bush through tricks
To go panja To go to Equatorial Guinea (where people speak Spanish) and 
then pretend to be in Spain
To hustle Respondents in the survey gave the below definitions of 
hustling:
‘Working as hard as possible’
‘Struggling abroad to make ends meet’
‘Fighting to make ends meet at all cost possible’
‘Doing so many kinds of work just to look for money. ‘
‘Doing business’ 
‘Working many kinds of jobs’
‘Working different things to achieve what you want’
Kojo Kojo is an abbreviation for ‘kojokojo’ which refers to a very 
close friend
Mamie Waka Both a woman who walks/travels a lot, as well as under cer-
tain circumstances a woman of ‘light morality’ (also used to 
allude to women in prostitution)
Mboma Literally speaking, mboma means python. Figuratively, the 
term mboma refers to rich married men that date younger 
women.
Money talks People who have money to spend are in command and able 
to do many things. 
Ngambe man Fortune teller with mystical powers, diviner
Njangi group A njangi group is a communal savings group that meets at 
regular intervals.
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Njumboss This new slang term is an assemblage of njumba (boyfriend) 
and boss (big man). Some define njumboss as ‘white old man’ 
or ‘sugar daddy’. The term njumboss can also refer itself to the 
girls themselves who aspire to a life of luxury – whatever the 
means necessary to get there. 
Nyongo Victims of this form of witchcraft have to work as zombies to 
make money.
Opening A possibility to fall bush
To see money Cameroonians often stress that they do not ‘see money’ for 
the work they do in Cameroon. To ‘see money’ means to see 
the fruits of your labour and to earn a quantity of money that 
allows certain needs to be met. 
Should in case An suplementary boyfriend for additional needs
Sugar daddy Older boyfriend who financially helps younger girlfriends
Umugwo This is a Nigerian term that refers to the time after giving 
birth where the grandmother of the new born baby stays with 
the young mother.
Thief lass run Male bushfallers that on a visit to Cameroon promise mar-
riage to women in Cameroon, but then disappear after their 
departure for bush. 
To work money Not to work the soil, but to work to earn money
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Annexe 4: Transcription of the song ‘Njumboss@yahoo.fr’ by Erico
Refrain 1: La vie au village est difficile mamie
Je vais en ville pour cherche la vie
Douala e fine sote
Je vais surfer sur le net et trouver mon blanc mamie 
Même s’il a le serpent
Na so e dey
Douala e fine sote
But na house dear
Refrain 1
Refrain 2 : Quand j’ai planté macabo, ça pas donné
J’ai même planté igname, ça pas donné
Moi je plante tomato, ça pas donné
Moi planté comme poteau à Douala et ça donne
Oh oh oh Njomboss@yahoo.fr
J’enverrai mes photos où je suis toute nue
Et même si elles sont diffusées partout 
Na me I find am - oh
Je mangerai le marigot d’autres
Et même s’il me demande de payer 
Na me I find am - oh
Refrain 2
Oh oh oh Njomboss@yahoo.fr
[Translated from the language Douala:]
The night work has paid me
Because of the life that I have chosen
If you don’t have money, don’t come near me (2X)
Don’t come near me (2X)
Stay where you are, don’t come near me
Stay there (2X)
Refrain 3:  You should look at me with that name njomboss
It is just a name
You should look at me
L’argent c’est bon
Look at me (2X)
Don’t think you can make me lose what I have found
You should see my money
Stand up and dance, dance, dance
Refrain 3
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Annexe 5: Advertisement posters of migration brokers
Bush Fal l ing Bush Fal l ing
empowering your future career
Global Tour and Career Programmes
We organise a monthy global massive tour and other career programmes to places 
and institutions around the world with more than 20 people. Spaces are always 
limited to make up the team. You could be part of the team. It may cost you just 
150.000 cfa for your visa to be handy. Departure date is a month from the day of 
registration.
For more details, contacts: XXX
What if you prefer anywhere around the world?
Travel Around the Globe
Departure: 1 month from registration date
inacod – cameroon
Good news – Good news – Good news
International Work Study Programme 2008- 09
Our Services :
Admission and Scholarships into foreign Universities•	
Foreign Jobs•	
Students Orientation and Career Councelling•	
Informaiton about opportunities•	
Travelling assistance•	
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Summary
“If you were to receive 2.5 million CFA, what would you do with the money?”1 Peo-
ple on the radio were hotly discussing the radio announcer’s jackpot question. Us-
ing the money for migration figured highly among the responses. Indeed, when my 
research assistant and I questioned 100 respondents in different neighbourhoods 
of Buea (South West Province, Cameroon), almost 40 percent of all respondents 
wanted to use the money to travel abroad. Yet, the gap between desire and capacity 
to travel abroad is vast. Of all respondents 80 percent would have liked to travel, 
but only five percent of all respondents had ever been to the West. 
In the face of ever-increasing difficulties to obtain papers and considerable 
economic costs of travelling, the desire of young Cameroonians to emigrate is un-
relenting. So much so that even after an informant was deported, my research as-
sistant, Delphine denied any possible downsides or negative side effect of leaving 
the country without papers. In the midst of diligently transcribing interviews of 
undocumented migrant women in Europe about their everyday struggle to survive 
in Europe, Delphine would jump up and proclaim: “Je veux go a tout prix!” 2 She 
confidently told me that she was going to go – at any cost and in any way. If others 
had been unlucky, she would work hard on getting it right. She was going to have 
success and travelling was the only means to do so! 
This study seeks to explain what makes young Cameroonians pursue migra-
tion at all cost. It was written both in reaction to strong motivations for migration 
in Cameroon and to the trafficking debates in Europe. The free flow of capital and 
commodities is often celebrated, while the free circulation of people is often seen 
as a problem (Malkki 2002: 352; Kearney 1986; Carling 2002: 5). My study takes 
the paradoxes between mobility and closure as its starting point. In view of young 
Cameroonians like Delphine, I studied attitudes regarding the costs of migration, 
flows of information and understandings of success and failure. 
Anglophone Cameroonians began to refer to migration through the Pidgin 
word of bushfalling only since the late 1990s, Bushfalling is the act of going out to 
the wilderness (i.e. the bush) to hunt down meat (i.e. money) and bring home the 
trophies. Emigration is currently envisaged in Anglophone Cameroon under the 
term of bushfalling. The phenomenon of bushfalling serves me here as a key entry 
1  Original:  “If man for dash you 2. 5 million, you for do weti with am?”
2  ‘Paris at all cost’ is the title of a recent Cameroonian film on the perils of emigration. The film talks about prostitution, 
money swindlers, failure and deportation. As Delphine was referring herself to this film from Francophone Cameroon, 
she mixed the title of the film ‘at all cost’ with both Pidgin and French. One needs to understand that the language situ-
ation in Cameroon is quite complex. The German colony Kamerun was divided between France and the U.K. during the 
First World War; in 1961 both parts were reunited in the Federal Republic Cameroon, but the country is still divided in 
Anglophone and Francophone areas. In the Anglophone part, people mostly speak Pidgin rather than English.
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point to study the vulnerability of migrants in a framework that is informed by by 
people’s perspectives in a place of emigration.3 
It has been the contention of this study that attitudes towards potentially risky 
migration trajectories can only be understood from the perspective of aspiring 
migrants in a place of departure. In this sense, I tried to balance the trend in much 
of the literature that writes from the perspective of values and norms in socie-
ties of arrival. Thus, this study ethnographically illuminates different spaces (i.e. 
migration broker offices, embassies, airports) and moments (i.e. monetary trans-
fers, departures, returns) of migration as they manifest themselves in Cameroon. I 
discuss relations between brokers and clients; the emergence of migration brokers 
and their relations to instances of state authority; dynamics during visa interviews 
at Embassies; diverging quests for security in the case of marriage-related migra-
tion attempts; and perceptions and experiences of deportation. By exploring the 
meaning and importance of notions such as openings, lines, connections and luck, I 
contribute insights into academic debates on migration, illegality and security.
I was confronted with the issue of migration through (both practical and aca-
demic) work on human trafficking. The paradigm of human trafficking very often 
limits migrant women to the role of victims. While films and Internet may portray 
unrealistic images of life in Europe, I argue in this book that the paradigm of traf-
ficking has equally given birth to unfounded images of why and how young wom-
en in West Africa seek emigration. The focus on abuse and forms of exploitation in 
countries of arrival often overshadows the choices, motivations and difficulties of 
aspiring migrants before they set upon their journey. The purpose of this book is 
to develop an alternative view on migration that focuses more on the choices and 
struggles of aspiring migrants when still in their country of departure. 
Rather than taking at face value legal distinctions between ‘human trafficking’ 
and ‘human smuggling’, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ migration, I follow De Genova 
(2002) and Torpey (1998) who suggest that notions like legality and illegality need 
to be problematized. To do so the historical and political construction of these 
notions need to be studied prior to analyzing how terms, such as ‘legal’ and ‘traf-
ficked’, are used to label people, activities or trajectories. In this way, the results 
of this research project speak to concerns within trafficking debates without be-
ing driven by the parameters of its legal and administrative definitions (Malkki 
1995b: 505).
Taking the governance of migration as the main focus of my work, I ethno-
graphically look at the ways in which migration is regulated by migration bro-
kers, state officials and family members. I use the notion of multiple regulatory 
authorities (Roitman 2005) as a means to challenge the limiting idea – more or less 
implicit in so many studies of migration— that the state is the main or only au-
thority involved. By encompassing market, state and family players, the theoretical 
approach of this study goes beyond the analysis of structuralist scholars that place 
migration in world systems and focus on market and economic disparities (Sassen 
3  I follow Wong’s call to analyse trafficking trajectories on the basis of the conditions under which migration projects 
are undertaken (2005: 87).
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1988; Massey et al 1993: 444). It also goes beyond network approaches that mainly 
look at migration through the agency of family, kinship and social capital (Levitt 
2007; Glick Schiller 1992; Nyberg Sorensen & Fog Olwig 2001).
When looking beyond the state’s apparent monopoly for legitimate control of 
mobility, one can recognise how state authority is implicated in the production 
of fraud. While state actors stage border controls also as a means to be seen as 
powerful, these ‘border spectacles of migration control’ (De Genova forthcoming) 
simultaneously also create the necessity for further controls. The accusations of 
fraud and selfishness by government officials construct the superiority of the state 
as an entity that acts in the general interest of all (Ferguson 2006: 92). By default, 
migration brokers and family members are constructed as instances that only rep-
resent particular interests and that are positioned ‘below’ the state. In this study, I 
investigate competing moves, but also overlaps between the regulatory ambitions 
of state, market and family. By doing so, I demonstrate how the state’s monopoly 
over the legitimate means of mobility is continuously in the making – amongst 
others through accusations of fraud and selfishness.
The focus on the different meanings and implications of paper, marriage and 
money (as effects of respectively state, family and market controls) within trajec-
tories of migrant departure, has made it possible to study various access paths 
and hurdles towards geographical mobility, as well as my informants’ experiences 
of their (migration) trajectories. Migration choices and emigration strategies do 
not depend on having or not having information, but on whether information is 
trusted and how it is interpreted. My research has demonstrated that women’s mi-
gration trajectories are not just characterised by vulnerabilities. In certain respects 
their strategies - for instance, in relation to courtship and marriage practices - are 
also enabling. While migration trajectories are clearly gendered, this thesis has 
demonstrated that it would be mistaken to assume that women are always more 
vulnerable, and that migration creates those vulnerabilities in the first place.
chapter  1
A line for 1.5 million cfa: overcoming closure through migration brokers 
In the first chapter, I focus on relations between migration brokers and clients 
and the way in which both deal with the loss of money and the involuntary return 
of aspiring migrants. I seek to explain why aspiring migrants are willing to take 
considerable risk by paying relatively large sums of money to brokers. Seeking 
to go beyond an analysis of relations between aspiring migrants and brokers in 
terms of either mere profit or patronage (Kyle & Siracusa 2005; Kyle & Koslowski 
2001; Spener 2009), this chapter shows that trust in migration brokerage needs to 
be considered on a micro-level with due attention to a wider structural context 
of departure. 
Within a symbolic economy where possibilities for migration are understood 
as lines and as openings, migration brokers are trusted according to their level 
of connections and their convincing portrayal of their own powers. Given that 
closure (i.e. the impossibility of air travel) is the point of departure for many, even 
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migration brokers who fail are not necessarily considered as enemies. To aspir-
ing migrants, they are allies and helpers in a quest for both geographic and social 
mobility. From the perspective of aspiring migrants, failed emigration trajectories 
with brokers are similar to the ones without brokers. I argue that the deeds and ac-
tions of migration brokers need to be analysed in relation to the expectations and 
norms of aspiring migrants and their family members.
chapter 2
The rise and fall of migration brokers: limits of credibility beyond the law 
In the second chapter, I discuss the development of two men who become migra-
tion brokers and the limits of their capacity and credibility. The chapter seeks to 
explain why migration brokers (like Mr. James and Mr. Walter) are credible in the 
Cameroonian context when they proclaim to fight illegal migration. I do so by 
investigating the place of the law with respect to the credibility of migration bro-
kers. Using local distinctions between dokimen, feymen and big men, the chapter 
argues for an evaluation of the scale of the power of migration brokers that goes 
beyond distinctions like ‘illegal’ and ‘legal’. 
In this chapter, I argue that migration brokers are credible authorities in Cam-
eroon because aspiring migrants evaluate migration brokerage less in relation to 
the location of paper production and more in terms of the efficiency of the travel 
documents. With respect to the travel permits that migration brokers issue and 
give to their clients, what matters most to aspiring migrants is not the ‘legality’ 
of papers but their capacity. An exploration of the terminology of dokimen, fur-
thermore, points us towards the limits of the distinction between forms of paper 
production within the supposed realms of ‘the state’ and the ‘market’. Aspiring mi-
grants do not always distinguish between state and non-state mediation, and thus 
do not perceive of migration brokers as working against the state. 
chapter 3
Luck, legality and technologies of mediation: What does it take to get a visa?
The third chapter focuses on visa application processes at the American (and to 
a lesser extent French) consulate office in Yaoundé. Taking as its starting point 
conflicting narratives of luck and legality, I explore what it takes to get a visa. The 
case studies in the chapter demonstrate the extent to which both legality and luck 
are belief systems that contribute towards framing some types of mediation as le-
gitimate - and even immediate - and other as illegitimate. By analysing decision-
making processes of consulate officers, the chapter highlights the construction of 
state authority and its supposed boundaries with market actors as ongoing proc-
esses (Mitchell 1991). 
The chapter argues that accusations against dokimen are better understood 
not as the condemnation of mediation, but as a struggle to establish the state’s mo-
nopoly over legitimate mediation. Processes of legal interpretation and application 
are necessarily mediated, and the work of facilitators and intermediaries needs to 
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be seen within a continuum. All law is mediated, but not all mediation is legal. 
Through the criminalisation of certain types of mediation, state officials draw a 
boundary between different types of mediation and thus legitimise state claim to 
the monopoly for legitimate control of mobility. The framing of certain types of 
mediation as ‘illegal’ should hence not be taken for granted, but taken as a site of 
analysis.
chapter 4
Marriage@security.fr: marriage migration and the production of fraud and 
selfishness
The aim of this chapter is to work out how forms of regulation of marriage migra-
tion by both state and family relate and connect with one another. The chapter is 
based on observations of marriage visa interviews at the French consulate office 
and on two case studies of Cameroonian women. Regulatory dynamics at both the 
French and the American consulate office are driven by fears and accusations that 
visa applicants might be committing fraud for their selfish personal purposes. By 
taking marriage migration as a theme, in the chapter I also explore multiple mean-
ings of accusations of fraud and selfishness. Through the analysis of articulations 
between state and family forms of regulation, results of this chapter contribute to 
debates on marriage migration and human security. 
The chapter has argued that the regulatory dynamics at consulate offices frame 
monetary exchanges, marital unions and family loyalties in a way that constructs 
visa applicants in general, and aspiring female spouses in particular, as supposedly 
‘fraudulent’ and selfish. While consulate officers might seek to ridicule family au-
thority, the family’s expectations are serious and important for (aspiring) migrants. 
The legitimacy of marital unions, family loyalties and monetary exchanges is cru-
cially framed by family authorities. Aspiring migrant women are thus confronted 
with contradictory (normative) demands and pressures by both state and family 
authorities. The accusations of selfishness and fraud made by both family and state 
officials constitute control mechanisms for aspiring migrant women.
chapter 5
Unlucky, but worldly: the moral economy of deportation
Deportation creates vulnerabilities for migrants – which in the case of deported 
migrant women have direct consequences for the ways in which they can and have 
to engage in courtship practices, marriage intentions and childbirth plans. In this 
final chapter, I study how deported migrant women and their family members 
understand, experience and deal with deportation. I ask why neither knowledge, 
nor the direct experience of deportation lower people’s motivation for migration. 
Through an in-depth case study of Manuella along with a few contrasting cases, 
I explain why deportation is understood in Cameroon in terms of bad luck, bad 
behaviour and laziness. In offering explanations to the above puzzles, I unravel 
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the legal consciousness that drives migration policies in countries of arrival (Sil-
bey 2005). 
Policy makers assume that higher deportation rates would discourage undoc-
umented migration because they assume that illegality is a relatively immediate 
cause of deportation. This chapter argues that deportations do not so much flow 
out of the condition of illegality, but - inversely – feed into belief systems surround-
ing the notions of legality and illegality. The question as to why aspiring migrants 
continue to fall bush in the face of the danger of deportation stems from, and even 
feeds into, a belief that attributes a quasi-automatic power to law. Through a critical 
analysis of narratives that refer to bad luck, laziness and bad behaviour, this chap-
ter locates illegality as a precondition and not a direct cause of forced return. 
Q
By investigating what makes young Cameroonian migrate at all cost, my study 
has unravelled how migration law and policy is based on normative assumptions 
about money, paper and marriage. By studying rather than presupposing the place 
of the law in conditions of departure, I suggest we will better understand why mi-
gration is connected with high costs for some and not for others. This study has 
demonstrated how close attention to the ‘moral economy of departure’ and the 
‘plurality of regulatory authorities’ can surpass the simplistic analysis of migra-
tion in terms of legal versus illegal – as some sort of fixed opposition.  With a 
greater awareness of the plurality of controls and the conflicting norms involved, 
a study of the governance of migration becomes possible that is attentive to the 
state as a regulatory authority, but does not take for granted its supposed moral 
and spatial superiority.
260
Samenvatting
‘Als je 2,5 miljoen CFA zou krijgen, wat zou je met het geld doen?’4 Op de radio 
werd verhit gediscussieerd over de hamvraag van de radiopresentator. Een veel 
gehoorde reactie was om het geld te gebruiken voor migratie. Toen mijn onder-
zoeksassistent en ik honderd respondenten ondervroegen in verschillende wijken 
van Buea (Zuid-West, Kameroen), gaf bijna 40 procent aan met het geld naar het 
buitenland te willen gaan. Er gaapt echter een brede kloof tussen droom en daad. 
Van de respondenten zou 80 procent graag hebben gereisd, maar slechts 5 procent 
was ooit daadwerkelijk in het westen geweest.
Hoewel de reis behoorlijk duur is en het steeds moeilijker wordt om aan de 
benodigde documenten te komen, blijven jonge Kameroenezen onverminderd 
hunkeren naar emigratie. Zelfs nadat een informant was gedeporteerd, bleef mijn 
onderzoeksassistent, Delphine, ontkennen dat er mogelijke keerzijdes of nega-
tieve bijeffecten verbonden waren aan pogingen het land te verlaten zonder reis-
papieren. Terwijl ze nijver interviews aan het uitschrijven was waarin vrouwen 
zonder verblijfsvergunning praatten over hun dagelijkse strijd om het hoofd in 
Europa boven water te houden, placht Delphine op te springen en uit te roepen: 
‘Je veux go a tout prix!’5 Zelfverzekerd vertelde ze me dat ze hoe dan ook en tegen 
iedere prijs zou gaan. Als anderen pech hadden gehad, zou zij hard werken om 
het wel te laten lukken. Ze moest en zou slagen en reizen was de enige manier om 
dat te bereiken!
In dit proefschrift probeer ik te verklaren waarom jonge Kameroenezen migra-
tie najagen tegen iedere prijs. Het is geschreven in reactie op zowel de enorme gemo-
tiveerdheid voor emigratie in Kameroen als op het mensenhandeldebat in Europa. 
Vrije circulatie van geld en goederen wordt vaak toegejuicht, terwijl vrije circulatie 
van mensen als problematisch wordt gezien (Malkki 2002: 352; Kearney 1986; Car-
ling 2002: 5). De paradoxen tussen mobiliteit en afsluiting dienen in dit proefschrift 
als vertrekpunt. Met betrekking tot jonge Kameroenezen zoals Delphine heb ik ge-
keken naar de attitudes tegenover de kosten die aan migratie zijn verbonden, naar 
informatiestromen en naar de opvattingen over succes en mislukking.
Pas sinds het eind van de jaren negentig wordt emigratie door Engelstalige 
Kameroenezen aangeduid met de Pidgin-term bushfalling. Bushfalling bestaat 
eruit de wildernis in te trekken (de bush) op jacht naar vlees (geld) om met jacht-
trofeeën terug naar huis te komen. Deze zegswijze gebruik ik om de kwetsbaar-
4  In het origineel: ‘If man for dash you 2.5 million, you for do weti with am?’
5  ‘Paris à tout prix’ is de titel van een recente Kameroenese film over de gevaren van emigratie. De film behandelt pros-
titutie, oplichters, mislukking en deportatie. In haar verwijzing naar deze film uit Franstalig Kameroen gebruikt Delphine 
een mengsel van Frans en Pidgin. De taalsituatie in Kameroen is behoorlijk ingewikkeld. Kameroen was een Duitse 
kolonie, die tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog werd verdeeld tussen Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië. In 1961 werden beide 
helften herenigd in de Federale Republiek Kameroen, maar het land is nog altijd opgedeeld in Engelstalige en Franstalige 
gebieden. In het Engelstalige deel wordt voornamelijk Pidgin gesproken in plaats van Engels.
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heid van migranten te bestuderen vanuit het perspectief van mensen in hun land 
van oorsprong.6
De houdingen ten opzichte van potentieel riskante migratietrajecten kun-
nen alleen worden begrepen vanuit het perspectief van migranten in spe op hun 
plaats van vertrek. Zo probeer ik tegenwicht te bieden aan de tendens in de lite-
ratuur om te schrijven vanuit het perspectief van de waarden en normen in het 
land van aankomst. In etnografische gevalsstudies belicht ik verscheidene ruimtes 
(de kantoren van migratiebemiddelaars, ambassades, luchthavens) en momenten 
(financiële transacties, het vertrek, de terugkeer) zoals die zich met betrekking 
tot migratie in Kameroen manifesteren. Ik bespreek de relaties tussen migra-
tiebemiddelaars en hun cliënten; de opkomst van migratiebemiddelaars en hun 
betrekkingen tot overheidsinstanties; de dynamiek tijdens visumaanvragen op 
consulaten; verschillende manieren om veiligheid te zoeken in het geval van aan 
huwelijk gerelateerde migratietrajecten; en percepties en ervaringen bij deporta-
tie. Mijn onderzoek naar de betekenis en het belang van begrippen als openingen, 
lijntjes, verbindingen en mazzel levert inzichten op voor academische debatten 
over migratie, illegaliteit en veiligheid.
Ik kwam in aanraking met de migratiethematiek tijdens (zowel praktisch als 
wetenschappelijk) werk met betrekking tot mensenhandel. Binnen het mensenhan-
delparadigma worden vrouwelijke migranten vaak gereduceerd tot slachtoffers. In-
derdaad worden in films en op internet vaak onrealistische beelden geschetst van 
het leven in Europa, maar ik betoog dat het mensenhandelparadigma evenzeer 
ongegronde beelden in het leven wekt, en wel over hoe en waarom jonge vrouwen 
in westelijk Afrika emigratie nastreven. De nadruk op misbruik en uitbuiting in 
het land van aankomst overschaduwt vaak de keuzes, motieven en problemen van 
migranten in spe voorafgaand aan hun vertrek. In dit boek beoog ik een alterna-
tieve zienswijze te ontwikkelen die meer aandacht schenkt aan de keuzes en wor-
stelingen van migranten in spe als zij nog in hun land van vertrek verblijven.
In navolging van De Genova (2002) en Torpey (1998) ben ik van mening dat 
juridische onderscheiden tussen ‘mensenhandel’ en ‘mensensmokkel’ of tussen 
‘formele’ en ‘informele’ migratie niet klakkeloos mogen worden geaccepteerd en 
dat begrippen als ‘legaliteit’ en ‘illegaliteit’ dienen te worden geproblematiseerd. 
Daarom moet de historische en politieke constructie van deze termen worden 
onderzocht alvorens te analyseren hoe ze worden gebruikt om een etiket te plak-
ken op mensen, activiteiten of trajecten. Door deze aanpak zijn de resultaten van 
mijn onderzoek relevant voor kwesties binnen het mensenhandeldebat zonder 
gestuurd te worden door de parameters van juridische en administratieve defini-
ties (Malkki 1995: 505).
De governance van migratie is het centrale onderwerp van mijn werk. In et-
nografische gevalsstudies bekijk ik hoe migratie wordt gereguleerd door migra-
tiebemiddelaars, overheidsfunctionarissen en familieleden. Ik gebruik het begrip 
‘meervoudige regulatieve autoriteiten’ (Roitman 2005) om vraagtekens te zetten 
6  Ik geef gehoor aan Wongs oproep om trafficking trajecten te analyseren op basis van de omstandigheden waaronder 
pogingen tot migratie worden ondernomen (2005:87).
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bij het beperkte idee – meer of minder impliciet aanwezig in veel onderzoek naar 
migratie – dat de staat in dezen de voornaamste of enige autoriteit zou zijn. Door 
de markt, de staat en de familie te betrekken, gaat mijn theoretische benadering 
verder dan structuralistische analyses die migratie bezien in het kader van wereld-
wijde systemen en zich concentreren op economische ongelijkheden (Sassen 1988; 
Massey et al 1993: 444). Ze gaat ook verder dan netwerkbenaderingen die migratie 
vooral behandelen aan de hand van familiebanden, verwantschap en sociaal kapi-
taal (Levitt 2007; Glick Schiller 1992; Nyberg Sorensen & Fog Olwig 2001).
Wie verder kijkt dan het ogenschijnlijke monopolie van de staat op de legi-
tieme controle op mobiliteit, bemerkt hoe de staat medeplichtig is aan de produc-
tie van fraude. De staat gebruikt grenscontroles deels om machtig over te komen, 
maar deze ‘spektakelstukken van migratiecontrole aan de grens’ (De Genova nog 
te verschijnen) creëren op hun beurt de noodzaak tot verdere controles. Doordat 
overheidsfunctionarissen anderen van fraude en egoïsme beschuldigen, construe-
ren zij de superioriteit van de staat als entiteit die handelt in het algemeen belang 
(Ferguson 2006: 92). De implicatie is dat migratiebemiddelaars en familieleden 
slechts particuliere belangen zouden vertegenwoordigen en ‘onder’ de staat zou-
den staan. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik hoe de regulatieve ambities van de staat, 
de markt en de familie elkaar beconcurreren en soms juist met elkaar overlappen. 
Op deze manier laat ik zien hoe het monopolie van de staat op legitieme vormen 
van mobiliteit voortdurend opnieuw wordt geconstrueerd, onder meer door an-
dere actoren te beschuldigen van fraude en egoïsme.
De aandacht voor de diverse betekenissen en implicaties van papieren, hu-
welijk en geld (de controledomeinen van respectievelijk de staat, de familie en de 
markt) binnen emigratietrajecten heeft het mogelijk gemaakt onderzoek te doen 
naar zowel de verscheidene toegangswegen naar en obstakels bij geografische mo-
biliteit, als de manier waarop mijn informanten hun migratietraject ervaren. Keu-
zes en strategieën bij emigratie zijn niet afhankelijk van het al dan niet beschikken 
over informatie, maar van de mate waarin informatie wordt vertrouwd en de ma-
nier waarop ze wordt geïnterpreteerd. Mijn onderzoek laat zien dat migratietrajec-
ten van vrouwen niet uitsluitend door kwetsbaarheden worden gekenmerkt. Hun 
strategieën, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot verloving en huwelijk, verbeteren hun 
situatie ook in sommige opzichten. Het is duidelijk dat de aard van migratietrajec-
ten deels door gender bepaald wordt, maar uit mijn onderzoek blijkt dat het een 
misverstand zou zijn om aan te nemen dat vrouwen altijd kwetsbaarder zouden 
zijn dan mannen en dat hun kwetsbaarheden door migratie in het leven zouden 
worden geroepen.
hoofdstuk 1
Een lijntje voor 1,5 miljoen cfa: afsluiting doorbreken met migratiebemiddelaars
In het eerste hoofdstuk concentreer ik mij op de relaties tussen migratiebemidde-
laars en hun cliënten en op de manier waarop beiden omspringen met het verlies 
van geld en met onvrijwillige terugkeer. Ik probeer te verklaren waarom migran-
ten in spe bereid zijn zware risico’s te nemen door relatief grote bedragen te beta-
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len aan migratiebemiddelaars. Door de relaties tussen migratiebemiddelaars en 
hun cliënten niet slechts te bezien in termen van winstbejag of patronage (Kyle & 
Siracusa 2005; Kyle & Koslowski 2001; Spener 2009) toont dit hoofdstuk dat het 
vertrouwen in migratiebemiddeling moet worden bekeken op microniveau, met 
gepaste aandacht voor de bredere structurele context in het land van vertrek.
Binnen een symbolische economie waarin migratiemogelijkheden worden 
bezien als ‘lijntjes’ en als ‘openingen’, is het vertrouwen dat migratiebemiddelaars 
weten te wekken afhankelijk van het niveau van hun contacten en van de over-
tuigingskracht waarmee ze hun eigen macht schetsen. Aangezien afsluiting (de 
onmogelijkheid om met het vliegtuig te reizen) voor velen het uitgangspunt is, 
worden zelfs migratiebemiddelaars die falen niet noodzakelijkerwijs als vijanden 
gezien. Voor migranten in spe zijn het bondgenoten en helpers in een zoektocht 
naar geografische en sociale mobiliteit. Vanuit het perspectief van migranten in 
spe zijn mislukte migratietrajecten met bemiddelaars vergelijkbaar met mislukte 
migratietrajecten zonder bemiddelaars. Ik betoog dat de handelingen van migra-
tiebemiddelaars dienen te worden geanalyseerd in relatie tot de normen en ver-
wachtingen van migranten in spe en hun familieleden.
hoofdstuk 2
Opkomst en ondergang van migratiebemiddelaars: grenzen aan de 
geloofwaardigheid buiten de wet
In het tweede hoofdstuk bespreek ik de ontwikkeling van twee mannen tot mi-
gratiebemiddelaar en de grenzen aan hun capaciteiten en geloofwaardigheid. Het 
hoofdstuk probeert inzichtelijk te maken waarom migratiebemiddelaars zoals me-
neer James en meneer Walter geloofwaardig zijn binnen de Kameroenese context 
wanneer ze beweren tegen illegale migratie te vechten. Dit doe ik door te onder-
zoeken welke plaats de wet inneemt met betrekking tot de geloofwaardigheid van 
migratiebemiddelaars. Aan de hand van het onderscheid dat in Kameroen wordt 
gemaakt tussen dokimen, feymen en big men pleit ik ervoor om de macht van 
migratiebemiddelaars te evalueren op een manier die verder gaat dan het onder-
scheid tussen ‘illegaal’ en ‘legaal’.
Migratiebemiddelaars zijn geloofwaardige autoriteiten in Kameroen, omdat 
migranten in spe hun oordeel niet zozeer baseren op de plaats waar documenten 
worden geproduceerd als wel op hun efficiëntie. Bij de reisvergunningen die mi-
gratiebemiddelaars aan hun cliënten verstrekken, gaat het de migranten in spe er 
niet om of ze legaal zijn maar of ze er in de praktijk mee kunnen reizen. De termi-
nologie die wordt gebruikt voor dokimen wijst er bovendien op dat het niet altijd 
zin heeft om onderscheid te maken tussen documentproductie in het domein van 
‘de staat’ en in dat van ‘de markt’. Migranten in spe onderscheiden niet altijd of be-
middeling door de staat geschiedt of niet, waardoor zij migratiebemiddelaars niet 
beschouwen als mensen die de staat tegenwerken.
264
hoofdstuk 3
Mazzel, legaliteit en bemiddelingstechnologieën: wat is nodig om een visum te 
krijgen?
In het derde hoofdstuk richt ik mij op visumaanvraagprocessen bij het Amerikaanse 
(en in mindere mate het Franse) consulaat in Yaoundé. Door tegenstrijdige verha-
len over mazzel en legaliteit als vertrekpunt te nemen, onderzoek ik wat er nodig 
is om een visum te krijgen. De gevalsstudies in het hoofdstuk illustreren de mate 
waarin zowel legaliteit als mazzel geloofssystemen zijn die sommige vormen van 
bemiddeling als legitiem (en zelfs onbemiddeld) doen voorkomen en andere als niet 
legitiem. Door besluitvormingsprocessen van consulaatmedewerkers te analyseren, 
belicht het hoofdstuk hoe gezag van de staat en de veronderstelde afbakening tussen 
staat en markt voortdurend in geconstructueerd worden (Mitchell 1991).
Ik betoog dat beschuldigingen jegens dokimen niet zozeer dienen te worden 
beschouwd als veroordeling van bemiddeling, maar veeleer als een poging van de 
staat om het monopolie op legitieme bemiddeling te verwerven. Het interpreteren 
en toepassen van de wet is ondenkbaar zonder bemiddeling en de werkzaamhe-
den van tussenpersonen moeten worden gezien binnen een continuüm. Iedere wet 
behoeft bemiddeling, maar niet iedere bemiddeling is wettelijk. Door bepaalde 
vormen van bemiddeling te criminaliseren trekken overheidsfunctionarissen een 
grens tussen verschillende vormen van bemiddeling. Zo legitimeren ze het mono-
polie dat de staat voor zichzelf opeist op de legitieme controle op mobiliteit. Het 
categoriseren van bepaalde bemiddelingsvormen als ‘illegaal’ dient daarom niet 
klakkeloos te worden aanvaard, maar te worden gezien als object van analyse.
hoofdstuk 4: 
Marriage@security.fr: huwelijksmigratie en de productie van fraude en egoïsme
Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om uit te werken hoe de manieren waarop de staat 
en de familie huwelijksmigratie reguleren zich tot elkaar verhouden en met elkaar 
in contact staan. Het hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op observaties bij visumaanvragen in 
het Franse consulaat en op twee gevalsstudies van Kameroenese vrouwen. Zowel 
in het Franse als in het Amerikaanse consulaat wordt de regulatieve dynamiek be-
paald door angsten en beschuldigingen dat de visumaanvragers zich uit egoïstisch 
eigenbelang zouden bezondigen aan fraude. Aan de hand van huwelijksmigratie 
onderzoek ik diverse betekenissen die beschuldigingen van fraude en egoïsme 
kunnen hebben. De analyse van de manier waarop reguleringsmechanismen van 
de staat en de familie op elkaar ingrijpen levert belangrijke inzichten op voor het 
debat over huwelijksmigratie en menselijke veiligheid.
Als gevolg van impliciete normen over financiële transacties, huwelijken en 
familieloyaliteiten construeert de regulatieve dynamiek in consulaten visumaan-
vragers in het algemeen, en vrouwen die in het huwelijk willen treden in het bij-
zonder, als frauduleus en egoïstisch. Terwijl consulaatmedewerkers het gezag van 
de familie nog wel eens belachelijk willen maken, zijn de verwachtingen van de 
familie voor migranten in spe van groot gewicht. Het oordeel van de familie is van 
doorslaggevend belang voor de legitimiteit van huwelijken, familieloyaliteiten en 
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financiële transacties. Vrouwen die willen emigreren zien zich geconfronteerd met 
tegenstrijdige normatieve eisen. Zowel de staat als de familie zet hen onder druk. 
Beschuldigingen van egoïsme en fraude door zowel staat als familie vormen  con-
trolemechanismen voor vrouwelijke migranten in spe.
hoofdstuk 5: 
Onfortuinlijk maar wereldlijk: de morele economie van de deportatie
Deportatie maakt migranten kwetsbaar, wat in het geval van gedeporteerde vrou-
wen onmiddellijke gevolgen heeft voor de manier waarop ze zich kunnen en moe-
ten opstellen bij hofmakerij, huwelijk en kinderplannen. In dit afsluitende hoofd-
stuk bestudeer ik hoe gedeporteerde vrouwen en hun familieleden de deportatie 
opvatten en ervaren en hoe ze ermee omgaan. Ik stel de vraag waarom de motivatie 
voor migratie niet te lijden heeft onder kennis van of directe ervaring met depor-
tatie. Aan de hand van een grondige gevalsstudie over Manuella (en enkele con-
trasterende gevallen) leg ik uit waarom deportatie in Kameroen wordt opgevat in 
termen van pech, slecht gedrag en luiheid. Door bovenstaande raadsels te verkla-
ren, leg ik het juridische bewustzijn bloot waardoor het migratiebeleid in landen 
van aankomst wordt gestuurd (Silbey 2005).
Beleidsmakers gaan ervanuit dat hogere deportatiecijfers migratie zonder gel-
dige documenten zouden ontmoedigen, omdat zij aannemen dat illegaliteit een 
relatief onmiddellijke oorzaak van deportatie is. In dit hoofdstuk betoog ik dat 
deportaties niet zozeer voortvloeien uit de toestand van illegaliteit als wel het con-
cept van illegaliteit als zodanig construeren. De vraag waarom migranten in spe 
vasthouden aan bushfalling ondanks het risico op deportatie, komt voort uit (en 
bekrachtigt) een geloof dat de wet een semi-automatische macht toeschrijft. Aan 
de hand van een kritische analyse van verhalen over pech, luiheid en slecht gedrag 
wordt illegaliteit in dit hoofdstuk als een voorwaarde voor gedwongen terugkeer 
geïdentificeerd, niet als een onmiddellijke oorzaak.
Q
Door te onderzoeken wat jonge Kameroenezen ertoe brengt tegen iedere prijs te 
emigreren, heeft mijn proefschrift blootgelegd hoe de wetten en het beleid met 
betrekking tot migratie gebaseerd zijn op normatieve aannames over geld, docu-
menten en huwelijk. Wanneer we de plaats van de wet in het land van vertrek niet 
vooronderstellen maar kritisch onderzoeken, zullen we mijns inziens beter begrij-
pen waarom er voor sommigen hoge kosten aan migratie verbonden zijn en voor 
anderen niet. Door aandacht te besteden aan ‘de morele economie van het vertrek’ 
en ‘de meervoudigheid van de regulatieve autoriteiten’ ga ik in dit proefschrift ver-
der dan een simplistische analyse van migratie in termen van legaal versus illegaal, 
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als ware dat een onwrikbaar onderscheid. Een groter besef van het veelvoud aan 
controlemechanismen en tegenstrijdige normen maakt het mogelijk de governan-
ce van migratie te onderzoeken op een manier die aandacht heeft voor de staat als 
regulerende autoriteit zonder de veronderstelde morele en ruimtelijke superioriteit 
van die staat klakkeloos te aanvaarden.
